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Abstract
Following political scandal and facing economic collapse, in 1933 Newfoundland
abdicated self·government in favour of an appointed Commission of Govcrnmcnt. World
War II brought an American presence and wartime activities to Newfoundland. This, lind
the colony's resourees spurred Canadian interest in the island. By war's end, the British
had detennined that Newfoundland would elect a National Convention, 10 recommend
forms of government for inclusion in a constitutional referendum. By this time, local
interest had developed in some quaners in confederation with Canada. J.R. Smallwood
was elected to the Convention and became its leading advocate of confederation, but the
Convention was dominated by advocates of a return to self· rule. In December 1946, a
Responsible Government League (RGL) was fonned by leading citizens. With ties with
the Roman Catholic Church, tlte RGL proposed tltat Newfoundland return to responsible
government before considering union with Canada. But while Smallwood and a
Convention delegation were in Ottawa in the summer of 1947 getting proposed temlS of
union, the RGL failed to campaign. In January 1948 the Convention closed after
defeating Smallwood's motion 10 include confederation wilh Canada on tlte ballot. The
public was immediately asked to send telegrams demanding that confederation be
included on the ballot, and the response was overwhelming.
But before the confederates delivered their telegrams to the governor, the British
had decided to put confederation on the ballot. RGL thunder was stolen when a pany
fonned advocating economic union with the United States (EUP). Both groups fought
confederate promises of the Canadian social welfare state. Smallwood campaigned with
an intimate knowledge of the proposed Canadian teons of union, and received Canadian
money and infonnation, but the BOP's promises of a higher standard of living, and its
bslick" campaign threatened to win. But because Commission of Govemment was
included with confederation and responsible government on the ballot paper, the first
referendum was indecisive. Commission was dropped, and a run-off vote was held.
In the seco:ld referendum campaign the confederates attempted 10 capture the
Commission vole by working in concert with the governor, Commissioners, and the
Loyal Orange Association in a sectarian appe.11 to outporl Protestant voters, Protestants
were numerically dominant but they had hitherto lacked political cohesion, a situation the
confederates had to overcome, While many factors entered into the decision of 22 July
1948. the second campaign was predominantly sectarian, personal, and not without
electoral irregularitie~, Confederation narrowly passed responsible government, and the
Government of Canada quickly accepted the decision, Despite RGL prolests, final tenns
of union were negotiated between Canada and a confederate-dominated appointed
Newfoundland delegation, Newfoundlandjoined the Canadian confederal ion on 31 March
1949, and the political dynasty of J,R. Smallwood was launched,
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Preface
The benchmark of modern Newfoundland history is its confederation with thc
Dominion of Canada. which occurred at midnight on 31 March 1949. An extcnsive
historiography exists on the subject, dominated by the triumphal accourUS of how
confederate leader Joseph R. Smallwood "got~ confederation. But thcrc has been liulc
scholarly critical examination of the political motives, activities, and methods of lIw
participants in the confederation campaigns, from their earliest involvcments. through the
second referendum on 22 July 1948, and into the early months of 1949. When
confederation was b~ing debated in the late 1940s, few Nt'.wfoundlanders misSl.-'(\ the
nightly broadcasts of the National Convention.! They were held spellbound by the
orations of Smallwood, Major Peter Cashin, and others, and they participated in the
referenda of June and July 1948 with a zeal hitherto unequalled in any poll in thc
country's history.l Yet when those who remember, or those who have re.1d aboutlhe
period, are asked how confederation was brought about, or are asked specific questions
about the campaigns between the dissolution of the Convention on 30 January aoLl the
second poll on 22 July, many answer predictably: the political climate was personal and
bitter; religion was a nebulous but important factor; and even if confederation was good
for Newfoundland, it was "done wrongM. Most will also credit Smallwood with the idea
of confederation, and its "victoryM, even if they are unsure of exactly what the victory
was, or how it was achieved.
Beginning in the Canadian centennial year of t967, a variety of accounts began
to appear dealing with Newfoundland's confederation. Smallwood's official MStory of
Confederntion" was set down that year in his Book of Newfoundlo.nd, volume 3, along
with other paeans of unbridled praise to the union, like "Happy Province", Mlet Us Draw
t For an analysis of the National Convention and its importance l;ee Jeff Webb, "Newfoundland'.
National Convention, 1946-1948" (M.A. thellil, MeltlOrial Univer!ity of Newfotlndland. 1987).
'88.36':' of the populalioll votcd in the first refercndum on 3 June, and 84.89"oflhepoput.tion
voted in the second on 22 Jul)'.
Close fo Canada~, alid "The Gospel of Confederation: Book One".J -77lt Book" - its title
replete with epic Biblical connotations - contained contriuutions by confederates and those
who had supported responsible government, but all gave the credit for confederation to
Smallwood alone: even his die-hard opponents William J. Browne and Peter J. Cashin'
dared not question the statement that Newfoundlanders ~marvel endlessly a, it, and their
heans are full of the wonder" of confederation.s In many of the accounts in ~The Book",
the reader was given a sense of the personal politics of the battles from a Newfoundland
perspective, in which Smallwood was ponrayed as a benevolent crusader for
confederation against a St. John's alliance of Church and merchantocmcy. Only one
significant anti-confed-:ra!e article was allOWed, by recently-tumed~Liberal Donald
Jamieson,6 but this carefully skated away from antagc.lizing believers of the Smallwood
account. The confederate establishment accounts were crowned in 1973 with ( Chose
Canada,? Smallwood's response to the dictum that ~History win treat me well: I will
write it. ~ Pro-responsible govemment accounts up to that time were few, and consisted
of short deferential items Iikp. newspaper articles,' and edited transcripts of panel
interviews with Smallwood's old arch-enemy, Peter Cashin, placed in proper perspective
by zealous confederate Harold Horwood, and historian Leslie Harris, who immediately
) The Book of Netifoundll:lnd, Vol. 3, ed. Josepb R. Smallwood (51. John's: Newfoundland Book
Publishen, 1961) (herurter BNF): 'HllPPY Province', pp. 1-3: "The Story of Confederation', pp. 4-34;
'Let Us Draw Close 10 Canlldll', pp. 35-1; lUld 'The Gospel of Confederation: Book One', pp. 38-62.
• Peter J. Cll9hin, 'My Fight For Responsible Governmenl", BNF, pp. 105-118; Willillm J. Browne,
"1l1e Cue for the Restoration of Responsible Government', BNF, pp. 119-130.
'Smallwood, 'HllPPY Province', BNF. p. I.
• Donll1d JllITIieson, 'I Saw the Fighl for ConfederatiOn', BNF. pp. 70-104.
7 Jeneph R. Smallwood. 1 Chost! CDnDda (foronIO: MlICmillllD llDd CompllnY Limited, 1913).
• For example see Wickford 1- Collins, "Respo...J5ible Govemmeot league outclassed from the
beginning'. in Tht Ewning Telegram. 28 MllJ'Cb 1969, p. 36.
admitted that, not being a first hand observer, he "could add very liUle- 10 the dclJ<ltc.~
It was not until the records of the Canadian and the British govemll1enls for Ihis period
became available that their parts in Ihe events in Newfoundland could he cxamil1l,."(l.
In the early 1970s, before documents were released, several scholars ntade
attempts at analyzing the events of the late 1940s, but these only offered re-pril1lS of
contemporary documents,IO and incomplete analyses,l1 and hore Iillle fruit. In 1974,
Paul Bridle, a Canadian official in Newfoundland before confedemtion, edited 11
collection of relevant documents from the Public Archives of Canada in Onawa for the
Department of External Affairs. A sec':'ild volume in two parts was issued in 1984.ll
These revealed some of the workings and involvements of the Canadian govcnllllcnt in
the period, and further work by Bridle explored some hitherto obscure Canadian and
American sources. ll In 1982, wilh newly-opened British government dOCUlllt:ntS, Peter
Neary ami Philip McCann challenged the popular theory that the British conspired 10 put
Newfoundland into confedention. They analyzed British policy towards the government
• See "No:owfoundland and COllfedo:onlion 1948·1949". Regio1lo/ism in Ihe Canadion C"mmurllry 1867.
1967, ed. Mason WadI' (Toronlo; UnivenityofToronlO Pml, 1969).
10 For example lei' Petcr NC&l)', the Poliliml Erorlflmy oj Ntv.{Clllmllmul 1929-1972 IT"ronlo: Copp
Clark Publishing, 1973).
II Seo:o S.J.R. NOl'I, Pofilicsin Nl!WfOllnd/anJ(Toronto: UnivcrsilyofToronlo P~9. 1971). pp. 2.57·9.
Foran a!tempt,t a hisloryof lhis period, ....rillo:on wilhoutacecllS to privatI' papel'll or g<>vo:omllll:nt
docllmcllls, see Hugh Alo:oxalldo:or Huck. "Newfoundland's Enlry lnlo Confedo:oration With CanIll1a, 1949'
(M.A. tlto:osis, Sl. LouisUllivo:onity.1970).
11 Docllmentson Relalions Bt~en CtlNJikl and N~oundland,Vol. I. 1935-1949, ed. Paul Bridlc
(Ottawa: Do:opllrtml'nt of EXtl'rnal Affain, (974), /lIld D()cutMrlts on Rl/la/ioTlS BI/rween Canada ond
Nev.fClllndland, Vol. 2. Patu I and II, 1940-1949, I'd. P,lul Bridlo:o (OUawa: IXpllrtrnent of EXlernal Mfain,
1984). HO:Ol'l'afto:or dted IJI Bridlo:o, DOCllnunIS. with volulTll' 1.9 indicated.
II Paul Bridle, 'Canada, 100 US and No:owfoundland, 1946-48', InlernatlOfW/ Perspl/di\lt!.r. (Novo:omber·
Dcco:omber 1983): 20-3: Bridlo:o, Lo:oUo:on 10 the Editor, IntemaliQ/lQ1 Perspedi\lt!s, (Septo:ombcr.(klobo:or 1984):
31-2.
of the colony.'~ This approach was elaborated upon by David MacKenzie, who used
Canadian and American documents to explain Canadian and American connections and
interests in post-war Newfoundland. U In 1987, Jeff Webb indicated in his M.A. thesis
on the National Convention that both Neary and McCann, and Bridle and MacKenzie,
had a similar chronology and made few original contributtons to 11:..: knowled.oe of events
in Newfoundland." A year later, Neary's landmark Newfoundland in Ihe Nonh Atlantic
World tackled the history of tbe Commission of Government,17 and the confederation
campaigns. While Neary's book has already become the standard text on the period, his
perspectives on events were from Whitehall and Government House in St. John's, and
the book lacked a local non-governmental perspective of the events of the referenda
campaigns.
Despite the professional h.istoriaros' aCCOIJnts of events in Newfoundland, -Joey-
mania- Ilourished in the late 1960s and the late 19805, with volume after volume of pro-
confederate prose. In 1968, Richard Gwyn's SmaUwr.od the unljuly revolutionary
appeared as a popular biography of Smallwood, who told his life story to Gwyn_II The
'"' Peter Neary, "NewfoundLwl', Ullioa ith CaIwIa, 1949: Conspirxy Dr" 0J0ice1', Amdimris, Vol.
XII, No.1, 1983: I I().I 19; Neary, "C\emeol utee'svi~tION_fOUDdIaDdSeptember1941",/laadimsis,
Vol. xm, No.1, 1984: 101-109: Neary, "Grellt Brilain alld the FUNro of Newfoundland, 1939-194.5",
NpfotUldltmdSmdi4{bereafter NFSj, Vol. I, No. I (Spriq 1985): 29-.56: Philip McCann, "CoafedenoliOll
Revisited: New L.i&bt oa Britilb Policy", l)IJl'*ript of a !r-'.t\Ull deliveflld 10 tha NewfouadllDd Historical
Society, JUlU&l)' 19&3, Ccalro for N_fouadland Studies, ,.;ell)(lria! Ullivenity LibtW)'.
IJ Oayid M.cKenzie, Inside 1M Allantic Trimlgle: CJlladtJ and the EntrrlllCf! of Nel'ofauntlland Into
COllfedmltion, 19J9-J94P (Toronlo; Vnivenil)l of TOrD1l10 Press, 1986), IUId MacKeMe, "&onomic
Union and the 1948 Referendum CampalgDs: The View From Washio8toO", Newfoundland Quanerly
(hereaftcr NOl, Vol. ucxxm, No.4 (Wioter 1988): 24-31.
I. Webb. "CODYCnlion",pp, 2-3.
" Peter Neary, NeYo(oundlO1ld in the Nonh I.-/antic World (KilIgsl01l: McGill-Queen's UojYersity ProSl,
1988).
.. RicMrd Gwyn, Sm4l1"'OOd: lhe unlikely rrvolwlolll:lry Cl'oronlO: McClelland and Stewart Umitcd,
1968: reprinted 1972).
next year, Call Me Joey (a name by which Smallwood was IlCver known among his
friends) appeared, an edited volume of reminiscences by friends and foes. In 1985, there
appeared the uninfonnative 71le SmalbNood Era by F.W. Rowe, a cabinet colle:\gue of
Smallwood's. This was chased by an unauthorized but ceh:bratory hiography of
Smallwood, entitled Joey, written by erstwhile confederate Harold Honvood, who wrole
himself inlo history and unabashedly mixed some truths with repeated portions of rhetoric
from I Chose Canada." Horwood told many lales, but offered few new insighls into
the inler-relationships between the confederates, the Canadian High Commissioner, the
Commission of Government, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Canada.
Along with confederate accounts came several "lay" anti·confederate accounts.
In 1985, Bren Walsh's More 71um It Poor Majority attempted, without footnotes, index,
bibliography, or argued thesis statement, to convince readers that there had been -a plot
to manoeuvre Newfoundland into Confederation by fair means or foul-. to Walsh's lext
sprawled over the events of two centuries. Where he discovered government planning,
he saw conspiracy, and where he set out to correct M a major historical untruth" ,11 he
only succeeded in spreading confusion. In contrast, Donald Jamieson's posthumously
published (1989) No Place For Fools,ll the first volume of his memoirs, furnished
readers with a thorough anti-confederate account of evenls in Newfoundland during the
late 1940s. While some stories and facts were repeated from Smallwood, Jamieson added
a balance to the available accounts, and his knowledge and appraisal of the evenl.~ was
It Frederick W. Rowe, The .ima/lwood Era (foronlo: McGraw Hill Rymon Ud., 198.:5), lIIId Harold
Horwood, Joty (Toronto: Stoddart Publi!>...·,gCOmPAAy Limited, 1989).
:XI Bren Walsh, More '[1wn a Paor Majority (St. John'a: Breakwater Books, 1985). p. S.
21 Ibid., p. 3.
:z: Donald Jamieson, No Piau For Fool: - The Pol/tical Memoir: of D(IIl Jamla"", Vol. I. ed.
c.nnclita McClrath (St. John's: Breakwater Books, 1989).
important,ll even if he lacked knowledge of the relationship and cooperation between
the confederates and the various governments.
In recent years, Webb and J.K. Hiller have explored the political events in
Newfoundland in the mid and lale 1940s from the viewpoints of internal political
activities and the involvements of individuals. Webb's thesis tackled MacKenzie's
assertion that the National Convention was ineffective. He showed that, coupled with
Canadian and Brilis~ plans, the Convention played "an indispensable part" in the
campaigns. 2f Hiller's biographical work and article on F. Gordon Bradley also criticized
the useful myths established by and about Smallwood that he was the "Only Living
Father",~ while Bradley had played a "sleepy second fiddle".26 But while Hiller
illustrated Brndley's roles and thinking at a variety of crucial points in Newfoundland
political history, he provided several clues to the inside workings of the campaign for
confederation. Webb replied with an article examining the Responsible Government
League, and concluded that "the League should have been able to put forward an
excellent campaign", but didn't.T! It lost because it offered "a return to economic
uncertainty alld the St. John's dominated political system", whUe confederation won
because it was an attempt to "break the St. John's domination of the state", and because
:>To date the onlyotJ>er publi!hcddiseussionorlhe role ofreJigion in the refefCndacampalgnswu
George Perlin. "The COll!titutional Referendum or 1948 and the Reviv.1 orSe<:larillfli!m iII Newroundland
Politi,,.". Qllurt'S Qll(lnerly. Vol. 75 (Spring 1968): 155-160.
:·Webb,'Convention',p.3.
tl Jamel K. Hiller, 'Frederick Gordon Bradley, 1888·1966. A PolitiealSiography" (lIllpublished report
(or the Government of NewfoUlldrlllld I.IId Labrador. His.toric Resourt:elI Divi!jOD. 1988), 81 pp., and
Hiller, "The Career ofF. Gordon Smlley", NFS, Vol. 4, No.2 (FaJI1988): 163·180.
:. Hiller, 'Career of F. GOrdOIl Bradley', f{FS, Vol. 4, No.2 (Fall 1988): 163.
:I Jeff Webb. "The Rcspoo!ibleGovemmenc Lague and the Confederation Campaips or 1948', NFS.
Vol. S. No. 2 (Fall 1989): 216.
the outports did not share in the city's sense of nationality.2' But Webb's article treated
the League in isolation, and if the League lost it mUSI be admitted that the confcdcrntcs
won. So the question remains: how did they win?
In 1989, Hiller called fora history which in pan would examine Ihe events Oflhc
two referenda and provide a explanation of why confederntion was as widely supported
as it was, and of "how Smallwood did his 'pretty good job of engineering'" .1' lllis
thesis will challenge what Hiller called the "confederate orthodoxy",JO which at its
apotheosis held that Smallwood personally Mchose Canada" for Newfoundland. II will
also show that the union of Newfoundland with Canada was the result of a process of
constitutional detennination spanning the years 1941 to 1949. Private British and
Canadian governmental policy-making preceded the public popularization of
confederalion by the National Convention and the referenda campaigns of 1946-1948,
which were again framed by a process of British, Canadian, Commission of Government,
and confederate policy planning. In the vein of Hiller and Webb, ·what went on in
Newfoundland" is re-visited. The involvements and interests of Smallwood, Brndley, and
other individuals in pressing for confederation. will be examined, as will their co-
operation with Canadian and British officials in working towards that goal. The nature
and imponance of the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to confederation will be
examined in relation to British and Canadian policy-making, and the Church's ties to and
support of the anti-confedernte movement will be discussed. This thesis is a micro-history
of the events, issues, and nature of the campaigns, illustrating the formation and the
campaigns of the political coalitions which were active, as well the reasons for the
:I fbid., pp. 216-218.
:19 J&me! K. Hiller, "Twentieth Century Newfoundland Polities: Some Recentl...iterature", Acadlnuls,
Vol. 19, No.1 (1989): 191.
JOOntbe 'ortbodoxy'sce ibid., p. 187.
success of the confederates, the failure of the Responsible Government League, and the
threat posed by the Economic Union pany. It will be shown how the confederates used
sectarianism in the second campaign in the hope of converting many voters to
confederation. This thesis will convey perceptions of the day on how the narrow majority
for confederation was gained, and illustrate the beginnings of the political settlement
which the British, Commission, and Canadian governments and Smallwood forged from
the referenda campaigns.
Chapter 1
Policy Objec:tives
The referenda of June and July 1948. in which Newfoundlanders chose Canada,
were the culmination of a long and extensive process of constitutional delcnllination and
policy-making by the governments of Newfoundland, the United Kingdom. and Canada.
Because Newfoundland was not self-governing, policy on Newfoundland's constitutional
future was quietly arranged by civil seIVants away from the glare of public senltiny.
Even before Newfoundland politicians became publicly involved, it had been decided thaI
union with Canada was Newfoundland's ultimate destiny, and political plan.~ and
structures were put in place to facilitate the union.
In 1934, the governments of Newfoundland and Britain accepted the /933 Royal
Commission Repon by Lord Amu!ree, which examined the country's failing economic
and political state and recommended that the island volunlarily abdicate self-government
in favour of a British appointed Commission of Government,l TIle report also
recommended that "as soon as the island's difficulties:ue overcome and Newfoundland
is again self-supporting, responsible government, on the request of the pcople of
Newfoundland, would be restored" ,1 Under the supervision of a British governor, three
British Commissioners, three Newfoundland Commissioners, and the Dominions Office,
on 16 February 1934 Newfoundland was constitutionally reduced to an uncertain and
ambiguous colonial status, and the Commission of Government was inaugurated.
The Commission of Government benevolently attempted to guide Newfoundland
through the Depression and World War n, though there were skinnishes along the way.
I NewfoundlMd Royal Commission 1933 R~pon (LarKton: His Majesly's Stalionery Office, 1933)
(hereafter Anwl,u R~port). The best overview of this period is Neary, North Allall/Ie World.
l Amulrtt Rtpon, p, 197.
10
In 1936 the British government began to finance the consUllction of Gander airport to
serve as a cornerstone for North Atlantic commercial air transport. Gander became
operational in 1938; by late 1940, it and the Botwood sf':<ipJane base had cost £900,000,
and when Gander was finished it was the largest airport in the world? For
Newfoundland, the first line in the defense of North America, wartime brought untold
prosperity. and wilh the arrival of thousands of American and Canadian troops came
American money and jobs for an impoverished people. War brought the September 1940
Anglo-American bases for destroyers agreement between the United States and Great
Britain, and saw the ferrying of American and Canadian men and materiel to Europe to
aid the war effort. Gander was defended, and airports were built at 51. John's,
Stephenville, and Goose Bay; anny and naval bases were built at SI. John's, and in 1941
extensive American installations were built at Argentia, Placentia Bay, which eventually
cost S52,000,000}
In 1937 the Commission had spent $1,646,545 on able-bodied relief;' with the
onslaught of war, almost overnight Newfoundland became a sentinel of great strategic
imponance, a veritable MBoomtown USN. Airpons and bases bustled, and commerce
expanded to the tune of American coin in the till. Americans were no strangers to
Newfoundlanders, as the United States had been the destination of thousands of migratory
1 Bridle, Donll'lClts, Vol. I. p. 170, 'McmgTWKIum of I Meedng 1151. Jgho's 10 Discus! Bilateral
Defence Queslign" 1 December 1940,"
• On Argenlia see Peler Neuy, 'Alexander Bishop's Account of Ihe Edlumalion of the Argenlia
Cemeleries, August 1942". HPS, V'll. 4, No.2 (Fill 1985): ISI-6; Illd Eileen (Hunl) Houliliall, "Eileen
(Hunl) HouJihlll's Family Memoin" ,:d. Peter Neary). NFS, Vol. 7, No.1 (SprinS t99I): 4S..,'i4.
I R.A. MlcKay, New[oundllJlld. Economic, Diplomatic, and Straftglc Studits, (Toronto: Odord
Unlvenhy Preu, 1946). Appendill A (Stali,liCl), Table 16.
II
Newfoundlanders at the end of the 19th and in the early pan of the 20th century.~ and
during the war over 25,000 Newfoundland women married American servicemen.? TIle
war brought many ,nillions of dollars into the Newfoundland economy. and America into
the homes and hearts of islanders. By 1943-1944, expenditures on able-bodied relief had
been reduced to $14,826,' and revenues had so risen during Ihe war that Newfoundland
provided financial aid 10 Britain.9 War saw the declaration of lhe Atlantic Charter by
Churchill and Roosevelt in Placentia Bay in August of 1941. The Charter's third article
affinned the right of ~II peoples to self-government, and Ihe existence of Commission of
Government in Newfoundland slOod as an egregious exception to the principles for which
the war was being fought and the Charter stoOO.1O But removed from their poverty.
Newfoundlanders were distracted by the war and by the American presence on their
shores, and for many, constitutional detennination and the political fUlure of their
country was the furthest thought from their minds. Politics would wait: there was money
to be made. and a war to be fought.
• On American-Newfoundland connections, see William G. Reeves, "Our Yankee Cousins':
Modemization and the Newfoundland·American Relationship, 1898-1910' (Ph.D. thesis, University of
Maine at Orono, 1981).
7 John N. Cardoulis, A F,itfllfly InKision - 11" Amui((UJ Military in New/oulldland: 194D-I990iSt.
John's: Breakwater Books, 1990), p.1.
I MIICKay, NewfoundlDnd. Appendix A (Statistics), Table 16: Ex~ditures· Department of Public
Health IlIld Welfare, 1933·1944.
, By the cod of the 1945-194> fiscal year, Newfoundllllld had IOMed $12,300.000 to the United
Kingdom. See NUJ)', Nonh Atlan' ;Vorld, p. 186.
It 'The President of tbe United. Stlltes, and the Prime Minister... respect the right of all peoplu to
choose tbe form of government under which they will live; IlIld they wish 10 see IOvereign rights restored
to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.' On the Atllllltic ChlJ1et see Theodore A. WlllIOI1, 11ft
First Summit • Roos~/t and Clwrchill at PlaCl!fllili Bay, 1941, (Lawrence, Kansas: Univenity Prell of
KanIa.9, 1991), and H.V. Morton, Ar/untll: Mtt/lnS. (London: Methuen IlIld Company, 1943).
12
The Canadian government was the first to begin considering its policy towards
the constitutional future of Newfoundland. With the outbreak of war, for defensive
reasons the Commission wanted temporarily to transfer control of GanJer and the
BOIwood base to Canada; lJul the Canadians were outsiders in Newfoundland, and the
Dominions Office balked al their suggestion. II But by late 1940 Canada wanted
"security of tenure of the siles" it had built al Gander, 11'!i'M1 soon Ihereafler began to
consider ils long-lenn relationship with Newfoundland. On 27 March 1941, Hugh L.
Keenleyside, the Canadian member of the Pennanent Joint Board of Defence,ll wrote
10 Nannan Robertson, Acting Under-Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs, suggesting
thai a Canadian representative be sent 10 Newfoundland, and be designated a "High
Commissioner".14 Robertson, who was himself concerned that Canada's influence in
Newfoundland would be compromised by the construction of American bases there,
wrote \0 Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King on 15 July, recommending that Charles
J. Burchell, a Canadian lawyer and the current Canadian High Commissioner in
Australia, be sent to Newfoundland. U No stranger to the idea of the union of
Newfoundland with Canada, King agreed,16 and Burchell was appointed on 23 July,I7
II Bridle, Documt!nts. Vol. I, p. 53, Governor of Newfoundland 10 Dominions Secretary, 31 Oclober
1939; Dominions Secretary 10 Gnvernnr of Newfnundland, 6 November 1939.
" Bridle, Dorllmt!nI.~, Vol. I, p. 170, "Memorandum ofa Meelin8 II 51. John's to DisclJ5ll Bilaleral
Defence Queslions, 1 December 1940."
Il This boa.td Will established to co-ort!inale llle war effort in Newfoundland.
" Bridle, Docu~nls, Vol. I, p. 193, Keenleyside 10 Robertson, 17 March 1941.
Il Raymond B. Blake, "WLMK', Altitude Towards Newfoundland's Enlry Into Confederatioo", NQ,
Vol. LXXXII, No.4 (5priog 1987): 17, and Bridle, DocurMnts, Vol. I, p. 197, "Memorandum from
Under-Secretary of Stale for ~Iemal Affain 10 Prime Minister Mackenzie King, IS July 1941."
16 Among those who may have had some influence 00 King were Sir A.B. Morine, II
NewfoundlandlCanadhlll lawyer who in 1937 suggested Ihe idea to him (see Malcolm MacLeod.
"Confederation, 1937", NFS, Vol. I, No.2 (Falll98S): 201-110); KiDg'sfriend Sir Wilfred Grenfell, who
looked favourably on sucb a union; and Norman l:>uncan, King's roommale at tbe Univenity of Toronlo
(See Blake, "WLMK', Allil\lde", NQ, Vol. LXXXIl, No.4 (SprinJ 1987): 27).
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By September Burchell was established and reponing 10 Ottawa. already
suggesting that more news, pUblicity, and radio broadcasts about Canada would be
desirable for public consumption in Newfoundland." His mandate was also to sound oul
and report local opinion about confederation. 19 In an 18 October memorandum on the
future relaliol1s between Canada and Newfoundland, Keenleyside obsclVed that
Canada must prepare eventually to accept Newfoundl[and] as a tenth partner in
Confederation. This being the ca[se] would ;1 not be wise for the Can.1dian
Government, without trying in any way 10 hasten the ultimate union, 10 lake its
present decisions in regard to the practical problems arising in Newfoundland in
accordance with this assumption? We could then have a simple and consistent nll~
upon which to base our day to day decisions.20
With a High Commissioner in place, >,the Canadians could react and quickly make
decisions on local issues. Policy was thus to make policy on-the-fly, as evenls warranted,
and generally to promote the concept of "friendly neighbour Canada". Bllt some
Newfoundlanders were immediately suspicious. "What the hell's Charlie Burchell doing
in Newfoundland!'?" exclaimed the observant Dr. John Sparkes to his wife, Grace,11
Sparkes had been educated at McGill, and he knew Burchell "from of old". When
Burchell arrived, the .)-park:ese.~ wondered why Canada would send a High Commissioner
to Newfoundland.» Grace Sparkes recalled that they felt that Burchell's position "was
" MacKenz.ie, Nonh At/atttic TriDllglt, p. 64.
II Bridle, Docummts, Vol. 2, Part I, p. 3, Bun:hell to RoberUoll. 19 September 1941. Further cil.o.tion!
of Bridle will be from this volume unless noted.
It For Burchell's repor'~ on this sec ibid.. pp. 3 and 1, Burch.:llto Robertson, 19 Sr.plember and II
D«ember 1941. On Canadian reasons for sending Burchell to Newfoundland, and the position Ilt1d function
of the High Comminioner s"e Kathryn E. Hayman, "The Origins Ilt1d Functions of Ihe Canldian High
Commiuioner to Newfoun':'.I:md" (M.A. thC5is, University of WC5tem Ontario, 1919).
::D Bridle, Documents, p. lIS, Keenleyside to Under-Secretary of Stale for Elttcm.1 Aff.in, 18 October
1941.
"Grace SparkC5 to the author, ISJ.I:I1.WY 1992.
nlbid.
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a place for somebody with authority to have a foothold to negotiate with people in
Newfoundland",ll Shortly arter Burchell's arrival, Sparkes and her husband noticed that
one Joseph R. Smallwood, a popular local broadcaster and journalist, became a frequent
visitor 10 Burchell's office at Canada House,24
Indeed, Burchell was very interested in confederation for Ne,;rbundland. Soon
after his anival, he visited the law firm of John B. McEvoy and Charles Hunt, with
whom Burchell's Halifax*based practice of Burchell, Smith, Parker, and Fogo exchanged
legal business.1l Burchell privately began sounding out McEvoy on his willingness to
lead a confedel1l.te party in Newfoundl::."l(V~ and later in 1942 or 43, he arranged for
McEvoy 10 address the Canadian Club in New York on the topic of confederation with
Canada.11 While he was at Dalhousie Law School from 1930-1935, McEvoy had been
a political science student of Dr. Robert Alexander MacKay." In Ottawa in 1943,
MacKay became intimately involved with the Newfoundland question as a t:'CCial
Assistant (0 the Under-Secretary ofState for External Affairs, and as a friend and advisor
:Dibld.
l"Jbid.
:IS JI.I!Iet Halley to lhe alllhor, II May 1992, and Mo's Who In CtznDda 1941-44, m. B.M. Greene
(Torooto:lnlemationalPressUmitm.1944l.pp.833-4.
~ Smallwood liter Ildmitted tbat the Canldillls cOlItinum toCllllVau lbout fori confederate leader unlil
mit! to lite 1946.!ie noted tbat •... tbey mll9lbave wolKlered if I wu rctlly the righlOOC, !'rom tbeirpoint
of viell', to launch and lea.f a COlIfederate mOVeIPCIlI.' See Smallwood, "The StOI)", BNF, p. II.
%l Halley 10 the luthor. It MIY 1992.. McEvoy wu I member of tile CanlldilO Club of New yolt. See
J.B. McEvoy Papen, Centre for ~wfo~dlllld Studies, Queen Elizabetb n Libl'llY, Memorial Univcrsity
of NewfouodllOd. (lutolbiogrt!"UctlskcICb,p. 4.
:III Public Arcbives of CalI.a. OttaWI (berellfter PAC) MG 30 E IS9, Vol. 6, file: J.B. McEvoy.
MIl:KtytoP.A. Bridle.9JUIlc 1948.
\5
10 McEvoy.~ McEvoy had the largest and -most lucrntivc- law practice in the colony.
was the lawyer for the companies which operated the paper mills. and remained al the
top of the Canadian list 10 lead a Newfoundland confederate party as lale as fhl: end of
June 1945. when Paul Bridle of External Affairs reported to Ollawa on McEvoy's
suitability and his plans 10 secure funding and begin a confederate newspaper:"
McEvoy's interest in confederation had been stimulated by Burchell, and thlls was
planted and left 10 genninate one of several seeds of confederate support."
While Burchell and officials in the Canadian Department of External Affairs
stirred interest in confederation in the likes of lawyer McEvoy and broadcaster
Smallwood, few others in the colony had much concern for the constitutional future.
Significant but sporadic efforts before the war had been made al prote.'iling againsl the
Commiision of Government. but these were made by the poor and unemployed, and
unions, who were "disillusioned with a government that the)' perceived as remote and
indifferent-,:J2 and upset with a foreign-dominated system which disregalded the pleas
of a people used to political patronage freely distributed by their local member of the
House. In 1936 a secret society, "11le Crusaders-, whose leading light was ex-eabinct
minister Peter Cashin. made its appe.1rAI1cc and criticized the Commission. as did the
public and IJ'K'lre sueces.sful Newfoundland Independence Association in 1937, which saw
Joseph R. Smallwood, among others, advocate a return to responsible government.)!
:l'I See Bridle,~ts, Vol. II, p. XUV, Lilt of Persons, ·R.A. MacKs)"; and J.8. MeEvO)'
Pspen, Biogl1lphkal Skcteh of McEvoy.
'" Bridle, Docu/llClts, pp. 1'2.-4, Bridle 10 J.E. Read, 29 June 1945.
)I Walsb, More 1M" a Poor Majoriry, p. 9a, noted lhal al onc point MeEvoy and Smallwood Iddrcucd
1M 1942 BOlrd of Trade mcc:tinp and advocated the return of tclf-,ovemmcnt. Bull..i, would nol prceludll
lhllirillvClltigaliOll,orinlcl'e'llJineonfc.dc:1'Itioll.
,. Webb, "Convcntion", p. II.
»lbid,p.l7.
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In 1938 the Newfoundland Public Welfare League under entrepreneur Chesley Crosbie
took up where the NIA left off, bUI it soon disbanded. But with the arrival of the war,
the American bases, and money, the vocal minority which was dissatisfied with the
suspension of self-government increased its agitation for the return of self-rulc.~ and
a number and ,'ariely of organizations emerged and criticized the Commission.
In February 1942, Clement Attlee, leader of the British labour pan.y and deputy
Prime Minister, becal!lc Secl~tary of State for Dominion Affairs. Soon after this, he had
his Under~Secrelary, P.V. Emrys·Evans, compile a memorandum on Newfoundland.
Evans identified what he believed were the causes of the collapse of self·government in
1933, namely ·Poverty. semi-starvation, lack of education, and a narrow
sectarianism",J' and suggested that
Our immediate aim should be the improvement of the condition of the people and
the development of the natuTaI resources of the country so that it may be ahle to
manage its own affairs again as soon as possible. We shC'Uld moreover do
everything in our power to improve the relations between Canada and
Newfoundland. If close and sympathetic co*operation in Ihe development of the
Island and of Labrador came from Canada, the possibility of union might come
into the realm of practical politics. The ultimate aim of our policy should be to
bring Newfoundland into the Confederation.:l6
In 1942 the Newfoundland Board of Trade held a series of meetings at which the
Commission's tax plans were stridently opposed, and at which it resolved 10 press
Whitehall for the return of self-rule." In September Attlee visited Newfoundland with
his Assistant Under*Secretary, P. Alexander Clutterbuck, -to infonn himself of
:M See Neary, North AtIIltlI/cWorld, pp. 278-9&11d IT., aDd Webb, "Convention", p. 21 and ff.
:u The Am\ll~ Report SIIW aoclarianism ail a problem so ,ignificantthat one of the map' appended to
it, report showed thegoogfIPhic locations of rcligiollll denominatioos in three colOllI'!l.
,. Public Record Office, Kew, Uniled Kingdom(herea.fter PRO), Dominion, Office files (hereafter DO)
3S/723/N2I731X1J7821. P.I. EIIIl')',-EvIDS 10 Altice, to JUlIe 1942.
lIOn the Boanl ofTme see Walsh, More Thana Poor Mojority, pp. 96*7.
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conditions in the Island~.)1 and 10 gamer first·hand evidence with which to modify
British policy.J9 Altice had always been critical of the Commission of Govcmmcni.
which he believed had been a mistake and had failed "10 prepare Newfouoolanders Itl
resume self-government". and likened it to keeping a "footballieam all the season in the
dressing room without even a pun' about andc~ them to be fit 10 win a malch althe
end".<tO Having mel with Newfoundland offICials and citizens, Attlee confidentially
concluded that "lhe proximate destiny of Newfoundland was union with Canada" ,~l even
though it was immediately impossible '100 quietly returned home. During the last wL'Ck
of June 1943 Attlee sent a three-man Parliamentary Goodwill Mission to Newfoundland,
comprised of the Independent MP for Oxford, Sir Alan P. Herbert, Labour MP Charles
Ammon, and Conservative MP Sir Derrick Gunston,U The delegation stayed lite
summer. ar.d although each member submiued his own report that fall, the gcncml
conclusion was that Newfoundland sh.ould remain independent. yet have continued
financial aid from Britain.·) In particular, Herbert suggested that a plebiscite on the
country's future be announced after the war and held two yean later. A year aOer lilt:
war, the three NewfoundWu:l seats on che Commission would be elected. while a
• Neary. Nt:Jnh AlID1llir World, p. 176.
JI' On British poticy allo _ Neal)', 'Great Britain and the Future of Newfoundland, 1939-4S', NFS,
Vo!.l, No.I(Sprinll985}:21J.S6.
.. Neary, Nom At/alt/if: World, p. 177.
•, Bridle,lJocurMnn, pp. 10]-2,1.5. Macdonald 10 CanadiM Secrelary of State for Exlemal Mf.in,
12 August 45. Macdooald rellted tbat P.D.H. DuM, lite Conuniuioner for Natural Re5OlIr<:e!, told lIim
Anlce's views. On Atllce's visit and Oilier of his conclusion! s.ee Nul)', 'Attlco'! Vi!it", AaId/~,u/1, Vol.
xm, No. 2(1984): 101-9.
'1 Ammoo cbaitDd Ibe million, Itld G.W. 51. lohn Chadwick w,Q the secretaI)'. Ammon favoured
confederalion wilb Canada. II an evenlual solution to Newfoundt."d'. problcnu, while Helbert found thai
Newfoundllllli WII! 'most elllraordinlt'i!y Britisb' ."d tbouJht lhal illhould continue illl ulOCiation with
Britain. See McCl.ll.D, 'New Uiht'. p. 5.
o MeCaan, p. S, and Neary, North A,/WIlif: Wurld, pp, 217....
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~ci[izcns' council" would be appointed to consider "alternate (Inns of future
govemmenl". oW Of all the recommendations, Herbert's "citizens' council" intrigued the
Dominions Office the most.
On the evening of 18 August 1943, Nonnan Robertson wrote to Prime Minister
W. L. Mackenzie King, noting that at lunch earlier that day he had discussed
Newfoundland with Malcolm Macdonald, the British High Commissioner, who
... asked me if I thought this Conference·' might provide an opportunity for him
to talk with us in a preliminary way about the general question of Newfoundland.
Mr. MacDonald thought it would be helpful if there could be some preliminary
exchange of views with the Canadian Government about Ihe future of Ihe Island
before the United Kingdom was compelled to take specific steps which might be
found to have detennined the fulUre of Newfoundland, including its relationship
to Canada.
My own feeling is that "somehow, sometime" Newfoundland should
become part of the CanaJian Confederation. I think that, in the long run, both
political and strategic considerations make this inevitable. I believe that President
Roosevelt has expressed the same opinion to you on one or two occasions.46
While the war facilitated closer relations between allied countries, the Canadians took the
opportunity to cultivate stronger bonds with Newfoundland. But Newfoundlanders were
enthralled with America, not Canada, and the British recognized this. Governor Sir
Humphrey Walwyn wrote:
Little or no interest is taken on the question of Confederation, and it is
hardly discussed at alL if anything, they are so dazzled by American dollars,
hygiene and efficiency that many of the public rather play up to America in
.. See PRO DO 35 13351N401I1/9 for a u"ful table comp,lriag tbe repon, of the members: af the
Goodwill Mission.
., Churchill. Roosevelt• .aI1d Mackenzie King auended the Quebec Conference fl'l)m 19 10 24 August
1943.
.. Bridle. DaCtlmCll.J. pp. 17-8, Robertson 10 Mackenzie King. 16 July 1943.
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preference to Canada. However, they universally want to be on their own. wilh
a comfortable grant-in-aid, and little responsibilify.~1
Indeed, there was no belfer time than the present 10 craft post-war policy on
Newfoundland, without the pressures of political friction from Newfoundland or Britain
being brought to bear on Dominions Office decisions.
That fall. the new Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, Lord Cmnbourne,
weighed the Goodwill Mission reports, and drafted a statement to Parliament. made on
2 December, assuring Newfoundland that opportunities to consider ils constitutional
status would be provided after the war," During the winter, Cranboume also requested
that the Commission develop and submit a reconstruction plan for the economic lind
social development and reconstruction of Newfoundland, and a modified version of
Herbert's "citizens' council", a national convention, was also floated willI the
Commission. Consideration was also given to mechanisms by which this could be done,
and various dmrt documents were contemplated. "A Convention on the lines of (b),"
wrote a patronizing but astute Walwyn to Clunerbuck in February 1944,
modified as we suggest might, I feel, be the best means of obtaining public
opinion, but it would be a long drawn out fight. A referendum on two specific
questions only would give a false result as the majority might want an
intennediate course and they are so illiterate that they wouldn't know what they
were being asked to vote for .•9
Thus the mechanism - a national assembly or "convention" • was considered for the
purposes of political education and obtaining public opinion, and the idea of three
referendum choices was planted. Comer Brook magistrate Nehemiah Short was directed
to study how a convention might be called, and he recommended 10 the Commission Ihat
<7 Bridle, Documents, p. 79, W.lwyn 10 Sir Erie Maehlig, PeffilUlcnl Undcr·Secrell.ry of SI.II", for
DominiooAffail'1l, 31 AUJUlII943.
• Neary. North Ar/anllC' World, pp. 218-220•
.. PRO DO 3511338, Walwyn to Cluucrbuek, 13 Fcbroary 1944.
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the old House of Assembly electoral districts be used, that the voting age be 21 years,
and thaI Convention delegates be residenls of their districts.50
Arter summertime discussions on economic and constitutional matters with a
delegation from the Commission, Whitehall received the Commission's reconstruction
plan, with its SIOO,OOO,OOO price tag. 51 Cranboume sent this to the Treasury, along
with a note stating that if responsible government were returned the same financial
problems would recur, and that the island would have 10 continue to be underwritten for
a transitional period.52 But when Lord Keynes of the :1ritish Treasury observed that
"after Ihis signal mark of our favour, the Newfoundlanders would still be more reluctant
to part company with usn, the scheme was rejected.5l With Keynes' further suggestion
that "it is agreed thai the right long-tenn solution is for Newfoundland to be taken over
by Canada" ,54. the Dominions Office began quietly 10 co-operate with the Canadians
while publicly remaining neutral on the question of Newfoundland's future.
In July 1945 Attlce fonned a labour government. The new Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, Lord Addison, sent Clutterbuck to meet his Canadian counterparts in
Ottawa on 17 September. Clunerbuck infonned them that union with Canada was
Newfoundland's "natural destiny", and several meelings took place between Clutterbuck
and R.A. MacKay on the finances of a confederation.~ According to Peter Neal)',
"Webb. 'ConYentloo", pp. 40-1.
J' Ncary. NfJrthAllalllicWor!d,pp. 223-6.
J, Ibid., p. 227.
II Ibid., p. 228.
lollbid.. p. 228.
"Ibid., p. 231.
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Clutterbuck's Mtriumph" occurred when Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King told
the British High Commissioner that the union of the two countries W:lS "nalurdl,
desirable, and inevilable",S6 But as David MacKenzie and J.K. Hiller iodie'ded,
confederation was not a new concept 10 the Canadians.J1 However, on 18 October 1945
Addison was able 10 write to his cabinet colleagues that
We should arrange to set up in the spring of 1946 an elected National Convention
of Newfoundlanders, whose dUly would be to review the alternative courses open
to the island and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government as a
basis for a na~ional referendum....
... it will be necessary for the Island 10 be guaranteed financial assistance for
recol'!!:truction and development. Unfortunately, however, there is no prospect,
the Chancellor's view, of our being able to find the dollars for this purpose, nor
in fact, would the Canadians welcome our doing so. It has been fUr1I\(~r
established that the Canadians would not be prepared under the present conditions
to finance reconstruction in the Island themselves.
Evidence is, however, beginning to accumulate that there is now a growing
movement ofopinion in the Island towards union with Canada. It has always been
felt here that Newfoundland is too small J. unit to be able to stand successfully on
its own feet, except at the price of a standard of living and of administrative and
social services much lower than those on the mainland. Union with Canada is its
natuml destiny. We know too, that this is recognized by Mr. Mackenzie King,
who has indicated privately that he would wannly welcome a decision by
Newfoundlanders to enler the canadian fold and do his best to assure them
generous tenns.
In these circumstances, we must, I feel, adapt our policy to the changed
conditions, and since we cannot look ourselves to helping Newfoundland
fmancially, we should now regard union with Canada as the objective to be aimed
al. It would, of course, be most imponant that no hint that this is the solution
which we envisage should be allowed 10 come out eilher here or jrJ
Newfoundland. The initiative must be er.tirely left 10 the Newfoundlanders, and
we must take care to avoid any appearance of seeking to influence them in any
~ Ibid., p. 232.
fl Hiller, "Twelltieth Centul)' NCW(OUlldllllld Politics·, Acaditrl$/s, Vol. XIX, No. I (1989): 189.
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way. At the same time, we must say or do nothing which would conflict with Ihis
objective or make it harder 10 achieve,"
A week later, Addison informed the cabinet that once Newfoundlandel'i in remole
settlel'"'~nts found OUI the full implications of Ihe Canadian family allowance program,
"a rapid swing of opinion towards Canada" might occur.J~ Policy was set, and it
remained for lhe formal statements to be made, and the Canadians to be brought into the
picture.
On II December 1945 Attlee made a carefully-worded statemenllo the House of
Commons, announcing the decision to establish a National Convention, an elected body
which would
...consider and discuss amongst themselves, as elected representatives of lhe
Newfoundland people, the changes that have taken place in Ihe financial and
economic situatiun of the island .~ince 1934, and bearing in mind the extent 10
which the high revenues of ::teent years have been due to wartime conditions, to
examine the posihn of the country and to make recommendations to His
Majesty's Government as to possible forms of future government 10 be put before
the people at a national referendum. 1lO
Addison made a simultaneous but more lengthy announcement of the government's plans
to the House of Lords. The issue of whether simply to have a plebiscite on the return of
responsible government was skilfully avoided, and with Ihe masterful stroke of
establishing a Newfoundland National Convention, the Dominions Office created an
unlimited opportunity for Ihe discussion of any and all options for the political future,
not whether Newfoundland would just return to .self-government. Of crucial importance
was thai the Convention was not a legislative body; instead il existed 10 make
recommendations 10 the Dominions Office, which would retain the fmal say over the
It DO 35/t341, 'Memorandum by the Seo::retary of State for Domil\ioo Affain, 18 October 1945,· pp.
t-1.
" Neasy. Nonh Arlanl/C World, p. 233.
Nllbld.. p.2J4.
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choices 10 be included on a ballot. But the Convention was a marvellolls Fabian tool for
Anlee: the politically-indifferent Newfoundland electorate could be politically re-
educated, even if it were on the merits of confederation, and a new crop of colonial
politicians could be trained to collaborate with post-war Brilish colonial policy. TIle
Convention was even easily defensible: who could disagree with giving Newfoundlanders
an opportunity 10 speak on their political future? But there was one Oaw: there were no
plans announced for who would lead it. To this opportunity of educating :Ill lIpathetic
public sprang two old political acquaintances: Joseph Roberts SmallwQ(rl. lind fl ~dcrick
Gordon Bradley.
Chapter 2
Interested P',1l1ies
In late 1945 when the Narional Convention was announced. political activities in
Newfoundland were inchoate, and no political parties existed. BUI there were a few
persons inleresled in confederation: Smallwood, McEvoy, and Bradley, as well as the
Canadian High Commissioner, and officials of the British government. There was also
considerable opposition 10 confederation, led by Ihe Roman Catholic Church, which had
historically opposed it. But the opposition had no indications of the planning for
confederation which was going on in this period. Few Newfoundlanders had thought of
confedenltion, or even of what the National Convention was or meant, bul when public
politics resumed, it was not in a vacuum. The germs of the political movements had
already existed. In order to examine what the Convention did and accomplished, it is first
necessary to examine the slate of political opinion and activity into which the Convention
The man who became Newfoundland's foremost advocate of confederatiml with
Canada, Joseph Roberts Smallwood, later claimed that hp. was in Montreal reading a
newspaper when he first learned that Newfoundland was to have a National Convention.-
He discussed the announcement that night with his friend and fellow-confederate Ewart
Young, the young editor of The Atlantic GlUJrdlan, a Montreal-based Newfoundland
magazine.2 Smallwood was born in Gamba on 24 December 1900, and grew up in St.
John's, the grandson of David Smallwood, a staunch confederate and one of the first
1 Smallwood, IChos~~, p. 228.
: Ibid., p. 228. For alle.OLIle. ac:cOUllts of this ~ee. Gwyll, Smallwood, p. 58, aod Horwood, Jrny, p.
67.
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Orangemen and Freemasons in Newfoundland.' Smallwood was nominally a Methodist,
and from about 1930 he was also a member of Ihe Loyal Orange Lodge.~ a Protestant
fratemal organization which had historically played an impor1am pan in Newfoundland
politics, although his membership was probably for political reasons. J As a young lIIan
he adopted socialism, although he did not understand its finerpoims; he became involved
in politics. and successively worked for Ihe St. John's Evening Telegram. The Daily
News, and wrote for 17lt Fishennen's Advocate, the organ of William F. Coaker'~
Fishennen's Protective Union (FpU).6 He then went 10 Canada and New York, working
as a reporter for the socialist paper, The COU,7 and where he spoke al public meetings
on behalf of the American Socialist Party.'
Back in Newfoundland, in 1925 Smallwood organized a Newfoundland Federation
of Labour, edited the St. lohn's Daily Mail, became a union organizer for the
Fishennen's Co-Operative Union, and re-embarked upon his role as a political pundit,
in 1928 campligning and working for Prime ;.'linister Sir Richard Squires.9 Through the
I In 1869 Smallwood's grandfather staunchly defended his nagpole in Greenlpond with the confederate
flag nying, despite thrcatJ agl1nsl him if he would not remove it. See Sm.a.llwood, '1be Story', BNF, p.
9. Ironically. Smallwood', mother, Mary Ellen DeV&lllla, was a Roman Catholic.
• See J.R. SmAllwood Papcn, Centro for Newfoundland Studi~ Archivet, Queen Elizabeth II Libnuy,
:\t.emorial Univenity of NewfoundlaDd, 3.29.138, Loyal Orange Association, Addrcn of Smallwood to
the opening of the LOA Cancer Hostel, 2S August 1965, wher:in he claimed to have been aD Orangeman
for3S yun.
'Mr. Albert WhellUl, ad honoul'l»' life-member or the LOA ofCupi,,'s, Conception Bay, auuested
this to tbe autbor OD 9 JUDe 1m, aDd noted that he, and many of his fellow Orangcmen, thought that
Smallwood only joined lUld used tbe Uxige to get vOl~.
I Smallwood, I ChOSf! CaMJda, p. 99.
'lbid.,p. lIS.
S Horwood, J0o/' p. 33.
• SmAllwood, I Chosf! Canado, pp. 189, 190,239.
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House of Assembly, some years earlier, be would have met F. Gordon Bradley, an
experienced MHA and soon-Io-be close associate. In t 9lO. he and Bradley walked
around Quidi Vidi Lake in St. John's and discussed the possibility of Newfoundland's
confederation with Canada,lO and Smallwood later wondered whether the idea which
was planted there had not grown into the "fact of confederation".II Moving temporarily
10 Bonavista 10 organize co-operatives, in 1936 Smallwood returned to St.lohn's to work.
at a sporadic publishing career, beginning the flfSl of several volumes of the Book of
N~wfoundfand in 1937 with the assistance of St. John's bu~inessman Chesley Crosbie.
That same year Smallwood became a household name because of his popular radio show,
The Barn~/mon, sponsored by 51. John's businessman and manufacturer's agent Francis
M. O'Leary. For six nights a week for almost seven years, S':.'1allwood made
"Newfoundland better known to Newfoundlanders- .11 Even the visiting GoodwiU
Mission look careful note of him as -An outstanding example to take pattern by... an
enterprising salesman who collects aU the small gossip and local news from lowns and
villages throughout the island.... •u Smallwood also edited O'Leary's advertising
newspaper, 7h~ Barnlman, which had a cin:ulation of 42,000 outside St. John's.l.
These publicity endeavours repaid him greatly during the confederation campaigns.
In addition to his broadcasting and editing work, in 1939 Smallwood look up
poultry farming and then pig farming on forty acres of land in the Kenmount valley
.. Ibid.• p. 227. and S.-Iwood. "The Story'. BNF, p. 8.
" Smallwood. 'The Story", BNF, p. 8.
,: leo MollkJer, "The BamlI1Wl: Makifta Newfouodlmd Bener NloWD 10 Newfollodlandel'l", in OJ/I
MI! Jury. ed. Jamell R. Thonu (51. John'.: HIUT)" ClIff Publication, Umlted, 1990): 19-28, and Geneviovll
l.ehr. "The Barnlman", 71I1! EncydopdiD of NrwfOJWiland and lAbrador (hereafter ENL) Vo]. I (St.
JOM',: Newfoundland Book PIIbJi,hel'l, 1967), p. 134.
1) PRO 00 35 1336IN402JIIIO, Iodivid~ Reporu by member1 of Cloodwill Mission, p. 4.
•• MOIkler. "Bun=hl~n", Cllll MtJrwy, p. 24.
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outside St. John's, establishing contact with the Ontario Agricultural College al Guelph
for technical advice. IS In 1941 Smallwood edited 'The £r:pf?SS. a newspaper which look
umbrage wilh the Anglo-American leased bases deal.'t The newspaper was backlXl by
O'leary, lawyers Gordon Higgins and Eric Cook (all of whom were members of the
Newfoundland Nattonal Association, a patriotic businessmen's club), Ml:morial
University College professor Allan Fraser, and St. John's businessman R. GonIon
Winter." 'Though a sometime socialist who had fought for the fishennen, at Ihis point
Smallwood apparently had no qualms about associating with the ruling classes of Water
Street.
On 9 January 1943 Smallwood mortgaged his Kenmount Road pig fam} for
59,000 10 his lawyer Leslie R. Curtis." Retaining his rann in St. John's, later (hat year
Smallwood set up another pig rann in Gander. I' Smallwood maintained that the move
to Gander was mAde at the encouragement of and in partnership with Captain David
Anderson, the Commanding Officer of the Royal Air Force Transport Command at
Gander, so that the swill from the mess halls might be effoctively disposed of. Sui he
"SnlaIlwood. !~ CGnada, p. 215.
"The exproprialioo ofNewfoutdland lands for tbc Anglo-Amc:ric.l bucs-for-dest~ndeal, and lhe
teeming uneoneem of Ill' Commission of Government aboul doin! this, reinforced many Ne~found1andcn'
misgivmp ..boultbc e~stcnce of tbc CommissiOll of Govcmmcnl.
11 Neary, Nonh Allanl/c World. p. 283: MoUIer, '8amlrnan", CDll Me J"9' p. 24, and JoIut J.
Murpby, "He Never Held a GrudJe", ibid., p. 33.
I. Regisl1y of Deeds, Confederation BUildma, SI. John'a (hereafter RP.' Vol. 182, folio 604,
Smallwood to Curlis. The eJllensive securities eueled by CUrlls in Ille indenture (ranJinJ from •
slaughterhouse down 10 one wbeelbarrow and two bucksaws) would lICCm 10 indicale CUrlis's IllCk of
confidenee in Smallwood's ercdit I1IlinJ.
"Smallwood maintained that he laler sold the Kenmount fann ala profit of$I25,OOO (ace Smallwood,
!Chost! CDnaikl, p. 233). On II December 1944 the St. JOM's HousmaCol'pon.tionuproprialedasma11
porlion of the farm's land from Smallwood and Curtis, for an undilCloacd fee (RD Vol. I", folio J, II
December 1944). On 4 October 1945 Curtis partially n:leucd Smallwood from the martPle for S I and
"other aood IlId valuable cotISidel1llioD" (RD Vol. 182, folio 6(4).
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also noted that the scheme was financed by Ches Crosbie, and that Anderson was
personally wealthy.20 James Halley, a clerk in McEvoy's office, laler noted that when
Smallwood left IOwn for Gander in the fall of 1943, he did so without paying a bill he
c<wed 10 O'leary. O'leary went 10 McEvoy, whu had Halley write up a writ against
Smallwood.21 While Smallwood left the impression that Anderson brought him to
Gander and kept him there, and thus that it was pure serendipity that he was qualified
10 run for the Convention,12 Halley claims that he had evidence that Smallwood had
prior knowledge through Burchell of the two-year residency qualification requirement for
election to the ConventionY
While Smallwood later maintained that at that period he "really didn't know
Canada". ,his is difficult to believe. From Gander he had access to free flights to
Canada,14 where he went to obtain advice and supplies for the Gander piggery.~~ More
:lI Smallwood, 1 Chos~ Canada, pp. 216·7.
II Jamc.s Halley to tbe author, 11 May 1992. Although it is unknown bow Smallwood spell! hb money.
he had and spent a considelllble amount of it, and had a reputation for fmandal unreliability. PAC MG 26
L, Vol. 61, file N-19-2. Memol'Uldum ()Q Newfoundland, luthor and date unknown. Penonalilies· Joseph
R. Smallwood, indicates that by late summer 1948 the Canadian Govemment observed that •... it iI spoken
quite freely in St. John'! that his cmlit is no good in the hlllinen sulion of the dty.·
21 Smallwood, /Chose Ca,UJlkJ, p. 220.
11 Jllflle$ Halley to tho author. II May 1992. After tbe second referendum in 1948, tbe Canadian
govemment observed of Smallwood and Bradley: "To add convietionto this opinioo ['that the eountry Willi
raill'Oflded into the Dominion") lIlI far IllI many people are concemed. is that fact that both Mr. Gordon
Bradley lll1d Mr. Small.....ood........hose activities normally made them resideo" of St. John's. for severaJ
yurt prior to the National Convention resided in ob~cure outlyina: districl!. w,",7h in flCt made tbem
eligible for eleclion to tbe National Convention. It being fairly obvious that if they had remained in SI.
John'! neither of them would have had a cbance of being elocled IS delegalet.· PAC MG 26 L, Vol. 61.
file N·19·2, 'Public Sentiment·. in ·Memorandum on Newfoundland."
l-' Smallwood, / Chose Canada, pp. 229 and 22.5. am: Small.....ood. ·The Story". BNF, p. 4.
11 Smallwood spent more time in Guelpb and SOUle in Toronto and Montreal. Sec Small.....ood. / Chou
Car.nd4. pp. 219 and 22.5.
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importantly, according to Leo Moakler, his Barrelman assislant, he -1c.1.med Ihe facts (If
confederation", which included financial information about Canad3..26 In Gander he
befriended Anthony Mul1owney, the Superintendent of Works and Buildings for the
R.A.F.. Mullowoey provided funding for Smallwood's Newfoundland and Canadian
endeavours, and was a strong confederate sUPPJrter.~J as was his brother Fr. Frnncis,
and Fr. Philip McCanhy, bOlh Roman Catholic priests. u Information poured into
Gander al-out confederation, and Smallwood even had assistance from Monsignor Finn
of Grand Falls, who provided him with evidence of previous Canadian lenns offered to
Newfoundland around 1919, and who seems to have set Smallwood thinking about
Canadian -'enns".29 Most conveniently, though, when Ihe National Convention was
announced with the qualification that elected delegates were to have resided in their
districts for at least two years before nomination day, Smallwood was both well-infonllOO
about Canada and met the residency qualification. He rnn for Bonavista Centre and was
returned.
F. Gordon Brndley spent his early youth in St. John's, but at age six had an atla~k
of scarlet fever, so he moved to Bonavista for the climate and rest, where he eventually
became headmaster of the Methodist high school.» A reader and a thinker, Bradley
explored the ideas of socialism, but was less taken with it than Smallwood, and thought
.. Moakler. 'The Burelllll.l1·, Call Me Joey, p. 21; Leo Moakler to the autllor, 18 May 1992, Ind
Smallwood, 1 Chose CatllJda, p. 224-228.
17 Smallwood, 1 Chose CaMda, pp. 230·1, Illd 242.
3 SlllIlIwood, 'The Story', BNF, p. 8
:It Smallwood, 1 Chose Canad4, pp. 229-30.
)Q For background 011 Bradley tllllaulltor has dn.wn on Hiller, 'Bradley - Political Biography', p. 4,
and also on Hiller, 'The CaToer of F. Gordon Bradley', NFS, Vol. 4, No.2 (Pall 1988): 163-30.
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that it was perfect in theory but ~impossible in practice".)l Independent of mind, he
decided to become a lawyer. He finished his training at Dalhousie Law School, during
which time he "came 10 the conclusion that Newfoundland had made a mistake in
rejecting confederation sixty years before" ,31 Around 1915 Bradley became a Mason,
and also around Ihal time an Ornngeman. In 1918 he went into practice with A.B.
Morine, a Canadian lawyer in St. John's who personally advocated confederation, and
in 1922 Bradley sel up his own practice.» The next year he ran as a Liberal in Trinity
Bay for the House of Assembly, interrupting the campaign to run and get elected Grand
Master of the Loyal Orange Association at the Lodge's convention in Grand Falls.
Ironically, though the Lodge was largely Liberal, he lost the election in Trinity.:W
In 1924 Bradley was elected to the House for Port·de-Grave, and in 1929 he
became Solicitor General in the ill-fated Squires administration. A member of the last
Newfoundland House of Assembly, in 1933 he advocated default on Newfoundland's
loans, blaming the Alderdice government for being at the beck and call of "a mercantile
aristocracy intent on recouping what the government owed it-.3s In 1934 he wrote a
reJXIrt on the conditions of logging operations in Newfoundland, condemning the
conditions of the workers and the paper companies' profiteering. For this he fell out of
favour with the Commission, which suppressed his report.J6 and after a disheartening
spell in Grand Falls as a magistrate, he returned to Bonavista where he immersed himself
JI Hiller, "Bradley • Politkal Biography',p. 5.
"Ibid., p. 6.
JJ Ibid., pp. 6-8.
J41bld.,p.8.
)) Ibid.. p. 19.
JI On thi, report tee Peter Neary. 'The Bradley Report On LoggiDg OperatiOD' ill NewfouQdllllld,
1934: A Supprased Doeumenl", LabollrlU Tnll'ail, Vol. 16 (1985): 193-232.
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in the life of his community. From there in 1941 he began writing a series of articles to
the Fishennen's Advocate. advocating confederation. In these he lamented thaI
confederation had 'never been fully discussed" in Newfoundland, citing the nCI.:d tll
Mdiscard ancient prejudices". He thought that an independent Newfoundland, "small and
insignificanlM , would never do, because Kthe ordinary Newfoundlander should be givcn
the chance of a decent livelihood, 10 escape from the conditions in which he had 1X.'Cll
living for the past decade"; otherwise the country would become "the plaything of
monopoly capitalism~.l7 He lambasted the British government and British capitalism,
imperialism and conservatism and ils Newfoundland manifestation, the Commission of
Government. which he held responsible for the concession of bases 10 Ihc Americans
(which undermined Newfoundland's bargaining power), and for saving "capital at the
expense of humanity·.ll According to Hiller, Bradley was no Newfounclland nationalist;
he once wrote "I do not care two straws for Newfoundland as an abstraction", and he
had "long been a believer in non-denominational schools·. J' Bradley lamented
Newfoundland's reliance on British texts, and the deferential attitude towards alllhings
British:
It was sad, he wrote, that ·At the singing ofGed Save the King, a Newfoundland
audience stiffens into a grotesque and Slonelike rigidity, and makes a rush for Ihe
nearest exit at the first strains of 'We Love Thee Newfoundland'" .40
Canadian High Commissioner Burchell had been keeping an eye on political
developments in Newfoundland, and in 1942 he sent an article by Bradley to the
Secretary of State for Exlernal Affairs, Prime Minister King, and reported that Bradley's
n Hiller, "Bradley -Political Biography",p. 23.
"lbld.,p.30.
"Ibid., p. 30.
'"'Ibid., pp. 30-1.
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...actions and writings have earned for him tile description of being what is called
in Newfoundland "communistic". 1 think a better description of him is anti-
Capitalistic, although I understand he is a bit of a Capitalist himself.41
Bradley clearly had his own ideas on the place of Newfoundland in the world and on the
future for his country, and they were about to be brought to bear on Newfoundland's
political life.
From February 1946 and most likely earlier, Smallwood and Bradley were
corresponding about plans for advancing the cause of confederation. Smallwood infonned
Bradley that he was secretly fonning a confederate party under the leadership of the
Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare, Sir John Puddester, although Bradley was
surprised at and questioned the wisdom of this. 41 Having decided to get themselves
elected to the Convention, they also discussed the course the Convention would take, the
necessity of keeping the Commission of Government out of negotiations of tenns of
union, and the sectarian implications in the possible election of Smallwood's friend
Mullowney to the Convention.4J Noting an exchange of ideas between Smallwood,
himself, and 1.S. Macdonald, the new Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland,
who that month replaced Charles Burchell,'" on 11 May 1946 Bradley wrote to
Smallwood, conceding that
McDonald's [sic] idea is perhaps better than mine. He at least ought to know
more of his government than either of us.
"Bridle,Doc:ruMnfS,p.I2,BurebellIoMackenzieKing,20Man:h 1942.
'l F. Gordon Bn.dley Papcn, privately held. Correspondence with J.R. Smatlwood, Bradley to
Smallwood. 28 Februal)' 1946; Hiller, "Bradley· Political BioSn.pby·, p. 35; Webb, ·Conventioo·, pp.
53-4.
" On Mullowney's desire to be elected to the Convention for Bollavisla South see Smallwood, / Chost
ConodiJ, p. 231 .
.. Burchell left Newfoundland in lanuaf)' 1944.
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..My own idea was for the Convention delegation to approach Canada. first with
a view fO enlisting their sympathetic approval (unofficial of course) ofour sending
a delegation to London for the purpose of gelling rid of a part al least and
possibly the whole of the national debt. Such approval might also involv~
Canadian pressure on london to go as far as possible in the matter of our debt.
All this of course would be quite unofficial and orf the record, but it could be
exceedingly valuable. Next a delegation to London to get Britain's concessions
if any. Then another delegation to Ottawa to get allierms but minor details, then
the recommendation 10 the British Govt. and a ballol having appended thereto the
terms agreed upan.1 note also that McDonald's [sic] view is that Canada will not
want to have anything to do with Commission of Government. I have told you
pretty clearly that is my view. Don't you realize that association with Commission
introduces a jarring element. There are thousands of people in this counlry who
hate Commission, and their entry into any negotiations will immediately cast
suspicion upon the whole thing and give the opponents of Confederation a
powerful weapon against it.
...A carefully prepared campaign of infonnation is essential. A very small slip
will give the vested interests and their satellites an opportunity to damn the whole
thing, and I don'. have to tell you what ignorance and mass hysteria can do. The
closer this is kept for the present the better and unless you have anyone in mind
upon whom we can rely absolutely I suggest that we keep the whole thing to
ourselves until we get Ihings lined up in the Convention.
Re Maloney: [sic} Do you think he can beat B.~' I am not so sure. It is by no
means certain that he will get the R.C. vote solid. You must remember that those
people do not vale for individuals.
And you must not forget that our people do not like the idea of being represented
anywhere (as between R.Cs and Prots.) by one of the smaller section. And it is
easy 10 stan the sectarian whisper. Once it is started it spreads like a prairie fire.
Then again there is another consideration. Three months ago this district was
bitterly anti-confederate,46 and they are a people with strong feelings. I have to
go cautiously and try to kill the prejudice, and am beginning to see results, but
'I "B" was Kenneth M. Brown. who WIJ elected to the Convention by acclamation (or Bonavista South
(sec Bertram G. RiUlJ, "ElccliOllS", ENL I, p. 720). SIJIlIJlwood mainll.iood lhat Mullowncy "changed hi.
mind" (see Smallwood. I Chou CanadiJ, p. 231).
.. Brldley referred 10 the diS/ricl of Boll!vista East, for which he WIJ eventually elected to the Natiolll.l
Convention.
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to tag m:- as a confederalcjust now would be to ruin me. My position is that I am
hostile to Commission as at present conducted but have no opinion as between the
alternatives until I get the facts.47
Bradley's letter to Smallwood illustrates the extent of secret political planning which took
place prior to the Convention. More than Smallwood would have his readers believe in
laler years, the Bradley-Smallwood relationship was one of a seasoned elder statesman
advising, tempering, and counselling an impetuous activist.41
Smallwood and Bradley were not the only confederate correspondents by February
1946. From 1944, J.B. McEvoy and R.A. MacKay had been communicating about
Newfoundland's constitutional statuS.49 McEvoy was not enamoured "',ith the idea of a
Convention, but MacKay was. On 19 February 1946 MacKay wrote that he was "rather
perturbed that you and your friends feel the constitutional convention is the wrong
procedure and, indeed, almost alanned that you all seemed unanimous against taking any
part in it". JO MacKay then played to McEvoy, and noted that he thought that
... those who may show up as political leaders in the Constitutional Convention
will in all probability be the leaders of Newfoundland under any new regime. I
think it would be a great pity if the wrong people gct the lead in the Convention,
not only because the Convention might lead to the wrong results under these
circumstances but because the wrong leadership might be riveted on the country
for the next generation.Jl
MacKay encouraged McEvoy, as one of "the best people", not to boycott the
Convention, and e'~dosed a memorandum on the Convention in which he no;ed that
., F. Gordon Brlldlcy Papers, Corm;pond~ce wilb I.R. Smallwood, Bradley to Smallwood, II May
1946.
.. For SlM1lwood's chanelerization of Bradley see Smallwood, I Chost Canada, p. 271; (or III
ahemlle view of this see Hiller, "Bradley· PolitIcal Biography·, p. 35~ .
.. For some oflhiSC:OlTe!llpoodenee see IheJ.B. McEvoy Papers.
!O J.B. McEvoy Papers, Mac:Kay to McEvoy, 19 FebrtWY 1946.
JI Ibid.
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.. .if care is laken 10 see that some.. even two or three. wise men are elected. it
should be a suett.SS. Although it might seem desin.ble to organize a party in
advance in order 10 control the convention, the disadvantages would be that
elected representatives might be prematurely commilled in advance and that OJ;
snap and iJI-considemJ decision might be taken by the people. The besl course
would appear (0 be to make certain of the election of one or two people of
judgement and capacity for leadership. Jl
MacKay mayor may not have been aware of the advanced plans of Bradley and
Smallwood, but his support was placeri behind McEvoy, and nOl behind the two political
hopefuls.
On 1 March 1946 Smallwood began his public campaign for confederation,
writing a series of articles to the St. John's Daily News. which the paper's anti·
confederate editor, the Han. 1.S. Currie, agreed 10 print provided thai Smallwocxl sign
them. lest the paper's editorial position be called inlo question.J~ Foor days later.
Smallwood wrote to the research a.dviser of the Bank of canada, noting that
I have been making as close a study of the question of Confederation as lJOs.sible
with the infonnation I have. I obtained some data. from the Office of the Prime
Minister, and from the Maritimes I obtained their estimates for ten years..•.J4
and asking for iI. fonnation about the fmancia.1 success of the Maritimes under
confeder.l.tion. Largely because of his newspaper letters, by the end of the month
Smallwood was recognized by I.S. Macdonald as the propagandist par er:alltJlCt! for
confederation.» McEvoy. who had been the chotce of Burchell and MacKay to lead a
'I Bridle. Doaunmu, pp. '2.12-3. Memorandum of MaeKay. enclosed in MaeKf,y to McEvoy, 19
February 1946.
JI Smallwood. J Chose Conodo. p. 237; (or the leller! see SrrLlllwood, "The Go!pel of Confederation:
Book One". BNF, pp. 38-62•
.. Bridle. Docu~nls. p. 219, Smallwood co D.A. SlteItOll. RetUl'Ch AdviKr. Bank of c.n.... ,
Much 1946.
" Bridle, DocruMnls, p. 233. J.S. Maedoru.ld to Soercwy o( Sla~ (or ~tema1 Affaira, 30 Mucll
,....
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confederate party, seems to have fallen from favour with J.S. Macdonald after delivering
an address to the Rotary Club of 51. John's, after which Macdonald reported thai he
spoke "timidly aud vaguely· of confederation,J6 But McEvoy had the continued
encouragement of MacKay, and after a meeting that summer with the new governor I he
began to think that he was to playa pivotal part in the National Convention, intimating
Ihis 10 the staff of his St. John's law office.51
In April Sma!lwood undertook a speaking tour of Bonavista Bay, speaking in
Orange or Society of United Fishennen halls, and he was generally well-received."
Smallwood received support from Protestant clergy, 59 while Bradley carefully avoided
showing his favour of confedcration.60 Like Bradley and the Newfoundland politicians
of old, Smallwood carefully cultivated a knowledge of each community he visited, and
working his way around a community, met with as many of its inhabitants as he could
and learned their feelings, a technique which was to serve him extremely well in the
campaigns to come.61 In early May he had an extensive meeting in Gander with J.S.
Macdonald, who was there attending a conference or. navigation facilities. The two
discussed Smallwood's correspondence with Canadian government departments, about
Jllbid,p.233.
11 Jame. HllIley to the author, 20 May 1992.
" Smallwood, I Chou Conada, pp. 238·9. The S.U.F. wu In Anglican-orieDted fraternal soeicly.
J9 At GlftllSPOnd on 7 May 19-46, Smallwood wlI!Ill!I.i1ited in hi, PrelCDtalion 10 a packed bllIl hy an
Anglican clergyman, who ·put some very II)'mpathetic questiollf to me after my speech". Smallwood, I
C"os~CtJtlDdD,p. 238.
'" F. Gonion Bradley Papcn. ColTellpondr'\~e Wilh J.R. Smallwood, Bradley to Smallwood, 18 April
1946. and Hiller, "Bradley· Political Biullraph,.", p. 37.
" Smallwood, I Chos~ Conada, p. 2.38·9.
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which Macdonald "had a good deal of misgiving-, and Smallwood's sllgg~slion thai
Canada buy Labrador to help finance Newfoundland's provincial services.01
On 25 April 1946. Sir Gordon Macdonald left Britain 10 replace Sir Humphrey
Walwyn as governor. Macdonald was a Welst4man, deeply religious, a teetotaller (which
caused the regulars at Government House 10 resort to one of the estate's lodges for drink)
who had been a Labour M.P. from 1929 to 1942, and at one lime party Whip,6J
Macdonald was a good friend of Clement AtUee, with whom he was in regul1lr
communication. In June 1946, shonly after his arrival, Macdonald wrote Aillee, noting
a growing trend towards responsible government and the appearance of sumt: strong
advocates in favour of confederation, "... though at the moment they are no doubt in a
minority".64 According to Peter Neary, Macdonald "...came to Newfoundland to carry
out the policy of promoting Confederation CO'.I which the United Kingdom had now
embarked and about which an understanding had been reached with the Canadians".~
Macdonald did that31,d more, for he nol only was Attlee'S officer in Newfoundland, but
he would provide continual advice to the confederates and the Canadians and work with
them for the realization of confederation. He chose as his secretary his son Kenneth,
perhaps for the sake of secrecy, and Kenneth himself became a political broker,
t2 Bridle. DoculN!llts, p. 242,1.5. MllCdonald to Made"y, 8 May 1946.
t2 Brian Cahill, "Newfuundland's Labor Go~mor,' ArlolllicAdVONte, lanuary 1948, p. 21 .
.. Al1lee Papers, Bodleian Library, Olford University, Deposit 38, folio 381, Gordon Macdonald to
"Dear Clem", 29lune 1946. Ma~dona1d lIlIIy lave been referring to eonfederates Smallwood and Bradley.
0$ Neary. North Atlantic World, p. 243. Despite Macdonald', minion, be kep' rnalletaquiel, and in
August even lold the Canadian High Commil!lioner tbat tbe constitutional iUlW'! 'would be between
Responsible Govel1lment IUId tbe mainlenan~e of Commission.' See Bridle, DoCWMnl.f, Vol. II, Pan II,
p. 1965, J.S. MacdooaJd 10 MacKay, 17 August 1946.
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~Ieaking" infonnation from Government House to the confederates," and fanning
friendships and alliances with significant people.67
The Canadian government had continued 10 monitor the political atmosphere of
Newfoundland, and all developments which might even remotely affect the chances of
confederation were reported 10 Ottawa. On 28 February 1946, I.S. Macdonald wrote 10
Mackenzie King, infonning him that opinion around the island on future (onns of
government was still "in the formative stage",61 King circul&ted this despatch to Cabinet
members Louis SI. Laurent (Justice), Fr.mk Bridges (Fisheries), Brooke Claxton (Health
and Welfare), D.C. Abbott (Defence), and J.L. llsley (Finance), who in November were
to become members of the Interdepartmental Committee on Canadian-Newfoundland
Relations. 69 Claxton pressed King to consider Newfoundland: "I still feel thai we should
lake a definite stand on Ihis question - We can't afford to lose Nfld. ".10 In March
Canadian attention was drawn 10 the opposition of the NewfO... ·ldland Roman Catholic
Church to confederation, and to the effect this could have on the Roman Catholic portion
of the eleclorate. J.S. Macdonald reponed to Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of
State for External Affairs, that he had a conversation with Mr. Justice Cyril Fox of the
Supreme Court of Newfoundland about the forthcoming National Convention. Macdonald
noted that Fox was "well disposed towards Canada", and because he was a Catholic and
.. Horwood, JIWY, p. 102, footnote.
ff At Ol\e point Kenneth Macdonald dated 1M daughter of I.T. Swyers, a Bonaviatll merchant and
Orangenw. whO!e lawyer was F. Gordon Bradley (Wallace Furlons to tho author. 24 February 1992).
Swyers' company wu listed in the confederates' Hat of suppliers of Soads and S«YicC.9 (J.R. Smallwood
Papen. 4.01.001. Ncwfou.odland Confederate Association. untitled lilt) .
.. Bridle. [}ocumtnts, p. 217, I.S. Macdonald 10 Secretary of State for External Affain, 28 Fcbnwy
,....
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had "many friends and acquaintances, particularly in Roman Catholic circles... his opinion
is worth recording".71 Canada was familiar with Church involvements in the politics of
previous attempts al confederation in Newfoundland. and was taking no chances in
having to deal with unknown factors. The Church was lhe single strongest apponcOl 10
confederntion raced by those who wished to see Newfoumlland become a part of Canada.
or all the long-term interests which were taken into account through the entire period,
from lhe lime of the earliest constitutional policy-making and implerncnlalion 10 the
referenda and the settlement of the issue, concern over the Church's opposition 10
confederation penneated and preoccupied External Affairs and the Dominions Office.
Roman Catholic reasons for opposing confederation in Ihe mid-1940s were
complex, and some went back 10 Ihe early nineteenth century. In 1832 urv.ler Bishop
Michael A, Fleming, the Church look part in lhe fight for representative government,
and eventually won the right to a share of legislative funds with which to run a
denominational educalion system.n Fleming's successor, Bishop John T. Mullock
played a significant part in the fight for responsible government, which was won by a
Catholic-supported Liberal party in 1855. In 1861 Mullock look a most active part in the
politics of lite Liberal party and in quelling the riots of that year,» from which was
1> Ibid., p. 1.27, J.S. Mac::donatd 10 Norman Robertson. MAI'l:h IS, 1946. As early ll!i 1941 Robert!lOn
was told by Scott Mac::doll.lld'ipredccwor, CharlesJ. Bun:hcll, lhal'Mr. JUlliecDllnfieldi•• very Ilrong
advocate ofeoofcdcnlion,!IO also i. Cyril Fox... " ibid., p. 10, BUl'l:hcll to Robcrtlon, 21 Fchl1llry 1942.
n On FlemIng and the politic. of the day lICe Raymond J. lahey, 'Religion and PolitiCli in
Newfoundtllld: the Anlecedents oflhe GeneraJ Elcelion of 1832', in Newfollndltutd HutIJry R~in1:S. cd.
Melvin BIker (St. John'.: Dcpl.l1menl of Hiltory, Memorial Univel'lity, 1997), pp. 249·263: laJley,
"Michael Anthony Fleming', DlcrlONlry of Quw{itln Biography, Vol. VII, ed. Ftulcw: Halpenny
(Toronto: Univel'lity otTol'l)nto Prell. 1988), pp. 292-300.
7J On Mullock arid lbe politlc.ofbi! lime MIll Frederick Jones, 'John Thomu Mullock",DlcrlofU,l'Y
of CarllJdi4n Biography, Vol. IX, cd. Francesl Halpenny (Toronto: Unlvenity of Toronto Prets. 1976).
pp. S81-S86: JODes, 'Bisbops in PoliliCl: Roman Catholic v. ProlClfant in NewfoundJAAd, 1860·2",
Cmradian Historical Rni/ew (December 1974): 408-421; and John Pius Greene, 'The InflueDceofReligion
in the Polillc.ofNewfoWldllUld, 18S0·1861" (M.A. tbesl', Memorial Univetlityof Newfoundll/ld, 1970),
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bom the Newfoundland system of equal sectarian division of jobs and public offices
which continued into the 19405,1. In 1869 when an election was fought over
confederation, "the antis eamed the day· when the Church's laity and clergy opposed
confederation along with lhe prominent merchants of SI. John's arld Conception Bay, and
when merchant ranks were divided making it impossible for the confederates 10 carry the
an overwhelming anti-confederate vole in Catholic districts." According to J.K. Hiller,
"To the Catholic mind, union spelled ruin, and its advocates were traitors~.16 Bishop
Mullock thought that if confederation came, "the education of our people [might] be
laken oul of the hands of the local clergy and transferred to a Board in a remote Province
notorious for its anti-Catholic spirit.. .. ft71 Following the defeat of confederation, key
anti-confederate Catholic MHAs Peter Brennan and Thomas Talbot were revered by Ihe
Church as Catholic heroes for preserving responsible government," while confederate
Catholics such as John Kent and Ambrose and Edward Shea were allowed to fade into
oblivion.
By the time Edward Patrick Roche became Archbishop of St. John's in 1915, the
Church had much experience with both politics and confederation, and 10 these issues Ihe
archbishop was to prove the most alert of aU the bishops of the diocese of St. John's.
Roche was born in Placentia on 19 February 1874, the eldest son of Edward and Mary
1< Even Water Street merchants showed preferenCe! whcn hiring and 10 cmployees and eu,tomel'll of
their own relieiou$ perllWlfion. Edward FitzGerald to the author, 21 March 1989.
'/l Jamu K. Hillcr, "Confederation Defeated: thc Election of 1869", Netifoundialld In 1M Njn~lttnth
and 1'w~ntitth Cmlllrits, edlI. lame! K. Hillcr and Peter Neary (Toronto; Uolvcl'llity of Toronto Prcs.s,
1980),p.82.
1o tbld.• p. 71.
T1 MuUock's Lentcn petoral sermon, in '17lt Nt!VtfounJlandrr, 6 March 1867.
II Brennan and Talbot wcre posthumously mcmoriali~ by hugc stained gles window, in thc Roman
Catholic Cathedral at 51. JaM',.
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Roche,79 the latter of whom was a staunch confederate in 1869. and saved Ambl'OS¢
Shea from being stoned to death by anti-confederates. to Orphaned al age ten, Edward
was sent to 51. John's to live with an aunt and 10 receive his early education. He wa1i a
pupil of the thorough and disciplined Irish Christian Brothers at 51. Patrick's Hall, and
laler at St. Bonaventure's College. II Like most of the Newfoundland priests of his day,
he studied at All Hallows' College, Dt,blin, and was ordained on 24 June 1897,11 A shy
and quiet man with a certain humility, a scholar with a mastery of English and Latin. and
an adept administrato,r with an eye for detail, he quickly rose through Church mnks 10
become the pastor of the Cathedral, and Vicar General of the St. John's Archdiocese
within len years of his ordination. As a priest and later as a bishop, he was respected by
Roman Catholics,U and by people of all denominations. His word was as good as law,
and so were his considered opinions.
When Archbishop Howley died on 15 October 1914, Monsignor Roche became
the administrator of the diocese:; on 18 February 1915 he was named Archbishop-Elect;
and on 29 June he was consecrated Archbishop, the youngest in the British Bmpire.
Presiding over 100,000 lay Catholics, and 200 priests, nuns, and brothers, he was a
19 Roche'J flther wu from St. JOM'S and llW1.gcd the Anglo-American telegnph c.ble JtltiOlll1
Placenti.; his motber wu an O'Reilly from PlleeDti•. Sec Presentation Convent Archives, Cllhcdllli
Square, St. 10M'S, filC5 on Atehhisbop Edw.rd P. Roche.
10 Sec: "Power of the Pen' recalls battle for Confcdellltion', 1h~ SutUkty Telegr(lnl, 31 Mlrch 1991,
p.6.
" George Allin frceker, 'Most Reverend Edward Patrick Roelle 1874·19~..., An:hbl!hrop of SI. lohn'.
(1914-1950)~,1hr Cerrr~nary of/he BtUmm OJ/htdraJ of St. John the &plut (SI. John'.: RobinlOn and
Company, 19S5),p. 187.
n ibid., p. 187.
n Fr. Thomal MoakJer to the autbor, 2 April 1989.
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"Newfoundland palriol", '" a "Prince of the Church" who played the part of the
successor to Bishops Fleming, Mullock, and Howley, all of whom were not only staunch
defenders of the faith, but prelates unafraid to take a public political stand when they
believed it wamnled.u Roche was unshakable once he made up his mind, and a finn
believer in making his personal views known, disliking both open disobedience and any
conduct of affairs behind his back.16 Roche was the Metropolitan of Newfoundland, and
disliked dealing with :he Ottawa-based Apostolic (papal) Delegate to Canada and
Newfoundland, Archbishop Ildebrando Antonutti,l7 and throughout his episcopacy he
avoided contact with him. Most Roman Catholics respected Roche's insight and
authority, and he was held in the same esteem in which the Newfoundland Catholic
clergy of previous centuries were held by their spiritual charges.
The exact extent to which the influence of Archbishop Roche was wielded in the
1940s confederation debate remains unknown. !M ample evidence exists of his previous
role in Newfoundland politics, and in the words of one observer, Newfoundland
traditionally had three centres of power: ~This office [the governor's], the police chief
ofSt. John's, and, the "Man on the HiW -the bishop or archbishop. Nothing could ever
be done without his consent".U But if the partnership between Church and state under
responsible government was traditionally hand-in-glove, there were also occasions when
church and state conflicted. In 1913 Archbishop Howley condemned William Ford
II As indicated by Roche's memorialllhlet in the Basilica of SI. John tbe 81pdst, in SC. John's.
Il "Prince of the Church" is an iJlfonnaltiUe given by Catholiell 10 senior billbopl in the Catholic
Chureh.
.. Fr. MoaIr.ler to the aUlhor, 2 April 1989.
n Han. Robert S. Furloog 10 the author, 30 April 1992, William J. Ryan 10 lbe author, 13 September
199I.aodMyluFurlongtotheautbor,21 March 1989•
.. HOll. James A. McGrath to lbe aulbor, 21 August 1991.
.)
Cooker's Fishennen's Protective Union because it opposed denominational education and
had overtly Orange connections, and because Howley percdved it as a socialist
organization and a secret society.n After Howley's death and before Rocht:'s
installation, Roche complained 10 Prime Minister Edward Morris about tfle SlaWs of
Catholic civil servants. and after his consecration he was an even more vehemenl
opponent of eoakcr than Howley, becoming known as the "Placentia Machiavcl" and
"TIle Borgia From Branch".'I() BUI Roche enjoyed the staunch suppon of two imponalll
men's associations which had been involved in Newfoundland's political life: lhe Knight~
of Columbus, a Catholic secret society, and the Benevolent Irish Society, an Irish
fraternal organization dating from 1806.91 Aware oflhe advantages conferred by support
from the bishop or archbishop of St. John's. prior to 1933 political hopefuls and evcn
seasoned politicians like Sir Robert Bond and Sir Richard Squires sought the archbishop's
approval and advice for their candidacy at election time. In exchange the arcllbishop had
their ear and they his advice throughout their tenns of office.on Squires' bluSlCry
Finance Minister, Major Peter Cashin, regularly went to II a.m. Sunday Mass at the
Cathedral. and afterwards to the Palace for an infonnal chat with the archbishop aOOn!
.. See 1M MlcDonlld. 'To £Dell Hi!: Own' William CoaYr and rltr Fish~nnM~ Pror«rlw Union In
N~oundland Poliria, 1908-1925, ed. J.K. Hiller (St.lohn',; In"ilute ofSocilllllld Economic Re!un:h,
1987), pp. 38-41. Coater liter hid to deal with Roche (whom Mad)onlld Qtegoriud u 'profoundly
reactionary') during his 1917 cloctioneampllign.
10 Ibid., pp. 66.7.
fl Roche WlIi!I in!trnmental in obtllining tbe lacilllJlProval of a wary Archbishop Howley in 1909 for
the establishment of Ihe K of C in Newfoundland !ee Kalb!)'o Pike, 7h~ Knilthts of Columhu.~ in
N~owulIQnd, NewfoundlllDd Hi!toriul Society Pllmphlel Number 9 (SI. JOhn'l: The Nevdoundlll1d
Hi~toricll Society, 1985), p. 8. On the history of the 8.1.5. !ee Noel Veitcb, "The Contribulion oflhe
Benevoleollri!h Society 10 Educalion in NewfoundlllDd From 1823 10 1875" (M.A. lhuil, 51. Prand.
Xavier Universily, 1965), and Ctflttnary Volume Btrlffl)/ttlt Irl.rh Soc/tty (Corle: Guy IIIli Company.
1906).
n MacDonald. To Each His Own, Pl). 76-8, 79-80, 84.
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the week's political events.'" When a riol ransacked the House of Assembly in 1932,
Roche's clergy were instrumental in saving Squires from a mob bent Ofl lynching him.
Monsignor McDennott was sent from the Cathedral to try and quiet the mob, while
Fathers Pippy and 51. John spirited Squires out of the Colonial Building 10 safety,9<I
One of the first experiences of the Commission of Government with the customary
rights of the churches occurred in March 1935, when the Commission attempted to
interfere with denominational education. With the ladt support of the Dominions Office,
the Commission wished to abolish the Church~comrolled denominational superintendents
of education, who ~were a law unto themselves",9J and bring them into the civil
service, and it also wished to impose auditing standards for the system, aud to establish
minimum qualifications for teachers.9/i An acrimonious banle ensued with Archbishop
Roche and Anglican Bishop William C. White, who both quietly but deftly fought the
proposals, and the Commission, especially British Commissioners H.N.R. Trentham and
Thomas Lodge, Commissioner John Hope Simpson later noted:
It was a most anxious day. It was clear that we could not continue to administer
effectively if two-thirds of the population - the Catholics and the Anglicans - were
definitely hostile. There were all sorts ofthreats.... in fact the R.C. Archbishop
had threatened that if we passed the bill, he would order the RC. Commissioner
[W.R Howley] to resign, and would not allow an R.C. to replace him - that the
action of the Commission should be fonnally condemned from the altar of every
RC. church in the Island - that no R.C. should be allowed to take part in the
Jubilee celebrations or to accept the King's Jubilee Medal. The Anglican Bishop
•• Thomas Cahill 10 the aUlbor, 26 May 1992.
.. WilliamJ. Browne, £ighly-Four Y~rsQ Ntw[oundlander{St. John'a: W.J. Browne, 1981), pp. 199-
200. Browne noted tbat he clllied the arehbishop asking for h~lp.
tj Phillip MtC.llllI, "The Educuional Polity of the Commission of Govemment". NFS, Vol. 3, No.
2 (Fall 1987): 20Jand n.
.. Sec Peler Neal)', "J.B. Hope Simpson's AttOUnl of Sir John Hope Simpsoo's Ncwfound.land Career,
1934-6". NFS, Vol. 6, No. I (SpMg 1990): 90. 102, codootes 101 and 102.
was equally hosl:ile, but evtdently has not similar dictatorial and disciplinary
power. In the outpor1s we should have had all the Anglicans against us. 101
Whether Roche actually made these threats, and whether he could have carrioolhcm out
remains uncertain." 11le Commission evenrually prevailed when Roche and White lin.'!
Howley and agreed to a set of modified measures, but denominational education was not
dismantled. Clunerbuck of the Dominions OffICe thought that acttons of Trenlham and
Lodge in pressing the issue were "wholly indefensibie", and that as a result, "lhe
denominational system is now more finnly eslablished lhan ever"." The Commission
and the Dominions Office had received quite a scare. Following this confrontation wilh
the Church's historical hold on government and education, they learned to lake much
greater care when engaging the archbishop in future dealings.
Concern over the preservation of Catholic education fuelled Archbishop Roche's
first known statement in opposition to confederation in 1916, when he made his firsl
address to the priests of his archdiocese. The speech was a milestone in clerical speeches,
and set the religious, social, and political outlook of the Newfoundland Catholic Church
for the next 35 yean. Strongly emphasizing the need for unity among the clergy, the
archbishop clearly linked the confederation issue with Catholic educattona.1 rights, and
stated the Church's responsibility and policy to protect them:
If we are to put forth our greatest endeavours, ... it can only be by
working together in hannony, unity and co-operation. Hitherto we have, it must
be admined, suffered and suffered severely through lack of concentrated aelion.
'" Ibid., p. l02endl\ole 102•
.. For the Roche·Howley cOlTC5pondcncc sec Exhibits/or Policy GriellQnct - Nl!W{oundlond TttJchrr.,·
Assodll/ltm vr. lilt Roman CllrhoJlcSmom lJogrd/orExplolts-Whltl Bay, Vol. El, pp. 122-4; 135-6, 131,
R(l(:hc to Howley, 23 Fcbruary 1935,29 April 1935, and 20 Augult 1935.1 thMk Mr. Junell.. GlUne,
Q.C., of St. John'. (or IcItUl. me _ Ihil document UI hilposKldOll. Roehc'l 23 FebNat)' letter relCrvcd
"tbe right Ie communicate Ibil leiter Ie the Catholic people of Ncw(oundIUld".
.. McCann, '£dueatiOllll Policy", NFS, Vol. 3, No.2 (Falll9S1): 205-6.
46
The ancient policy of "divide et impera" is as powerful and effective in this age
of the world as it was in the days of old.
There is no part of the British Empire, in faci. I may say there is no part
of Ihe world where the Catholic Church as a social and civic force can exercise
gre. '-::T influence or wield greater power, if properly directed, than it can in this
ancient colony of Newfoundland .
... I hardly need say that power and influence should never be used for
political purposes. If the Church stands aside and aloof from all political parties,
then in all matters where Catholic rights and Catholic interests are concerned it
will practically be in a position to dictate the policy of any government.
The preservation of our denominational system of education rests entirely
with ourselves.
or recent years there have been rumours, persistent rumours...of
Confederation with Canada. Of the truth or otherwise of these rumours I know
no more than the man in the street. I have no inside information, and I know as
much and as little about the possib:lities in that direction as anyone listening to
me. II is a large question involving vital interests of our country, involving very
grnve financial and economic issues upon which I do nOl wish to pronounce any
opinion. I have no doubt, however, that if ever such a question should arise the
people will get an oppoltunity of passing upon it. It will then be our duty as
citizens, as Newfoundlanders, as lovers of our country, to examine every phase
of the question minutely.... it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that it may
be incumbent llpon us to tender our advice to the Catholic people... should the
issue ever become a real and vital one unless our educational terms are acceded
to, no matter how attractive the other aspects of the question may be, we will be
forced to give it OUT most pronounced and uncompromising oppositionYIO
In the archbishop's mind, the issues of confederation and the Church's ability to maintain
the educational status quo were inextricably linked. Confederation was acceptable to
Catholics only if Catholic educational tenos were accepted and funded by a state in
which they had a say. Furthermore, the status quo could only be preserved by a united
clergy. While in 1968 Richard Gwyn thought that Roche's motive for opposing
.. Edward PJitriek R()<;h~, "Addre.q to the Clergy oftbe Provinee' given totbe annual priests' retreat
in 1916", St, John's: Newfoundland Quarterly Print. 1916. pp. 4, 5.9-10.
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confederation was ~one of the enigmas of the Confederation battle" ,101 and then
speculated that it could have been because Roche answered only to ROlll~ bUI in
confederation, he 'Would be a lesser personage than the two Canadian cardinals.lOO But
throughout his entire episcopacy Roche consistently opposed il on the grounds of its
threat to Church-sponsored education. It was a position from which he never retreated,
and with Roche's extensive social, familial and culturnlties to the Newfoundland political
community, the Church's position was rarely challenged.10J
By the 194Os, Roche was experiencing health problems, and there ilia)' have been
a certain health-enforced reticence, HI. but true 10 his intentions of 1916, he maintained
an influence on government policy, for both the British and the Canadians sought his
views on the constitutional status of Newfoundland. In September 1942 during the visit
of Clement Anlee, Clunerbuck had met for three hours with Roche and had come away
with the definite impression Mthat the Hierarchy was strongly opposed to any move
towards closer union with CanadaH.'~ In the summer of 1943 Roche reportedly lold
101 Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 107.
1M fbiJ., p. 108. Gwyn also erroneously observed Ihlt Roche bcelme aKhbishop i,l 1917; it was in
1914.
110 Roche was a good fricnd of Captain TholDllS Bonia, M.H.A., of Placentia who was Sir Richard
Squires' Minister of Finl.llte from ApriltoluDe 1923. In 1~24 Roche'.lCCond eousin Mary became the
IiCCOnd wife of William 1. Browne, who at one time WIS the archbishop'. solicitor. Browne himself WIS
related to Roche: both their Illlllhen were O'Reilly. from Plaeen!ia. See Browne, EI"hty-FtlUr Yl"llt"S, pp.
1,96, 128.
'1M Roche suffered from tubeKulosis from his days IS a pri~l. Tl1aUeviate Ihis he made -.n IMU.lI trip
for treatment 10 Saranae in New York. As his health wonene.d, he took up rC!lidcrn:e in a larle hoose,
Beaconsfield, outsi6e SI. 10!ul's close 10 the sanatorium (Fr. MollkJer to the author, 2 April 1989, ..,d
Richard Furlong to the author, 20 Mareh 1989). Yel Robert S. Furlon8, the ChuKh's solicitor, and
W11liam 1. Ryan, a church architect, maintained tblt Roche WIS still ver)' accessible (R,S. Furlong to the
author, 21 November 1991, and W.l. Ryan to thc author, 13 September 1991).
•~ Bridle, Docunumts. p. 165,1.5. Macdonald to Secretary of State for ElttemaJ Affairs, 21 AUiu.1
1945.
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the Goodwill Mission thai responsible government should be restored, or as an
allemative, Newfoundland "should have a ronn of government like Northern Ireland with
representatives in the House of Commons in London" ,lOll But on 15 November 1943,
Burchell mel Roche althe Palace in St. John's. where Roche told him that ..... the idea
of Newfoundland gelling back its dominion slatus should not be considered. a~ a
community of 300.000 people should not ask for Dominion status", and that "the future
of Newfoundland was either with England or Canada" ,un It seems thai policy was not
finnly set in Roche's mind, for he later changed and expanded his views on why
Newfoundland should oppose confederation. As far as the British and Canadian
governments were concerned. it was necessary to estimate his influence and seek his
counsel in order 10 make future plans for the island, and his remarks to Burchell must
have provided some temporary relief that the Church would not oppose confederation.
BUI Ihis would nOI last long.
In the summer of 1946, the archbishop made a statement on confederation to Ihe
priests' retreal. After commenling thai the American bases were established on
Newfoulldlalld soil "by prescription" and "withoul the knowledge or consent of the
people", and thai Ihere was
... reason 10 fear that what happened durirlg the war may happen again, and that
Newfoundland's future is likely to be delennined. unless we are on our guard, by
power politics from withoul rather than by the wishes of the people from
within,IOl
I" William J. Browne, ~~ghry-Sn'm Y~rs Q Nro-foutui/(mder{St. John's: W.J. Browne, 1984), p. 44.
107 Bridle, DO~(lts, p. 86, BUfl:hell to Robertson, 16 November 1943.
1101 •AddreJs of Hil Grace the Archbi$hop', given at the elose of lbe PrieJta' Retreat, 1946, p. 2. My
than\l:slo Msgr. David O'Keefe for this.
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lhe archbishop then turned his ancnlion to education. He noted that the Commission of
Government showed an -intelligent appRCialion of the Education situation in
Newfoundland-. and thai
If... the people of this country should decide 10 become a province of Canada -
I hope that conlingcocy will never arise, because it would become an ill-advised
and unfortunate decisMln • immediately the education issue would become a liv~
issue. II is true that in theory in Canada each Province deddes its own
educational policy, but it had to provide the funds. Newfoundland's economy
being what it is, we could never from direct taxation provide the necessary
grants. and education would at once become a Federal question with reslIlls and
consequences thai anyone would foresee. 10'1
Thus, dependence on an unknown quantity of transfer payments from Ottawa was
unacceptable, because it would impinge on the Church's ability to control education.
Then, emphasizing the need for ·infonned public opinion among our Catholic peoph,~·,
and the responsibility of the Church to promote Catholic literature, he noted the
·unaccountable, ....almost suspicious irregularities in the mails· in the delivery of the
Catholic newspaper, Th~ Monilor,110 and the need to keep The Monitor in press as a
vehicle for the Church's concerns. III
As prominent as Archbishop Roche was in St. Jolm's, he did not directly
represent tbe views of the whole Roman Catholic Church in Newfoondland, and his
clergy were divided over the issue of confederation. The pJt:dominantly run.1 antJ very
poor people of the Diocese of 51. George's, stretching along the old French Shore, were
led by Irish-born Bishop Michael O'ReiUy, while the bishop of the Diocese of Harbour
IOflbld.,p.3.
110 711ft Monitor began in 1934 as the newsJeller of St. Patrick', parish in 51. John's, bllt lrew 10
become Ihe newspaper for Ihe An:hdio.:ae of St. John'•.
III "Addn:ss of HilOrace IhCl Archbishop," 1946, pp. 3-4. All pIIrties hid intermillenll\ClWlplper
distribulioo later durioi the coofedel1llioo campaignl, perhaps bctaUle of the practice of Iouini the plpen
ofpolitieal opponenll ioto pondl and rillett, or of the posItnIIler aotdelilleriGJ papers ir he diNJrocd witlt
IhecooLellIl.
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Grace was John M. O'Neill, a Newfoundlander. Both deferred to Roche in matters of
faith and morals, and in most matters as protocol required, they tried to present a unified
appearance behind their archbishop. But O'Reilly was an advocate of confederation, and
would later support the election 10 the National Convention of his pro-confederate bridge
partner William J. Keough, a co-operarive movement organizer around Port-au·Port.lI~
O'Neill remained silently against confederation and loyal 10 his superior, despite attempts
by Smallwood to "convert him".m While letting Roche handle the issue from 51.
John's, O'Neill quietly spoke of his views to his priests,I14 But because of Roche's
infinnity, in the spring of 1945 Fr. Thomas Flynn, the pastor of St. Patrick's parisb (and
founder of The Monitor), was appointed as co-adjutor archbishop,lIJ and Flynn
favoured confederation. J.S. Macdonald reported to Ottawa that soon after the governor's
arrival, Flynn, who was regarded as the "acting head- of the Church, and several or the
clergy, visited Government House. At that time Flynn "spoke favourably of
Confederatior. with Canada" to Govemor Macdonald. 116 The High Commissioner and
the governor may have believed then that Flynn was in command, but in reality he was
nOI, and seems to have had a penchant for disagreeing with his superior. l17
By the reckoning of any politician forced to deal with the reality of sectarian
polilics in Newfoundland, the political views of the Roman Catholic people had to be
'" Dr. Hans Rollm.um to the author, 23 March 1989. Keough was a RolJWl Catholic, and active in
the co.gpel1ltivo movement around the Port-au-Port Peninsula of Newfoundland.
IU Smallwood, "The SIOry", BNF, p. 8.
'" Gregory I. Power 10 Ihe aUlhor, 21 MlII'Ch 1989. O'Neill wu coo,idefllbly younger Ihan Roche,
havingjUSllfllduated from St. Bon', in 1921, when Rocho was already Il/'l;:hbisbop.
III A co.adjutor archbishop assists anotber archbishop in the per(onnanee of hi' clerical duties.
"' Bridle, Do~nt$, p. 243. J.S. Macdonald to Socret&Jy of Stale for External Affairs. 8 May 1946.
111 William I. Ryan 10 Ihe author, 13 Soplembor 1991. Ryan noted !hat Roche and FIYM diSllgrced over
the design during Ihe constructioll of a portion of St. Clue'o Mercy Hospital in 1946-1.
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consklered. In later ages in Newfoundland the Church may have lost a measure of ils
influence, but during the 19305 and 1940s it was embraced by the people as not only a
~Iigious but a cultural and social institution. Roman Catholics were of Irish and French
extraction, and were concentrated in St. John's, the Southern Shore, and Placentia, with
some adherents on the west coast of the island. III 1bey constituted a good fIOl1ton of
Newfoundland's working class in these districts and had some representation in lhe
professional and mercantile class. In 1948 they constituted one-third of the population of
Newfoundland (106,006 Oul of 321,819), and were the dominant denomination in seven
electoral districts. II' The remaining eighteen districts were predominantly comprised
of fishennen and workers in small towns, were primarily Protestant (but had sollie
Catholic enclaves), and accounted for the remaining two-thirds of the population.
Culturally and politically, Catholics strongly supported lheir Church,rro and became
quite sensitive when they perceived it to be under attack. After 1936 with the outbreak
of tbe Spanish Civil War, it was well known that Catholics in 51. John's liked Frnnco
and were appalled at the atrocities which occurred against the churches, 111 With
memories of Attlee's support of the British volunteers, and of the International Brigade
against Franco,l:t2 the accession of the Altice government in lhe United Kingdom was
a bitter pill to swallow. With confederation in the offing, and the Attlce government
involved with t~ conscirutiooal question, Newfoundland Roman Catholics were a
political force with which to be reckoned.
II' See map of Rcligious Denomination" Amul,u Repon, 1933.
"'SeeAppendixl,Tabllll.
IXI Edward Fill:Ocnlldlothllalllhor, 21 MllIdl1989; Wallacc FllrlonllOlhealllhor, 24 Febl\lllry 1992;
&lid Gregory J. Power to the author, 21 J&lIuaty 1992.
1:1 Dr. GeoreeSlorytolheautbor,llJlIII1W)' 1991.
III On Attlee!lee Alan Palmer, ·Clcrne.nllUebud Allleeo Diet/OtlDf)' o/1'wvllidh-Centllf'j History
(Loodoa: PePluin Boob, 1990), pp. 32-3.
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In contrast with Roman Catholics, Newfoundland Methcxlists were quite receptive
10 Canada, as were some Anglicans and members of Ihe Salvation Anny. On 10 June
1925 Ihe.Newfoundland Methodist Church had undergone its own union, and become
part of the United Church of Canada. IZJ Religious books and materials were
standardized, and the United Church hymnal and religious materials in use in
Newfoundland came ftom Canada, not England. 1lf Many residents of predominamly
Methodist communities on Ihe south coast and the north east coast had family connections
and friends in Canad~. who occasionally returned to Newfoundland with evidence of
Canadian wealth,IU and those who could afford an education were often trained at
Canadian universities like Mount Allison, in New Brunswick,l2ll FurthclTI1ore, in St.
John's, the Methodist College Literary Institute, one of Newfoundland's most respected
debating societies, arranged debates on confederation, wh.ich were widely attended,
widely reported. and avidly followed. m Smallwood and Bradley were Methodists, and
their advocacy of confedcl.ttion would not have been lost on their fellow churchmen,
Like the Methodists. since 1945 the Church of England in Newfoundland under
Bishop Philip Abraham had been discussing ttie union with the Anglican Church of
1:1 DayidG. Pitt, "Mctbodilm", EM.. m. p. 525.
1:" Oa Ibil -= Frederick W. Rowe, Inlo Ihe Srram • Memoin ofo NnifCNNiIWld Smator (Toronto;
McGrlw-HiII Ryenoo lJd., 1988), p. t08,
'>l Ibid.• p. 108.
,:> On the 5tRngth orMetbodism on the south coulll1d ill tic.s with Canada sec Eugene Forsey, A Ufe
on th( Fringt - 71l( Mtmoln ofEufmt! Forsey (Toronto: O,;rord U.uycnityPress, 1990), pp. 2-4, 10-11,
I'.
U'J Sec Rowc, /flfO t~Br~dI, p. 109, II1dJamc.s W&de, ·ute,.".1oIIitute, Methodist CoIlC&Il', EM..
III, pp. )19·320.
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Canada. m Newfoundland Anglican clergy were interested in participlliing in the
Canadian Church's retirement fund, which provided better pensions than their own
fund. 119 In 1948 f~,e Newfoundland Church of England synod decided to tlCcome Ilaft
of the Anglican Church of Canada, and the two were united on 7 Septcmrer 1949. IJO
Brigadier Clarence D. Wiseman, Territorial Commander of the Salvation Anny, was a
friend of Smallwood's. and the Army later provided assistance to the confederates,lll
It must be stressed that denominational persuasions did not universally equate with
political persuasions. But if the Roman Catholic Church in St. John's opposed
confederation in part because of its historic involvements in the Newfoundland state; the
Church of England. the United Church, and the Salvation Anny outside the city favoured
confederation in part because of the ties their churches had with their sister churches in
Canada.
The election of delegates to the National Convention took place on 2l1une 1946.
Forty-five members were returned for 38 districts, among them Bradley anti
Smallwood. m Labradorians voted for the first time and elected Rev. Lester Lecland
Burry, a United Church minister, while fellow confederate William J. Keough was
elected for Port au Port. For the anti-eonfederates, from 51. 1ohn's came lawyer Gordon
';II See Hans Rollmann, Rtl/SiollS SJudlu 1901 - Religion in Ntlifoundlund and Lubrudflr,' 1111'
Ninelunth and Twtntitlh Cmruries (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1990), p. 4.5.
I~ Ibid., p. 4.5.
IXlfbid.,p.4.S.
III J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.32.001, Petrt de Grave Pre-Confederation, J. Dawe, Coley'a Point, to
Smallwood, 4 May 1948; Horwood, Joey, p. 114.
'11 Smallwood later elaimed tbat on nomioation day, 00 opponent appcared to challenge him for hia
district, so he bad one DOminated. When be was elected to the Convention with the larged majority of any
member, having campaigned on a confederate ticket. thia fact allowed him to avoid the embarr..ament of
beingelectedunopposed,andtbedignityofitbeinguid that tbe elcctorate bad acholce. SceSmallwood.
I Chose Canada, p. 241 (footnote).
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Higgins (51. John's City Easl) and Frank Fogwill (St. John's East Extern), both Labour
pany candidates, while ex-Finance Minister Major Peter Cashin, the son of fonner Prime
Minister Sir Michael P. Cashin and brother-in-law of Justice Cyril Fox, was elected for
51. John's West. For the same district were returned businessman Ches Crosbie, and
writer-broadcaster Michael Harrington, who had become The Barre/man after Smallwood
moved 10 Gander. Cashin, who was quite unpredictable and no stranger to flip-flop
politics from his Squires days, vigorously campaigned against the Commission of
Government and even agiiinst the idea of a Convention. III But he had been in Montreal
two years previously. and his time there infringed by a shon period on the residency
qualification for a candidate to the Convention. IU two years before nomination day, J I
May.1ll Another potential delegate, businessman CaJvert C. Pratt, lived just outside the
district he wished 10 contest and was also disqualified, but Cashin had his lawyer J.B.
McEvoy go to Government House and plead his case with Governor Macdonald, who
quielly waived the requirement and pennitted Cashin to run, fearing that the exclusion
of Cashin from the Convention could cause political trouble. 1J6 Cashin ran and got
elected.
Others members elected to the Convention included Captain Charles L. Bailey,
a fishennan and schooner~masterfrom New Chelsea who was returned for Trinity South;
Pierce Fudge. President of the Newfoundland Labourers Union, for Humber, and Samuel
F. Vincent, a small businessman, for Bonavista North. The Convention had four other
I» Bridle, Do~nrs, p. 'lIS, J.5. MacdoMld, Canadian Higb Conuuissioner in Newfoundltnd to
SecretaI)' of State for E~lemal Affairs, 23 FebtuaJ)' 1946. On Cashin's previou! po1ilietl earur sec Noel,
Pofilla ill NeM{ound/(UI(J. p. 197, and passim. Cuhin wu well known fOf his bluster:tnd mood swings.
1J< Thomas Cahill to lhe autbor, 11 May 1992.
III See 1946 National Convenlioll Act, Acts o/tht Honourab/t Commwiml 0/ GovmlJ1U!tl/ 1946 (51.
John's: King's Prinlcr, 1946), p. tw.
I"ThomuCahillandJ~Halleytotheaulbor, II May 1992.
union men electoo in addition to Fudge, and only five mem~rs out of forty-five had
previous experience as members in Newfoundland Houses of Assembly.111 According
to Jeff Webb, it was -tile most broadly based assembly the colony had seen in tenus of
class and rural representation-. 1lI But there was little interest in tbe colony's political
future among Newfoundlanders. Eight deJegates were elected by ~tamation, and only
one-third of Newfoundlanders voted in the election, u, 'The American Consul General
observed that participation in the voting had been -disappointingly low-. 1-10 With no
political parties and no issues, the low turnout and popular indifference were hardly
surprising. On the other hand. this low turnout could have indicated Newfoundlandeffl'
relative satisfaction with the Commission of Government. but more evidence exists to
suggest that this electoral behaviour was apathy and ignorance, and not approval. Some
candidates even proved their ignorance of the what the Convention was by making
promises they would fulfJ.! if elected.'·' But as Peter Neary noted. satisfied that tile
delegates had been chosen, and that -the Convention's legitimacy was accepted-. '.J the
Dominions Offi·~ and the Commission pressed on ·.... ith their plans.
In See Bertram G. Ril&', "E1ediora", ENL I. p. 120. These were Bradley, Cabin, 1bolnaI
A!bboume, Ken Brown, aDd RoIal)d .st.rkes.
IJI Webb, "Convm.tKJa.", p. .51.
'" Riggs, "Elccliora", ENL I, pp. 72().1. These were P. Wellinlton Crummey, S.P. Vineent, Ken
Brown, Alfred Watloa, Jr., W.I. Banfield, J.T. Spencer, Edgu RObeN, IIJld John J. Mac:CormKk. Ibid.
indle-.tc9tbat 107,378 votes we~ cast in the National Convention elections, out of a total population (See
Appendi,;I,Tablcl)of321,819,
1«1 G.K. Dolll1d, U.S. ConJul General in NewfoundlllJld, to Scc~l.ary of Stale, Washington, 17 July
1946, as cited in Ne.uy. Nonh AtlQlltlc World, p. 280.
"I IbUl., p. 280.
ICIlbUl., p.280,
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Since it had been established by law that the Chainnan of Ihe Convention would
be a Justice of Ihe Supreme Coon,143 Mr. Justice Cyril Fox was chosen. He was
presented with a -nole of guidance" from Lord Addison which set forth the procedures,
rights, and topics of discussion correctly within the Convention's purview. II assumed
thai the Convention would discuss
(a) the return of responsible government (b) the retention of the system of
Commission government for a definite period, with or without some indication
of the steps to be taken at the end crthat period, (c) confederation with Canada,I'"
and suggested that the Convention send a delegation to Canada for the purpose of
obtaining infonnation when the question of confederation was discussed. It also noted
that
It should not be presumed that no course for which there is a substantial backing
would be excluded from the proposals recommended for submission 10 a
referendum merely because it was not favoured by an actual majority of the
members of the Convention.I.'
Nothing was left 10 chance, and even when the fall sitting began and some Convention
members attempted to call Commissioners publicly to testify and answer questions, this
was overruled. I~
Prior to the calling of the National Convention, bolh those in favour of
confederation and those against it were largely operating from set positions, policies and
ideas, but there was no focal point. Opposition to confederation was disorganized, but
the advocates of confederation, particularly Bradley and Smallwood, were quite
organized. They had the advantages of Ihe early support of the Dominions Office and the
IOl Ibld.,p. 285,
,.. PRO DO J5IIJ46/N.402I48, Addison 10 Newfoundland governmenl, 17 June 1946,
10.1 PRO DO J5IlJ46, "Terms of Reference for Convention Il1d Plebiscite',
,* Neary, North Atlantic World, p. 286.
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Government of Canada, a definite plan for proceeding with coni'edemtion, and the
blossoming leadership of the ardent, if impetuous, Smallwood. The seeds of the political
movements were also present in the Convention: the confederates were Smallwood and
Bradley, with the supporting cast of Keough, Buny, and Vincent; while the anli-
confederates included Cashin, Higgins, Crosbie, Bailey, Fudge, and Harrington. The
election and meeting of the National Convention marked a turning point. Donllan! since
1933, public partisan politics re-awakened in Newfoundland, and public hopes and
antagonisms were focused away from the Commission of Government and onto Ihe
politicians who were to emerge as leaders in the new political creation of the Dominions
Office.
Chapter 3
The National Convention, 1946-1948
Just after the Convention elections in the summer of 1946, Smallwood look
Bradley to meet Canadian High Commissioner J.S. Macdonald at Canada House on
Circular Road in S1. John's, and Smallwood laler note<! that the three were quite
~a"xious for anonylt'ity· ,I At the meeting they discussed confederation. It seems thai
soon thereafter, Smallwood and Bradley had an extensive meeting at Bradley's house in
Bonavista, where the two divided up the political posts they would take should
oonfederalion occur: Bmdley chose to become Newfoundland's minister in Ottawa, and
Smallwood wished to become premier.1 JUSI before the Convention opened, Smallwood
went to Ottawa, where he met McEvoy's friend R.A. MacKay, and Nonnan Robertson,
and was introduced 10 Mackenzie King through his assistant John W. Pickersgill.
Smallwood met cabinet ministers Brooke Claxton, Clarence Decatur Howe, and Louis
St. Laurent, from whom and from whose staffs he received considerable assistance in
gathering infonnation about Canada. He also had discussions about the six senatorships
and the Newfoundland representative in the federal cabinet which would be required
under confederation,] But by the end of September, when Bradley informed J,S,
Macdonald that he would support confederation if acceptable terms of union were
extracted from Ottawa by a Convention delegation, Macdonald deemed Bradley to be
"the most promising man" to lead a confederate pany,4
ISmallwood, I Chose O:molkl, p. 244-5, II would be unlikely that litis wn Bradley's firsl meeting with
Macdonald, as Smallwood implied, Jr it were, then the "McDonald" written of by Bradley earlier wn
Governor Sir Gordon Macdonald,
I See Smallwood, I C!WSt Canada, pp, 244·5; Smsllwood, "The Slol)'", BNF, p. 8, Gwyn,
Smallwood, p, 18; and Hiller, "Bl'Idley - Political Bioglllphy", p. 35.
'ft,A. MscKay, "When be Wu Unknown in Ottawa", Call MtJrwy, pp, 37-9,
• Bridle. Docummrs, p, 291, 1.5. Macdonald to Secretary of Sute for EXlemal A(flllrs, 30 September
,....
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Once the National Convention was summoned. Smallwood and Brndky seized llkl
opportunity 10 assess the extent of support among delegates for a motion to include
confederation on Ihe ballot paper. On the train to St. John's with other Convencion
delegates. Smallwood assiduously sounded 001 the opinions of all delegates on
confederation, and as Don Jamieson later wroce,
Smallwood was everywhere. He bunon-holed prospects in diner, smoker, and
pullman. wherever he could find them. When nauery was caUed for. he WAS
shamelessly lavish with his compliments. If an appeal to ambition might produce
the desired response, he hinted broadly at great rewards 10 come. One result of
this technique was that three delegates left the train to St. John's each convinced
Ihat he was assured the job ofMinistcr of Finance if Confederation lriumphet.l nnd
Smallwood came inlo his own!'
When members arrived at the Newfoundland Hotel, Smallwood continued the squccze,
reponing each succcss or failure to Bradley.6 In the summer of 1946, there also
coalesced an infonnal working group of confederates, consisting of Smallwood, poet-
writer Gregory 1. Power (from Dunville, a cousin of Archbishop Roche,l and the only
Roman Catholic in the group), labour organizer Harold Horwood (whom Smallwood met
through a mutual friend. civil servant and anttquarian Nimshi Crewe), and Philip Forsey.
a Grand Bank-bom teacher. They wcre later joined by Irving Fogwill, the brother of
Convcntion delegatc Frank Fogwill.· Significantly, Fogwill and Horwood edited, and
Forscy contributed articles to Protocol, a Newfoundland poetry and prose journal which
in May 1946 criticized Smallwood's ·Confedcralionist propaganda-rbapsodics· and look
J Oooald JamielOll, 'An Account of lbe Events teadinl Up to !he EIltry of NewfOWJdtand into the
Canldilll eonfedentioD", typeKripe, Cet1trc for Ne.... foundland Studia, Queen Elil.lbeth II Librlry,
Memorial UniversityofNcwfouodlaod, prepared for the Department of Rcaional Md Economic ExpanslOll,
Ottawa, 1914, p. 4; also see JamiClOll, "I Saw tbe Fipt", BNF, p. 72.
• William J. Banfield, "He Had Whatll Takcs', CQIl Me )C/rY, p. SO.
• On Powcr sec Horwood, lory, p. 75. Power', cousin Blanche FitlPatrick of Placentia, Wall Peter
Cashin's wife (Gregory J. Power to the author, 27 January (992).
I 00 the eDofede:nte oraaniutioo whicb was extant ~rore the Convention, lee Horwood, J~, pp.
73-6.
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an anti-confederate stand.9 At one point Horwood and his brother Charles had a brief
flirtation with the supporters of responsible govemment,10 But by the end of the
summer, they were working under Smallwood from his Devon Row apartment in 51.
John's. This inner group, which had a sirong socialist cast, eventually became known
among their opponents as the -Bolsheviks·. 1I
The Convention opened on II September 1946, and the ceremonies were
broadcast over the government-controlled radio station VQNF. 11 Soon after this, a move
was made to arrange for the broadcast of all the proceedings. Judge F.J. Morris wrote
Commissioner Albert Walsh, suggesting thai the Convention be broadcast ftto make the
people aware of the issues", I) Governor Macdonald was also intent on broadcasting the
Convention proceedings, and requested Ihe Broadcasting COIporation of Newfoundland
to do this. I. But the BeN's board of governors thought that Macdonald's intervention
would infringe on their autonomous control of the network, and they replied that they
Vlould only comply with a direcl order from the government. Fearing a confrontation
which would reveal his hand, Governor Macdonald mel with the BCN Chainnan, George
Williams, and they arranged for Ihe Convfntion Ch"innan Justice Cyril Fox 10 write Ihe
• Proforol, Vol 4 (May-June 1946): 1-2, and Robert H. Cuff, 'W. Irving Fogwill". ENL I, p. 242.
'0 Robert S. Furlong 10 the author, 21 November 1991.
" See: Horwood. J~, p. 103, Md Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 75. Botb writers disagru over who was in
the inner group. lIlld wbo IIlld how many the "Bolsheviks' were.
01 VONF wu supervised by tbe Board or Governors or tbe BroadCASt Corpol1ltiOD or NewrouodlaDd,
whichlll5weredtotheConuoiuiCHlerorrinance.
"Webb, "ConventiOll",pp.62-).
"Jamieson, No PloftFor Foofs. p. 48.
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governors requesting that the proceedings be broadcasl.'~ According 10 Jnmi~son, the
BeN was thus "responding to the Convention Chairman rather than to the
govemmenl".16 According 10 Webb, the effect of the broadcasting of the Convention
was tremendous, and gave the clear opportunity to Smallwood, who was to dOll1inalc lhe
Convention. IT The microphones re-appeared on 28 October in time for Ihe first repons
of the Convention's Forestry and Education committees. Smallwood was fortunate
enough 10 have had one microphone placed just in fronl of him in the ell,Hnber, II and
according to Convention delegate Michael Harrington, Smallwood had prior knowledge
of tile retum of the microphones.19 Smallwood later admitted that from the oulset of the
Convemion he had closed his mind to all options but confederalion,:lO and thai "the only
hope" from the beginning was to go over the delegates' heads "in a direct appe..l.I to the
Newfoundland people" .11 This he proceeded to do, and he soon becamt: Nt:wfoundland's
prophet of confederntion.
Courtesy of the Dominions Office '~e Convention was furnished with an expert
advisor on government, Professor Kenneth C. Wheare, a Fellow of All Souls' College,
" fox's aunt·in·law manicd former Prime Minister Sir E.P. Morris, whose brother wu ludge Frank
Morris. The author tbank!! Mr. David Fox for this information. fox may have suggested Ihll Morris write
the leller in Ihe first pllcc.
"lamieson,No Plar:e For Fools, p. 48.
11 Webb, 'ConveDtioo', p. 1.50. Webb Dotes that in 194.5 there were 37,676 radios in Newfounf.lland.
and thlt from anecdoW evidence these were unfailingly tuned in 10 tire Convention proceedings each
evening.
"Smallwood, 'The &orr", BNF, p. 14.
" Michael F. Harrington to tbe luthor, 16 July 1992; also see Harrington, "A MaUet of Memory',
The r.~ning TtlegnJffl. n.p.,.5 April 1968.
:!I Smallwood, "The Slary", BNF, p. 8.
l'IbId.,p.12.
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Oxford, whose newly-published Federal Government became a favourite text on the
lopic. 11 The Convention divided itself into a variety of commillees which would make
inquiries and report back to the larger body, and the chainnan of each committee sat on
a Steering Committee; among ils members were Bradley and Peter Cashin. In early
October 1946 the Committee held a secret meeting, at which Chairman Fox proposed thaI
a delegation be sent to Ottawa to enquire about tenns of union. Cashin opposed this. but
Bradley thought it was a good idea. Bradley reported the idea to Smallwood, who had
been itching for just t~e occasion for such publicity, and who on 25 October moved the
resolution," which was seconded by Gordon F. Higgins. At virtually at the same time,
on 30 OCtober, Mackenzie King in Ottawa agreed to receive a delegation should the
Convention wish to send oneY In response to Smallwood's speech moving the
resolulion, which glorified the benefits of confederation, Cashin called Smallwood a
Quisling and a Judas Iscariol, and Michael Harrington launched an acrimonious debate,
challenging the correctness of sending delegalions when the convention's primary lask
was 10 detennine Newfoundland's self-sufficiency,:l:I Harrington also charged Smallwood
with bribery, ac.::using Smallwood of offering him '1 position on the Onawa delegation
in exchange for support for the motion,26 If this was true, it would not be the first nor
the last anempt by Smallwood 10 gail! support through questionable means, Other
opposition followed, including a dramatic address by Ken Brown, during which he
charged that in his hand was a document which, if revealed, would convince the
'" Kenneth C. Wbeare, Fd~raI CioYtrn~1lt (London: Oxford Universily Pres" 1946). Wbean: h.d
been advised by the Dominion, Office not to encourage tbe Convention to look to Britain for financial
Imbtutce. See Webb, "Convention" p. 51.
D Webb, "ConventiOll", p, 66.
,. Blue, "WLMK', Attitude", NQ, Vol. LXXXll, No.4, (Spring 198'/); 29.
ljWebb,'ConventiOll",p,61,
)0 Ibid., p. 67. and Micbael F, Harrington to the author, 16 July 1992.
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Convention and Newfoundland to reject confederation.n AI that moment Brown had a
stroke, from which he never recovered, and the document was 1051.11 Even 1000:gh
Smallwood's motion was defeated on 5 November, it was significant. for it drew the
suppon of Bradley, who openly declared his sympathies for the first lime. ~
Smallwood's motion may have been judged "ill timed" by Wheare, writing to the
Dominions Office, but like Wheare, Smallwood most likely knew of the Dominions
Office's timetable for events in Newfoundland, which had 10 be again revised, and of
Canadian willingness to meet a delegation. The Dominions Office was content to let
events take their course in Newfoundland. lO
On 16 November the Convention's chairman, Mr. Justice Cyril Folt, died.
Followilig this, the Steering Committee met and Cashin nominated Bradley,JI who was
approved for the post after Wheare went to LondonJ2 and suggested Bradley because
of his experience.'J As Webb noted, perhaps the anti-confederates were glad 10 sec Ihe
ZI Bertram G. Riggs, "Kenneth McKenzie Brown", li.NL I, p. 276.
"'Ibid., p. 276.
:!9 Webb, 'Conventioa",p. 67.
XI Ibid.. p. 68 notes th.tthe date for the rderendum had to be pu.hed blck fl'Clm M.y tn October 1947.
while PRO DO 35/1344 conlabts a "Provisional Timetable", c.:Impiled in 1944, and indic.tl:. the origin.1
intention of baving the referendum in Or:tobcr 1946.
3l Webb, "ConventiO!l",p. 70.
'l By the nellt SUIllIl1ef the Dominion Office observed th.t Wheare hid "taken much of the onus for
'managing' and reporting on the National Convention off the shoulders of the: Commission'. Hi. role
ICCms to have been much more important than previoutly indicated. Sec PRO DO 3S/lJS I, Commiuion
Government - Official Commeots on N.tional Conveotion Proceeding•.
n Webb, "Convention", p. 70. AlIlO.tCC Bridle, Do~nrs, p. J37, 'Memorandum by Second Political
Divi.ioo, 20 November 1946", wbicb indicated that the Interdepartmental Commillce 011 Canada-
Newfoundland Rel.tioos observed tbat FoJt was a Catholic and III.t. Catholic ChairTlWl of the Convention
would be desillllble, bulCh.t judge Dunlield, the best choi~, Wall • Prolcllant, and that "his Ilppointmenl
might callSCundCllirablcrepefCussions',
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confederate Bradley removed from the immediacy of debate, but the confederates inside
the Convention were perhaps just as pleased to see him take the chair. Debate was
acrimonious, but Bradley was widely acknowledged as the most experienced member of
the Convention. and for the time being he commanded the respect of all delegates.
The report of the Fisheries Comminee, submiUed in October, renected the view
of its chairman, Robert B. Job, that Newfoundland access to the American market should
be considered in a quid pro quo for the 99-year leases gr.'l',ted to the American bases.:l4
In January 1947 Job pUblished A Pamphlet on the lMO of a ~Panly Internationalized
Newfoundrand", and on 4 February he moved thallhe Convention investigate whether
measures might be taken to improve economic relations between Newfoundland and the
United States, as well as investigate the financial relationship of Newfoundland with the
United Kingdom, and on whal basis union wilh Canada might occur. Job's mOlion was
indicalive of the pro-American sentimenlS of many Newfoundlanders. But when a
Convenlion committee approached the Commission to discuss Ihe motion, the
Commission ruled oul the possibilily of sending a delegation to the United States, noting
Ihat this was not within the tenns of reference of the Convention.]J Any mention of
union with the United States was precisely what the Commission and the confederates
wished to il.void. For ,t,e confederates, advocates of responsible government could be
easily dismissed as wishing a return to the bitter past and "merchant rule-, but advocates
of economic union with the United States, making promises of more of the prosperity
experienced after Ihe arrival of the American bases, would be much harder to counter.
A delegation to Washington was also a chance the Dominions Office was not willing 10
take. Late in February, Ihe British Embassy in Washington was warned that if Ihe
JO See Bridle. Documents. p. 290, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for Extlimal Afflin. 30
September 1946.
"Webb. 'ConveDtioD',p. 76.
.,
sending of a delegation got past the governor. -the services of lhe Embassy should hi:
invoked- ,36 Job was approached to consider making ill resolution that delegaltooS be scnl
to London and Ottawa, but he refused. Bradley urged the Commission to )'Crmit a
delegation to Washington, but it also refused.n As it turned oUI, the issue ofcoonomie
union with the United Stales was to become the bane of the confederate campaign.
The combined e((ecu of Smallwood's motion to send a delegation to OUawa,
Bradley's assumption of the chainnanship, and Job's motion, caused concern among a
number of opponents of confederation outside the Convention, who became more
strident. By mid-December a working group in favour of the restoration of responsible
government was in existence,JI and on 31 December J.e. Britton. the Canadian Trade
Commissioner in St. John's, reported 10 R.A. MacKay that the group consisted of
leading citizens like
Charles Hunt, the Ayres, Bairds, Bowrings, MacPhersons of Royal Storc.<;,
Hickman, Ches Crosbie, Job, H.M.S. Lewin, David I. Jackman, President of the
Mine workers Union at Bell Island; (and] Pierce Fudge, President of the
Newfoundland Laboun:rs Protective Union in Comer Brook.:lt
A.M. Duffy, State Deputy of the Knights of Columbus for Newfoundland, also lold
Britton that he was taking an active part in the group, which was actively suppontd by
aU of Water Street (many of whom were the leading lights of Protestant Newfoundland),
Archbishop Roche, and some other religious leaders.~ Britton noted that presiding over
II PRO OO3SI3445, H.N. Tait, DomiDionsom~~,London, to B. Cockram, Wubi~&tQl'l, 2h Februlf)'
1941.
11 Webb, ·Convention", p. 11. By advDC:ltingl Washington delegllion, Brldley lMy hive willtlcd to
lDIinuin III impreuion among tho Convention deleptes thlt he wu open to III pouibilitic:J.
II This WAS reported to Wuhington by Ihe U.S. Consul G~nenl to NewrO\lndland. See Neary, NfJrth
A,lunticWorld,pp.292and413,rootnote8S.
.. PAC MG :Kl E IS9, Vol. 6, file: 1944-1950. Brittoo to MacKay, 31 Deo::ember 1946.
-/bid.
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the lcnlativc group was F.M. O'leary, and thai the group appeared to be the Mfinal
authority· with respect to Newfoundland affairs, but thaI he Wall unsure how they would
be affected by a proposed ·commission to enquire into profits and mark-ups· .~l
On 8 January J.S. Macdonald reponed thai in accordance with St. Laurent's
instruct)ons, he had met with Smallwood and Bradley on the evening of7 January. They
knew lilal the executive of the responsible government group had met the previous
evening, and feared thai the new group would soon sponsor a resolution in the
Convention requesting thai the restoration of responsible government be the only question
put to the elecioratc.42 On II February, the first public meeting of what was 10 become
tbe ResflOnsible Government League (RGL) was held at the Newfoundland Hotel, its aim
being to "secure Responsible Government for Newfoundland and encourage the people
of Newfoundland to accept their full, perso..'al, and collective responsibilities for the
good government of our country".·) The League declared itself to be "non-sectarian and
of no party., but this may have been a deliberate attempt to dissociate tJ .." group from
what not a few observers perceived as its liabilities: the fact that it was largely oomposed
of merthants and St. John's businessmen, that at flJ'Sl many of its executive members
were Roman Catholics, and that a Roman utholic party would not be elected in
Protestant districts." F.M. O'Leary was elected President, J.T. Cheeseman was Vice-
President, Joseph (·Jos·) O'Driscoll was Treasurer and Finance Committee Chair. The
"ibid.
01 Bridle, DoCUf/ltflU, p. 377-8, J.5. Macdonald to Secrewy of Stale for Elttemlll Affain, 8 January
1947.
., ResponJible Govenllnent Leaguo Papers, in the John G. HiUinJ Colleclion, Centre for
Newfoundland Studic.l An:hivol, Queen Elizabelh rJ Ubrary, Memorial Univcnity of N"wfoundland, Sl.
1oIUI'I,3.0I.oo2, EltcculivoCommillee MinUlellJ.2.47-IO,9.48, II February 1947. FuturedtalionJfrom
HiUins' pcrsonal papel1l will be delignatod with hiJ name, while RespooJibl"Govemmlmt Leagu" papcn
will be RGLP.
"J_ Hall"y 10 tbeau!hor, 20 May 1m.
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remaining members or the League's executive were divided into a cooS{;lutional
committee with members RB.C, Mercer, R.S. Furlong, U. Maddigan, and W,R.
Dwyer; a policy commiuee of memben A.B. Perlin, Furlong, Professor Allan Fmscr.
and the Han. J.S. Currie; a membersllip committee with members J. Tucker, B. Norris,
and G. Bemister; and an infonnation committee headed by O'Leary." As one
participant later wrote, the League was operated "lU'e a well-run business". and "guided
by gentlemanly principles of conduct and beha...iour".~ It was a civilized foil 10
Smallwood's "Bolsheyiks", who kept the League 0.. "~ loes.
Smallwood laler told his outp:lIt audiences that the League was composed largely
of the fishennen's enemies, the ·Water Street Merchants". While this analysis was
partially true and damaged the League's outport support, it was well known among the
people of St. John's that a number of the League's members were former business
associales and close friends of a number of confederates, and of Smallwood, the
Barrelman and pig·farmer, in particular. All the members of the executive were well-
connected· socially, politically, economically, and religiously. O'leary was well-known
as the sponsor of Smallwood's Bam:lman programme, was a close friend of the
archbishop, and a member of both the Teml Nova Council of the Knights of Columbus,
and the Benevolent Irish Society. Cheeseman was a businessman and former MHA, and
like O'leary, O'DriscoU was a manufaetu~r's agent. Currie had been an MHA and
owned 1ht! Daily News, which was edited by Perlin, who was married 10 Ches Crosbie's
sister, Vera.41 Perlin wrote the Dally News' ~Wayfarer· column, and also Jdited the
Observtr's Weekly, both of whieh kept up a torrent of criticism against eonfe(j".. ation.
'1 RCiLP 3.01.002, Exceulive Committee MioutCll, II Febnwy 1947.
" Collins. "League outt!wod", 1711 Ewnins Ttlt&TOIIl. 2S MlItb 1969, p. 36.
C See Albert B. Perlill, A a~r HtDd /n Ttmputl/OfU ThrIa· Albtrr B. Ptrlin: 71It Wa}fllrtr, edI.
Franc:i~ Hollobu ud Melvin BUer (St, John'l; H.",. Cuff PublleatlDtUl, 1986), "BioanPbY", p. I.
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Allan Fraser was a professor of history al Memorial University College. One of the most
significant of all the members was R.S. Furlong, a well-known lawyer, the solicitor and
an advisor of the archbishop, an aide-dc-camp to Governor Macdonald, a 50vemor of
the Broadcasting Corporation of Newfoundland, and Peter Cashin's second cousin, with
whom he often had disagreements,·' Through Cashin, Furlong was related to Justice
Cyril Fox, the Convention's first chainnan, Many members of the League were
prominent businessmen, and were members of the Rotary and City clubs; the latter was
known to lesser Water Street merchants as -The Skunk-Hole" .~9 A number of League
members, particularly O'leary, Fraser, Furlong, O'Driscoll, and Cashin (who later
joined the League), were of Irish Catholic extraction, ha... gone 10 the same schools, and
advocated -home rule" or self-government for Newfoundland/o a slogan which they
employed and which the confederates ruthlessly played upon in the referellda campaigns.
NOI surprisingly, Ihe League was inilially funded oul of Ihe pockels of executive
members,'l but il later made successful appeals to many merchants through busilless and
social cOllnections.'2
The organization of the RGL was initially intended to be quite flexible, and it
followed Ihe praclice of solicitillg prospeclive members to join the executive if they were
deemed appropriate. As a result Ihe executive expanded almost continually. But at ftrst,
• Robert S. Furlong to the author. 20 January 1992. Furlongwll9 a elll9smale wilh BisbopJohn O'Neill
at 51. Boa's in 1921 .
.. Edward FitzGerald to tulhor, 21 March 1989.
1O Robert S. Furlong to the aulhor, 20 JanlWY 1992; Bridle, DOClUMnfl, p. 413, 1.5. Macdonald 10
Secretary of Stale for Eltlemat A.ffairs, 20 May 1941; and ibid., p. 155; 1.5. Macdonald 10 MacKay, 10
Dc«mber 1941.
II Robert 5. Furlong to lho aUlhor, 21 November 1991.
J1 For lisls of donofSVld donationlsee RGLP3.01.015, DOl1OI'S and DonaliollJl. Approximate Amounts
Received For Firsl Refereodum By Both Partin (!he ROL and !he Economic Union Party). 4 pp.
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the executive was largely comprised of members or the St. lohn's proressiol~,,1class, aoo
this left the League open to the confederates' criticism thai it was an elite merchants'
party.D In mentality the League initially seemed bound by the divisions of lown and
outport, for at il$ second meeting it resolved to -send a letter to all outport members
infonning them of the League's progress·~ (as opposed 10 actively soliciting their
involvement), but it laler overcame these obstades, and wilh the publication of its
constitution in early March it attempted to allraet many members of various c1aSlie5 in
Newfoundland outports and towns.
As well, there ·...ere external membership divisions which the League tried to
minimize, but which caused considerable difficulty. Cashin. Crosbie, Hollen, and
Harringwn, the prime advocates of responsible government in the Convention, were not
invited to join the League's executive unlillater in the campaigns. Consequently, what
they said in the Convention and what the League said publicly were often two differenl
things, and tended to reflect more of the latest scuttlebutt than a single party line when
one was needed. Crosbie was a good friend of Smallwood, and Smallwood had
encouraged him tn run for election to the Convention." For the duration of the
Convention, and during the campaigns, Smallwood had a standing offer to Crosbie of the
premiership in tum for supporting confederation.H cashin, whose own behaviour in lhe
Convention and outside was emtic and unpredictable, WL!i looked upon with disdain by
I) Bridle, DoCWMtlts, p. 481-2, M.etu,y 10 Under-Secretary of Stale for Eltlemal Aff.IT1, '27 MIY
1947.
,. ROLP 3.01.002, Execulivc CommlUce Minutes, 6 MIY 1947.
I' Smallwood, / ChoH Canada, p. 2SO.
loOlbUI.,p.2S0.
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League members,17 and a personality conflict between O'leary and Cashinll seems
to have kcpllhe lalter from being invited 10 join the League unlil late summer 1947. As
well, Cashin did not see eye to eye with Furlong or Crosbie,S9 but personality clashes
between Cashin and olhers were the rule, not the exception.60 Crosbie was known to
"enjoy a sleepless night of revelry\~1 and Cashin and Hollett had problems with
alcohol,61 and this would have kept them from favour until the League felt forced to
deal with them.
Bven with Cashin outside the League, it had more than its fair share of internal
disagreements and strongly-held assumptions. At the 30 May 1947 meeting of the
cltecutive, RS. Furlong tendered his resignation despite strenuous protests,6J Furlong
was a capable lawyer. and this was a strong blow 10 the ROL, which could ill-afford to
let it happen. Furlong later noted that he disagreed with some of the methods, policies,
and approaches taken by the executive in the summer of 1947, and thought them 10 be
ineffective.6<l Harrington later claimed :hat he thought that the League's leaders had no
JJ Bridle, DocutrUnts, p. 482, M.cKay 10 Under-Secrel.lty of Slate for External AffairJ, 21 May, 1947;
Smallwood, 1 Chou Conado, p. lSI.
51 InJM1IAlY 1941 O'lury commented to U.S. COMU] General G.K. Oonald tlLat the Leape bad "not
lot around toapproachinl" Casbin tojoiD, IIlld Donald lalerlhought it "hardly ... plausible.' See Neary,
North Allantic:World, pp. 292-193.
19Webb, ·Convention·,p. 86.
00 It is also pouible thlt tbe cantanlceroU5 Cashin may Dot have wished to join the League.
.. Jamieson, No Placr For Fools, p. 42.
•, The confederates later h.ighlighted Ihis In their campaigns. See Gregory J. Power, "The Sacred Cow
i. Sick', in 1Jl~ Pawt'r of'h~ P~n, ed. Harold Horwood (51. John's: Harry Cuff PublicatjoM Limited,
1989). pp. 36 IIlld 38.
., RGLP 3.0L.()()2, Executive Committee Minutes, 30 May 1947•
... Robert S. Furloni! to the IUtbOf, 30 April 1992..
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knowledge of politics'" but the league's ineffectuality seems to hav~ been endemk.
Before the Convention was announced, the individuals who became the RGL's cxectuive
had assumed that as a matter of principle, responsible govemment would be returned.
Then when the Convention was established, the Iawyer-dominaled executive assumed tim,
the Convention would run its course, and that -British Justice-" would prevail when
the Convention disposed of the confederation movement. In a fit of self-aSSllredness, it
committed tbe falal error of remaining relatively silent while the Convention sal. It also
had too many chiefs, who sat on the executive by invitation only. and very few
iodians.61 Its assumptions and approach were perhaps best captured in the questions of
one executive member: "Well, what were we 10 do? Get the garbagemcn to run the
League"?61 As long as personality conflicts and disagreements dominated, and were
exacerbated by the assumptions of what appeared to be an abandoned colonial elite which
had previously run the country under responsible govemment, and still expected
preferential treatment by the British, the League would continue to t;c ineffective. Tbcse
problems continued for some months, and they Cripplc:d the campaign for responsible
government when a comprehensive and cogent approach was most needed.
FoUowing the demise of the Job motion, Smallwood intended to move that
delegations visit the United Kingdom and Canada, before Malcolm Hollett coukl move
that a delegation go to London. But Smallwood consulted J.S. Macdonald, and agreed
to let HoUett: make his motion flrst, and ·to delete from his own all reference to the
United Kingdom and to strike out {the] requirement that repor1S of both delegations· be
... Michael F. Harrington to the uthor, 16 July 1m.
to Ibid,
or James Halley to the .ulhor, :w M.y 1m,
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tabled 5imultancously." J.S. Macdonald was pleased, and observed that ·we can now
be lWUrtd [thai the] mailer is coming up for decisioa under the most favourable
conditions that can be brought about in the circumstances- .l'O On 26 FebNary Hollett
moved that the Convention send a delegation to London to enquire as to the financial
prospects of continued British support for Newfoundland, and Smallwood proposed that
a delegation be sent 10 Ottawa on the return of the London delegation, to investigate
possible tenns of union. Smallwood's motion provoked a stonn of protest from the
responsible govemm~nt advocates, and especially Cashin, who railed against the
confederates for giving the country away. the Commission for having been created by
bribery, and Justice Harry Winler and Chief Justice Sir L. Edward Emerson for having
been bribed to vote to suspend respunsible government,?l But because the Convention
was ROC a legislature and did not have parliamentary immunity, Cashin was charged with
libel. In the ensuing trial, which was anended by many members of the Convention, he
raced his cousin R.S. Furlong, counsel for the plaintiffs. For the three hours that the jury
was out, Cashin noted that Smallwood himself -kept up his spirits with
encouragement-.12 The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, and when neither side
could agree whether to accept a majority verdict, the case wu dismissed. A triumphant
Cuhin emerged from the Counhouse to a cheering crowd.n lbe trial was important,
though, and Smallwood may have done weU to encourage Cashin, for if Cashin had been
curtailed in his speaking in the Convention, Smallwood might have been 100. But
.. Bridle, Docu~IIII. p. <401, J.S. Macdonald toSeeretaJy ofStite for Ellemal Affairs, 28 Fcbnwy
1947.
'" Ibid" p. 401.
11 Nell!)'. Nunh Aflantlc World, pp. 298-9,
n Pelff J. Cubin, 'M)' FiJht fOf Respoll!lible Government", BNF, p. 116.
1) See Neary, Non" Allantic World, p. 299, aIld c.sbin. "M)' Fiplo, BNF, p. 115-6.
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Smallwood kept up his friendship, counselling, and "assiduous cultivation" of Cashin,
and made a number of attempts to convert him to confederalion.1~
On 27 February Hollen's motion passed, and the next day so did Smallwood's.
In April a motion was made by David I. "Nish" Jackman. the delegate for Bell Island
and president of the Wabana Mine Workers' Union, that the Convention also ~nd a
delegation to the United States. but true to policy, the motion was eventually overruled
by the Commission. Some officials in the Dominions Office were ambivalent about a
L::mdon delegation,15 but had suggested that it be accompanied by Commissioner Walsh,
which it eventually was, and hoped that the same delegates would proceed to both
London and Ottawa,76 which the Convention decided against. l1 Instead, different
members were elected to each delegation, and Bradley infonned the Commission that the
London delegation would go first. lI While the London delegation was away, the rc.~l
of the Convention members prepared the committee repons.19 On 21 March 1947,
Smallwood wrote to get St. Laurent to impress upon the British that the London
delegation had to return with "a clear cut official statemenl by the British Government
,. Smallwood, / Chou CaNJdn, p. 251, and Smallwood. 'The Story", BNF. p. 15.
13 For example see Bridle, Documents, p. 404, Memorandum of Second Political Oiviaion, wherein
Chltletbuck. voical IDS quallDllabouta LandoD Delegation, and also p. 406, Robertson (High Commiuioncr
in Greal Britain) to Lester B. Pearson, Under-~re"l)' of State for External Anairs, II Much 1947,
whcrein Sir Eric Machtig wu noled 10 be in favour of the move.
10 Bridle, Docu~nu, p. 406, Robertson to Secretai)' of Stale for External Affairll, II March 1947.
77 Wcbb, 'Convcntion", p. 79, and PRO DO 35n446/N40051J3, Dominions Offico to Commbsion
of Govemment, 7 Mareh 1947.
11 Webb, 'Convention", p. SO. MacKay, Robertson and otherll in the Canadian govemmenl would !lave
preferred to sec an Ottawa delegation go firllt. Sec Bridle, Doc:u~rus, pp. 406-411.
"'Webb,'Convenlion·,p.84.
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of exa<:t1y what Ihey are prepared 10 do for Newfoundland-.to Otherwise, if a
commitment were given 10 continue Commillion of Government, it would win on a
~11ot. II Smallwood noted that if the British government could not help Newfoundland,
it would be doubtful whether the National Convention would IttOfl1mend that
Commission be placed I'm the ballot. In those circumstances, if the Ottawa delegation
obl:ained satisfactory tenns, Smallwood felt sure confederation would win against
responsible govemment. IZ In order to put confederation in the best possible light, the
olher options had to appear undesirable. and the worst scenario would be if the British
indicated that they would countenance further financial support for Newfoundland. The
trip to london would have to be a failure.
The London delegation included Cashin, Keough, Crosbie, Fudge, HoUett,
Bradley as Chainnan, and the governor and Walsh. Upon arrival in London, it received
a lukewarm reception from lhe British, but began meetings on 29 Man:h. Among Olher
things, Lord Addison intimated that if three options were on the ballot paper and lhere
was no majority in the referendum, there would be a roll"'" referendum.1l Tempered
by Bradley and WaJ~, Cashin pressed Addison for a fmandal commitmenl (0
Newfoundland, but British policy was that Newfoundland should become a part of
Canada, and not bea fUWICiaJ ward of the United Kingdom. Addison closed the meedngs
with a paternal "God bless you·. Cashin responded with a characteristic ·God help us,''.
Addison replied with a deft Ox-bridge "God helps those who help themseJves", and the
• Bridlc, Documtflll, p. 414, Srt\llIwood to St. Laurent, 21 Much 1947.
"lbid"p.414.
., Ibid.,p. 415.
.. Webb, "COQvcll!ion", p. 90.
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London delegation returned disappointed.'" On 12 May. just before the delegatiun
arrived home, London announced that if Commission of Government was abandom:d,
Newfoundland would receive no further financial assistance from the United Kingdulll.
While Job's motion had been rejected, inlelesl m economic union with the United
Stales was growing, and did not go unnoticed by the Americans. In May, United Stales
Consul G.K. Donald reported 10 Washington thai he thought "a substantial majority of
the people would vote for union with us·." and in June, the Convention delegate for
Trinity North, Reuben Vardy, approached the Amvrican Consulate seeking a leiter of
introduction to anyone in the Stale Department who could discuss economic union
between the United States and Newfoundland. Vardy was refused such a leUer by Ihll;
Consul, who argued that any such assislance would look like "the Depaltrnent of State
had been secretly negotiating with members of the Convention".l6 Vardy's request WlIS
no'. the first time America would be approached, nor did his letter occasion thll; only
reply the Americans would give to requests for infonnation from Newfoundland.
The Ottawa delegation, which included Smallwood, Rev. Lester Buny, Charles
Ballam, Chainnan F. Gordon Bradley, Gordon Higgins, P. Wellington Crummey,
T.W.G. Ashboume, and R.B. Job, did much more than the London delegation was able
to, for the Canadians were well prepared. In April, Pickersgill wrote a memo to
Mackenzie King, stressing his belief that "the whole future of Canada" depended on
Newfoundland, and that its union with Canada would have a vital effect on Canada's
.. See PRO DO 3513448, Transcript of London DeJeg.tion meeting with Lord Addi!lOn.
., Bridle, "Canada, tne US and Newfoundland, 1946-48', ItllmwtjfJooI PU!iptaiwJ·. (November-
December 1983): 21.
.. Cited in Macr.:nzie. "UODOmiC Union". NQ, Vol. LXXXIII, No.4 (Winter 1988): '25.
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MnationaJ oullook and oalional psychology".11 "With Newfoundland in American hands",
Pickersgill feverishly continued, ·our international importance would be reduced; our
responsibilities in world affairs would inevitably decline; and, with that decline, our
voice in detennining our national destiny".11 On 30 May, Bradley and Smallwood met
J.S. Macdonald in SI. John's and requested as much favourable publicity as the
Canadians could give, and in his report to Ottawa, Macdonald noted that Smallwood and
Bradley recognized that the reply of the British government to the London delegation
placed
...the projected campaign for Confederation under a tremendous handicap. They
feel that it is now essential for them 10 delay the referendum and that, instead of
trying 10 finish the discussions quickly and meet the timetable the Governor
prefers, they should proceed with the discussions as leisurely as possible,
adjourning from time to time to permit full exploration of particular subjects.
They inform me that they will be assisted in this procedure by the fact thai a
number of influential members of the Convention, having private business
interests to attend to during the summer, are not at all anxious to have it
reconvene in the middle of July or August. The general objective would be,
without appearing to do so, to postpone the referendum till next year.lt
Prior to leaving for Onawa, Bradley told the Convention that the delegation intended to
return within two weeks,90 but this was clearly a ploy, for the confederates had ewry
intention of getting "all terms but minor details", which indeed they did, and of having
the referendum at their prefcr,ed time.9 \ Soon after the meeting, J,S, Macdonald told
Mackenzie King thai he and the confederates hoped to ".. ,manoeuvre things so as not to
v J,W, Pickersgill 10 Mlckenzie King, 2.5 April 1947, cited in Bridle, leiters 10 the Editor,
IntemuliUlKlI Pflrspflaiws, (.xptcm~r-Oclo~r 1984); 31 .
.. Ibid.. p. 32.
.. Bridle, Docwrrtmts, p. 484, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 30 May 1947.
"'Webb, "Conventioo",p.93.
-, The Dominions Ortice also CQocluded thai Bradley and Smallwood wlllltel! to delay the referendum
uDtilthe spring of 1948. See PRO DO 3.5/3447, British High ;oounissioner in Canada to Commonwealtb
Relations Office, 4 July 1948.
77
make their recommendations to the British Govemment until October, \' 'hen it will he too
latc to have a referendum this year. and it might come some lime next year" .Q: By eMly
the next month Sir Alexander Clutterbuck had been influenced by Kir.g 10 think the same
way, and the British tacitly approved of the OUawa Delegation Slaying tile SlImlller and
delaying the referendum.u
Arriving in Ottawa on 24 June, the Newfoundlanders received a W3nll reception.
They stayed no! for ',he promised two weeks, but for the summer. Wilh the Canadians
they divided themselves into eleven committees, with Smallwood as a member of "11,'1-1
and they proceeded towards negotiating draft lenns of union.9J While the Canadians at
first did not wish to negotiate (enns, Ihey assisted the confederates as mudl as they
could, and the Interdepartmental Commilteeon Canada-Newfound!:l.nd Relations provided
the delegation with much useful infonnation.96 But according to Jeff Webb, the
confederates in the Newfoundland delegation pressed the Canadians, who got the
impression that the Newfoundlanders were "spinning out their time- in Ottawa, ami in
late July, work finally began on preparing tcrms.97 For their part the British gave every
91 Bridle, DoroflU!nlS, p. 519-20, extract from The Mackmzie King Rerord.
., Bridle, DocunumlS, p. 553, E. Reid to Under-Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs, 4luly 1947.
Memorandum of ConVel'$l.tioD With Sir Alexander CIUllerbuck on luly 4th.
.. Alec G. Stacey, '1000 OIIys Thai Changed Our Destiny·, BNF, p. 135.
.. Bridle, DOCllflU!nlS, pp. 571-2, text of telegram to Bradley sent 16 July 1947, enclo,e,d in Acting
Hlgb Commissioner in Newfoundland 10 External Affairs, 17 july 1947, and Hiller, 'Bradley - Political
Biograpby", pp. 43-6.
'" For example, of the infonnation thi' committee had been collecting since late 1946 !Jee Bridle,
Documents, p. 392 IIld ff.
." See Webb, ·Convention", p. 94, and Bridle, DocuflU!nts, p. 560, E. Reid 10 Under-Secretary of Stale
for Extemal Affairs, 10 July 1947, in which Reid noted lbllhe NewfouRdlanJcr'!l had 10 thai lime only
beeoIlSJUnglentativequC5tions.
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encouragement 10 the Canadians 10 be as ·concrete as possible" in the terms of union
offered.q
Even though won: proceeded in Ottawa, the confederates and Canadians mel
considerable diffICUlties. Higgins and Crummey, the l'tS]Xlnsible government delegates,
were displeased by the length of lime the delegation was spending in Ottawa, and thought
that the confederates were attempting 10 gel a set of terms they could "railroad" through
the Convention." Throughout the summer Higgins was in contact with his law partner
Charles Hunt, who on 20 June became a member of the R:.1l. IOO But Higgins seems
to have been much less convinced about the merits of self-rule. He was castigated in mid
July by Convention members back in Newfoundland, who were upsct at the "bartering"
going on in Ottawa, and who threatened wrath unless the delegation carne home. IOI In
response, Higgins told one of the Ottawa secretaries, Miss Muriel Mosley, that he and
Crummey wished to see the conference adjourn, and asked her aJvice on bow this should
be done. "The matter was quick.ly brought to the attention of Pearson and then
Bradley,llll; who encouraged Higgins to stay the path. Apparently approving of the
negotiations. Higgins agreed to stay. The next day, Bradley also received
communications from Convention members in Newfoundland demanding that the
delegation return home. and claiming that Governor Macdonald would hold the Ottawa
delegation responsible if an etlort were being made -10 deprive the country of a
.. Bridle, Don;mtlllS, p. 404-5, 'Mernollllldum 00 COI1vemlion with Sir Alcunder Clutterbuek, by
P.A. Bridle, 8 March 1941."
.. Bridle, Docu~llls. p. 510, Bridle to Ullder-SecrctAl)' of State (or External Affairs. 161uly 1947.
I. RGI.P3.01.002, EMCutivo Minutes, Wlune 1947.
OIl Bridle. DDCUtMnfS, pp. 51().I, Bridle to Uoder-Scerctary of Str.to for External Mfain. 161uly
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referendum I.his fall" .100 Bradley contacted Macdonald for confinnation of this,l()l but
Macdonald denied having made the statement, and emphasized his wish to remain I1elllml
in Ihe matter. lltI As well, the negotiations were made politically difficull for tile
Canadians by agitation from Premiers Duplessis and Macdonald of Qudll:c lind Nova
Scotia, who pressed for a reopening of the Labrador Boundary displllC and 11 say in lhe
Ottawa deliberations. lor. The delegation's stay in Ottawa was also lengthelled by the
death of Fisl.eries Minister Frank Bridges of New Brunswick. Fearing lhe political
implications of negotiating without full Maritime cabinet representation, Ihe Canadians
called and concluded a fall by-election in New Brunswick before sending a propoSl.'d
tenns of union 10 Newfoundland.100
During the meetings in Ottawa, discussions were held concerning education and
divorce, about which the confederates knew Archbishop ~oche and the Roman Catholic
Church would be concerned. To his "disgust" Smallwood discovered that Gordon
Higgins, as the "prominent and respected" Catholic member of the delegation, had not
called on Roche before he left for Ottawa. loa In an attempt to circumvent Roche's
Itn Bridle, Docum~nts, pp. 571-2, Acting High Commissioner in Ne..... foundland 10 SecretaI)' ofSlalc
for EXlemai Affairs. 17 July 1947.
,.. See Bridle, DQcu~n.ts, p. 572, "Memorandum from High Commissioner in Ne.....fouml1and 10
Under·Secre1al)' of State for External Alfllin. 17 July 1947.·
101 See Bridle, DocuntmlS, pp. 577-8, "Memorandum from High Commissioner in Newfoundland to
Under-5ecre1al)' of Stale for EXlemli Mfain, IS July 1947.·
/<III According 10 Paul Bridle, MlCke.nzic Kin!)! seems 10 have been constantly concerned ".bolll the
effect on tbe Maritime Provinceil of Ne.....fournllllld's cnll)' on Icrms lhal would salisfy it." Sec Bridle,
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opposition, make up for Higgins' shortcomings, and gel re-assuranccs from Canadian
churchman thai confederation would not be hannful to Catholics, Smallwood had Bradley
meet with Apostolic Delegate Antonutti to ask for his opinion on the issues. lOt
Apparenlly unaware of (or unconcerned about) Roche's desire to see the statuS quo
maintained, Antonulti wannly welcomed Bradley and told him that divorce would not be
a problem (ever-though it was in Newfoundland. because the Church had always opposed
divorce legislation), but that the Church would be concerned with the financing of
Catholic schools. 110 Bradley emerged from the meeting delighted, and told Smallwood
that Antonutti. "though a Roman Catholic and an Italian at that" • had completely placed
him at ease. II I
The Convention's decision to send a delegation to Canada had caused great
concern among the advocates of responsible govemm":nt, especially in the Roman
Catholic Church, that ·underhanded methods· were being used to further the cause of
confederation. As a result, both the Church and the anti-confederates increased their own
political activity. On 24 June Archbishop Roche celebrated his fiftieth anniversary as a
priest, an event which drew consicl",rable public attention to the Church and its
leadership, N::-ither Roche's anniversary nor the constitutional issue escaped the notice
of Smallwood's Montreal friend Ewart Young. His July Al/antic Guardian featured a
photo of Roche on its front cover with the caption ·What Would Confederation Mean to
Newfoundland", and the smaUer caption "His Grace Archbishop Roche Fifty Years of
'Oil Smallwood later noled that Bndley 'was a vigorolU Protr.ltaDl" and a former Grand Master of the
Loyal Orange Lodge of Newfoundland, with 'a strong antipl.tby 10 any poS!libility of domination of
Newfoundland by Ihe Roman Catholic Chu~h.' See Smallwood, J Chou CanadD. p. 307,
III/bid., pp. :>01-8.
"'lbid.,p.308.
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Devoted Service".112 Young's cover. while perhaJ)!" uninlcnlionally mixing mau~rs of
Church and Slate, was a harbinger of things 10 come.
During the summer, the RGL approached the Church through F.M. O'l.eary,
encouraging it to comment on confederation. 1U On 20 July 1947, a written address
from Archbj~:.op Roche was read by Archbishop Flynn 10 a reunion breakfast of th~ 51.
Bonaventure's College Old Boys' Alumni Club. Roche suggested that the youth of the
counlry should awaken from their apathy, which had been caused by growing up in an
"undemocratic atmosphere". in order to avert a "national dilNlsler". He saw the youth as
"the trustees for posterity in a sense that no previous generation could claim 10 be·. and
stated that "the fate of Newfoundland will be irrevocably detcnnined for weal or woe in
the very near future" .114 The July-Au!:"st issue of The Monitor reprinled Roche's
address, and reflected on the Convention and the delegations, which many felt should
never have occurred, and on Bradley and Smallwood's chal4Clerization ofNewfoondland
life in terms of class division. Referring to the confederation campaign and Ihe
propaguda. being spread about, it said thai
It would surely be the supreme tragedy of OOf history, if by apathy,
indifference, lack of enlightened leadership, or the influence of sinister
propaganda we were to alienate ilTttrievably the inheritance y,.hich was won fOf
us by our patriotic forbears, which is a sacred heritage from the past.'"
In seeming response to this, on 7 August, the British Monchuttr Gunrdian predicted lhal
the Catholic vote would be "instructed" to vote fOf responsible government.
Commissioner Albert Walsh, who was a Roman Catholic, also inlerpreted the address
III A/Jamie Guardkm. Vol. 3, No.7 (July 1947), front cover.
III Frank O'Leary tothe'lIthor, 12 M.y Im,and WiJliamJ. Ryan 10 lhe.ulhor, 13 September 1991.
1I'1be~dress wu printed in IheJuly-AugIlsl issue of71rt MOIl/tor, and lllBy .rso be found in PAC
MG 17 m 810, Vol. 'S, '26 British Government, file ).
lIJJ1uMOIlltor,JlIly-Alilustl947,p.1.
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as ami-confeder.llc, but J.e. BrittOll noted that Roche made no mention of how his
listeners shoukt vote, and that the archbishop was
...regarded as a diplomat of the highest order and, whatever his private views
may be, [he was) unlikely to commit himseJr openly as favouring one fonn of
Governmenl. The letter has had quite wide circulation and as the Archbishop is
held in such high regard by members of all denominations, his opinions carry
considerable weight. lIt
8ri1l00's appraisal was accurate, and even wben the SCClanan campaigns began, the
archbishop carefully avoided telling anyone how to vote, even though all knew his views.
Some members of the Catholic clergy, however, had no such reservations, and became
personally active ill the political campaigns.
By latc July 1947 the League's executive had increased to 43 members.H7 Of
these, 19 out of 43 were from 81. John's. ar.:] 26 out of 43 lived on the Avalon
Peninsula. All were prominent in their communilie5. and the SI, John's element was
entirely comprised of members of the business and professional class. But publicly, the
League 'A'as still an unlcoown quantity, It W3S also fighting a yet unknown enemy, for it
lacked Smallwood aocl Bradley's advantage of inside knowledge. and co-<lpen.tion with
the British, Canadian. and Commission governments, woo made policy. controlled the
timing of political events, and the flow of infonnatioo, The extent of the League's lack
of influence may be measured by the fad that it was not until July that Gordon
Macdonald saw cause to report the League'swstence to Atllce, alona with olher routine
political observations, III
II. PAC MG 27 1II:m>, Vol. 58, 26 British Govel11llleot, file I, Britlollto SocRtaly of Slate for
ExtemalAffain. 28 AUIUlt 1947,
11. Enelosed in Bridlo, DocwllKnts, pp. 582-4. Ading High Commi"ioner in NewfoundllJld 10
SecrelaryofState For ExtemaJ Affa.in, 22JIlly 1947.
III Altlee Plpen. Depolh 58, folilMl 101-2, Gardea MaedooaJd 10 Aulllll. 28 July 1947. In tbe same
leiter, M.c:donaId .110 &dded. hopeful note tb&1 the 'ill4ividlllh f.vOlIrab\e 10 Coafe&raliou wilb CIn&da
lteelllerty_aiUngtberetul1lofthedeleptiOllfrotDOttlo..... •
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In August the League sponsored more mdio broadcasts and launched a public
campaign. On I August, broadcasts began over commercial radio slation VQCM for
fifteen minutes on Saturday nights. 1I9 Recognizing the importance of the rol~ women
played in society, on 11 August the League decided 10 sponsor a morning broadcast, u
women's talk show, which woold begin 10 September. m1 Its programmes f~1lurcd a
number of "Lady SpeakersM, often wives of League executive members, III but which
came to include women "more represenlative of the various classes and nol of one group
only". m These programmes were audible only in 81. John's and the northeast Avalon
Peninsula. but when linked up with VONF and its repealer stations in an "island-wide
hookup", the broadcasts may indeed have had some effect. On 5 August the
Longshoremen's Protective Union in Botwood wrote A.B. Perlin, congratulating him on
a fine recent broadcast, and pledging the Botwood !.SPU's support. UJ Broadcasting
gave the l..eague a publie presence, and brought its political message into over 37,000
radio sets around the island. 11oI
Interestingly enough, one criticism of the League's broadcasting on VONF
provides an indication of one of the difficulties which plagued the League's executive.
On 2 August the Managing Director and owner of radio station VOCM, Joseph L.
Butler, wrote to Finance Commissioner R.L.M. James complaini.lg that
"' RGLP 3.0Ull)2. Executive Minutell. II AU8U!1t 1947.
IZl Ibid.
III RGLP 3.01.002, Executive Minutell. 18 August 1947.
122 RGLP 3.01.002. Executive Minutes. 8 September 1947.
I'D RGLP 3.01.020, Correspondence O'u!uy/Collins, SOlplember-Dolcember 1947. W. ThomplOll and
F.H. AnIle 10 Perlin. 5 AUiUst 1947.
11< Webb, 'Convenlion", p. 150.
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1be recent endorsement by some of the Governors of the B"Oadcasting
Corporation of Newfoundland, viz. Ron. J.S. Currie, R.S. Furfong, K.C.• and
C.E. Hunt, K.C., of a political prognunme for Newfoundland, prior 10 and in
anticipation of the completion of the National Convention of the work assigned
to it. would suggest that the altitude or the B.C.N. during the coming referendum
may not be entirely free and unbiased. In these circumstances, a powerful and
free and independent station. which VOCM has demonstrated itself to be since
its inception. may be considered a must if a full and intelligent educational
campaign is to be pennitted. In
In addition 10 being governors of the BCN, Cunic, Furlong, and Hunt were leading
members of the RGL al the time of Buller's letter. Furlong was also an aide-dc-camp at
Government House. The BeN and [he RGL had very different - 'titudes on the return of
self-government: the League endorsed it, but the BCN's VONF was the censored
infonnation organ of the Commission, which had confederation as its goal, and provided
the radio plalfonn for Smallwood to lead the movement. Butler's letter illustrates one of
the brilliant tactics of the Commission. What better way to help the confederates than to
keep three ofttlc best leaders of the RGL as governors of the BCN, requiring their public
silence on political issues, lest a conflict of interest be perceived? Significantly, because
of who its executive members were, and how their loyalties were kept divided by the
Commission, the League may have been prevented from being as effective as it could
have become.
In August the League attempted to gain more momentum with its pamphlet -1be
Case For Responsible Government",'· but for this it came un.;er harsh criticism from
within. M.F. Blackmore, the publisher of Tht Grand Fa/ls Advertise,., accepted a
directorship on the League's executive, but scathingly observed that -the League, IS at
I~ W.F. Galgay Papen, Centre for Newfoundland Studiu AfCb.iVe.l, Queen Elizabeth n Utnvy,
Memori.1 University of Newfoundland, file fI 18, Correspondence 1947, 1.L. Butler to HOD. R.LM.
JlmeJ, Commissioner for FinlllCe, 2 August 1947. encloted memorandum. p. 4.
I:' The pIIIlIIhlet wu pUblilhed on 21 July (see NellY, Nonh AtlQlltlc World, p. 316); forext.....tJ from
II tee Bridle. Doolnullt•• p. j1l4 IIlld «.
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present set up, lacks the (orce, drive, energy and colour, if you like, necessary to
accomplish anything at all.. .. It should proceed like a steam-roller inslead of the killen
it resembles at present". 111 The pamphlet, Blackmore complained. ·should have lhe
signature of every lawyer in St. John's and every doctor and businessman throughollllhc
country, who favours the return of Responsible Government", And even at that, the
pamphlet
... does not tell halflhe story .... It glides over the surface and evades tim real I\'IOt
of the whole issue--the monstrous fraud Ihal has been and is being perpetrated
against the Newfoundland people.... it has adopted the wrong altitude and takes
the wrong line of attack: il addresses the people as if they had something to do
with the helpl.~ss position, and state of political ignorance, in which they now find
themselves. And instead of attacking the conspirators whom it knows to exist, and
exposing their trickery, ... the League... liopes, without denouncing the wrong-
doers from start to finish, to persuade the people to avoid the danger.... the
British Government let a generation grow up in political ignorance. But [the
League] makes no attempt to stress the seriousness, the injustice, the scandal
outrage of this act on Britain's part. In
The League was thus condemned as weak and ineffectual when it should have been
fighting not the attitudes of Newfoundlanders, but British manipulation of the
Newfoundland constitutional situation. The League's failure to deal effectively with this
manipulation was its greatest deficiency.
The League needed management and policy direction, and in September,
Wickford Collins arrived as a paid full-lime secretary, 119 replacing Herbert B. Morgan,
who left for England to take up a Rhodes Scholarship.IJO In August, there seems 10
m RGLP3.0UXll, Executive Minutes, M.F. Blackmore to O'l.elIry, 21 August 1941.
l:lllfbUJ.
1:0 RGLP3.01.002, Execulive Minutel, II AU8llll1 t941.
,:II> RGLP 3.01 "02, E~ceutiveMinulel, IS September 1941, and 3.01.020, Collinl to H.B. Morgan,
29 Doeel1lber 1941.
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have been a movement towards bridging the gap between the League and responsible
government supporters in the Convention. Executive member Edmund J. Phelan proposed
that the League invite Cashin to join - which must have taken some convincing of F.M.
O'Leary by Phelan· and at its 8 September meeting, A.B. Perlin reponed lhat Cashin
~would co-operate". III AI the same meeting Phelan proposed that the League make a
"clear-cut statement of ils policy on constructive lines so that there should be no mis-
understanding as 10 the future aims of the League" ,131 It was noted that the League had
the sUPPO" of many people, but that many others had reservations as to what would
happen if responsible government were restored. "Will the League then retire from the
political field", asked Phelan, "or will it produce a platfonn of financial, moral, and
physical advancement towards a happier way of life for the common man"?'lJ To solve
this problem, Malcolm Hollett, another new executive member, was set the task of
drafting a policy and tactics statement. In an early draft he noted that the League's main
objectives were to condemn the constitutional impropriety of the process in which
Newfoundland wa.~ engaged, to ensure close co-operation with the R.G. members in the
Convention, and ensure that confederation be defeated in the Convention. In The plan
also called for attention to be called to the fact that Canadian taxes would be stining.
Hollett also suggested that the League strike a committee, with members from the
National Convention, to plan the "fonn which a Responsible Government is to take" , and
to discuss reroon of the political system, m
!JI ROLP 3.01.002, Executive Minutes, 8 September 1947.
m/bid.
'!JIb/d.
U' RGLP 3.01.004, Policy. Aims, Tleties, 'Some Thought! on II Plan of Action Relative to a
Campaign for Re.:Ipollllibh. Government,' (110 dale), p. I.
'>J Ib/d., p.4.
At the 15 September meeting, the League established press. radio, and othllr
committees to deal with Hollett's recommendations, but onc of the best opportunities uf
its existence was missed. O'Leary raised a question fromlhe absent R.S. Furlong for thl.'
League's consideration. Furlong suggested that the League obtain a legal opinion "as tll
the legality of the Dominions Office inserting Confederalion on the ballot paper, if it
receives 11 minority vote in Ihe Convention~ .1:16 Without a second thought. the League
casually decided 10 "leave the matter until the lime of the Referendum" .U1 Whether
Furlong, in his capacity as an aide-de·camp al Government HOllsc, had heard any
rumours of Dominions Office intentions remains a question. But when the Lcague
decided to ignore the possibility, it was a decision it would regret billerly. In many ways,
it was yet another missed opportunity.
The League continued its radio broadcasts through the fall, with spc.1kers like
A.B. Perlin, Wick Collins, J.T. Cheeseman, and Mrs. Frances Holmes, but Canadian
High Commissioner 1.S. Macdonald reported that
The League is considered a moribund organization wilh liUle hope of innuencing
the electorate either one way or the other. The speeches have all lacked lire and
the speakers themselves, as well as the sponsors of the League - all leading
citizens in the community - suffer from !he handicap thai they have avoided
commiuing themselves to either taking an active part in politics or running for
office in the event of the restoration of Responsible Government. 111
The League's refusal to become a political party, perhaps a psychological remnant of the
poUtical troubles of the 1930s, effectively emasculated it when it could have bee.. most
effective: while the confederates were in Ottawa. In fact, this was recognized by A.B.L.
,.. RGLP 3.01.002, Ex.:eutive Minutes, 15 ~ptember 1947. furlonJ seems to have been in .n
awkward position to do Ihb billlS"lf and go public with ii, for imparti.lity wu expectw from him in hi.
10Je, 11.5 a governor of BeN, an lIiJe-de-eamp at Government House, IIId u solicitor to the Irchbi'hop.
,:11 Ibid.
1:11 Bridle, DUCUIMIIIS, p. 122-3, J.S. Macdonald 10 Scel'l:'.-· of Slate for Ealernal .... rr.il'll, 7
November 1947.
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Cannon, the Acting Canadian High Commissioner. who cOlllmented thai he doubted
whether the League would "ever take an active part in politics. as ils leaden shy away
from the thought of active participation in public affairs· .lJQ When Ihe Convention
resumed, the confederates had gotten proposed tenns. and made much political capital
on the social and business character of the League's leadership. Even though tile RGL
subscribed to the Canadian Press clipping service, and solicited financial infonnatillll
from the govr:mmenls of all Canadian provinces,l40 it had fallen behind in the bailIe
because of a lack of infonnalion, organization, and ruthlessness, and never regained ils
opportunity.
By September 1947, tilC Commissiv" of Government wished to have more
infonnation on political opinion around Newfoundland, so it requested its magistrates
outside St. John's to begin assessing public opinion on confederation, and instmctcd
Chief Ranger E.L. Martin to have the Newfoundland Ranger Force submit regul;lr
confidential revorts on Newfoundlanders' Wattitudes towards various foons of
government".I.1 Even in late 1947, the public attitude towards politics was quite
ambivalent outside of St. John's, and not a few residents listened to the National
Convention for entertainment rather than for infonnation.'(l The rangers were perhaps
not an unbiased sourcc of infoonation, for some feared the loss of thcir jobs if
Commission of Government was eliminated, but one of their most frequent observations
oJ. Bridle, DoCWMnlS, p. 582, A.E.L Cannon tel Secrelary ofSl.Ile for EKtemal Affai/'J. 22 July 1947.
140 ROLf 3.01.020, COTJe!pondencc O'Lear}'fCollins September-December 1947. Collin. to Canadian
Pres', 17 September 1947; and various lette/'J from Collins to provinei&l govemmentJ.
1'1 See Marilyn Tuck, °The Newfournlland Ranger Force, 1935-1950' {M.A. Ihesis, Memorial
University, 1983),p. 99.
142 For example see Provincial Archive, of Newfoundland and Labrador (hereafter PANL) GN 38IS·1-
5-2, C. Matthews, Eaglet, 10 CbiefRanger, 13 December 1947, wherein Matthews reported that oJ wotlld
say that at the present time the Convendon i. equal 10 the programme or 'Can You Top Thi,' u far u
laugbsarecoDcemed.'
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was thai outpon Newfoundlanders were illiterate and politically indifferenI.1•
'
At this
period, 15.j2% of Newfoundlanders were illiterate, and illiteracy rose the farther one
went from St. John'S,I" Smallwood later observed that
Our people had no notion at all of what Confederation was or what it meant.
They had no conception of a federal system of government. Their only experience
of government was what they had before the coming of the Commission
system, I.'
These characteristics were recognized and exploited by the confederates in their
campaigns.
By the fall of 1947, the Commission of Government had accumulated a
considerable amount of valuable political infonnation. It had not only the Ranger reports,
with their detailed infonnation on the opinions of the Newfoundland electorate; it also
had Magistrate Short's voters list, compiled for the election of the National
Convention.l~6 At the end of September, the League asked for a copy of the voters list,
but on 30 September, the SecretaI)' of the Commission, W.J. Carew, replied that the list
would not be available 10 the League because an insufficient number of copies were on
hand, and the present ones were being used to prepare for the referendum.l~7 In order
to create its own list, the RGL then resorted to canvassing its supporters in outlying
''JTuclc, 'Ranger Foree,' p. I02,andespeciaJly p. 113, footnol023.
,.. See William Wan:aIZ, •A Methodologic.l Consideratioo of Some Geographie Mpccls of lhe
Newfoundland Referendum on Confederalion With Ct.nada, 1948', CaMdlan Cdogropher, Vol. 6 (1955):
39-49. For illiteracy rales, taken from Warntz:, in the various political distric~ of Newfoundland in 19411,
see Appcndixlll.
1<' Smallwood, 1 Chose CANJdD, p. 235.
'''Webb. ·Conventioo·,p. 49.
,,, RGLP 3.01.020, CorrespoDden<:e O'l...cAryICollins, September-December 1947, Carew to Collins,
30 Scplembcr 1947.
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districtS. 141 It is unknown whether the confederates asked for or got a list during lhal
fall, but perhaps this point is insignificant. Unlike the League. the confederates had Sptmt
the fall profitably arranging matters in Onawa and in the National Convention. When
lists were required, theirs would be more than adequate.
When the National Convention mel again on Friday 10 October, Smallwood
tabled the Mblack books" of infonnation on Canada (the proposed temlS. the 8 grcy
books", were sent later), but Bradley faced a storm of criticism from the responsible
government members who had demanded the return of the Ottawa delegation, From mid-
September, Mackenzie King had known of a p13n to oust Bradley as chainnan, and to
press for an immediate referendum on the return of responsible government.I.'
Presumably Bradley was infonned of this soon after it was known. Before the delegatcs
could attaCk, he resigned and left the chamber. The Convention recessed in an
uproar. uo On Saturday morning, Bradley saw Governor Macdonald 10 tender his
resignation. 1'1 Thai evening the Commission met, and chose McEvoy to replace him.
McEvoy was neither a judge (as Ihe original statute required) nor an elected member of
the Convention, but he was a pro-confederate,m and the choice of the governor and
I. For cxamples oftms sec 3.01.020, COm5JlOlldcncc O'LearyfCollin., Septcmber-December 1947,
Collins to E.P. Henley, 29 September 1947, and Fr. FitzGerald 10 Collinl, undated.
I" Bridlc, Dor.ummts, p. 631, J.C. Briuon (Acting High CommiSlioner in Newfoundland) 10 Secretary
of Statc for External Affairs, 13 September 1947.
110 Alec O. Stacey, "1000 Days', BNF, p. 13.'i.
III Bridle, Documm/:r, p. 672,1.5. Macdonald 10Seeretary ofSta"" for External Affairll, II October
1947.
1J2 Bridle, DoCWllDlt;r, p. 672, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of Stale for External Affairs, 13 Oclober
1947.
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the confederates, who seem 10 have pressed for his appoinlment, 1$3 McEvoy was sworn
in as Chainnan on Monday morning, and on Wednesday 15 October the Convention
resumed silting.
Until the Canadian teons arrived, the Convention considered the remaining
committee reports. On 16 October Cashin tabled the report of the Finance Committee
which argued thai Newfoundland could remain solvent. With this responsible government
volley the Convention began 10 divide bitterly, and the political atmosphere soured. On
6 November the "grey book" arrived, outlining in twenty-three detailed sections the
proposed teons of union.lS. Because Bradley's attendance at the Convemion following
his resignation had been sporadic because of illness. the next day McEvoy appointed
Smallwood to lead the discussion, Ul and he proceeded methodically through them, tenn
by term. Having the tenns gave the confederates and SmaUwood an outstanding
advantage, for they were able to make campaign promises to the electorate and invoke
a confederate imagery of the great wealth which would come to Newfoundland as a result
of union. This was a device which the League could only attack, but not match.
Cognizant that they desperately needed information about Canada, at the 12 November
meeting it was suggested that J.S. Currie get the Daily News' Ottawa correspondent
Gerald Waring, who had covered the Ottawa meetings, to send information or secure a
source. 1S6 Perlin moved thai liaisons be formed with the responsible government bloc
III Sec Bridle, Docummls, Vol. II, Part II, p. 1561, Han. C.D. Howo to Senalor A.N. MeLan, 29
Much 1949. in whieh Howe ~minds Melan tbat the eonfederales turned \0 MeEvoy to bud the
Convention after Bmlley ~iped. Presumably, the Canadians were informed by tbe eonfederates that this
wasthecasc.
,'''' Bridle delivered these to J.S. Maedooald for "transmillliOlI" to Govemor Macdonald. Sec: Bridle,
DocwlMnls, p. 681, E. Reid toJ.S. Macdonald, 3 November 1947.
," Webb, "Convention", p. 120.
')0 RGLP 3.01.002, m:eeutive Minutes, 12 November 1947.
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in the Convention, and in seconding this R.B. Mercer noled that ·such a liaison should
have been made earlier-, but noled Ihal this situation occurred at the "dvke of the
Convention members. m Lacking infonnation and alliances with Convention delegates,
the League was powerless to counter the confederates' campaign, and by Novlll11ber the
confederates were setting the agenda, and the constitutional debate became the
confederation debate.
On 8 Novemtler, Premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec denounced the proposed
tenus of union, questioning the right of the Canadian govemment to negotiate withollt
consulting the provinces,"1 and on 29 November he repudiated the 1927 Privy Council
Decision, asserting that Quebec owned Labrador. 119 This had been a persistent claim
made by Quebec that fall, 160 and rumours of its interest in labrador gave Ihe advocates
of responsible government, and particularly Cashin, a useful source of ammunition
against the confederates. But beginning on 20 November, Smallwood effectively
countered the Quebec threats with his elucidation of Canadian social services, family
allowances, and old age pensions which would be available under confederation. 161 nlC
effect of Smallwood's promises was remarkable, and when these were coupled with a
prediction of dire consequences should ~Water Street~ regain political control, more
interest was stirred in confederation than through any other method,
lll/bid.
lSi Bridle, DoCU1Mfl1S, p, 732, elltraci from leleglllm from SecretaI)' of Stale for Exlem.1 Aff.irl 10
Ambuudor in Franee.
"'Staeey, "I000D'yl·,BNF,p.135.
IIIIl On Quebec's interest in Labrador su PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 3, file: NF - De"p.tehet and
Memos, Bridle to EKtem.1 Affairs, 20 Oelober 1941; ibid., Brittoo 10 Seeretal)' of Stale for EKlem.1
Affain, 16 September 1941; lIlld The Daily News, 16 September 1947.
til See Bridle, Do~u, pp. 736-9, J.S. Macdondd to Secretary of Stale for EKlem.1 Arf.in, 21
and 26 November 1947.
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Soon after the Ottawa delegation retumed, Smallwood infonned J.S. Macdonald
lhat he had discussed the draft (eons on ooucation and divorce with the leaders of the
Anglican and United Churches, and the Salvation Anny, all of whom had no objection
to the wording. Smallwood sent Higgins to the archbishop's palace with the proposed
(coos, bUI later noted thai Roche did nol receive Higgins. lot In facl, Roche was out of
lown, and Higgins left the lenns with Roche's secretary, Fr. O'Mara. 1u While Higgins
had been quite concerned while in Ottawa to press the point that Catholics expected a
Canadian undenaking that underconfederalion, Newfoundland couns would not be able
to grant divorces,l64 Higgins made liule issue of it that fall, and no special clause on
divorce was drafted or included in the terms. IOl If Roche or Higgins contacted each
other afterwards, no record of this exists. They made no further representations to the
Canadians, and later that fall when ].S. Macdonald reported that Chief Justice Sir
Edward Emerson, a Catholic, remarked that he thought that the Canadian tenos were
excellent, and that he -saw no need for any particular safeguard on the question of
divorce-,I66 the issue seems to have died. As a result, no provision was made for
divorce in the final tenns. 167 A year later, Bishop lohn M. O'Neill addressed the
Calholic Women's League of Windsor, Ontario, and explained that the Church had
apprehensions over confederation because with union, it would not be long before a
-two-to-one Protestant majority" would "demand and get a Provincial law legalizing
,.: Smallwood, / Chou CAnada, p. 309.
,oJ Bridle, DOr:umt!nls, pp. 675ot'i, J.S. Ma;:donald 10 Secretai)' of Stale for Exlernl1 Affllin, 17
Ocl~rl947.
,.. Bridle, Dor:umt!nlS, pp. 675-6, footnote 168, "Memorandum of MacKay 10 l.R. Baldwill, 30
Seplember 1947.·
'oJ/bid.,pp.67Sot'i,foolnOleI68,
t.. Bridte, DoCllmDIIS, p. 733, J.S. Macdonald 10 MacKay, 8 November 1947,
111 Smallwood, / Chou CaNJikJ, p, 308.
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divQrce in Newfoundland".I" As well, mixed Catholic-Protestant marriages would
present problems in passing on the faith, immoral lilcralllro would l100d into
Newfoundland, and union would bring unlold wealth and secularism inlo the island and
create "a new environment where pleasure was unlimited and joy unconfined",I&'! For
their part, some Newfoundland Catholics also keenly felt thai Canada was a Protestant
nation, and would not understand either their history or culture, in which their Church
played a pivOlaJ role. 110
In November, The Monitor continued ils campaign against confederation. In
"Newfoundland at the Parting of the Ways". it adopted the arguments or tile Responsiblt:
Government League. Its tone was nationalistic, and it exhorted Catholics to "...consider
what is best for the country... ",and recognize that "...there has grown up with us during
the past four and a half centuries a simple God-fearing way of life which our forbearers
have handed down to us and which we must pass on untarnished to posterity".m The
only proper group to consider confederation was an elected Newfoundland parliament,
and The Monitor noted that
...a referendum may very often bring about the results cesircd by the promoters
of it and may not actually represent the real view of the voter. This notorious fact
has been highlighted 100 often in recent years for us to accept a referendum as
being a truly worthwhile test of public opinion. m
The next month The Monitor warned that Confederation was irrevocable, and Ihat "a
great deal of the information upon which the so-called "terms" are based is at best well-
,. 7ht Evtning Ttltgram, 13 Oclober 1949, p. 3.
'''/bid., p. 3.
110 Edward FitzGerald to the author, 21 March 1989.
111 7);eMoniIQr, November 1947,p. J.
IT.! Ibid., p. 1. Pcmibly The Monllor wu referring to the Nalional Convention eleoction., fJld the
subsequentdomioationofthatbodybythcconfcderate,.
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infanned guess-work, and the danger of a hasty decision becomes apparent M • 113
Reflecting concerns of the Cold War world, by its late 1947 issues nle Monitor also
began to print brief articles from the United Stales press dealing with Communism and
the dangers of its advancement. To the politically-attuned in Newfoundland, though, this
was a preliminary warning about associating with anyone of socialist tendencies,
especially Smallwood's "Bolsheviks·, whose "communistic methods" were later
condemned by both the RGL and the Church.
On 9 December, R.A. MacKay sent a telegram to 'it. John's instrucling J.S.
Macdonald 10 refer the Convention's requests for infonnation on Canada to answers in
available sources before referring to Ottawa, because many of the Convention's questions
were "tendentious" and involved matters of Canadian policy and procedure. 17• MThis
would leave the Convention members to dig up the infonnation and interpret it as they
see fit", remarked MacKay, and he concluded that "Delay might be the best
solution". m This had been a successful tactic when the Commission had denied the
RGL the voters lists, but the next day Macdonald replied that if laconic replies were
giveu, he feared that the "Home Rule" element might feel strong enough to express
concerns that Newfoundland was being asked to make an irrevocable decision for
confederation on the basis of insufficient infonnation. 176 Macdonald's observations
were perceptive, for the RGL and the Church later made these claims, but he perhaps
overestimated the strength of the League. The RGL's campaign was not as active as was
Smallwood's, and dissatisfaction with the League was growing among some who desired
the return of self government.
I7l ThtMofliror,DecemberI947,p.IO.
1/. Bridle, DOCllmtllts, p. 7.52, MacKay to J.S. Macdooald, 9 December 1947.
"'lbfd.,p,752.
,,. Bridle. Documnlls, p. 755, J.S. Macdonald to MacKay, 10 De«mber 1947.
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Capitalising on the lacklustre perfonnance of the League, and fearing the
confederate propaganda machine. a new political movement emerged on 25 November.
On thai day, a series of advertisements began in 171t! Daily News, announcing till.:
imminent fonnation of the "Union with America Party".m Demanding American lenns
and claiming allegiance to Ihe American Republican Party, the advertisement noted that
"15 local leaders with 112 group heads in various Newfoundland outpons are now
forming plans". and provided a post office box address 10 which prospective members
could write,l1& James Halley, who had become McEvoy's law partner, later noted that
he thought economic union with America would be Rood after responsible govcnlmcnt
were returned, but because McEvoy was a confederate, he secretly ran and paid for the
first ~Unioll with America" newspaper ads out of his own funds. l19 He then approached
Geoff Stirling, the young pro-American owner of the St. John's Sunday Herald,11O
suggesting that a party for economic union bc fonned. This proposal was not actcd upon
until the close of the National Convention, but the ads continued, and in the New Year
they even drew the altention of Altlee's Private Secretary. T.J. O'Brien, who commented
that "The party front put up by the Union with America Party reads like an ad for Coca-
Cola".lll
177 Bridle, DOOJllUnu, p. 140, J.S. Mlcdonald 10 Secretary of Stale for External Affairs, 26 November
1941.enclosure; lIIsosee Neuy. NortllAtfant;c World, pp. 311 and 418, foolnolelS, Uld ThcDuily New.~.
2SNovember 1941,p.S.
," The Dally Ncws, 2S November 1947. p. S.
17' James Halley 10 Iheaulhor, 20 May 1992. and Walsh, More Than Q Poor Mojoriry, p. [93.
,.. Slirling'! family owned the Stirling Restauranl on W~ler Street, and he had been a student althe
Universil)' of Tampa in Florida, wllero he was acom:spondenl rorboth Tune and The ChiclJlW Tribune.
He returned to Sl. John's where in May 1946 he started the gossip-lilled,luerative The SundDy HerulJ.
\'1 PRO 0035/3487, T.J. O'Brien 10 United Kingdom Embassy ill Washington, 261111Ulry 1948.
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When the Convention rose on 13 December 1947 for Christmas, J.S. Macdonald
infonned Sf. Laurent that bickering had broken out over procedure, but thought that this
behaviour was useful, noting (kat "Newfo~":'Id[and is accustomed 10 violent, personal
abuse of the kind common in Canadian politics half a century ago and such attacks still
appear to be good tactics here- ,Ill Just before adjournment, Cashin and several other
delegates damaged the cause of the "Home Rule" group and added to the credibility of
the confederates when they left the chamber in disgust over not having had the last
word."l Whenever any atlacks or slights were made to the confederates, Smallwood
the broadcaster provided a play-by-play to the eleC!flrate over VONF, and the confederate
cause was furthered.
BUI the cause of responsible government was not dead. The day befue the
Convention adjourned, J.5. Macdonald had lunch with the Honourable Harold Mitchell,
a business partner of H.M.S. Lewin, the General Manager of the Bo·;'ater's
Newfoundland Pulp and Paper Mills in Comer Brook. In confidence, Macdonald was
told of Lewin's plans 10 oppose confederation.1M Lewin, who "ran Corner Brook, and
virtually everything and everyone in it-, IIJ had hired a Canadian finn to study the
proposed terms of union, and planned to have it printed in the paper company's The
Western Star,lt6 which wa~ edited by F. Burnham Gill, a nominal member of the RGL
10:1 Bridle, DuctllfUnfS, p. 759, I.S. Macdonald to Secretary of Slale for Extemal Affairs, 13 December
1947.
1.. Ibid., p. 760, and pp. 761·2. "Memorandum by Second Political Divi!ioll."
lM/bid.,p.76O.1,
I" Jamieson. "' Saw the Fight'. BNF, p. 95.
'10 Bridle. DocutMm:r, p. 761, J.S. MacdOllaid 10 Seo:relary ofSlale for E.\lemal Affairs, 13 December
1947.
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executive. 137 Like Dowaler's, the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company nlll a
paper mill in Grand Falls, and it also stood to lose money if taxes and stullIpage fee~
were imposed under confederation. The AND Company kepi Grand Falls in rein ,IS il
"small British town," and combined with the efforts of 71,e Grand Falls Adl'el1ise", anti
Ine anli-confederate views of the Roman Calholh.: Church there, many Grand Falls
residents were convinced of the dangers of confederation. III TIle same Siltlalion may
have prevailed in the company towns of Bell Island, where the Dominion Sled
Corporation mined iron ore, and in Buchans, where the American Smelling and Refining
Company mined copper, lead and zinc. Fearing Canadian taxes and regulations, the
maintenance of the StolUS q/lo or a return to responsible govemment was beller for
business than confederation.
While Lewin was becoming active in the campaign, the RGL intensified its quiet
activities during the late fall and into the Christmas season, still cautiously surveying th~
field. At the 16 December executive meeting, a policy change was evidenced when a
committee of the League was directed to approach C.B. Hunt, C.C. Pratt, Raymond
Gushue, Sir Leonard Outerbridge, and Edgar Hickman and request that they publicly lead
a political party under responsible govemment. l19 However, the response only netted
members, not leaders, and the League decided to abandon the idea. l90 On 19
December, cc.~.sponding with the League's agent in Gander, American Overseas
Airlines manager Ted Henley, Collins noted that F.M. O'leary thought -it would be
'07 RGLP3.01.020, Correspondence Collin~IO'Lcary. September-December 1947, B. Gill to O'Leary,
12 :>eeember 1947. The report by the Montreal finn McDonald, Currie and CompllllY was published in
17rt WUltrn Star iD the late sprins of t948.
I. Mrs. Teren Kennedy to the luthor, 9 February 199t.
lit RGLP 3.01.002, Executive Minul~, 16 December 1941.
1110 RGLP 3.01.002, Executive MinulCll, 30 Deecmber 1947.
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fatal 10 lackle Smallwood~ in public "and lose out through lack of infonnation",
Smallwood had
...about a three (3) years head start on us, and is fully prepared with the most
detailed information to speak in public. I personally feel that when we are ready
we will be able to give him a good roasting over the air, on the hustings, or any
where we meet him or his associates. It is a bit binding to have to sit back, and
watch him sweep all before him, bUI our tum will come, and I hope it comes
5000,191
In the most honest apPl<lisal of the political situation to date, at the end of the month
Collins commented on the progress of the campaign:
Reports from the outpon districts would indicate that Confederation is high
liner at the moment, with Commission GO\l~mmenl second in the field, A great
deal of bitterness has been stirred up against Responsible Government by the use
of class hatred against the merchant classes. Our radio talks and pamphlet have
been in the nature of academic discussion, on our political affairs. However we
know our weak points and are well prepared to put on a first class show in 1948.
We have six months to go before the Referendum, which is a long time to
maintain an active political campaign.
A new party has come into the field, known as "The Union with America
Party", The leaders are unknown, as also the strength of their movement. They
will without (sic] doubt cause that much more confusion in the minds of people.
I am quite optimistic about the future and feel that the six months ahead
of us will allow us time to put the true facts before the people, We realise that
we have a hard fight ahead of us, but I am certain that our efforts will be
crowned with success. In
The League was obviously feeling the effects of Smallwood's anti-merchant propaganda.
But its members did not see that the arrival of the Union with America Pany was a sign
of its own inadequacies, even though it recognized that confusion was beginning to
become the hallmark of the campaign. By early 1948 many outpOrt Newfoundlanders had
,.. RGlP 3.0t.020. Correspondence CollinslO'Leaty. September-December 1947, CotliD! to Henley,
19 December 1947,
'''l Ibid., eoUiD! 10 H.B, Morglll, 29 Dc<:embcr 1947.
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come to favour either the continuation of Commission. or confederation wilh
Canada, I~J and responsible government was becoming a hard sell. As C,J. Burchell told
R.A. MacKay in Onawa, "The Responsible government pcople~ were "LIP against a stone
wall, and it is probable that their effort from here on will be to retain as much popular
support as possible wilh an eye on post-Confederatiol1 political campaigns· .I~
The 1 January 1948 levee at Canada House in 51. John's saw visitors grllCl the
New Year with the c~ngenial toast of ·Canada Ever, Confederation Nevcr",'QS yet fOil I'
days later when the Convention re·opened, the acrimonious debate continued. The feisty
Smallwood challenged responsible government delegate Pierce Fudge to a showdown
outside the chamber, but Fudge was verbally reprimanded by the chaimlan before hoth
men could leave. lge The confederates subsequently mocked Fudge, a large lIlan, liS
"Fierce Pudge". even though Smallwood later claimed that Fudge was one or his
friends. 197 Smallwood was also reprimanded by the chairman for repealing himself,
whereupon he told Convention members that he was not speaking to them, but rather to
the people of Newfoundland. 191
191 Sec PANL GN 38/5-2-5-2, C. Milthew, to Chief Ranger, 20 January 1948, wherein Mallhew$
related tbat while Olle mall in Enllce hlld to "tum off bis radio every time be hUI1I Mr, SMALLWOOD
or one of his usociates speak of Confederation beeause he wu afraid he would uneon~iously find that he
had broken it iQtQ a thousand pieccs"; "Iut week practically the whole population of... [Roddickton] WII!!I
in favour of Confederation with CANADA.'
I" PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: 1944-50, Burchell to MacKay, 5 January 1948.
1t1 Bridle, DoClltnmtS, p. 189, J.5. Macdonald to Secretary of 5tate for External Affair!, 28 JllIluary
1948.
'''Webb, ·Conventioo·,p. 121.
It' Smallwood, "The Story", BNF, p. II.
,.. Webb, "Cooventioo", p. 124.
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Speaking in resronse to Smallwood's campaign, Cashin blasted confederation on
the grounds of the devastating lax:o.,ion which would be imposed,l99 and on 8 January
the Cl:llilmission made a significant reply to a query made by Cashin two days earlier
regarding Ihe date of the proposed referendum. The British govemment would need a
month to consider whatever options the Convention recommended. It was planned that
the referendum would be held in laic May, because it would "be impracticable 10 hold
a poll during the period from early June 10 late September as so many people are away
from their homes and may be disenfranchised".'l<iO Furthennore, it was tersely noted
that "The matters preliminary to the voting" would take place "in the foHowing order":
- delivery of recommendations by the National Convention, consideration by His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, communication of decision as 10
forms of Government to be submitted to the people, final draft and publication
of legislation for comment, passing of legislation, printing of ballots and other
forms, setting up of polling stations, and distribution of election material.'Zlll
The Convention was pressed to conclude its work, because the Commission felt ~unable
to give any assurance that the referendum will be possible this spring if the
recommendations of the Convention are not received by the end of the present
monlh~,m This was exactly what the confederates wanted, and the RGL was
summarily denied two months of their projected campaign. It was a possibility the
League should have anticipated, but had not. The crisis was recognized by responsible
government supporters inside and outside the Convention, and on 10 January a committee
l"'lbIJ" p. 127.
:to PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 3, Newfoundland·Despatehes-McMOJ, SecretaI)' of the Commission of
Govcmmenllo Secretary ofthc Convention. 81anIWY 1948.
Jlllbid.
;D:fbid.
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of Ihe League met several responsible government members of the Convention.M
Deciding that productivity could be enhanced with a smaller coordinating comnliltee, Ihe
meeting elected Currie, Cashin, Crosbie, and Cheeseman.~ 5ince "it was decided that
the meeting and the matters discussed there would be secret and confidential", no n.-cords
were kept,~ but an attempt seems to have been made to bring the ever-wayward
Cashin further into the fold, lond the autonomous Crosbie in line, and strategy must have
been plotted.
In early January 1948, Charles 5. Burchell revisited 51. John's after severnl years'
abS'·nce. Perhaps mindful of Cashin's abilities to whip up crowds, and of his part in the
debacle of 1932,100 Burchell voiced concerns that Cashin would "make an effort to
upset the political apple-can by staging a demonstration of some sort" and that "it is
always possible that, if this were to occur, some sort of violence might develop" .~O'I
He also noted that there were 2000 unemployed in 51. John's, and that a number of 51.
John's finns had taken out riot insurance. Even the governor had thought of the
possibility of serious rioting, and Burchell noted that Macdonald had
...considered the advisability of having a British warship stand off 5t. John's
within an hour's call, if he should receive infonnation that would warrant such
a step. I know, however, that he is reluctant to do this and that the only
:Ill RGLP 3.01.003, Minute! of Secret Meeting, 10 Janual)' 1948. Present from lhe Lugue were
O'Lul)', Cbeeseman, Cunie, Phelan, and Fraser, witb se(retaJ)' Collin,: present from the Convention
were Cashin, Crosbie, Fudge, Butt, lIlld Northcotl.
3l"lbid.
3>1 Ibid.
3>6 Cashin played a huy role in the demolllltration ofurly April 1932 which quickly be:clme the House
of Assembly riot. OD thi, period see James Overton, "Economic Crisis and the End of Democracy: Polities
in NewfoUDdland During tbe Great DeprellSiOD", LabfJur~ Travail, Vol. 26 (Fall 1990): 8.5-124: Neary,
Nonh Ar/anr;" World, p. 14; and Noel, Politics In Ntwfoundland, pp. 19&-202.
21'1 PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: 1944-19.50, Burchell to MacKay, S January 1948.
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alternative he has in miod. were the police 10 need assistance, would be to call
on the Americans at Fort Pepperrell.101
Aware of the difficulties Ihis would cause, Burchell nOled thai "This would be most
undesirable".209 Shortly thereafter. on 8 January, MacKay heard from Sir Alexander
Clutterbuck in Ottawa that Philip Noel.Baker, the British Secrelary of State for
Commonwealth Relations,210 "might come to Ottawa from New York for a day or
SO",211 MacKay suggested thai if Noel-Baker came, the opportunity should be taken to
discuss the Newfoundland situation with him, particularly Canadian concerns over "the
fann in which the question concerning continuance of Commission of Government would
be put on the ballot paper" (because "'he ronn might influence the result"), and the
procedure for admitting Newfoundland if there was a favourable vote in the
referendum. m MacKay also suggested that Noel-Baker have the Canadian views before
Governor Macdonald could meet with him.21J But because matters required his
presence in New York, Noel-Baker could not visit Ottawa.
On the first of a series of overseas lrips he would make in 1948, on 10 January,
Govem\Jr Sir Gordon Macdonald amved in London and met with Commonwealth
Relations Office officials and with Attlee.214 Because he wished to see Noel-Baker
D/bid.
110 In 1947 tile portfolio of Dominion Affain in Ibe Alllee government bec~·1C Commonwealtb
Rel.tloM; Noel-BakersucC<:Cded Addl500 intb.is post.
111 PAC MG 30 E t59, Vol. 6, file: 1944-1950, MacKay 10 Pearson, 8 January 1948.
l,: Ibid.
:1) Ibid.
ll' Aulce Papel'l, Deposit 65, folio 141, Gordon Macdooald to Aulce, 30 Uecember 1947, oOtU1g
Macdoeald'spe1ldioS vbitto London.
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when he returned from New York, Macdonald stayed umil mid-February, missing the
close of the Convention.m l.S. Macdonald thought the governor's visit was made at
an inopportune time, because of the imminent close of the Convention wilh no
recommendations in sight, and because McEvoy, who was "a mther ttlmperamcmal
individual not in the best ofheallh", looked "to the governor constantly ... for advice and
guidance". JI6 BUI Gordon Macdonald's London visit was imponant. While he did not
gel 10 see Noel-Baker, he did press for the inclusion of confederation on the ballot
paper,m and discussed policy arrangements for the campaign 30d tbe possible
confederation of Newfoundland with Canada,m
On 19 January, Gordon Higgins moved that Commission of Government and
responsible government as it existed in 1933 be placed on the ballot paper. Webb
maintains that by this time Higgins had ~unreservedly recommended" responsible
govemment despite his earlier flirtation with confederation,119 but if he had tried,
Higgins could not have given the confederates a grealer advantage. The wording of his
motion was pivotal, for it gave the confederates concrele grounds 10 claim what they had
hitherto only alleged; that responsible govemment (which, in effect, the confederale5
111 PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: 194+1950, "Memorandum of MIICKay 10 Secrelal)' of Slate for
External Affairs, 81anllar)' 1948."
211 Bridle, Doarmmu, p. 768,l.S. Macdonald 10 SecretaI)' of State for External Affairs, 7 11l1\UlI')I
1948.
211 Bridle, Docu~nu, p. 804, 1.S. MlICdonaid lo5e<:retary of Slate for External Affairs, 2 February
1948.
11'Macdonaldh&dexpressedhispreferencesinceI946llu1llhewordingonlhehallotlimplyprelcnt
three choicell: re5ponsible iovcmmcnt, confederation and commission of iovernment. In September 1946
he was concerned lluitthe DomJnions Office would "cook' the WOrding on the ballot, and it wu no1ed th~1
he orposed Ihis. &e Bridle, Docu~nu, p. 273, "Memorandum of a COIlvcrsation with the Governor, II)'
P.A. Bridle, 7 September 1946."
2ltWebb, "Convention",p, 129.
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were themselves advocating) was associated with memories of corrupl merchant rule as
it existed in 1933. As a responsible government advocate, Higgins must have had either
some sympathy for confederation, or been incredibly shortsighted. The wording of his
resolution was pregnant with meaning, and meant different things 10 each group. To the
RGL and the British it meant the return of self government, "the adoption by
Newfoundland of the Statute of WestminsterM or "assuming full Dominion status on the
Canadian model".2W But 10 the confederates. it was a nugget of gold. Smallwood
brilliantly supponed ~iggins' motion. and was thus enabled to slate that at no lime did
he deny the right of the people to choose one fonn of government over another,21I
Surprisingly, Higgins' motion was passed without criticism of the wording from the
responsible government group in the Convention, and another vital opportunity to limit
the confederates' propaganda was lost.
In March 1946 Bradley had written to Smallwood, asking whether there was
"some way of stripping the party mask off both advocates and opponents thus forcing
them to appear in their true characters1"m On 21 January 1948, McEvoy did just that
when he infonned the Convention that it would recommend the options to be placed on
the ballot by conducting three polls: responsible government versus Commission of
Government; Commission venus confederation, and confederation versus responsible
govemment.2l3 As Webb pointed out, "surprisingly, none of the members objected to
this·.2~ but perhaps what was not surprising was that McEvoy recommended it. The
next day, all delegates voted unanimously that responsible government and Commission
T.Il PRO DO 35/3456, Addison 10 Alllee, 3 February 1948.
~, Webb. ·Conventinn" p. t30.
::: Bradley P.pcT1l, J.R. Smallwood Corrcspondencc, Omloy 10 Smallwood, 19 March t946.
l:lWcbb,"Conventioo",p.131.
l:'/bld.,p.131.
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of Government would appear on the ballot paper in the forthcoming refllrendum, and on
23 January, Smallwood moved that confederation, "on the basis submiued to the National
Convention on November 6 1947 by the Prime Minister of Canada" be placed on the
ballot paper, and assured the people of Newfoundland that
..althollgh the confederates in the Convention are outnumbered almost two to
one, although we are a minority in the Convention, OUf recommendations will be
respected by the British government. There is no doubt about ii, confederation
will be on the ballot paper in the referendum. OUf people will get their chance
to vote for confederation this spring....the British govemment will prolect the
democratic rights of our people against all attempts of a mere majority of this
Convention.w
It was obvious that the motion would be defeated, but an open question whether
Smallwood had prior knowledge of the Commonwealth Office intention to place
confederation on the ballot. 1:6 But Smallwood must have had a sense Ihat confederntion
would be placed on the ballot paper, given the regularity of consultation between himself,
Bradley, 1.S. Macdonald, and the governor; given Bradley's original tacit assumption in
May 1946 that confederation would be a choice upon which people would vote; and
given Lord Addison's indication during the visit of the London delegation that the people
would have a choice.221
In his speech Smallwood again spoke out against the merchants, and particularly
vilified manufacturer'sagents (of which the League had more than its fair share) for their
profiteering at the expense of the people. In his closing argument, Higgins attacked
215 PANLGN 10, N.tiOllal Convenlion Proc~ings, 23 January 1948.
12>1 Webb. ·Convention·,p.)32.
m During the London vi!it. when Bradley uked Addison .bout his pouible .ltitude tow.rd. the
·recommendllion. of. sulJ,tlnti.1 minority' in the Conyention, Addison replied •...we Wlllilo lettbe
people have a choice.' PRO DO 3~13448, TtID!Cript of London Delegation Meeting with u.rd Addison,
p.12.
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confederation, and accused Smallwood of making misleading statements about divorce.
Higgins slaled that
.. in the event of Federal Union with Canada the sole right and authority to pass
divorce laws and sel up Divorce Courts in Newfoundland rests with the Federal
Government al Ottawa and with that government alone. With union of the two
coontries the Provincial Legislature of Newfoundland would have no right to say
"yes" or "no" in this mauer, unless a clause was included in the tenns of union
clearly stating that the Federal Parliament at Ottawa would forego for all time the
right 10 legislate for divorce in Newfoundland and undertake to have the British
North America Act amended immediately. Without such provision such tenns
would not be acceptable to the Catholic people of Newfoundland. Mr. Chainnan,
as no such provision is made in the terms received from the Right Honourable the
Prime Minister of Canada, I must infonn you, Sir, that the proposals cannot be
accepted by our Catholic people.11I
For better or worse, Higgins had entered the sectarian domain, and J.S. Macdonald laler
characterized his speech as a "deliberately planned allempt 10 stir up sectarian
feeling-. m Smallwood later told Macdonald that Higgins' assertion hurt the
confederates, and it would be particularly difficult to counter propaganda which would
result from Higgins' statements.
The conclusion of debate in (he Conventio~ was nol without a further sectarian
element. The only Roman Catholks in the Convelilil"n who had supported confederation
were William Keough of St. George's and Michael J. McCarthy, a co-operative field
worker from Port-au-Port; both were from Bishop O'Reilly's diocese. Keough later
related that he " ... received a message through an intermediary from the head of my
church in Newfoundland that I could not vote to have Confederation placed upon the
:21 PAC Me; 30 E 159. Vol. 3, Newfoundllllld-~tcbes-MclllOl,Partial Texl of Speech by Mr.
Gordon Hiuinl. 24 Janllal')' 1948, eoclOlCd inJ.S. Mftcdnnald to Seo::relary of Stale for Elltemal Affaifl,
4 Febl"lW)' 1948.
m Ibid.. J.S. Macdonald to Seo:relll')' of Stale fOT External AffaiTl, 28Janllll)' 1948.
10'
Referendum Paper".1JO Keough had st:rious misgivings about opposing Archbishop
Roche, and paced the floor of his house the night before Ihe vote. :Jl In the Convention
at two in the morning of the night before the final votc was taken, Kl:Ough stood 10
speak, and "the intennediary in question came up behind me and said 'remember what
I told you! ,"1]2 But Bishop O'Reilly held more sway over Keough than did Archbishop
Roche.
Following a vigorous all-night debate which concluded at five in Ihe morning 011
28 January, Smallwood's confederation motion was defeated twenty-nine to sixlccn,lJl
But in fact, the confederates had won. The anli-confederates had fallen into the lrap of
"denying the people the right to choose", and they were subsequently condemned by
confederate propaganda. Two days later, on 30 January, the Convention dissolved, and
the occasion was marked by the presentation of the Convention's recommendations, and
a short speech given by the Administrntor, Sir L.E. Emerson, in the absence of Govcmor
Macdonald. Emerson noted that "a great deal more infonnation" had been broadcast by
the Convention "to a greater number of people by the means adopted, than would have
resulted from the limited circulation and publicity given a lengthy repon of a Royal
Commisslon".2u Then reflecting Dominions Office policy, and using the trademark
religious metaphor of Governor Macdonald, Emerson declared that the
Z)lI Keoup, "We Knew What We Wanled", BNF, p. 64.
:01 Mrs, Gertrude Keough te the author, 19 Febf\lllT)' :II.
2:11 Ibid., p. 64.
lJl Placing a sectarian emphasis on the Convention', concllillion, 1.5. Macdonald noted to Ottawalhll
eleven of tbe thirteen Roman Catholics in the Convenlion h.d 'IDled aglillllithe inclusion of confederation
on the ballot (see Bridle, DOCUfMrIIS, p. 788.1.5. Macdonald to Secretary of State for &otemal Afflif',
28 January 1948).
:0.0 PANLGN 10. NatioDalConvention Procecdinp,:30 lanll8ry 1948.
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...Commi5sion of Government, excellent as it is as a temporary stopgap in the
case of an emergency. does not pro,.';ue the proper spiritual oudet for the
development of the political soul of a free people. Their ultimate goal must be
democratic government either alone or as a panner in a greater democral!c union.
Whether democratic govemmem is to come now or later, it is o1i1f by the
exercise of the right to vote that the people can demand it, as it is only by similar
action that they can control it. m
With that statement concluded a tumultuous chapler in Newfoundland's political
history. The National Convention had been the preliminary public forum for tbe political
campaign for confederation, which had proceeded behind-the-scenes for some time. It
provided the confederates, the Canadians, and the British with an elected political body
through which to publicizt" confederation. It took much of the anention off the political
arranging which had proceeded in Whitehall, Ottawa, and SI. John's, and provided a
means to recommend that confederation be included on the ballot paper. Since the
Convention had not done this, it thus became a body against which public opinion could
be turned to justify the inclusion of confedemlion on the ballot paper. While the tenn of
the Convention saw the birth of the Responsible Government League, over a two-year
period it nevertheless achieved the aim of publicizing the unknown option of
confedemtion and giving it legitimacy. The Convention placed the confederates on the
brink of their campaign, and this was facilitated by publicizing Smallwood, whose
rhetorical lOllr-de-force captured the minds of Newfoundlanders. Indeed, the custom·
made National Convention was almost the ideal vehicle for transporting the message of
that sea~oned broadcaster-wordsmith to the outpons, and for advancing British and
Canadian political goals. With the war over, the economic boom beginning to subside,
and uncertainty in sectors of the fishery,236 the audiellce was receptive to the
~l ibid.
m For IbC3e trends see David Alexander, 17t~ D~cuy of Trad~ • An Economic Hislory uf th~
N~""folUlliland SDlt Fish Trfldt, J9J5·1965 (51. John'.: InslituleorSoclal and Economie Research, 1977),
pp. 39 and ff.
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confederate message, as conjured up by Smallwood. He offered II brighl and secure
future, in contrast with the uncertain images of a retum to merchant-ridden self-
govemment. For its part, the Responsible Government League did little throughout lhis
period to help themselves or their cause by countering lhose images, anJ the League
remained disorganized. But by the close of the Convention, the public polilicalletlmrgy
of 1946 had become interest in Newfoundland's political future, and the Convention had
primed the Newfoundland electorate well for the confederation campaigns which were
about to be launched.
Chapter 4
"Clarlned Minds":
The First Referendum Campaign, January-Marth 1948
From the time of tile closure of the National Convention at the end of January
1948, 10 the announcement of the wording of the referendum ballot by the British in
early March, all parties engaged in political maneuvering. During this first phase of the
post-Convention campaigns. a "phony war" ensued until the issues of the struggle were
made known. The confederates consolidated their support, and took every opportunity
to create the impressions that confederation had momentum, thai it was going to be on
the ballot, and that it would win. While the RGL also organized, it was nol as well-
prepared as Ihe confederates, and its earlier failure 10 organize and commit to the fight
look ils loll during this period. As a result, a pro-American party was re-born,
advocating economic union with .::e United States under the banner of respomll.J!e
govemment.
When the Convention ended, Governor Macdonald had already been in England
for three weeks discussing the ballot paper wording with the Commonwealth Relations
Office. On 3 February 1948, Lord Addison noted that he had met with P-tlacdonald and
Sir Eric Machtig, the Pennancnt Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,
and that both they and the Commonwealth Relations Office agreed that Commission of
Govemment and responsible govemment should be on the ballot with confederation,
unless the Canadian govemment preferred that confederation should not be included. I
Altice, who had discussed the maner with Macdonald, agreed that confederation should
be on the ballot, but directed that Noel-Baker's views be heard before the maner was
I PRO PREM 8/1043, AddisoD to Attlee, 3 FeblUl.ty 1948.
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finalized. 1 On S February the Canadian government stated through J.S. Macdofl.1ld lhat
it would have no part in detennining the wording of the ballot paper, and thai the: IIkllh:r
would be left entirely for British tietennination.J
On 6 February, London sent the Convention's recommendations 10 Nocl-Bak":f
alLtke Success, New York.~ where he was preparing to de.3.1 with the Palestine Question
before lhe United Nations' Security Council, and lhe NIndia-Pakiscan business·,' Noel-
Baker had wanted to visit Ottawa, a trip which the Canadians also proposed. but he
received Gordon Macdonald's views through Machtig that a visit 10 Ottawa would be
useless and could be seen by the RGL •...as an attempt by the United Kingdom to force
Confederation on Newfoundland". such a development would be damaging to the
objective which we have in view·.' AUlee similarly instructed Noel-Baker the next day.1
Instead, Gordon Macdonald would meet Noel-Baker in New York to exchange views on
the ballot wording, and discuss the anti-confederate campaigns.· Machtig infonned
Nonnan Robertson, now the Canadian High Commissioner in London, of the impending
meeting.'
1 See Bridle, DfH:wMnu, p. 110, ADiJtaDt Private Sec:m..ry 10 Prime Minister of Greal Britain to
Assistant Sccrcwy, Commonweallh Relatiou Office, 4 f~bnwy 1941.
I Bridle, Docv/MflIS, p. III, "MelDOf'Mdum by Department of Er.temal Affairs, 5 february 1948."
• Bridle, DOalrMnU, p. 114, MllChtiS to Noel-Baker, 6 february 1948.
• PRO DO 3513456, Alllee to Noel-Baker, 7 february 1945.
• PRO DO 35/3456, MachliS 10 Noel-SUer, 6 Februal}' 1948.
1 PRO DO 3513456, Attlee to Noel-Baker. 7 Fcbr\lll')' 1948,
-Tbid.
• Noted in PRO 00 3513456, M.ehtig to Clutlerbllek, 9 februuy 1948.
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While Macdonald was away, the National Convcnlion had closed and the
confederate campaign shifted gears. The Convention had recommended that only
responsible govemment and Commission of Government appear on the ballot, but even
before the Convention closed, Smallwood announced that hundreds of telegrams from
around Newfoundland requesting confederation on the ballot paper had begun 10 arrive
at his Devon Row flat. 10 While the ielegrams and petitions may have arrived unsolicited
at first, they did embody the first national public expression of political opinion on a
single issue in years. The confederates soon realized their potential: they could be an
excellent propaganda tool for criticizing the Convention and creating interest in
confederation, and more importantly, if they were solicited in large numbers, they could
provide an updatoo operating list of confederate supporters in every settlement in
Newfoundland. II As well, any campaign for confederation would be useless until the
wording of the ballot was known, and so the best use of the time Ilntil then would be to
gather suppoc On the evening of Sarurday 31 January, Bradley took to the airwaves of
VONF and appealed to the people of outport Newfoundland to nood the confederates
with telegrams "demanding" that confederation be placed on the ballot by the Dominions
Office, and Smallwood later made the same appeal over VOCM. 12
For a moment, Bradley the elder statesman was back in the political saddle with
a vengeance. With a masterful, carefully-planned ten-minute speech (the authorship of
which Smallwood later claimed)l) calculated at evoking the widest possible public
'0 Tht! £vming Tt!/t!gfQlfl, 31 JlrIlIal')' 1948, p. 3, llIld Horwood, Jot!Y, p. 98.
II The confederates already had a list of thCl I1~mes lUId addresses of potential supporterll; Smallwood
had kept F.M. O'Leary'. Barn/m.lIl newlpaper mailing list. See Horwood, Joey. p.65.
'lJamicson, "I Saw the Fish'", BNF, p. 83. and Stacey, "1000 Day'", BNF, p. 135. Under the rules
Jet for VONF by the BeN, only former ministers of Newfoundland govenutlCnlS could broadcut political
statements.
lJ Sec Smallwood, "ThCl St01)'". BNF, p. 26; lrId Jamieson, "I Saw the Fight". BNF, p. 85.
114
support, and "spelling the doom" of the opposition,l. Bradley went on VONF and laid
listeners that he bad been "besieged" by cilizens who had expressed "indignation" and
"urgent protests", and that he had been approached to "offer advice as to whcthtlr there
are any steps thaI the citizens can now take, and if so what those steps are". 1J "Let me
make it perfectly plain" he said,
that I share fully the popular indignation over the action of lhe majority in Ihe
Convention. I think that their action is completely undemocratic, completely in
the spirit of pure Hitlerism. By their vote they have done lheir utmost to cheat
you of your undoubted right to decide for yourselves whcther you will have
confederation. 16
Then, defining the enemy by deliberately over-playing the strength and unity of the
proponents for responsible govemme::t (which in fact was never the case). he noted that
... this attempt is not a calm judicial decision of impartial men, but one of an
organized political party which used its membership in the Convention to promote
the only fonn of government with which it agreed - responsible government. I?
The vote of 29 to 16 was thus the "inevitable, the pre-determined decision- of those
wbose minds were closed 10 all but responsible govemment. But the British were 1I0t
bound to accept tll& majority of the Convention, because Lord Addison said tbat "a
~ in tbe Convention might well represenl a m.Wri.lY. of the ~"." Bradley
then advised his "fellow citizens" that they could
clarify the British Government's mind, you can clear up any doubt they may
have, and I will tell you how to do it.
My first thought was to advise you to send cables in thousands to the
British Government, but after some reflection I have rejected that idea. It would
be too expensive. II costs probably too much money to send cable messages
" Hiller, "Career uf F. Gordon Bradley", NFS, Vol. 4, No.2 (Fall 1988): 174.
"Bradley Papel'!.l, Speeches-Confederation, 31 January 1948. p. I.
II/bld"p.l.
17/bld.,pp.I_2.
"/bid., p. 3. Elllphuis incillded in original document.
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across the Atlantic, and the expense might cause many of you to hesitate. and
some of you wOtJld take no further action in the matter.
But there is no need to send expensive cables 10 England. You can send
them here 10 St. John's by Postal-Telegraph, at very much less cost.
If you 'vanl Confederation to be on the ballot paper in the Referel.dum;
if you think that you should decide the question of Confederation in the
referendum, you only have 10 send your telegrams saying that you demand to
have Confederation placed on the ballal.
..if you believe in fair play. if you believe that the people of
Newfoundland should not be cheated out of their right to decide their own
destiny, you will flood me with telegrams within the next few days, demanding
that confederation be placed on the ballol.
I will guarantee that your telegrams will be forwarded quickly to His
Majesty's Government in England through His Excellency the Governor. 19
Having ensured that the confederates would get the names of supporters of confederation,
instead of the Commission or the British, Bradley then enjoined his listeners to "show
these 29 dictators that the people are detennined not to be trampled upon". W Having
createdlhe perception that the rights of the people had b.;~n violated,11 Bradley returned
10 his beloved Bonavisla,11 where he remained throughout much of the campaign.
The years that the Barrelman had spent teUing his audience to ·write in" served
the confederates weU, and the response to their plea was overwhelming. On 3 February
j.S. Macdonald infonned Ottawa that five hundred telegrams had been received, bearing
eleven thousand signatures. 13 This trend continued, and Harold Horwood recounted that
the telegrams continued to flood into Devon Row, where they were counted by
lflbid., pp. J-4.
"'Ibid., p. 6.
:l A. observed by MtcKay iu PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: 1944-1950, MacKay 10 Smallwood,
26 March 1948.
:: On BllIdley', anxiety to return to Boll.vis... see Herwood, Jo~, p. 100.
» Bridle, D<K'IU7If'rItS, p, 801, J.S. Macdonald IoSxrewy ofSlale for External Arfain, J February
1948.
116
Smallwood, Fogwill and his wife. the Smallwood family. Forsey, Horwood. In.-nl:
Ebsary. and Roy Pike. 1ot Spomaoeously, Newfoundlanders organized petition-signing
meetings in rural communities like 51. Anthony, tawn, Grand Bank, and in the west
coast Catholic community of Louroes where 375 signatures were obtaincd.:S On lhe
night of2 February Cashin went on the radio to try 10 ·stem the tide-, but to no avail.~
and soon after he returned 10 Montreal to visit his family.n Starting on the eVl:ning of
4 February, the confederates canvassed large pans of 51. John's,lI and while Bradley's
-next few days· stretched into two weeks, the number of names received reached
49,769,:" with about 20,000 coming from areas with convention delegates who voted
against the inclusion of confederalion on the ballol.JO
On 12 February Noel·Baker wrote Gordon Macdonald, noting that he had read
the Newfoundland file Macdonald had loaned him, and.lhat in view oflhe Convention's
recommendations, he agreed with Macdonald, Attlee and Addison that ConfederAlion
should go on lhe ballot.31 -It would be, I am sure, wrong thai this choice should be
:.0 Horwood, J«y, p. 100.
~ PAC MG 21 ill B 20, Vo!. 58, file: 26 Brilish covemmeal, file I, J.S. M.cdonaId to Sce~ of
Stlte (or Exlemal Affain, 04 r-ebruary 1948.
)0 Ibid., 1.S. MKdonald 10 Secretary ofStt.le for Exlemal Affain, 2 Febniary 1948.
P On Camin·...bseoee lee PRO 00 35130455, J.S. M~d to Secretary of Stale for Exlernal
Affairs, 19MI.tCb 1948.
11 See Horwood, JHy, p. 100, IUld PAC MG 27 III B 20, Vol. 58, file: 26 Brilish 80vernmenl, file
I, 1.5. Macdonl1d 10 Secretary of Stale for Ell.leml1 Affairs, 4 February 1948.
~ HotWood, Joty. p. 101.
JO PAC MG 2711I B 20, Vol. 58, file: 26 BrilithllDvemmenl, file 1. Mw:lonllld 10 Secretary o(Stale
for Exlemal Affairs, 4 February 1948; Uld l.R. Smallwood P.perlI 7.01.002, J.R.S. CorretpOlldence,
SlMIlwood 10 Carew, 14 February 1948.
)1 PRO DO 35/3456, Noel·BUer 10 Gordoa MacdotWd. 12 Februuy \948.
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closed 10 those who desire 10 make it-, said Noel·Baker, -I am also in agreement that
a time limit of five yean should be added to the proposal for the continuation of
Commission of Government. ... ·}2 With thai observation the deciston was made. with
the added agreement lhat Noel-Baker and Macdonald would laler craft the text of tbe
orflcial statement between London and St. John's during February, when Canadian input
and reaction cookl be gained and considered.D Macdonald had achieved his personal
objectives of placing oonfedcrntion on tbe ballot wilh responsible government and
Commission (which had been suggested to AttJee's cabinet in October 1945). and of
making Commission of Government look enticing on the ballot paper by adding the
condition that it be continued for five years.~
On 12 February, before he left New York, Macdonald addressed a group of
Newfoundlanders living in Brooklyn, and lold them that -the people themselves" must
shar~ in the blame for Newfoundland's situation, and that Newfoundlanders ·Iacked
confidence in themselves, and in one another, and in their own ability to surmount
difficulties·. JJ Presumably, this anitude towards Newfoundland partly explained why
the British felt justified in over-riding the Convention's RlCommendations. But, continued
the governor, ·if every man put his shoulder to the wheel,· there was ·00 reason why
the standard of living and the way of life of the large masses of our people could not be
:l:/bld.
" ThaI lhis oc<:ul'T'Cd il evident in Bridle, DoCI/IMntt, p. 827, Mlchli, to Gordon Macdonlld, 24
Febnwy 1948.
M nil Mlcdon.ald hid RIIdo tho Comminion look quile flvoul'lble on the blilol, llIld, U far u J.S.
Mlcdonlld wu concerned, hid lhUll put coofeclel'llion on tbe billot "in tbe most unflvourable
circumstances,· see PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file; 1944-19SO,J.S. MllCdonaldloMICI~y, 27 Febru&l)'
1948.
~ 1M Evm;", T'/'Iram, 19 Februaf)' 1948, p. 11.
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raised 10 a more satisfactory and comfonable level".J/> With thai pronouncement,
Macdonald returned home.
When Smallwood finally delivered the telegrams 10 Government House on 14
February, he enclosed a covering leiter addressed 10 WJ. Carew, the Secretary orlile
Commission, with whom Smallwood seems to have dealt instead of the govemor.Jl WI
deliver 10 you herewith", began Smallwood in his most eloquent, florid. and unusually
deferential prose,
in behalf [sic] of F. Gordon Bradley, K.C., telegrams, letters and petitions
containing the names of approximately 50,000 voters who request that
Confederntion be placed on the ballot-paper in the fonhcoming referendum.
These requests have resulted from a len-minute talk made by Mr. Bradley
on the radio two weeks ago today, in which he declared that the people. by Ihis
means, could clear up any doubt the British Government might have as to whether
it was publicly desired in Newfoundland that Confederation be placed on the
ballot. Mr. Brndley stated in his broadcast talk that he would endeavour to have
the requests forwarded, through His Excellency the Governor, to the Right
Honourable the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Ralations [sic]."
While it is hard to question the statement of support embodied by the telegrnms, there
were never fifty thousand telegrnms. There were fifty thousand names,'9 for it would
have been most unlikely if fifty thousand voters had actually signed a piece of paper.
Wick Collins of the RGL later noted thatlhe petition was never scrutinized, and that
many of the names on it were unqualified signatures.4~ Given the high illiteracy levels
l'IVid.• p. It.
J1 A1thougb Smallw~ implied that a meeting with the governor look place. See SmaJlwood, 1 Ch"u
CtJ/WIUJ,p.283.
II J.R. Smallwood ""pen, 7.01.002, J.R.S. Correspondence, 1948, Smallwood to Carew, 14 FebfUlry
1948.
M See Horwood, J~, p. lOt, and Smallwood 1 Chose CmuldD, p. 283.
~ ROLP 3.01.026, Correspoodence Collint Seplember 1949, "Memorandum of Wickrord L. Collin!,
ROL, to tbe Empire Prime Minillen in Conference in London, 16 Oetober 1948.·
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in Newfoundland outpons, and the accepted custom of the head of the household
speaking for the whole family in matters electoral,·1 regardless of individual views or
electoral eligibility, the fifty thousand names most likely came (rom considerably fewer
Ihan fifty thousand people, and some probably came from tombstones.
Smallwood laler maintained thai his heart stopped beating when he discovered
from Kenneth Macdonald that the governor did not send the telegrams and petitions 10
London;6l in Horwood's account, Smallwood swore on the governor in anguish when
he found out that a description of the telegrams was sent instead of the telegrams
themselves.4l But on 14 February Governor Macdonald had just arrived back home
from New York, suffering from a severe cold." It would have been unlikely if he had
received visitors. He intimated to Machtig later that day that "the skinnislting" had
already started in St. John's and that "It is thought that the sooner the better such
decision is made known" and that he was satisfied "that the course we agreed upon is the
right one".·5 Macdonald made no mention of having met or knowing of an imminent
meeting with Smallwood bearing fifty thousand petitions. It seems likely that if he had,
this also would have been noted to Machtig. It would also have been most unlikely if the
confederates did not have some sense that confederation would be discussed during the
governor's visit to England. By the time Smallwood delivered the telegrams, it mattered
" Thls may have been the cue when J.S. Mlednnald noted to the Sec~taJy of Stale for Elltemll1
Afft.irs that tbe St. Antbon)' meelrnJ S&w tbe turnoul of "two hundred dtluns • practically the whole adult
male poputation.· Sec PAC MG 27 m B 20, Vol. 58, file: 26 British Govefllmeol, file I, J.S. MacdoDald
to5(:(;rel&ty of Stalc, 2 FcblU&t)' 1948.
"Smailwood,IChQseQulada.pp.283-4 .
... Horwood,Joey, p. 101-2.
.. PRO DO 35/3456, telegram of Sir A1cllltlder Cadogan, Pcrmancnt Under-Sccrewy of Stale for
Foreign Affairs, in New York to M~htig, no dale, lIlld Ibid•• Gordon Macdonald to Maebtig, 14 Febnwy
1948.
.. PRO DO 35/3456, GOrdOD Macdonald 10 Machtig, 14 Febnwy 1948.
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not whether Macdonald or anyone else saw them, for the decision had already been
made, and the timing of events had been long decided.~~ l1le only functions the petition
had were 10 encourage to British in their intentions, give credence 10 Noel-Baker's
announcement when it was finally made,41 and 10 stimulate confederate support and
indicate the extent ofil.
With Bradley's broadcast a propaganda campaign had been launched which saw
the confederates oUH~anoeuvre and vilify their opposition. But this could only be done
wilh considerable Canadian financial assistance. On 31 January. the evening of the radio
appeal, Smallwood's friend Ewart Young met with Paul Bridle in his Ottawa office,
where the two discussed the plans and finances for Smallwood's campaign. 4I Young
relayed to Bridle that Smallwood had
...engaged a business manager to look after the financial aspects of the campaign
and that this business manager was in Ottawa in the course of a tour during which
he has been endeavouring to secure campaign funds from business people in
Canada.49
The travelling manager was Ray Penen,so who with the assistance of cabinet minister
C.D. Howe and Nova Scotian Senator A.N. McLean, the Liberal Party treasurer for the
.. ASlIII observer who pal1icipated in the lime, G.W. St. John Chadwick believed that the British were
convinced by tho telegmm. See Gerard William 51. John Chadwick, Newfuundland· Island Inlu ProvlnCfl
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univcnity Pre$I, 1967), p. 203.
47 Webb, "Convcntion",p. 141.
• Bridle, Do£'Ul/U!/'lu, p. 810, "Memorandum by British Commonwealth Diyision (P.A. Bridle), 4
February 1948.' On 20 J.mw)' 1948 the Second Political Diyision of the Departmenl of ElI.lemal Arf.in
was divided into Ihe European Diyisioo, IlIId the British Commonwealth Diyision, the laller of which Wall
beaded by R.A. MacKay, aod assigned the case of Newfoundland. See ibid., p. 189, footnote 2S.
"lbid.,p.810.
"l HOlWood, Jory, p. 113, and SmaJlwood, I Chose Canadi:I, p. 288.
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Marilimes," was linked up with Senator Gordon Fogo, who was Charles Burchell's
fonner law partner, Chainnan of ~he National Liberal Federation, and chief fund-raiser
for the party.~l According 10 Greg Power, Petten was given the "run around" at first,
but when Smallwood threatened MacKenzie King that he would cancel the campaign,
within twenty-four hours Fogo shared the party's Jist of donors with Petten. JJ But Pelten
found that at first donations were few and contingent on confederation being on the
ballot,J4 so fundraising from Canada had to wait just a little longer. But when the
telegrnms came in, the names of possible campaign workers in the outports were culled
and copied, and 101 of these were contacled to become "vice presidems".JJ These
officials ran the confederate branch associations and campaigns in the outpons and towns,
occasionally collected funding from what few Newfoundland donors there were, and were
reliable campaigners and informants for Smallwood on political sentiment and events
around the island.u As titular seconds only 10 Bradley, and later as officers who paid
campaign workers on behalf of the association, if they were not already, they became
quite influential in their communities.
JI Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 101). Mcl...ean bad previously obscrved to Prime Minister MackcnIie Kingtbat
Newfoundland wag rich in n.tural resou~« bue tllIt impol1ers and elCpol1en supplied the llUljor portion
or the island's revenue from duties. He a180 admitted 10 King tb.t be bad a personal interest in
Newfoundland bcc.use be wished to build. ·very large and modem fisb cannery" tbere. McLean offered
to obtain alltbe infommtion he could .bout!bo island for King. See Bridle, DOCll~nls, pp. 425-7, Senator
A.N. McLean 10 MlICkenzie Kina, 26 March 1947.
11 On Mclean see Who's Mlo in Canada 1949-1950. ed. 8.M. Greene (foronto: International Press
Ud., 1950), p. ISO); on Fogo see ibiJ., p. 600,
" Gregory J, Power 10 the author. 27 January 1992: and Horwood, Joey, p. 113.
... Bridle. Do~nts. p. 810. Memol'ltldum by Bridle, 4 February 1949.
'I For a list of these by district and community !I.lC Smallwood PapeT!, 4.01.001, Newfoundland
Confedcl'1ltcAssoeiation,
,. For an ClCll1lp[C of this sec J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.3J.()OI, St. Barbe Pre-Confeclel1iltioll, H.
Genge. J,P., 10 Smallwood, 18 Mlmh 1948,
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While the confederates were the first QUI of the staning blocks. the slipporters of
the Union with America P".ny were also canvassing for support and infonmllion for 11~cir
campaign. They hoped either 10 get union with America put on the ballot, or to prevent
the British from including confederation, which "would close the door 10 all their
hopes" ,j1 Joining Halley and Stirling were Halley's Father, Thomas, also a lawyer. 0.1.
Jackman, and William B. Perlin, the brother of A.a. Perlin.'· Having received many
telegrams indicating support for union with the United States, and recognizing Ihe need
to begin a campaign, Halley first contacted the U,S. Consulate in 51. John's for
encouragement.5'J But he found none, so he proceeded to Ihe United Slal~ where his
efforts met with a similar lack of success.60 Wishing to avoid looking as if "Ihe
Department of State had been secretly negotiating wilh members of the Convention",
American officialdom viewed the Union With America Party with a cel1ain
detachment,61 It was also sympathetic to the confederate hopes of C~:lada.&l
On 9 February a damaging blow was dealt (0 the confederate cause when J.B.
McEvo.v ,;poke on confederation. Since his meetings wilh Charles Burchell in the early
19405, McBvoy had envisioned himself as the confederate leader, but he disliked
"PAC MG30E 159, Vol. 3, file: NFLD· Dcspatchcs'Memos, J.S. Macdonald toSccrelaryofState
for E~lemal Affairs, 5 February 1948.
>lJamcs Hallcytolbeautbor,and PAC M030 E 159, Vol. 3, file: NFLD-Dcspatcbcs· Memos,J.S.
Macdonald 10 Secrelaf)' of Slale for Exlemal Affairs, 5 Febnwy 1948, W.B. Perlin had offered bis
services to the ROL tbe preYious August (.see ROLP ),OJ,()()3, MInules ofOeneral Mu;Iogs, Planning
Committee meeting, 6 Augusl 1948), bUI by this time.seems to haYe become disillusioned with tbe League.
"PACMO)O E 159, Vol.3, file: NFLD-Dcspatches- Memos,J.S, Macdonaldtos.-.•,m::l.ary ors.....
for E~temal Affairs, 5 February 1948.
00 Ibid., and MacKenzie, "Economic Union", NQ, Vol. !-XXXIII, No.4 (Winter 1988): 25 and 3D,
footnotet3.
01 Ma<:Kenzic, "Economic Union', NQ, Vol. LXXXIII, No.4 (Winter 1988); 15.
02/bid"p.15,
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Smallwood and had kept his distance from the "little man from Gambo".Ol He also
maintained close lies with the governor/'" a privilege which Smallwood seems not to
have enjoyed. But in a surprising statement, McEvoy lold the Evening Telegram thai
confederation should only go on the ballot paper in principle, and "not on the basis of
the present tenns" which were not negotiated and had been received by a "delegation
hampered by their lack of power".6S McEvoy funher noted that "before the ~pJe are
ask~d to make a decision for or against union with Canada the tenns must be negotiated
between govemments".66 McEvoy's statement seemed to parallel the arguments of the
RGL, but tbe next day in a letter to R.A. MacKay. McEvoy regretted that he "had been
indiscreet enough to verbally state my views which, under no circumstances, should I
have done, • and vowed that he would see the governor and disassociate hilnself from the
statement.&7 He then told MacKay that he hoped soon to go to Ottawa and have a
.;;onferencc with him on how he might speak out in favour of Confcdcrntion.&1 MacKay
welcomed the proposal.&9
Upon reading McEvoy's statement, the confederntes must have been
thunderstruck. "I think on balance", Smallwood later wrote to R.A. MacKay, that
after careful consideration, I regard him as the greatest fool I ever meL He is a
fool. but his impenetrable vanity makes a fool of him every time. The old
0.1 Robert S. Futlooa to the author. 2Q Janlilt)' 1992.
"Ja~HalJeytolbeauthor,20Mayl992 .
.., E~ning TtJtgrum, 9 February 1948, p. 3.
.. Ibid., p.3.
~ PAC MG 30 E 1'9, Vol. 6, file: 1944-1950, McEvoy to MacKay, 10 Februaty t948.
'"ibid.
If ibid., MacKay 10 McEvoy, 13 FeblUlrY 1948.
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Governor made a veritable tool of him, and he wasn't bril!ht enough 10 see il.
He's lusting visibly after a knighthood.70
It is unknown whether McEvoy's momentary lapse and Telegram ~"iatement were caused
by stupidity. his hypoglycemia or his fondness for spirits,11 but his actions indicate both
his own instability and tbe divisions among confederates over the fitness of Smallwood
to lead the pany. These divisions surfaced again during the following month when
McEvoy embarked on a personal crusade to promote confederation.
On 10 February, Currie's Daily News published a petition which some members
of the Newfoundland Law Society had sent to Ihe British government and to Noel-Baker
at Lake Succcss.n It affinned the National Convention's recommendation Ihal only two
forms of government should be placed on the ballol, and offered the considered opinion
of 32 members of the Newfoundland Bar that confederation should only be decided upon
after responsible government had been restored, and "in the usual constitutional manner
at a general election-.n Instigated by John G. Higgins, the Society's Treasurer. and
C.B. Hunt and E.l. Phelan, it was signed by all but three St. John's members, and fiyc
members outside the city.1. It was the most damning of all assaults the confederate
movement had received to date, but many must have thought that it was seven months
'" ibid., Smallwood to MacKay, IS Mareh 1948.
11 James Halley later noted that because of McEvoy's hypoglycemia IlId mood swinp, eYery day It
about 10.30 a.m. he would get McEvoy a mUbhake (Jamell Halley to the author, 20 MIY 1992).
7:llbe Dally News, 10 February 1948.
"'Ibid.
... Bridle. DocufMnls, p. 818, J.S. Macdonald to Sccrclaly of Stille for External Affail'll, 10 February
1948. The petition was signed by Charles E. Hunt, John G. Higgins, R.A. Pll"Dnt, Richard Cramm. E.S,
Pinsent, R.S. Furlong, Harold Knight,John A. Barron, Thornu P. Halley, Eric Cook, E.J. Phelan, Rupert
Bartlett, Jmet Halley, wlie R. Curtis, Gordon Higgins, Jamel D. Higgins, frederick Emcl'lOll, JltIlCI
Gibln, Arthur Mifflin, Dougl.. Ploscnt, Rex Renouf, Alex Kelly, Eric JelTClt, JlmtII Bradahaw, Gerald
Tessier, Derek Lewis, Gordon Stirling, IIIUC Mercer, Francis Ryan, SlImuel Hawkin.t, PaulinG Howlett,
Illd1.cJuiscSllundel'll.
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too late. The same day, the ROL emerged from its preoccupation with the Convention.
R.S. Furlong re·joined [he League, and suggested that the law Society petition be
circulated to the Western Star and the Grand Falls Adveniser. 7J 1,G. Higgins, Wilr
McGrath, Clayton Puddester, and Frank Fogwill were invited to join the League and
came a week later ,76 and on 25 February fanner Convention members Michael
Harrington and Edward P. Reddy accepted direclOrships.n But al the 16 February
meeting, Fogwill, an electrician with the Railway and a fonner Labour member of the
Convention, told the ~ague of the "strong anti-merchant feeling that exists in labouring
classes", and added that he felt he could "better serve the cause of self-government by
not being publicly associated with Ihe League". although he would attend meetings, act
on committees, and act as a liaison with Labour forces. ll The League wished to exploit
the potential of radio, for this was the first general campaign in Newfoundland history
which had the advantage of the use of mass media. It attempted to purchase all the
available radio time on both VONF and VOCM on the day before the referendum, but
was infonned that Ihe time had to be shared.~ At the same meeting A.B. Perlin was
assigned to investigate the publication of a newspaper. On 7 February the Union with
America Party had reorganized itself as the Economic Union Party,1O and on 16
February O'Leary infonned the League that during that past week he bad a meeting with
Geoff Stirling and Bill Perlin who represented the ~well organized" Economic Union with
America group. They had Slated that "eventually they aim to work with the Responsible
7l RGLP 3.01.002, Executive Minult:, 10 Febnwy 1948.
" RGLP 3.01.002, Executive MInUIC., 10 and 16 February 1948.
71 RGLP 3.0 1.002, Executive Minules, 2S Feb~ 1948.
7f RGLP 3.01.002, EJlecutive Minules, 16 f'ebl'l1ll')' 1948.
"'Ibid.
10 Stacey, "1000 Days", BNF, p. 135,
126
Government League" because they "know the only way 10 get Economic Union wilh Ihe
USA is through Responsible Government"."
While O'Leary promoted a positive perception of the new pro-American group,
the Economic Union Party struck oul on its own, and in fact had no intention of allying
itself wilh the faltering League. According 10 James Halley, he, Stirling, and Perlin
reorganized Ihe group, changed its name (so as not to offend conservative outport
supporters who were wary of republicanism, and to win support for ha... ing more
American money in Newfoundland), and began advocating economic union. n
Borrowing confederate methods. on 7 February, Nish Jackman appealed over VONF for
signatures to a "mons.er petition" requesting Ihat union with Ihe United Stales be placed
on the ballot.1l Halley and the group met O'Leary and Collins, and lold Ih~m about the
organization, which O'Leary later described as "47 keymen, 15 group leaders, and 200
contect men" ... According 10 Halley, the EUP had also received several thousand
telegrams of support - O'Leary noted Ihallhere were two thousand" • which Halley had
assiduously .;oUected since Ihe opening of the old Union With America party's postal
box. O'Leary lold Halley tbat the League had no members at all, and suggested that the
League should join with the EUP.16 Halley downplayed the suggestion, later claiming
Ihat he thought that if O'Leary, a St. John's Roman Catholic merchant, headed up a
"' RGLP3.0t.OO2, Executive Minutes, 16 Febnwy 1948.
., James Halley to the author, 20 May 1992.
., Bridle, Docummrs, p. 718, "Memorandum from L.B. Peanon to Secrel&Jy of Slate for External
Affairs, 10 Fcbnwy 1948.'
.. RGLP 3.01.002, Executive Minutes, 16 Fcbnwy 1948; IIId with minor variations in numbers and
terminology, Halley 10 author, 20 May 1992.
Ij James Halley to thclutbor, 20 May 1992; RGLP3.01.002, E.o.eculive MinulelI, 16 FebrtW)' 1948.
.. James Hallcy to author, 20 May 1992.
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united RGL-EUP group, support from Protestant outports would be politically
unoblainable." As a result. Halley and Stirling concluded that the BUP leader should
be Ches Crosbie, a Protestant who had good connections, was liked by many in the
outp0l1s, and electable. II His recruitment was their next goal. or all the threats with
which Smallwood and the confederates had 10 contend, the EUP was by far the most
potent, ar:d uncontrollable, for it was designed to cut across class, religion, and regional
interest, and according to Halley, to 1>e a group which Smallwood and the governor could
nOI control.t'l J.S. Macdonald also realised the appeal of the EUP, and told Lester B.
Pearson that if interest was stirred up by the party. "sentiment in favour of [the] idea of
union with the United States." would be quite irresistible- ,90 Pearson infonned St.
Laurent, and conveyed Macdonald's suggestion that the movement be "nipped in the bud"
by pressing Noel-Baker to announce immediately the ballot options.'!
While the EUP was constituting its leadership with a view 10 .sectarian
considerations, Archbishop Roche lived up 10 the predictions of the Dominions Office
and the hopes of Ihe Quebec Catholic newspaper, L 'Action Calhollque,n and gave his
imprimatur9J to the February 1948 Montfor, which was a harbinger of things to come.
"'Ibid.
a Ibid.
"Ibid•
.. Bridle. DOCUr1U!nts, p. 818, Pearson 10 Secrellory of SlIote for Exlernal Affaln. 10 Febnwy 1948.
"'lbid.,p.718.
OJ PRO DO J.5JJ4.5.5. [Noel-Baker) 10 H.N. Tall, 9 Febnwy 1948, and Bridle, Donmu!nlS, p. 858,
'Memorandum by Department of m.lemal Affairs, Summary of Opinions in tbe Freneh-UnJuage Pres!
on Recenl Developmenl.t in Newfoundland". in whieh tho 5 Febnwy L 'Aaron Calholique was noled 10
hIVllllUppor1edthestandtakcnby7heMoniror.
"'In Ihe Roman Calholic Cbul'Ilb, an imprimatur is tbe officiallicen.sc 10 print or publisb, granted under
the autborityofa bisbop.
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Compared with the November issue. the February Monitor was more authoritative in its
views on confeder.ttion and staled its position in depth:
I) The MONITOR does not propose to become ajoumal ofpolilical opinion.
2) The MONITOR believes that the question of lhe ultimate (onn of
government which the people of Newfoundland should enjoy is., question
which can only be decided by the people themselves, and 00 coercive
influence should be permitted or encouraged to influence the elc..:tornlc.
3) The MONITOR believes, however, that the people should have all the
infonnation possible placed before them before tlwy are asked \0 decide
for themselves as to the furore govemmcni of the coomry.
4) The MONITOR believes that to invite the people to declare themselves to
be in favour or opposed to a political union with Canada, which can never
be dissolved, on the basis of the incomplete infonnation now available to
them is not in the best interests of this country,
5) The MONITOR believes that constitutionally the people of this country
should decennine only one question at the present time, and tbal is
whether they desiIe to return to Responsible Government or 10 retain
Commission of Government.
6) If the people of lhis country desire to enter into an irn:vocable politteal
union with the Dominton of Canada, then this can be best carried oot, and
should only be carried out, after suitable negotialions between a full
people's Government of Newfoundland and the Government of the
Dominion of Canada.M
Responsible government was thus the only logical, fair and just choice, and the proper
position from which Newfoundland would be able to conduct equal negotiations with
Canada.
As well, the first in a series of patriotic articles appeared in the February
Monitor, entitled "Newfoundland At The Parting Of The Ways". This series was a
"The MOfliJor, February t948, p. 2.
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comprehensive effort at documenting the historic struggles of Newfoundland Roman
Catholics for self-rule, and its dominant themes were Newfoundlanders' desire for
independence and self-government, and the value of a pure, simple lifestyle.91 71,e
Monitor noted that divorce was a growing evil in Canada, bUI its editorial ~Where Once
They Stood We Stand- (a patriotic title taken from the Newfoundland national anthem)
was the most significant item in the paper. It expressed outrage at the identification by
the previous August's Manchester Guardian of "the position of the Catholic people"
regarding confederation, and its insinuation that the Catholic vote would be instructed.
Thus, the nbigoled and insulting reference" 10 the Newfoundland Catllolic Church by the
"Liberal English daily" had rendered it necessary for The Monitor, which disclaimed any
presumption to direct or instruct people how to vote, to make clear its position on the
constitutional issue, which it held to be the only course "consistent with our dignity as
a people and with our tmditions and history~.% Perceiving itself to be the butt of
English Protestant crilicism, The Monitor became militant, and increasingly on the
offensive. Ostensibly to coincide with Catholic Press month and inform its readers about
tlte function of the Catholic press, The Monitor's circulation was increased for tlte neltt
four months to 20,000 copies per issue, to be distributed across the island to every
Catholic home, free of charge.'"
While the Clturch look up the cause of responsible government and carefully
elucidated its own position, Smallwood organized the confederate campaign machine. He
identified the 100 or so vice presidents from the petitions before his organization was
formed, and in many cases informed people that they were vice presidents before they
fl Gwyn. SlMl/wood, p. 109.
.. Tht! Monifor, Fcbnwy 1948, p. 4.
~ Ibid•• p. 4.
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had in faci accepted.91 By 19 February the confederates had set up a small suite uf
offices at 158 Water Street, and with secretary Muriel Templeman and a trickle offund§.
the association was in business.99 On lhe evening of 21 February there was a meeting
of the Newfoundland Confederate Association in the ballroom of the Newfoundland
Hotel. 11Xl Bradley came to 51. 10hn's and spoke, and was elected President, while
Smallwood was applauded and elected as General Secretary and Campaign Manager. IOI
Greg Power was elected Assistant Campaign Manager, and Charlie Garland Financinl
Secretary-Treasurer. ~ variety of committees and other offices were eSlablished,1t1'l bUI
nonc of these met or operated sUbsequently in official capacities. lID All members
"coalescedM around Smallwood, who by his own admission exercised an Kiron_
dictatorship· over the party's affairs. IOl Also on 21 February, Chief Electoral Officer
Nehemiah Short (himself 0. confederate
'
!») published Ihe polling divisions for Ihe
If For an eX&m;lle oflhis see I,R. Smallwood Papers, 1,14.006. GrtJld Falls S-Z 1949. Smallwood
to R.G, Starkes, 19 Febnwy 1948, in whieh Smallwood informed Starkes that he would be elected as a
vice president allhe upeoming Coofedel1lte Associalion mcelinS; ami Jamieson, "I Saw the Fisht", BNF,
p. 87, in whichJlmieson note, that sevenol viee presidents who were nlmed claimed their names were used
withoulaulhoriution. Horwood, Joey, pp. 101 and 114, elaimed there were 101 viee presidenls. bUl 102
are listed in the Smallwood Papers, 4.01.001, Viee Presidents in Referenda.
"Smallwood, fChOSt Qmada, p. 287, and Bridle, ~nts, p. 825-6, Briltonto Secretary of Stile
for External Affairs. 19 February 1948.
'1lI Horwood. JOt!Y. p. 102; EvenilJg Ttltgram, 2.1 febnwy 1948, p. 31. Strangely, Webb.
"Con"mlion', p. 143; Diane P. JaMS, "Newfoundland Confedenole Auo<:iation', ENL I, p. 496, and
Smallwood, / Chost Canada, p. 286 indiCite that the meeting wu on 26 MlU"Ch, bUI the absenee nr
reference, 10 sueh I meeting ill doc:umenlS ltOund thi' dale ealls Ihis iMIl queslion, and it woold be mOlt
unlikely lhll any public politieal meeting, would be held on Good Friday.
101 Dillie P. Janes, ~Confedenlle Association, Newfoundland". EN!.. I, pp.496·7.
1G:/bid.. p.497.
,ot Horwood,Joey, p. 102.
'''' SIIlI11wood, "1be Story", BNF, p. 32.
lot I.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.39.001,51. John', East, includes 'N. Short, Colonial Buildins' on lli.t
ofCOllfedenotesupponel'Sl.
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referendum. each of which conlained about 300 voters. I06 Anned with this information,
with a knowledge of the total number of volers in each community, and with lists of
supporters in each community .~ompiled from the telegrams they received, the
confederates knew exactly their areas ofsuppon, and where their support was weak. I01
Their opposition was never as organized.
In comparison, the RGL had prepared more radio broadcasts, and was preparing
10 launch a newspaper. Al the 2 March executive meeting, O'leary stated that his fum
would own the 10 to 10.30 pm. time slot over VONF from 13 March onward, and that
he would donate this radio time to the League. IQl Bot as Collins later observed, the
radio broadcasts sported speakers "with educated English accents using words not
understandable to those with less than a grade five education", and their value must have
been variable,l09 Planning continued for a newspaper, but this too was done with
hesitl"'\CY. R.S. Furlong cautiously suggested the fonnation of a limited liability
publishing company for the paper in case libel actions were initiated against the League
executive, and Malcolm Hollett noted that if the forr.:~ of government to appear on the
ballot were not soon known, the League would not be able to publish the first issue of
lot Stacey, "1000 Days", BNF. p. 136,
107 For lilts compiled before the referenda. of key confederate supporters in variow districr.s, and
Ol:cuioualliltinp of tbe number of voters in variOUI communities, sec J.R. Smallwood Papers. 1.06.001,
Burin Pre-<:Onfed.; 1.08.001, Carboocar·Bay-de-Verde Pre-Confed.; 1.09.001, Ferryland Pre-<:onfed.;
1.12.001, Fortune Bay Pre·Confed.; 1.14.001, Grand Falls Pre-Collfed.; 1.15.001, GreeD Bay Pre·
Confed.; 1.16.001, Harbour Gnce Pre-eonfcd.; 1.18.001, Hr. Main·Belllsland Pre-eonfed.; 1.28.001,
Placenlia-St. Muy'sPre-<:Ollfcd.; 1.23.001. Labrador Pre-COllted.; 1.30.001, Placentia West Pre-Confed.;
1.32.001, Port-dc-oravo Pre·Conted.; 1.37.001, St. Gcorge's-Port-au-Port Prc-Cootcd.; 1.39,()0I, St.
John'IEasI Pre·Confed.; 1.45,001, Trinity North Pre-Confed.; 1.33.001,51. Barbe Pre-Confed.; 1,48.0ll!,
WhilcBay P1"e-Coofed.
I" ROLf 3.0UlC)2, EAccutive Minules, 2 March 1948.
1/11 ColliJu, "League outclassed", 1M Ewning Trl~granl. 28 MItCh 196~, p. 36.
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ils paper on 15 March. Ill) Compared with the confederates. the League was a rank
amateur, and was no match for the mixture of well-planned and oR-the-spot operations
of the confederates.
When Noel-Baker announced the wording of the ballot paper on 11 March, it
l'ppeared as if the decision had been only his. The indusion of confederation greally
upset many members of the RGL. who thought that the British government had violall."d
the unwritten code of British fair play and justice. 111 'The EUP, however, seemed nol
to be concerned. But contrary to the belief that it was Noel-Baker's announcement, the
wording had been ammged between Gordon Macdonald. Noel-Baker, Sir Eric Machlig,
Nonnan Robertson, Louis SI. laurent, R.A. MacKay, and Paul Bridle, with final say
reserved for the Brilish,lI2 and Gordon Macdonald, who wa~ laler described as "having
won his point~ .lIl Canadian influence in the decision was oot insignificant, and the
British carried out the negotiations with a view to allowing the broadest powers for the
Commission ofGovernment to authorise a Newfoundland delegation to "negotiate teons",
while relying heavily on those already sent by the Canadians. 114 At several points the
Canadians were displeased with the wording of the announcement, and remained so even
after its announcement. 1lS At one point on the morning of 2 March, R.A MacKay in
Ottawa contacted Nonnan Robertson in London, suggesting that "the Commonwealth
110 Ibid.,p. 36.
III RobertS. Furlongtothe.utbor, 2OJI./lll.llY 1992.
III See Bridle. Do~nlS, pp. 827-833, for V.rioll' ilUll&neet of Ihi' eonllliative proeesl.
III Bridle, DOCU/fIOlu, pp. 846-', J.S. Macdonald to M,eKa)', 25 Mueh 1948.
"' Bridle, DO~fl/', pp. 828. High Commi"ioner of Grelt Britain in OltiWI 10 MlChlig, 27
Februuy t948.
'" For R.A. MICKly', disappointment witb the wording see PAC MG JO E 159. Vol 6, file: 1944-
1950, MIeKl)' to Smallwood, 26 Mueb 1948.
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Relations Office be asked 10 delay (the] despatch to Newfoundland until tomorrow". 110
But the despatch had already been sent to Gordon Macdonald in St. John's, with the
justification that Britain felt that the issues and implications of confederation had been
"sufficiently clarified" for Newfoundlanders to make a choice on confederation. 117 The
next day the governor discussed the despatch with J.S. Macdonald, to whom it was
c),plained thai with regard to the inclusion of confederation on the ballot, "the electorate
would be asked to vote merely on the question of principle, leaving the tenns 10 be
discussed between the Commission of Government and the Government of Canada" .111
It is unknown whether the confederates already knew that confederation would be
on the ballot, but given 1.S. Macdonald's discussion with the governor, they must have
had some indication. While Smallwood kept up a public air of confidence1l9 during the
"intenninable, intolerable, m2'ddening wait for word from London", 11G Gordon Bradley
made a series of discreet but reportedly unsuccessful trips to Government House to
delennine from the governor whether confederation "on the teoos secured by the
delegation from the Canadian Government would be on the ballot" .111 On the morning
of 11 March, VONF announcer Dick O'Brien received Noel-Baker's despatch dale<! 2
March in a sealed envelope from Kenneth Macdonald, and it was read on the noon-hour
", Bridle, Dor:utN!nrs, p. 830. M.eKay to Robertson, 2 Mucb 1948.
II? Neary, Nonh AtlamlC' World. p. 314.
III Bridle, Docummu, p. 831, J.S. Macdonald to SccI"eWy of Slale for External Affain, 3 March
1948.
III Jamieson. "ISawIbeFight",8NF, p. 85.
1:10 Smallwood, "The Story", BNF, p. 27.
III Bridle, Docummu, p. 832, J,S. M.cdonald to Sccrewy of Slate for Exlemu Affun, 3 Marcb
1948.
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newscast,122 with representatives of all parties. Sm~l1wood included, in the station. The
questions on the ballot paper were to be "Commission of Government for a fuether
period of five years; Responsible Government as it existed in 1933 prior 10 lhe
establishment of Commission of Government; anJ Confederation with Canada".11J
Smallwood was elated, bUI when Bradley heard the wording of the confederation option
he was privately disheartened, feeling thai voters would be in doubt as to whether they
would be voting for confederation "on the tenns offered by the Canadian government or
in principle only·. 114 Significantly, no one seemed to notice thai Noel-Baker made no
reference to the receipt of any telegrams from the governor, although on II March,
Mackenzie King implied to the Canadian House of Commons that the telegrams had an
effect on the decision. l1J
Gordon Macdonald was pleased that confederation would be on the ballot. Peter
Neary may have thought Ihat -The five year time limit .. placed on the continuation of
Commission of Government was designed to make this choice as unappetizing as
possible-,116 but J.S. Macdonald observed that the governor had succeeded in
... securing a fonn of ballot that gives maximum advantage to the Commission of
Government. The provision limiting the tenn of Office to five years will appeal
powerfuUy to the large body of Newfoundlanders who hesitate 10 take so
irrevocable step as Confederntion, with all the uncertainties and readjustments that
it would involve, when presented with so favournble an opportunity to put off the
decision. Moreover, omission of any reference to Britain's inability to continue
In For coaflicting ICCOUllU of tbis see Smallwood, I Chost:, p. 284, and Horwood. JOE)!, p. 102.
,.. Noel-BakertoGordon Macdonald, 2 March 1948, cited in Chadwick, Island InfO Prol'lnet:, pp. 203-
4.
.'" Bridle, I>ocumc!/S, pp. 848-9, "Memorandum by P."". Bridle. 19 MI./"Ch 1948.'
,:IS For King's comments see Extract from Canada, HoulC of Common_, Dt:baus, 19.$8 Yol. 3, pp.
209S.(i,in Cridle, Docu/tll:J1f,$, pp. 836 and rI•
•:16 Neary, Nonh Atlantic World, p. 314.
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financial assistance· the raison d'etre of the Commission's appointment -
contrives 10 leave the impression that retention of the Commission, for a further
period, will carry with it the undertaking to maintain Newfoundland's financial
stability as in Ihepasl. l27
Despite Macdonald's concerns over the strength with which Commission appeared on lhe
ballot, the governor's idea was brilliant. What belief way to give the advantage to
confederation than to capitalize on the known support for the Commission in a
referendum, and in the likely event tbat the decision was inconclusive, create the
alternate avenue of a. runoff referendum in which support for Commission could be
switched to support for confederation? From the Ranger reports, Gordon Macdonald must
have bad a sense of the strength of support the Commission had in the Protestant outports
on the north-east coast. By "splitting the vote" in the first referendum, confederation
would have a second chance. All that remained was to make legal provision for a sec"'1d
referendum if needed, and then to provide encouragement for Commission supporters to
switch to confederation.
Among the anti-confederates, and particularly in the press, there was considerable
outrage over the decision to include confederation on the ballot. 12I Currie's Daily News
was disgusted by the move, while Perlin's Observer's Weekly became suspicious of the
intentions of the British. l19 The Evening Telegram, which subtly supported
confederation, thought that the inclusion ofconfederation showed British foresight, while
the Grand Fa/Is Advertiser decri~ the British as being outside the law for overruling the
Convention on the basis of "some unverifiable signatures telegraphed to a private
1'l1 Bridle, DocurtlOlt$, pp. 838-9, J.S. Macdonald to Secrelafy of Slate for EXlemal Affairs, II March
1948.
1::1 On press reaction tee Geoff C. Knight, "Newfoundlucl Newtpaper Reaction 10 the Confederation
tUIlO: 1946-1948" (B.A. diuertation, Memorial Univenity ofNelllfoundll1ld, 1984).
':0 The DtJllyNtws. t2 March t948, p. 4; The Obs_r's Wufcly, 16 MlU'Ch 1948, p. 1.
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individual over a long-distance line". and encouraged the Newfoundland Bar to pursue
the matter MIa the highest court in the Commonwealth" .1)0
By the middle of March the confederate campaign was in full flight, and on the
151h Smallwood wrote R.A. MacKay inquiring if under confederation the federal or
provincial governments had a lien on the properties of an old age pensioner following the
person's death, and if the supply of bait facilities for fishennen would be a federal or
provincial responsibility. III MacKay replied that no lien existed and that federnl
financial assistance would be available for provincial programmes, but commenting on
the campaign, he observed that "Ches Crosby's [sic] campaign for Union with the U.S.
after responsible government may do a 101 of damag:l. It looks as if you were right in
prophesying a dirty campaign",m MacKay concluded with a spirited "All power to
your anns!" ,Ill and with confederation successfully on the ballot paper, the volume of
Canadian diplomatic correspondence between Ottawa and 81. John's dropped off, As far
as Ihe Canadians were concerned, the diplomats would now back away from
involvements in the campaign which Smallwood was delivering, perhaps fearing that to
be involved would provide ammunition to the anti-confederates. Instead, the Government
of Canada advised its High Commissioner to content himself with reponing significant
happenings while events took their course. Future confederate dealings between 51.
10hn's and Ottawa were supposed to be on a more clandestine and higher political plane.
In many ways, the announcement that confederation would be placed on the ballot
paper delimited the conclusion of a sitzkrieg of words and jockeying for posilion and
UO The Evening Telegram, 11 March 1948, p. 4; The Grand Fa/f$ Adwrtl$tr, 13 Marcb 1948. p, 1.
'" PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: 1944·1950, Smallwood 10 MacKAy, IS MU"<.:h 1948.
In Ibid., MacKay to Smallwood, 16 MU"<.:b 1948,
"'ibid.
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support by the panies, and the b<:ginning of the public political campaigns in earnest,
based on the actual choices Newfoundlanders would make. Just after the close of the
Convention the confederates quickly started their campaign, and set about creating the
impression that telegrams from Newfoundland would "clarify· British minds enough to
have confederation placed on the ballot. Even before the telegram campaign the minds
of Whilehall had been clarified and policy set, but they publicly claimed satisfaction thai
the political issue of confederation had been "clarified" by the Convention, and that in
tum Newfoundlanders had been educated enough in politics to be capable of a choice on
confederation. The Roman Catholic Church had unequivocally re~terated its stand against
confederation, but the RGL had not yet completed its organization, nor seriously begun
its campaign. When its issues and policy should have bt:en clear, the League had again
hedged, and the opportunity for campaigning during the interval between the close of the
Convention and Noel-Mer's announcement had been lost. The greatest threat to emerge
against the confederates was the EUP, not the League, and the EUP would provide most
of the impetus, energy, and issues for the responsible government movement during the
rest of the first campaign.
Chapter I;
Amerkan Hands:
The First Referendum Campaign, Man:h.May 1948
With the announcement of the ballot options by Noel-Baker, the political
campaigns look off in earnest. From mid March to early May, the second st:lge of the
campaign, the confederates fought off the Economic Union party. It had quickly became
the greatest threat to the confederate movement, and provided many of the issues lind
much of the impetus to the responsible govemment campaign. Sparing no efforts to
further preach their gospels, all parties issued political newspapers, bUI foreshatiowing
events to come, all parties had trouble with their delivery. While the Roman Catholic
Church reiterated its position against confederation, the Canadians quietly provided the
confederates with political money, campaign infonnation, and increased assistance.
Once it was known that confederation would be on the ballot paper, the Economic
Union party began its campaign in earnest. From the start, it operated as a family affair.
Stirling was a friend ofBW Crosbie (Ches's brother), so Ches was brought in to lead the
group, and they decided to get W.S. -Bill- Perlin (A.S. Perlin's brother) to contact
broadcaster-publicist Don Jamieson, an employee of Ches's.' Perlin called Jamieson,
who was in Gander, and invited him to join the group. Jamieson returned to St. John's,
and met Perlin, Stirling, and Bill Crosbie at Crosbie's house} Ches Crosbie was a good
choice to lead the party, since his first wife was the daughter of SI. John's Mayor
I Jamieson, "I Saw the fi&J!t", BNF, p. 89; and Jilmell Halley 10 the author, 2Q May 1992. HaJJey
Doted tbat at the time, Jamieson bad been writiDila column for StirliDS'. SWIlkJy Hn-ald, and worked ror
Ches CTOlIbic at GMien'. Aen.ted Wa:cr LId.
2 On this point Jamieson'••tory divc'1e5 rrom other vcnion., ror he claimed tllat he beSM the
organization or the sroup (Wbillh was not \tile) and amlllSed ilJ fint broadeul. See Jamicson, "I Saw the
Figbt·,BNF,p.89.
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Andrew Carnell,J and several of Crosbie's sisters were well married: one 10 St. John's
businessman Lewis Ayre,~ and another to A.B. Perlin, the writer of the ~Wayfarer"
column in Currie's Daily News. In his column Perlin supported the fonnation oflhe EUP
as "a constructive move", and defended Crosbie from the vagaries of Smallwood's anti-
merchant rhetoric,s Canadian High Commissioner J.S. Macdonald had previously
described Crosbie as "an aggressive and rather uncouth individual prominent in local
manufacturing enterprises", though in the same breath noted that he had been invited to
the wedding of Crosbie's daughter.GIn March he described Crosbie as "a man of means,
willing to spend it in the pursuit of political power".7 Even though economic union was
not on the ballot. the party countered this by encouraging voters to vote for responsible
govemment, after which economic union could be investigated, which would lead to "full
employment al high wages" " as opposed [n hand-outs from Onawa.'
After Crosbie took the helm of the EUP, the party began receiving excellent
publicity. The official organ of the EUP became Stirling's Sunday Herald, which eagerly
promoted Ihe cause. Campaign manager Jamieson came up wilh a jaunty musical theme
for the party, and invented the campaign slogan "For a Brighter Tomorrow". 10 Crosbie
'James Halley to the luthor, 20 May 1992. Carnell wu the Mayoro(St. John's from [9)2-[949, and
u the only elected leader of any elected body io the couotty, was often known u the 'Mayor of
Newfoundland". Both Bell and Carnell supported the return of respoosible government.
• Wallace Furlong to the luthor, 30 May 1992.
l See Pr.rlin, A ClrtJrHtad, pp. 109-110, forextn.cts from bJs23 March 1948 column.
• PRO DO 35/3455. 1.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for Elltemal Affait3, 28 11l1U11)' 1948.
, PRO DO 35/3455. 1.5. Macdonald to Secretary of State for Extemal Affait3, 22 March 1948.
• Jamieson, "I Saw the Fight", BNF, pp. 89·90.
• MacKenzie, "Economic Union", HQ, Vol. LXXXID, No.4 (WInter 1988): 26.
IOJlllllieson, "I Saw tbeFight",BNF,p. 89.
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was a director on the board of Beverage Sales LId .. the suppliers of Coca-Cola. and
brought their powerful markecing organisation skills to the campaign. II Despite his poor
oraloricaJ skills, Crosbie announced the new EUP on the radto an 20 March,l: lnd a
full page advertisement was taken oul in The E~ning Tt/tgram. lJ 1be next day the
party headquarters at the Movie Chat Cafe on Henry Street in 51. John's were mobbed
by supportcn wishing to sign up, and a flood of telegrams poured in from around the
island. I. A week after the group started up, Halley withdrew, prderring 10 let Slirling
and Jamieson run Ih~ pany. McEvoy learned about Hailey'S involvement (rolll the
governor, who -had his spies". IS McEvoy and Halley fell out, and Haney withdrew
from their finn to sel up his own pmctice. 16 Around this time, the BUP began a mlllour
campaign around 51. John's that the governor would come oul publicly for
confederation. 11
11le EUP again approached tI'.e American Consulate in St. John's requesting
support and assistance. The new Consul General, Wainwright Abbott, re('lined his
predecessor's distance, but on 2S March reported to the State Department that an
indication of American suppon for the EUP could mean victory for responsible
" PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: 1944-19S0, BrittOD 10 MllCK.y, 19 April 1948.
I: Stacey, ·10lX) Days·, BNF, p. 136.
II 1M Evrtll", T~l~,mm, 20 March 1948, p. 19,
I' James Halley 10 lhe luthor, :zo MlY 1992,llld Bridle, OoCllmt"rs, p. 8.50, ·MelDOrsI1dum by P.A,
Bridle, British Commonwealth DivlliOQ. 22 March 1948,'
lJ Jamel HaIley to the author, 20 May 1992.
'·Jbld.
"1b/4.
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government, while rejection of support could play into the confederates' hands.I' Abbott
also astutely observed that "There is no doubt that one of the first acts of any
Responsible Government party returned to power would be an endeavour 10 obtain a
review of the Bases Agreement" .19 But despitc. a pledge by Crosbie to the Consulate that
if he came to power, the bases deal would remain intacl,20 many responsible
government supporters realised that the prospect of more American money in
Newfoundland could be the most deadly salvo against the confederates, even if 1.S.
Macdonald thought thai such a campaign would be "flagrant dishonesty",ll Althe end
of March, Stirling was encouraged by Crosbie's friend Raymond Gushue, Chairman of
the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, who hadjusl returned from the United States and told
Crosbie that "the Americans would welcome economic union".12 Stirling took off to
New York, Montreal, and Ottawa, where he met with government officials in an attempt
10 gamer support. In Ottawa he warned Terry Sanders, the second Secretary in the
American Embassy, thai Smallwood had approached Ottawa "to put pressure on
Washington to oppose economic union" and noled that Smallwood was in the pay of
Canada, and "had been promised the Premiership of Newfoundland if confederation
won". U While in America, through his friends Colonel "Bertie" McConnack, the anti·
British owner of the Chicago Tribune (for which Stirling had won-ed), and Eugene
Griffin, lhe Tribune's Ottawa correspondent, Slirling met U.S. Senator C. Wayland
"MlcKenzie, "Economic Union', NQ, Vol. LXXXIJJ, No.4 (Winter 1988): 26.
If Abbott to Secretary of Slate, WUlUngton, 30 MlfCb 1948, lIlI dted in Neary, North Atlantic World,
p.319.
1IIIbid.,p.319.
:1 PRO DO 3513455, J.S. Mlcdonl1d to Secretary of State for Elltemal Affairs, 22 MlfCh 1948.
l:l MlcKenue, 'Economic Unioo", NQ, Vol. lXXXm, No.4 (Wioter 1988): 27.
l:l Ibid., p. 27. M.cKerWe noted tblt Smailwood'sipproacbes 10 IIlId arnugemenl!l with Otawl bad
been confirmed by OtlaWI 10 Ihe AmeriC&ll Embassy (see p. 31. footnotec 28).
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(~Curley~) Brooks,lot from whom he collected a statement which endorsed the etooomic
union movement in Newfoundland. Stirling had it read and recorded by a professional
announcer for later use.1S In early April, Paul Bridle in Onawa nOied an impenrling trip
to Boston and Washington by Crosbie to detenninc i~ Economic Union would be worth
supporting,'O but it is not known if Crosbie actually wentY
Though the Responsi~le Govemment League must have been shocked when it
heard of the foonation of the EUP, it continued 10 deny the existence of any divisions
between the two groups. ZI The League continued to concentrate on its paper and radio
campaigns, and on organizing outside St. John's, but with mixed resulls. On 9 March
the League received a donation of meeting rooms from the Mount Cashel Old Boys'
Association, the support of Labour leaders R.J. Fahey and James Ryall, and was
informed by los O'Driscoll that Don Jamieson was willirlg to do a news jroadcast for
the League "if the directors of his finn" were satisfied.2'l The League also wanted to
swap airtime owned by the unpredictable Cashin, who was about to return from
Moncreal. JO But when Cashin got back early the following week, he approached
1.lllmieson,"1 Saw the figbt",BNF, p. 94.
~ Horwood, JOf)', p. 119.
•0 Bridle.~nls, p. 855, "MemoraDdum on Despatch of8 April by ClJladian HiJh Comminioner
in St. John'., by P.A. Bridle. British Commonweallh Division."
"l1 MacKeruie, "Economic Union", NQ, Vol. LXXXIll, No.4 (Winter 1988) doet not mention. vi.it
by Crosbie to the USA.
.. 0Il2S Mareh to a meeting oflhe newly-fonned Young Voten Alfociation F.M. O'Lea!)' denied that
there were any conflicts between the EUP and the RGL (ROLP 3.01.003, Minutes ofOentral Meetings,
Mcetingof Youllg Voten, 2S March 1948).
l'I RCiLP 3.01.001. Executive Mioulea, 9 March 1948.
lO On Cuhio'. return !lee DO 3513455, 1.5. Macdonald 10 Secrewy of Stale for EXlcmal Affalra, 19
Marcb 1948. and ROLf 3.01.001. Executive Minutes, 9 Marcb 1948.
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Jamieson and the EliP suggesting that both groups share radio airtime. JI Jamieson
refused, on the grounds that the League "continued to treat us as meddlesome
intcrJopers".J1 Cashin's orrer was probably made without the League's approval, and
the response was predictable. At one point during the campaigns, the League denied
Cashin the use of the its Wednesday evening time slot on VONF, and informed VONF
manager Bill Galgay that the League had no intention of swapping radio times with the
EUP.JJ It precipitated a minor crisis, and highlighted the still-shaky alliance between
Cashin and the League. On the 19th a re-vitalized radio comminee was established,3~
and on the 22nd a Young Voters Association (YVA) was set Up.lS Comprised of young
men and chaired by Geoffrey C. Carnell, the son of the mayor of St. John's, it held a
form of social gathering called a "smoker", at which League executive members spoke,
and at which the theme-song of the RGL, "The Hero of '48", was sung.» It also
delivered the League's newspaper,31 and in a certain way, seemed to be the League's
answer to the Church's argument that youth should become involved in the constirutional
issue.
By the end of the month, Cashin was happily operating hand-in-glove with the
YVA on his weekly radio programme. J .5. Macdonald reported that a young person
II Jamieson, "' Saw the Figbt", BNF, p. 90.
II Ibid., p. 90.
lJ W.F. Galgay P1Ipel'll, file II 29, Political Bl'Oldeuts, Galgay to Board of Goverool'll, undated.
)l RGLP 3.01.003. Minutes of General Meetiogs and ColDlJlitrecs and Secret Meeting, Minutes of
Planning Meeting 19M&rCh 194t.
lJ Ibid., Minutes ofYoUllg Votei'll Meeting, 22 Mareh L948.
Jt Forcxamplc sec RGLP 3.01.001. Executive MiDutes. 6 April 1948.
)1 RGLf 3.01.001. EX~culive Minutes. 30 March and 6 April 1948.
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would cleverly ask Cashin to ·clarify our minds· on issues like laxation,» Cashin would
then hold forth on the perils of double taxation imposed by both f~ral and provincial
governments, or on the possibility of losing the Amerkan bases under conr~eralion. and
then observe that the taxation would be ·well nigh llIinous·. or that Newfoundlanders
would lose their jobs if the bases closed. Macdonald condemned Cashin's
pronouncements as "flagrant falsehood and reckless statements·. and warned that -in the
absence ofan effective organizalion 10 answer them. however, they are undoubl:edly very
potcnt in building up sentiment against Confederation".)'
Back in February the RGL had received estimates of the publication cosl of 3-
weekly eight-page campaign paper with a circulation of sixty thousand,40 and on 22
March The Indeptndem appeared, published by Curric's Dally News}' A masterpiece
of reasoned argument and lucid prose, under the nationalistic masthead of ·Where Once
Our Fathers Stood We Stand·, The Independw rebutted all confederate arguments, listed
the names of several hundred RGL supporters,·! and tackled the confederate machine.
Its cireulation was island-wide, and the League even wanted to deliver the paper to the
offshore seal fishery on the seal spotting plane.4l But the League was broadcasting,
planning, organizing committees, debating, and holding social events when it should have
been on the hustings fighting the confederates. It was only on 2 April tbal the colourful
:. PRO DO 35/3455, J.S. M.:OooaId to Secrewy of State for uternal Afrain, I April 1943.
)I Ibid•
... RGLf 3.01.003. Minutes of General MeaioBJ and Commillus and Secrel Meeting, enelosed report
in Minutes of Plannln, Committu, 20 February 1948.
" RGLP 3.01.001, Executive Minutes, 30 March 1941S; and 3.01.003, Plannina Meetinl, 17 April
1948. Currie later aksorbed l.IIe (Oils of publishing two luues l:lf17le Indepmdtll/.
G The Irwkptndmt, 22 March 1948, p. S.
OJ RGLf 3.01.001, ElIecutive Minutes, 30 Marcb 1948.
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fonner Convention member Captain Charlie Bailey began an extensive campaign (or the
League in the outpof1S of the oonheast coa.st.~
By mid March, newspapen began to detect sectarian concerns in the political
atmosphere. Identifying II mixture of religious and political feelings al work in the
population, the March 14 edition of Stirling's Sunday Herald published a poll of 300
people of voting age indicating that 45 percent ·would vole the way their churches
wanted them to votc-,-S AI the end of March The Monitor responded to Noel-Baker's
announcement and claimed thai
We cannot accept the reasons which have been advanced by the Secretary of State
for including Confederation on the ballot paper.... to ask the people to go to the
polls with such scanty infonnation as they presently possess is indefensible. We
have not sufficient infonnation on the many financial and economic aspects of
Confederation; and we have no infonnation on any of the important social and
spiritual aspects of it. This fact seems to have been lost sight of by the apologists
fo1'" Confederation, and it must be borne in mind that there may he far more
serious ills in prospect than purely economic ones.46
'The Monitor then compared confederation to a marriage between a couple, arranged by
their parents withoot their consultation, and characterized the confederates as
·opportunists who would have Confederation now at any price·.C7 Continuing with the
theme of Archbishop Roche's letter 10 the St. Bon's Association, The Monitor then
reminded young people of their responsibility to vote, bearing in mind that the union the
confederates proposed should only be the result of negotiations between elected
parliaments of Newfoundland and Canada.·' 1.5. Macdonald noted that
"Ibid.
"'1heSurldoyHtrold,14Man:b 1948,p.2.
"1htMOIIiror, Muth I94B,p.l.
"lbid.,p.l.
"lbid.,p.l.
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...the priests of 51. Patrick's Deanery, who edit 71le MOl/ilor, could nOllake so
strong a stand on an imponant public question without the consent of the
Archbishop. It cannol be doubted, therefore. that the views that they expound in
the editorial under reference will have a considerable effect on the development
of opinion among the Roman Catholic section of the elecloratc.4Q
Macdonald also pointed out that The Monitor ignored the point that if Newfoundland
returned to responsible government, there would be no negotiations with Canada, a point
central 10 the confederate wish to have a referendum, and Ihal "both parties would be
controlled by Water Street and would see to it that Confederation proposals were nol
brought forward". 50 Both the EUP and The Monitor also came to the attention of
Attlee's secretary, T.J. O'Brien, who sardonically asked "has Catholic opinion always
been so averse to marriages arranged by the heads of the family?"" Most observers had
already accepted that the clandestine rumblings of religious discontent could potentially
come to the fore.
The Monitor'", complaint about the lack of infonnation being presented to the
electorate by the confederates was well-founded. Smallwood's campaign was intensely
personal (compared with the dry campaign of the League), and in the traditional Squires
style of Newfoundland politics, his appeal was based on an infonned knowledge of what
people in the outports wanted, oot on what the fmer points of constitutional law and
procedure should be. The message was kept simple, the grab was always for the
emotions, and a few basic topics were always dealt with. These included the personal
financial benefits all would reap from confederation, the personal attacks on EUP and
RGL members, the "fact" that "everyone" was voting for confederation, the "lies" which
... Bridle, Documents, p. 851, 1.S. M&edonaJd to Secrelaty or Stale for Elternll Afflirt, 24 Mlrch
1948.
3O/bUJ.,p.851.
JI PRO 00 35/3455, WI. Ref.Canada, 2214/48, T.l. O'S[ricn], 29 April 1948.
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were being spread about confeden.lion by its opponents, and the role religion would play
in the vote.
On 7 April, sixty thousand copies of the first issue of 171~ Conf~duaJt, the organ
of the Newfoundland Confederate Association, raised the campaign pitch even higber.JJ
Mainly wrinen by Smallwood. with salire by Power and articles by Horwood, T1lt
Confmeratt featured cartoons by the Toronto Globe and Mairs Jack Boothe. which
completely outclassed those by W.J. Groves in The Indtptndem. The first issue of The
Confederate was paid (or by teacher and writer Phil Forsey,1) who was laler repaid with
Canadian money.u The paper was printed by The Evening Telegram and sent around
the island using the old mailing list from O'Leary's Barre/man newspaper.'s With the
appear,mee of The Confederate. financial, regional, and sectarian issues were first
injected into the fray, and where The Independent Mwas detennined not to descend 10
guttersnipe invective·, 1h~ Confed~ral~ -shouted and bellowed, whooped and hollered,
and used whatever tactic the situation called for-." Ulilising -bandwagon psychology-,
The Confederate was ruled with propaganda and made its appeal to the outports,
promising -baby bonusc,s- and -family allowance chequcs·, the cornerstone of
Sma.llwood's entlrc campaign. A table was published listing the 35 electoral diSlricts,J7
with tbe number of nam<:3 from each who had -demanded- to have confederation put on
n Bridle, Dot:unImrs, p. 153, 1.5. MlCdoaaIdlO Secretai)' OfSUlC for E.r.lcmal Afrairs,6 April 1948.
JJ J&me:ll Hlllle)' DOted tllal during his days .1 MClllOrial University College, Forsey hid a reputation
for a 'vicious pen". J_ Halley to Ihoautbor, 20 May 1m. Also see Hotwood, Joey, p. 114.
JoO Smallwood, 1 Chose C'atwJdll, p. 288; and Horwcod, Joq, p. 110.
» HOfWood, Joty, p. 65.
Jf Collins, "Wgul; outc!uled', ~ EVC!'nin& Ttl,grtJJfl, 28 Mlll'l:b 1969, p. 36.
II The electorJJ boundaries of Newfoundland b.cl bcea changed 1m the Convention was elco::ted, aod
Smallwood'. table UKd 35 diltricu.
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the ballot. Any outport Newfoundlander with even a remote sense of geography could
tell that the seven least enthusiastic districts listed were predominantly Roman Cathotic.
and close to Sl. John's, while the l-est of the island was projected 10 vot~ for
Confederation.'" As Smallwood later observed, • All people were CORSctOUS of their
denomination, and they watched each OI:her's activities narrowly. TIle sectarian spirit
saturated all society in Newfoundland-.J' tbe RGL was condemned, and an article
listing -great Newfoundlanders who were strong Confederates- included Archbishop
Howley.6O Courtesy .of Greg Power, Roman Catholic political history had been
resurrected and turned against the policy of his cousin, Archbishop Roche.- I
Presumably because 17lt Conjederart! delighted in attacking Water Street, it wns
notably devoid of commercial advertising. This was significant. With laler sources of
funding, advertisers were probably not needed to sustain the paper, but lhe absence of
advertisements seems to indtcate that either the confederates could not get business
support because few dared advertise in the paper, or that no advertising was included as
a tactic to convince the outpons that a St. John's-based paper was not supported by St.
John's merchanls, who once again were out to trounce the confederates and (he
OUtports.'2 While the RGL weakly p.:t forth the -Tax Song- in its 12 April
Indtpuuient.6J and spent the next day haggling over the weight or the paper to be used
• 7MCf)tl/tderate. 1 ....pril19-i8.p.2.
"Smallwood,/OIoseCtmrJdiJ,pp.312.313.
10 Ibid., p. 2.
" Gregory J. Power 10 the autbor, 27 January 1992.
It Fr. lbomu Moakier 10 lhe author. 2 ....pril 1989.
., The popular 'Tax SoDg" played up the "poll·lUelI. ICboollUel. exeile w: and IUper-lU; Ptetlch
CulMiiua tU.iasalllhcjoo. in Ubndor" which wOI.Ild be illlp(*d 00 NewfOlllldlNlClaflerwnfederation.
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for publishing The Independent/'''' the 14 April edition of The Confederate again
brazenly listed districts which supported confederation, and claimed that confederation
was "very strong" in 18 out of 24 of them. St. John's East and West, Ferryland, Harbour
Main-Bell Island, Harbour Grace and Placentia-St, Mary's were all "weak", while St.
George's-Polt-au-Port and Placentia West were "very strong".&' It also noted that
confederation could win "without getting one vote in St. John's".06 On the whole, nIt
Confederate wenr "for the jugular", while The Independent plodded on in its own
academic way.
In response to Tile Confederate, The Monitor's 17 April edition accused the
confederates of spreading "sinister propaganda" ,61 In the continualioo of the article
entitled "Newfoundland At The Parting Of The Ways", "fear and timidity· were
identified as "(he death of self-government", and it lamented that "We alone are
measuring the issue in dollars and cents. We alone are prepared to become a nation of
shop-keepers, bartering autonomy and self-competence for a political and economic
mirage".61 Readers were told that 6 you have a vote....For the first time in a decade and
a half that conviction of yours counts for something. For the first time since 1933 you
can express it where it will do most good, at the polling booth".1II 11lt Monitor then
pledged itself as the national journal of Catholic opinion, and borrowing from the
61 The Independent, 12 April 1948, p. 7; RGLP 3.01.001, Exccutive Minute" 13 April 1948.
... The Confederate. 14 April 1948, p. I.
.. /bld.. p. I.
fT The Ml»lir:.r, April 1948, pp. ] and 7.
"lbid.,p.] .
.. Ibid.. p. 7.
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writings of Fr. Henry Davis, a Jesuit morallheologian, it carefully instructed its readers
that
...we would like to make it perfectly clear to all Catholics that when they
vote, they are completely free to cast their ballot according to their own personal
convictions. The only thing that we would add is that you must vale. You are fn:c
to vO!c how you will, but you are not free nollO vote. YOU MUST VOTE.70
Aware of the Church's stand on this issue, Catholics were thus told to vote, but not how
to vote, and they were free to vote as their consciences dictated. Continuing the aUack,
under an article on Communism in the United States, 11lt Monitor generalized "Once
again a new generation can sow its wild oats. Let's not let it become Electioneering".n
In contrast, the April edition of the Anglican Diocesan Magazine published an injunction
from Bishop Abraham stressing "the personal responsibility of each citizcn~ to vote "at
the coming referendum~ .'1 But it also hinted broadly at the advisability of
confederation:
It surely is not too difficult a question for a Christian to answer; first whether he
wishes to be governed by a majority of his fellow-citizens or not; and second
whether he wishes to share his citizenship with Canadians or to "paddle his own
canoe".'l
This was the only expression of Anglican interest in the constitutional issue. But the
April Monitor blasted the Commission and its methods:
For surely the common good of this state demands that after fifteen years in
which the people were not the rulers of their own country, some stable and
permanent fonn of government in which the people themselves have a final or
at least a limited say should be established. 7•
XI/bld.,p.7.
'1 Ibid., p. 8.
'n The Diocesan Maga~ine, Vol. LVIII, No.4 (April 1948): 116.
"lbld.,p.1l6.
"TheM<mitor,ApriI1948,p.4.
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The Monitor rcnected widespread sentiments which even Governor Macdonald, despite
his abiding sympathy for Commission of Govemment,TI was powerless (0 stem, and
both he and J.S. Macdonald nQ(ed that Commission was losing SUpport.16 But the
grealer threat to confederation was noted by Paul Bridle, who feared that "vinually all
the Roman Catholic votersW would take The Moniror's advice, and vOle against
confederation. 71 For Smallwood though, whose campaign mollc would eventually
become ftBritish Union". to have the Church casting aspersions on British rule must have
been useful. At the hands of the confederates, 71lt Monitor's opinions were to do much
more damage to the RGL cause than good.
The confederates' campaign activities, which were many and varied, cosl money.
as did the secretaries, the 102 vice presidents' expense accounts, the hall rentals and
equipment purchases, and the campaign materials.1I According to Harold Horwood,
airplanes were the most expensive single items; one, a Norseman, was chartered for $50
an hour.79 The confederates paid their campaign workers, drivers, and canvassers, a
pra~tice which the opposition were unable to match. After it was known that
confederation would be on the ballot, Smallwood sent Ray Petten back to Canada for
71 On this see Bridle. DcK'Umenls, p. 868. J.S. M&Cdoosldto SeculIJ)' of Slat>: for External Affairs,
12Ms)' 1948.
1lo Sridl>:. DocutMnts, p. 8.57. "Memorandum b)' British Commonwealth Division. Minute on Despatch
No. 1670f April 15th. by P.A. Bridle,'
'if/bid., p. 851.
.,. On Ibe paymenl of vice-presidential expeoltS see Horwood. Joey, p. 114. For lI1TVIgemc:nU for
payment of van drivers and crew, to distribute The Con/dtrate newspaper. and for companies and/or
persons from which goodl and/or serviees had been obtained see l.R. Smallwood Papers, 4.0I.(XlI,
Newfoundlmd Confcdel'lle AQQCiation•
.,. Horwood, Jaey. p. 114. Smallwood. I Chost Canada, p. 290, IMintains that there wu only one
aircraft, piloted b)' Captain Eric Blackwood. On 26 June SmI1lwood clwtercd Blackwood's plano for $
3000 for the remainck:r of tbe eampaipll (see J.R. Smallwood Papers 4.01JI06, TeJeSram of Smallwood
to Blackwood. Ui June 1948).
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more money,lO and it seems thai the confederates began to R'ceive infusions around mid
April. lIOn 7 April (the day the first issue appeared), Smallwood issued an open leiter
asking cltpatriate Newfoundlanders in Canada to sign a confedcmte petition of support
and write back 10 Newfoundlanders encouraging them to v()(c for confederation.'l All
names would be published, and were to be put with the names garnered on a similar
leiter being carried around Canada by a "representative now trdvelling in Canada",u
Charley Penney, who collected names and solicited money for the cause.U
Back in Newfoundland, Canadian money was augmented by donations from a
number of local businessmen, particularly the largesse of 81. John's businessman
Alexander B. Baird and (amler Fisheries and Marine Minister H.B. Clyde Lake, once
it became known that seats in the Canadian Senate were for sale." Horwood laler
estimated that by the end of the camr ligns about a quarter of a million d»lIars came to
the confederate cause from Canada,16 much of it from the liquor indust!)', and this did
not include Newfoundland fundraising. In Sl. John's, all deals were consummated with
10 Horwood,Joey, pp. 112-13.
tt The eonfcden.tes needed Forse)' to pay for the first issue. but neither Smallwood nor Horwood noted
who paid for Ihe second. However. around 15 April. Bridle wrote to Ottawa ob$Crving thatlhe Confederate
association SIIffered from 'a $CrioUJ lack of funds'. See Bridle, Docunumls, p. &57, Minute on IX5paleh
of 15 April, by P.A. Bridle.
11 J.R. Smallwood Papen, 4.01.002. ~titions.Smallwood to "Fellow-Newfoundlander", 7 Apri1194B.
OJ Ibid.
114 Horwood, Joey, p. (II.
Q Ibid., pp. I 10 and 288. Baird, PetteD, and the father of Lake's daughter·in-Iaw, George J. Penney,
liter became tbe fintllu'ce Newfoundland senltortl.
It Ibid., p. 113. Greg Power maintains that Peltetl brau"'t in $280,000 (Gregory J. Power tu the
autbor, 17 January 1m).
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a nandshake. and at Smallwood's orders, no ~ipts were issued." By comparison,
before the first referendum the Responsible Government League had collected around
$30,000. and the Economic Union Party around $20,000." None of the parties had all
the money they would have liked, but the anti-confeder-lles were no match for the
foreign-funded confederates, who had the motivation, means, and several times the
financial backing of their opposition.
The front pag~ of the 5 April lndeptndem gleefully sported a cartoon which
showed Bradley and Smallwood piling Canadian bags of taxes in the cart of a worried
Newfoundland dog," The confederates were outwardly confident and relatively wealthy,
but it was the faonation of the EUP, not the cartoons of the ROL, which hit them
precisely where it hun their cause the most. They fought back with a variety of tactics.
In a bid to get every possible vote, on 5 April Smallwood wrote Chief EJectoral Officer
Nehemiah Soon, asking whether polling booths could be put on board bankers, drnggers,
and trawlers.to In preparation for their campaign and newspaper, the confederates made
a number of contacts with the Canadian High CommiSSK>nef fOf infonnalkm from Canada
wilh which to counter the Economic Union Pany. On 5 April Lester B. Pearson replied
to Macdonald's enquiry:
I appreciate the emergence of a party for economic union with the United
States is a serious threat to confederation, and I can quite understand that, as a
result, the confederation group may be in something of a funk:.
'" Horwood, JtHY, p. III. How-e...er, the eoofeden.teIJ in Comer Brook did issuelUeipts. See Georae
P. Hobbl, "WB Had to H....e. Dri...er", OJIl Me Joey, p. 72.
• See RGLP 3.01.015, Donotl and Don.lion" AppTOximalB Amounls Rr.cei...ed (4 pp.). From thelJ(l
figures, which.re .pproxillll.tB &lid did not includB dOllldollS of!N:low $20, thclluguB receivlld $25,950,
IlIld tho EUP recei...ed $17,340, from which, being g<:llBrouJ with tbo addiliOll of petty don.tiOfl5, the dted
fi.ureaWBreetlimatod.
" ~ In::lt~ndtlll, 5 ApriI1948. p. I.
... J.R. SmIIlwood Papr.n. I.JUlOl, St. John'. Eaat: Pre-Confod., Smallwood toSbor1.:5 April 1941.
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At the same time I am very doubtful about your laking any pan in
providing the confederation group with special material to meet the issue. The
issue, after all, is not immediately union with Canada or union with the United
States, but rather union with Canada or restoration of responsible government.
The Canadian Government has committed itself to complete abstention from
influencing the election in any way. Care should therefore be taken 10 provide the
confederation group with only such material as would be available to aoyant:
requesting it.9l
Despite having been warned about interfering, on 15 April J.S. Macdonald brought up
Pearson's point about "available material" to R.A. MacKay, and noted thai Smallwood
and Bradley had expressed great disappointment that infonnation was not quickly
forthcoming from Ottawa with which they could counter gross misrepresent9tions about
tenns, and "puncture" the ·widespread yearning in this country for free trade with the
United States".92 Having been limited to ·available materials· , Smallwood also kept up
his attempts to "convert" Crosbie, and at one point had a secret meeting with him. But
Smallwood recoiled in horror when the EUP later alleged that they had recorded a secret
meeting between the two leaders. and threatened to broadcast it over Jamieson's EUP
radio show For A Brighter Tomon'Ow. 9J Crosbie later denied that a tape existed. '14 At
one point, Smallwood wrote and Bradley recorded a speech designed to "take apart" the
EUP movement, but the EUP obtained a copy, and obtaining airtime just after the speech
was played, they rebutted every argument.u
" Bridle. DO~f1IS, p. 852, Pe8noo to 1.5. Mac:donlld, 5 April 1948.
n Bridle, Docurrttlms, p. 856, J.S. MlICdonlld to MlcKay, 1.5 April 194a. The", had been I
longstanding fixation in Newfeundland with free trade u a pll1aeea ror the i.lll1d's economic problemll.
01 Jamieson. 'I Saw The Fight", BNF, p. 93; Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 104; and Horwood,JIJ/!'j, pp. 111·
8.
"'llnUeson, "ISawtheFight·,BNF,p.93.
" Ibid., p. 93.
In another radio address on the evening of 5 April, Smallwood introduced
Bradley, who re-Iaunched the confederate campaign, but 1.S. Macdonald reported thai
Bradley was lacklustre, and did not "tum his devastating logic M on the Economic Union
movement, much to the dismay of his listeners,'Iol Even the British were wonied, and
Anlee's secretary, T,J. O'Brien, proffered that "the less said about the slick tempo of the
"Take a Chance with ChesM campaign, the better".97 Beginning on 7 April, 11,e
Confederate aimed the satire of Greg Power at the EUP and the RGL. Crosbie became
"Sitting Bull"; Don Jamieson became "Donald Duck", and later "His Master's Voice",
a jab at Crosbie's poor oratorical abilities on radio and Jamieson's practice of repeating
Crosbie's ideas. Power eventually wrote:
Said Donald Duck to Sitting Bull
"I Know 'twill take an awful puU,
But if you'll just consent to wait,
I, Donald Duck, will make you great,"
"Well, Duck, you'd better make it soon;
You have until the month of June
And if by then I'm still not great,
Why· maybe I'll confederate!dl
The RGL was similarly dealt with In a column caUed "In the Stable of the Sacred Cow· .
Too much serious public effort given to countering the BUP, whose object after all,
would not be on the ballot, would be counterproductive for the confederates." Along
with satire, there were other better ways of dealing with the opposition.
"Bridlll, DOCllrMnlS, p. 8.53, 1.S. MacdolWd loSecretal)' O(Statll for External AffaiQ, 6 April 1948.
.. PRO DO 3.5134.5.5, 2OJ.Rof.Canada, 2214/48, T.J. O'S[rien], 29 April 1948.
• 'Sitting Bull and Donald Duck", in Power, ThO! Powc of til<! Pm, p. 3.5.
.. Follhil conclusion $flCl MIICKenzie, °E,-'Joomic Union", NQ, Vol. LXXXIII, No.4 (Winter 1988):
27.
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Three weeks after the EUP was founded, McEvoy secretly visited the Unill..'d
States, most likely after encoura~ement by R.A. MacKay.loo Travdling with Arthur
S. Monroe, a Newfoundland fish exporter, his goal was effectively 10 discredit the
Economic Union Party, by discovering whether "Economic Union with the United Slales
is practically possible". lOI Through Monroe, McEvoy was put in contact wilh Judge
Manley O. Hudson, a Professor of Law at Harvard University and Judge of the World
Court,IO'l On 20 and 28 April McEvoy and Monroe met with Hudson and his assistant,
Richard Young. IOJ At some point during his visit McEvoy also met wilh an Assistant
Secretary of Slate and one of President Truman's private secretaries, and as J.S.
Macd.onald later observed, McEvoy was
given to understand th~t the United States, before getting involved in negotiations
with Newfoundland for economic union, would have 10 be sure thai
Newfoundland was acting, nOI only with the consent, but at the request, of the
United Kingdom and Canada. 11)4
Important as this was, it was not the most useful infonnation McEvoy oblained. On 29
April, Hudson sent McEvoy the memorandum he had been hired to prepare, in which
he concluded that there was "no prospect~ for ~establishing any enduring liens which
would be of advantage to Newfoundland-, that "the possibility of any political or
economic union with the United States is remote and its achievement may be fraught wilh
many hazards... " , and that "I am unable to hold out much hope of finding a pennanent
solution of Newfoundland's present problems in any special relations with the United
1011 Inaleller 10 R.A. MacKay, 1.5. MllCdonaid ll9!umed that MacKay did nol know of McEvoy's plan!
- which Ill&y have been the case - for he outlined McEvoy'! itinerary. See Bridle, Durnnunts, p. 8S9, J.S.
Macdonald 10 MIICKay, 19 April 1948.
101 I.B. McEvoy Papers. McEvoy to Maurice Saval, 13 April 1948.
l""lbid., Hudson 10 McEvoy, 29 April 1948.
IOJ/bid.
111I PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: Memoranda on Newfoundland 1947-1949,1.5. MlCdonald 10
Secretary of State for ~Iemal Affain, 6 May 1948,
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StatesR • las As far as McEvoy was concerned. this was just what was needed to discredit
the EUP.
While McEvoy was away, news of his trip was conveyed to Bradley in a
contidentiallettcr of 18 April, signed by -A 100" Confederate. of the Civil Service
(Dept. of Natural Resources)", a government infonnant for the confederate cause. lor.
On the premise that Bradley did nOI know of McEvoy's trip· although he probably did-
his correspondent noted that before McEvoy's departure. Ches Crosbie visited him from
Harbour Grace Jnd "attempted to talk over McEvoy to his way of thinking", because
McEvoy had "quite a large following in the country", and carried a "great deal of
influence".IC1 Fearing McEvoy's vnnity, his "weakness of charncler", and that he was
·very easily influenced", Bradley's correspondent then warned that "His vanity must be
catered for"; OIherwise. "the influence which he undoubtedly possesses, with the general
public, and in particular tM Roman Catholics whom he would encourage, would be lost
to the other party- .IW On his return McEvoy intended to -make mince-meat (sic} of
Crosbie's farce and the so-called Responsible Government League-, and to do this via
radio broadcasts. -Such an eventuality must be avoided at all costs-, continued the
informant, because -it would represent to our people a division in policy as presented by
the confederate party.... Contact him immediately on his return, 4Ild usc all the influence
you possess to win him over before it is too late-.11l' J.S. Macdonald infonned RA.
MacKay of McEvoy's trip· most likely baving been infonned of it by Bradley himself·
1«1 J.B. McEvoy Papers, Hudson 10 McEvoy. 29 April 1948, p. 6.
,Ot F. Gordon Bradley PIpers, Confederalion Mi5cel1aoeoul Correspondence, "1001 Confederate' to
Brldley, 18 April 1948.
IOffbld.
IOf/bid.
'''Ibid.
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and noted that McEvoy "claimed to be on the fence ... but sentimentally allachcd to the
Confederate solution, 2lthough nol in the present lenns" ,110 McEvoy had promised to
speak for confederation on two occasions, but "never carried the maner any funher". lind
since he had mel Crosbie before leaving, he could be ·undertaking the job on Crosbie's
behalf",l1l Macdonald's leller is significant, for it indicates McEvoy's ambivalence
toward the Confederate Association (or perhaps Bradley's opinion of McEvoy's attitude),
and that McEvoy was distrusted by Macdonald, Smallwood, and Bradley. But he was
needed on the confed;llIlc side, and could not be ignored.
For the present, though, the confederates were more concerned with their
campaign Ihan with McEvoy. The Confederate was not the only medium by which the
campaign was delivered. Radio broadcasts, hundreds ofcommunity meetings, the printing
of thousands of posters and photographs, airplane fly-overs and community visits, and
the mails were all used. The building-block of the campaigns of all the parties was the
town or community meeting, which was usually held in a fraternal or parish hall. The
confederntes got an early start on these in early April, and had Samuel F. Vincent and
RG. Starkes make tours of the varioes bays. In Unlike the antis, confedernte meetings
were on!y held in receptive communities, ensuring that only a positive impression would
be left. III In Protestant outpol1S, meetings were were often chaired by clergymen, and
usually held in Ornnge Halls. The "gospel of confedemtion" was thus given culluml,
social and sectarian associations. In a different sense the same occurred on the west
no Bridle, Docu~ms, p. 859, 1.S. Macdonald 10 MacKay. 19 April 1948.
"'lbld.,p.8S9.
1Il11lt Con!tdtratt, 7 ApriI1948,p. I.
III On this .pproach see Smallwood, I crou CtJNJJkJ, p. 289.
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coast, where Fr. Ronald Jones and Mkhacl McCarthy of Lourdes,l~W.J. Keough,
and Kevin BarryllS encouraged the west coa.u and the Port-au-Pon Peninsula to vOI:e
for confederation because it would end poverty and forge closer ties to Fr.mch Canada
and to friends and family in Cape Breton. At all confederate meetings, the speakers and
their topics were carefully selected and amnged, and the message was kepi simple. lI6
Guided by the maxim thaI "too many cooks spoil the broth". Smallwood approved and
controlled all confederclte propaganda, and like his anonymous "1()()9lj Confederate"
supporter, he insisted on "3 unified story from beginning to end, without contradiction,
and following a single theme".117 Throughout the campaign, the theme was the great
boon that confedemtion would be to Newfoundland instead of returning to St. John's-
dominated merchant rule.
While the BUP's campaign was better organized than that of the RGL, it also
operated under the confederate shadow. While many EUP meetings went well, at an
April 23 (St. George's Day) meeting at the Orange Hall in Spaniard's Bay, the EUP had
a panicularly difficult time convincing the crowd. When the meeting grew hostile,
Stirling, Jamieson, and Bill Crosbie cut the meeting soon and headed for their cars. III
On their way nome, within half an hour they heard Smallwood on the radio describing
their meeting as a fwco. llt Most likely because of Smallwood's desire to defeat the
... JODelII was included oa Smallwood', list of campalJll wor\:Ctl aDd tupporten (_ J.R. Smallwood
P1Ipetl, 1.37.001, St. GeMJe', Port-au-Port).
III Barty wu oac of Smallwood', vice presidetltt, aDd • leadinJ Ronwl Catholic Lawyer in Comcr
Brook.
'10 Forex.arnplu of Ihl.1CC Smallwood, I Chose CDncuUl, p. 291.
"'lbld.,p.287.
Il'Jamieson, ",Saw the Flpl",BNF, pp. 92-3.
'~lbld., p. 93.
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EUP, during April the EUP received more confederate 3nentian than the ROL. The
League did not employ the media salUtation techniques which Smallwood could afford,
so its campaign was started in St. John's. where meetings were held at the Church Lad's
Brigade Armoury and the Slar Hall. "Key men" from 51. 10hn's were soon scnt OUI 10
hold meetings in Buchans, Grand Falls, Bell Island. and Comer Brook, no Apart from
the work of Pierce Fudge in Comer Brook, m who began chairing a Corner Brook
branch of the League in late April, m and the itinerant Captain Charlie Bailey, who
managed to hold some of his meetings in Orange Halls and make an impressioa, m tire
League planned to campaign outside the major centres Slarting in early May,l14 btlt this
was comparatively late, and by then the confederates had the upper hand.
By mid-April, all parties began having sporndic difficulties with the delivery of
their papers. The confederates received complaints that The Confederale was not arriving
in the mail,and Smallwood requested that he be kept infonned. 1ll Similarly, for
severnl weeks in early April The Independent did not arrive in Gander. As a result. the
only paper which arrived was The Co'!federate, and RGL campaigner Captain Charlie
1:0 ROLP 3.01.001. Eueutivc Minules. 30 March 1948.
111 ROLPJ.01.022, Com.spoedenee O'Leary/Cellin! January-April 1948. Cuhin (0 Fudge. 12 April
1948.
III RGLP 3.0UXII, Executive Minules, 27 April 1948.
In RGLP 3.01.023. Mrs. A.H. Malthew! 10 Collins, 28 April 1948. nOled lhal Bailey wu well
received in the LOA Hall at BrownsdaJe, Trinity Sty.
1:10 Ibid. The public meelings were 10 begin on I May in BlY RoIKrts, Carboneat. HlrbourGrace. Bell
Isllll1d,andHarbourMain.
III J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.08.COI, Carbonear-Bsy-do:-Verde, Smallwood 10 E. Avery. 19 April
1948; Smallwood 10 W. Fraaces. 3 May 1948; 1.15.001. Smallwood to R. May, 4 May 1948.
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Bailey was told that it was "doing a lot of damage".126 All parties suspected thai
partisan postal officials were involved. and on 13 Aprillhe League engaged a truck to
deliver The Independent to Conceplion and Trinity bays. and the Southern Shore. 117
Significantly, Smallwood's supporters often included postal officials,llI whose delivery
of The Confederate seemed to be under party controL n9 They infonned him whether
they had delivered the paper, and as O'leary was told, they may have also made sure
that their opponents' papers were nol.I)O Because of the non·arrival of The lndepc'ulcnt
in many seulements, and its banal and legalistic tone and conlent, the League's ;:ampaign
suffered. As Bailey reponed from Whileway. Trinity Bay. ~A small strong body using
the right kind of Propaganda would have Put her into Res. Gov. but the cleavage is very
wide it's a breech that must be healed".Il1 The referenda campaigns were the most
media-intensive campaigns in Newfoundland's history. Delivering the propaganda was
uppennost in every politician's mind. But because of the RGL's other problems, maners
of propaganda distribution seem to have arrived in confederate minds first, and after that,
the breach between the campaigns of the two organizations was never quite closed.
1:0 RGLP 3.01.023, CorrespondeDCtl Q'!..eaJy/Collin.t, May 1948, L Harris to C. Bailey, 20 April
1948.
I~ RGLP 3.01.001, Ex.ecutive Minutes, 13 April 1948.
IS For an ex.ample of this see l.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.37.001, SI. Goorge'I·Port-aU,PQr1, Pre-
Confederation,listofsllppol1ers.
•-:< Sec J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.08.00t, Carbonear-Bay de Verde, W. Clarke, Victoria, to
Smallwood, IS April 1948.
'XI RGLP 3.01.024, Correspondence O'Leary/Collins, May-JUDe 1948, J. Seymour, ScaI Cove 10
O't...eary, 21 June 1948 noted that 'The postmistress is. enllfederate Illd that', why lite people do Dol get
t~m [Thtlndtptrldtfll)."
IJI RGLP 3.01.012. Cormpoodenee O'Leary/Collins Ianll8f)"-ApriI1948, Bailey to Collins, 25 April
1948.
On 19 April J.C. Brillon reported that many believed that Crosbie and the EUP
had launched their appeal too early in the campaign, and Ihat outport Newfoundlanders
"are be~inning to see the flaws and will realise before the referendum that he has nothing
definite or tangible to offer". Ul Though Ray Gushue was reticent about coming out
publicly in favour of Economic Union, his ~very close" friend Patrick HalleyllJ thought
that Gushue believed that economic union was possible.u~ Briuon then noted that
The consensus of opinion in 51. John's is that Confederation would make milch
bener progress under different leaders... It is of course wishful thinking but under
the aegis of Ray Gushue, Charlie Hunt, and possibly Ches. Crosbie there would
be no question but confederation would carry.m
Brinon also reported that there was a "present lull in business· which could have a
"decided effect on the final choice" .136 Businesses were uncertain about Ihe effects
confederation would have on taxes, and a general tension seemed to have settled over the
economy. But Brinon's observations on the confederate leadership were important. In SI.
John's there would come to exist a ~replace Smallwood" movement, and his observation
about the respectability which Crosbie would bring to confederation had occulTCd to
Smallwood, who redoubled his efforts to convert Crosbie. But for the time being,
Crosbie remained with the EUP, and pulled "some further surprises" hefore the voting
took place, "in an effort to get an overall majority for responsible government in the firsl
ballot".m
m PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: 1944-1950, Brillon to MacKay, 19 April 1948, p. I.
m Patrick Halley WlIlI JarneJ Halley's uncle, and had contributed $1000 10 Crosbie's campaign (sec
ibid.,p.I).
1JoOlbid"p.2.
m PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6. flIe: 1944-t950, Brillon to MacKay, 19 April 1948, p. 2.
1:If/bid.,p.2.
l1l/bid.,p.2.
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Britton obviously did not know the degree of closeness between Crosbie and
Gushue. On 20 April, Ray Gushue arrived back in Washington, detennined 10 find
support for the id.:a of economic union. However, he was told by his friend Jack
Hickerson of the State Depanment (hat Canada was more important than Newfoundland,
and thai there were major obstacles 10 linking the Newfoundland and American
economies. l3J After becr.ming convinced thai Gloucester fishing interests would stop
any Newfoundland attempt to obtain free trade with the United Slates, Gushuc returned
to Newfoundland. S,everaJ RGL and EUP supporters were part of NAFEL, Ihe
Newfoundland Associated Fish Exporters Limited, and arranged for him to speak on the
prospects for economic union on the radio. Gushue privately "had no wish 10 align
himself with Crosbie's cause, or risk becoming the laughing sto ::k of his fellow
professionals in the diplomatic field", U9 Perhaps out of respect for Crosbie, Gushue
waffled through the speech, giving little encouragement to the EUP. As a result, his
words became ammunition for the confederates, confmning "the evils of NAFEL" .l40
On 21 April, The Confederate obliquely equated region and 5e('~an affiliation
with how people could be expected to vote. A map of Newfoundland was inset on page
three showing confederate areas in black, marginal areas in shades, and weak areas in
white. 141 From this map which showed "How Confederation Stands around the Island",
it was obvious that white and shaded areas almost coincided with the areas of
predominantly Roman Catholic habitation in Newfoundland, with black areas coinciding
". MacKenz.iIl, 'Economic Union", NQ, Vo\. LXXXIII, No.4 (Wirller 1988): 28. Ironically, Canadian
Arnbuwlor H.H. Wrong later nollld lUI .tter mecdng with Gusbue's friend Hickerson, be wu Inclined
10 believe tbat Manley Hudson btd also gotten his informacion for McEvoy from Hickerson (See Bridle,
DIJCll""nu. p. 872, Wrong to Penraon, 19 May 1948).
•,. Jamieson, ') Saw tbe Fighl', BNF. pp. 95-6.
'''lbid.,p.96.
"'~Conftdtr<Jle,1t"prilt948,p.3.
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with PrOlestant areas. 141 But even areas which were not confederate were claimed to
be so, and Ihis angered Wick Collins of the RGL:
When the Confederates say that St. Brendan's [Bonavisla Bay] is solid for
confederation. they are using a cheap political trick and trying to convince poopl!:
from olher pans of the country Ihal 51. Brendan's is all confederate and Ihal
everybody here should follow them. 14'
Collins may have had one response 10 the paper, but one resident of St. BmorA,,'s nOIt.'<i
another: "There wasn't much nOlice took of it here it seemed to be too dirty to read. The
majority of Ihe people burned it" .I"
When the confederates staked their claim, and created sectarian overtones. the
effect of this was reinforced when the RGL announced ils areas of support over the
radio. According to Jamieson, "It was an inept perfonnance,· since it had the effect of
"contributing to the public conception of a religious division over the referendum issue",
and of affirming Smallwood's sectarian "claims about the nature of the opposition he
faced" .14' Smallwood's broadcasts often gave reports on how confederation was doing
around the island:
Smallwood would forecast: "Confederation won't get a vote in SI. Mary's, or St.
Bride's," or so on through a long Ust of R.C. settlements. Then, he would say,
"Confederation will get over 90% of the votes in Wesleyville, and Bonavisla,"
following up with an even longer list of Protestant communities. Though he never
1.Q It was only after confederation that the cultunJand religious isoillion of communilies began to
break down. In 1948 the religious persuasion of setllements was easily correlated by • reader with.
preference fororagaiostCOQfedcralion.
,., RGLP 3.01.023, COlTCS)lOndcncc O'leaIy/Collios, May 1948, Collil\llto D. Ryan, 7 May 1948.
,,, RGLP 3.01.023, Correspondcncc O'Lu.I)'/Coliins, May t948, J. Hennell!CY to RGL, 22 April
1948.
1" Jamieson, "Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation", pp. 29-30,
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elaborated, the message was perfectly clear; it was not lost on thousands of
voters. 146
Smallwood also had nIt! Confederate publish these lists, which had the same effect.
While Smallwood was dividing up the island into areas of black and white,
Bradley again tackled the EUP. In a radio speech during the week of 17·24 April, he
first observed that the American fishing industry would never allow free trade with
Newfoundland, and thai Canada was more important 10 the United Sta.~· than
Newfoundland. He then disparaged the EUP and the RGL:
The people are sick of bluff and slogans.... Isn', the whole idea just
economic buncombe? ... These are facts we would do well to remember, when
an attempt is made to sweep us offour feet into the very Responsible Government
thai we don't want. There are those in this country who want Responsible
Government, and who want it desperately; and 8l~ delennined to get it if they
can. Some of them will stop at nothing 10 get it. Money is no object....
Can you hear the voices of the dead past in those catch cries and slogans -
don't you recognize the antics and stunts and appeals to prejudice and vague
promises of a new jerusalem? Of course you do. 1bey bear the hallmark of that
old discredited system - Responsible Government. They reek of it. They are of
its 'ery body and bones. They are a pan and parcel of the tactics used in the
Convention.
Spurn these red herrings and promises - Grasp the substance and let the
shadow go. Give confederation a thundering majority on polling day. Let this be
your answer to this contemptible campaign 10 delude you into voting for the thing
yoU~.141
1lle confederale speechmaking strategy was simple. Issues were attack.ed, colourful and
visceral metaphors were presented, and then the people were told that they hated and
fearecl the opposition and its platfonns. It was ruthless, but a brilliant tactic.
t"lbki.,p.28.
'" l.R. Smallwood Papel'll, 4.01.001, NcwfoundlandCoofedcratc Association, undated Bradlcy~h,
pp. 8, 10-11, 13 and 1.5. EmplLasia inc1uded in original documcol.
166
On 22 April J,S. Macdonald reported on the :lctivities of lhe EUP, and on
Crosbie's campaigning in Hartx)uT Grace. Macdonald feared thai economic union was
very appealing, and observed thaI
The Newfoundland elector is a panicularly gullible individual and the yearning
for free trade with the United States is so deep-sealed and offers slIch
overwhelming advantages if it could be secured, that there is no doubt al all that
the idea sponsored by Mr. Crosbie's party will gain many adherents among th~
fisherfolk if it cannot be shown conclusively to be wi~hfullhinkingwithout any
possibility of being achieved.1u
Macdonald praised Bradley's speech as "the UGSI ... that has been delivered on the
subject thus far". 149 Macdonald also noted that in response to anacks on the
Commission of Government, and "with no one to champion their cause" in the campaign,
within that past week Commissioner Herbert Pottle had spoken to the Elks' Club, and
Commissioner Herman Quinton at the Rotary Club. Both defended the Commission's
record and accomplishments, and the High Commissioner noted that their efforts were
-the most clear-cut effort to champion the cause of Commission that has been made
yet-."c
Since mid-March the Commission had been quietly silting on a referendum bill,
aiming at a late May referendum date with a run-off, if necessary, within ttln days of the
first. lSI On 24 April the Evening Telegram announced that the referendum would be
held on 3 June,l51 On the 27th the Commission's referendum bill became law, and set
the referendum date with provision for a run-off referendum if there was not clear
," PRO DO 35/3455,J.S. Macdonald 10 Sccrctary of State for External Affairs, 22 April 1948, p. I.
'''lbid.,p.2.
l"'fbid.,p.2.
III PRO DO 3.5/3455, J.S. Maedonald 10 Secretary of State for External Affain, 19 March 1948.
III The Ewniflg TeleGram, 24 April 1948.
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majority. III On 26 April, J.S. Macdonald, Smallwood and Bradley met, and according
10 Macdonald,
They staled that opponents of Confederation are conducting a whispering
campaign among Newfoundland civilians employed on the United Stales military
bases. The campaign is designed to persuade the employees that union with
Canada would mean thai the bases will come under Canadian control and they
would lose their jobs... Altogether Mr. Smallwood computes that, with
dependents, about 10,000 votes would be affected out of a total electoral roll of
approximately 173,000. It will be, therefore, one of the most important groups
of opinion in the referendum.
They also pointed out that the oppositio;. groups are making statements,
and twisting statements, .. 10 convey the impression that Family Allowances are
merely a wanime enactments and that there is a strong probability that they will
shortly be abolished.
As the campaign is working up into its final stage, statements on both of
these matters, to be fully effective. would have to be made by the middle of May
atlhe latest, in order that time may be aUowed to give them publicity in all parts
of Newfoundland. l$4
In addition to the renewed request for help. Smallwood and Bradley were apparently
quite aware of their opponents' tactics. Another method of campaigning • ~whispering" -
had emerged, and it was to become a principal tactic of the confederates.
J.S. Macdonald's response to his meeting with Bradley and Smallwood was also
significant. Though Pearson had stated that Canada wished to "avoid being used as an
infonnation bureau by the confederates". m Macdonald again pressed Ottawa for
infonnation with which to help the confederates. and advocated active Canadian
involvement in the campaign. His unwillingness to stop helping the confederates. and his
III NealY, NOl1h Atlantic World, p. 315.
114 Bridle, Docu~n(s, pp. 862-3, J.S. Macdonald 10 Secretary of State for El~mal Affai~, 26 April
1948.
III Bridle, D~nts, p. 861, Pearson In J.5. Macdonald. 24 April 1948. The CanadillllJ were
cnn~med thai the ROt would dl!ICover their intervention in tbe confederate campaign.
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endowment with a certain "loose longue and lack of discretion""" s~cm to have
resulted in the announcement of his transfer 10 Brazil. Pearson observed that it was nOI
only a ·promotion" for Macdonald, bUI would serve "to mess Canadian detennination
10 stand entirely aloof ff('~11 Newfoundland['s] referendum, and to make no attempt
whatever to influence its result" ,m But Atllee's secretary, T.J. O'Brien, lamented tlmt
The departure of Scott Macdonald, who for our purposes has almost replaced the
Governor as reporter on current affairs, will be a great blow 10 the
punctiliousness of the Canadian Government, far from producing the
effect .... III
Macdonald had become useful to the British as a well-connected observer, and the British
recognized this and his usefulness to the Canadians, even if the latter themselves did not.
Macdonald had been the conduit for Canadian infonnation and assistance for the
governor and the confederates, and he had ably conducted these operations, since he
knew the system, had the contacts, and worked well with Smallwood and Bradley. With
Macdonald gone, and no one in the offing as competent as he was, the British predicted
that the Canadians would be drawn into Newfoundland affairs much more than they had
been when Macdonald was their representative.
Macdonald left Newfoundland in mid-May, at the height of the first referendum
campaign, and was replaced by the more tighHipped Paul Bridle, who remained acting
High Commissioner until September. Before he went to Brazil, Macdonald met in Ottawa
on 19 May with Mackenzie King, who noted that Macdonalrl thought Newfoundland was
...almost certain to come into Confederation but agrees with me [that) it is going
to be a source of trouble for some time to come. The only thing to do [is} to save
,5' Walsh, Morl 71lan A Poor Majority, p. 304, endnoto 2.
III PRO DO 3513455, United Kingdom High Commiuioner in CUladJ to Maehtig, 28 April 1948.
,>I PRO DO 3513455, 211.Rcf.Caoada, Tel. 380, 28/4/48, in the handwriting ofT.J. O'Brien. Thi'
sentence ends in the original doeUmeJll all cited, for the following plge il milling from the file.
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the Island from drifting into the hands of [the] Americans. Specially important 10
Canada. ll'
With the departure of J.S. Macdonald, the Canadians attempted to take more of a quiet
role in political events in Newfoundland.
By early May. the confederates had emerged as leaders in the campaign. With
Canadian assistance, their campaign was better infonned, organized, and funded, but
their greatest threat was the powerful appeal of the BUP. It had a strong party
organization, a plethora of business know-how and advertising acumen, and captured the
attention of many voters. Since the BUP advocated more ties with America after the
return of responsible government, the confederates realized that the EUP platfonn had
to be decimated if confederation were to win. For the last stage of the first campaign,
Smallwood's finely-tuned confederate campaign shifted into high gear.
I" Bridle, Dot:U!MItls, p. 872, Extract from The MackLmle King Record.
Chapter 6
"[ Have Come to You Out of the Clouds"l:
The Conclusion of the First Campaign, May-June 1948
Once the date of Ihe referendum was known, the campaigns became more
vigourous. Even before a definite date towards which 10 work was known, lhe
propaganda campaigns of all parties had begun. In May, the Roman Catholic Church
made its strongest appeal for the return of responsible government. 11M: BUP countered
the confcdemte message with ils own propaganda. The confederatcs became zealous in
their attempts to discredit the BliP, and to Ihis end attempted 10 forge an alliance wilh
J.B. McEvoy, who had obtained Judge Manley Hudson's analysis of the prOSpt:cts of
economic union. In response, the EUP countered with its own news and encourngement
from America, and this strengthened the support for responsible government. But the
confederate campaign was extremely well-organized and highly personal. Smallwood and
his campaign agents visited many of the communities of Newfoundland, anti as a result,
their messages were dominant in the outports, where the RGL and EUP were not as
organized.
On Saturday 1 May, McEvoy arrived back in St. John's with the Hudson
memorandum. On the 6th he wrote Hudson requesting that he not communicate any OIher
opinions to persons in Newfoundland "who may be adversely affected by your Opinions· ,
until McEvoy supplied Hudson with "additional information as woold be necessary in
fonning a true perspective" on these people.1 McEvoy then spent a week preparing to
release his infonnation.1 and requested airtime on VONF.4 But Bradley seems to hav~
I The words of Smallwood, u eited by Gregory J. Power to the luthor, 27 JanWiry 1992.
1 J.B. McEvoy Papen, MeEvoy to Hudson, 6 MIY 1948.
I Ibid.
• W.F. Gtlgay papen, file # JS, J.B. MeEvoy, MeEvoy to Gelgly, 6 May 1948.
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laken his -100r. Confederate- infonnant's views into accoonl, and gone to the
Commission seeking 10 restrict McEvoy. McEvoy was refused pennission to broadcast
because he was not ronnally allied with any political organizalion. Galgay suggested that
he arrange to present the material during the airtime of one of the three panies.'
While McEvoy prepared 10 decimate the EUP I the ~ponsible government
advocates fought the confederates. The Sundlly Htrald stepped up its attacks on the
confederates and the Commission of Government, and made as many insinuations as if
could hope to gel away wi:h. On 2 May it said that Gordon Bradley was·Afraid He May
Not De Prime Minister".6 It noted thai the previous .....eek·s Pravda bad indicated tbat
the Russians contemplated establishing a consulate in St. John's with a staff of 14, and
in an oblique poke at the confederates it claimed that "to aUow 14 Russians to calmly
walk into this country with the Communistic activity which is already taking place here
is nothing short of madness-.
'
On 9 May The Herald asked why the confederates had
made $100 worth of phone calls to Ottawa, and related that -Many wondered if the loc:aJ
Confederates were phoning for instructions-.· One week later it noted that a
-Communist group· met on Thursdays evenings in a house on the Higher Levels of 51.
John's; among its members was a former member of the Commission of Government.
The Herald also asked whether the petitions SmaUwood collected had ever been scnl 10
England, and put about the rumour that they had not.' The Independent satisfied itself
I Ibid., Galgay to McEvoy, 1 May 1948•
• Tht! Sunday HfflIld, 2 May 1948, p. ,.
'lbid.,p.'l2.
'nrt!SundayHttuld,9May 1948,p.'.
• 1M Sunday Httuld, 16 May 1948. pp. ) iIIld S.
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with cautioning that the American bases in Newfoundland would be lost ulKler
confederation. 10
BUI Smallwood was occupied with more imponant concerns. He wrote 10 Captain
Leonard T. Stick, his vice-president in Bay Roberts, enclosing a cheque for $300 and
instructing him that "This, together with the $100 you have already rccdved. aught (sicj
to go I considerable distance towarrl meeting the Association's local expenses in your
area".ll Smallwood confided that "Johnnie McEvoy is back from Washington with len
times as much documents and other evKlence as he needs to smash Economic Union (0
splinters, H:: will be going on the air to do so·. I) For his part. Bradley had been in
Bonavista during the previous two weeks, and was due to arrive the next day in 51.
John's, where Smallwood was "going to try and get legs under him to get out and !loki
some meetings·. IJ Sma.llwood did get Bradley to speak, and he was sent around the
nolth-east coast, while Smallwood headed off on a campaign visit to the Burin
PeninSUla.'·
On 8 May, lhe Hudson memorandum appeared ill The Evening Teltgram along
with a letter from Monroe 10 McEvoy discotlraging lhe pursuil of economic union
because it would endanger the fishing industry'~ existing con--..essions, and a letter from
the Gloucester Fisheries Associalion to McEvoy threatening [0 lobby Congress for full
II~ IndtpDJdmJ. 3 May 1948, p. I.
II l.R. Smallwood Plpen, 1.32.001, Port de Grave Pre·Confederalion, Smallwood 10 Slick, 3 May
1948. Stick had formerly been the Chief Ranger of the Newfoundland Ranger Force.
"Ibid.
,. Bridle, DoamImu, pp. 866-7, J.S. M.cdonaJ-l1O Secretvy ar Slate rw &te.maI Affairs, 12 May
,....
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protection if funher concessions were made to outside interests. 15 The Telegram blasted
the BeN for refusing to broadcast Ihis infonnation. 16 If the confederates had been
previously chafillg :Jt the bit, there was now no shonage of political capital. Smallwood
could have cared less for McEvoy's message or news about industry concessions: the
immediate value was the sensational, and he quickJy distilled McEvoy's message and
turned it into a slick with which to beat economic union. In his last despatch to Ottawa,
J.S. Macdonald nOled thai Smallwood quickly went on an "Island-wide" radio hook-up,
"spreading the infonnation brought back by Mr. McEvoy.... He spoke very well, and
was markedly superior to Mr. Crosbie who followed him".11 Smallwood loId his
listeners: "It's over and done with....a farce, a sham, a complete impossibility. Forget
about it" .11 Then neatly turning a trick, SmaUwood "castigated" the BCN for not
allowing McEvoy to speak, and with the offer of airtime, the confederates "adroitly
invited McEvoy to make use of as much of the Association's time as he might need" to
spread the gospeL 19 Apart from his Telegram statement McEvoy avoided entering the
arena, but Smallwood's broadcasts had the desired effect, even if it was not appreciated
everywhere. One listener in the Cashin stronghold of Renews commented that "people
are now taking in all he [Smallwood] says". but "sometimes I get down in the dumps
IJ Noted in PAC MG 30 E 159. Vol. 6. Memoranda on Newfoundland, 1947-1949, J.S. Macdonald
10 Sco:relary of Slate for External Affairs. 8 May 1948; also.sce Neary, Nonh Allanlic: WOfld, p. 319.
.. 17r~ Ev~ning T~f~grom. 8 May [948.
11 Bridle. Docum~nls. pp. 866-7. J.S. Macdonald loSecrelaty of Slate for Exlemal Affairs, 12 May
1948.
II Jlmieson. ') Saw IIlGFight", BNF, p.96.
19 Bridle, DocufMnls, pp. 864-5. 1.S. Macdonald to Sccrelaty of Slate for External AI1J.irs. 8 May
1948.
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over it I cannot listen to Smallwood afraid lhat I would get 50 bad lhat the radio would
end up in the Harbour-.%O
In a symbolic event carefully calculaled [0 increase confederate support among
oUlpOrt fishennen, upon Bf1dley's return from his speaking tour ne was made an
honourary member of lhe Fishennen's Prolective Union.11 Meanwhile, on II May.
Smallwood left on another tour of Trinily, Bonavisla, and Noire Dame bays in a small
seaplane.n The .usc of aircraft by lhe confederates, and later by the League. was
arguably the most innovative, glamorous, and effective tactic which could be employed.
The confedef1tes had purchased [he most powerful amplifier and speaker systems
avail<tble and anached them to the planes.1J Campaigning by aircraft allowed Ihem to
visit areas not accessible by road and eliminated time wasted in travelling by boal orear.
Smallwood rented a plane with pontoons, and had it land in harbours, where he
addressed crowds (and often whole communi:ies) assembled on the shores.14 Sometimes
the plane flew over the settlements, and Smallwood addressed people from the air,1J
Either way. the effect was biblical, and like the voice of God over the waters or out of
the skies, Smallwood told people to vote for confederation.1e According to Greg Power,
~ RGLP 3.01.tnJ, Com:spondcrKe O'L.euy/ColliftS. May 1948, F. Goodrid~ 10 Cashin, II M.y
,....
21 Asarly u April JO Ibe R<iL hid been warned thIl B..-dley would be llIIde a member orille FPU.
See RGLP3.01.024, Conesponckncc O'I...caJy/CoJlins, M.y-Julle 1941, <i.F. Hcnncbul}' 10 O'L..c.uy, 30
Aprill94S.
22 Slal:cy, "'000 Day.', BNF, p. 136.
DHorwood.Jory, p. 114.
:z,o Smtllwood. I Chost Canada, p. 290.
v Horwood, Joey. p. 115.
»/bid., p. 114; GIKe SparkCll 10 Ibc author, IS January 1991., and GrcJOlY J. Power 10 the .ul!lor,
21Januaryl99'l.
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who occasionally went on these trips, on several occasions Smallwood even began his
addresses with ~My dear friends, I have come to you out of the clouds" Y
The confederates continued milking the apparent EUP fiasco for all it was worth.
On 12 May The Confederate appeared with the huge headline, "Comic Union Blows
Up!", and with Ihis catchy slogan for the EUP, the confederates rededicated themselves
to the decimation of the remainder of Crosbie's campaign.2t In the same issue another
theme was class, wealth, and the anti-confederate feeling prevalent in St. John's. Steali,,:~
a leaf from Smallwood's National Convention perfonnances, an article entitled "The 21
Millionaires" indicated how the wealthy of 51. John's would suffer under confederation,
and that eighteen were "definitely known to be opposed to confederation".29 While the
truth of Smallwood's statement may never be known, it stirred up a hornet's nest of
opposition in anti-confederate strongholds.
Eager to counter the confederate coup, EUP members began a personal attack,
denouncing: the motives of McEvoy and Monroe, who "because of their business
connections" had personal. interests in preventing free trade, and who were "traitors" for
obtaining "a statement from the Gloucester fishing interests, the "traditional enemies" of
Newfoundland's fisheries".JO Crosbie and Jamieson took to the airwaves on Saturday
night, 15 May, and announced that they had the names of, and received messages from
"a large majority of the United States Senate" who supported economic union; among
them, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, a presidential hopeful, who staled "Yes, I wW be
II Gregory J. Powcr to the author, 27 JanlW)' 1992.
;J 17t~ COflfrdmJt~, 12 May 1948, p. I.
1(1 PRO DO JS/J4SS. Bridlc, Actina: Canadian Higb Commissioncr in Newfouadhmd, 10 5el:retal)' of
Stale for External Affairs, 17 May 1948.
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glad to see your delegation" ,JI The EUP also ,tried 10 play the recorded words of
Senator Brooks. 32 Howevt::r, at the last moment in the VONF studio they were stopped.
and handed a cryptic note which read "Because of diplomatic implications beyond the
control of the BeN the playing of the record has been postponed. [It] May be read".lJ
The senator's message was introduced by Jamieson as "the Words of Senator Brooks·.
and instead a transcript was read,u The Commission of Government ultimately
controlled the BeN, alld had no intention of giving credibility to the EUP,JS Undaunted,
The SullLlny HeralJ published a list of senators who responded to the Stirling's qu~slion
whether they would meet a delegation from Newfoundland 10 discuss economic union,l&
With Brook's statement that Newfoundland was important to America -because of its
strategic position as an air traffic centre-,n and further encouragement from Senators
Taft, Wagner, Ball, and Bridges, "TI:lE PROOF" was provided that economic union v.as
viable. In contrast, the Hudson memorandum was "a glorified report from a senile school
teacher".31 Stirling :>hot the paper around the island via airplane.
II Bridle, !mru/fU/lts, p. 870, Bridle 10 Secretary of Stale for E~lemal Arfail'l, 15 May 1948.
n Jamieson, No Place For Fools, p. 120, place! Ihi! event in the .sc<:ond referendum campaign, but
in 'I Saw the fight", BNF, p. 94, Jamieson places it in the first.
1I W.F. Galgay Papers, flIe # 29, Political Broadcasls, undated, unsigned hatKlwrillcn nole, pnsslbly
a ~tudio inslnu:tio/l.
JoIJ-.mie!DD, No pw.ceForFolJis,p. 120.
" For other reasoD.II wby the recording was dilallowed, including thllthe EUP were perceil/cd 10 be
mis.representingl public figure, sce Horwood. Joey. p. 119.
MThtSuruJayHtrald,23 May 1948, p. 2, and Bridle, DocumtllU, p. 871, Bridloto Sceretal)' ofStalo
fotExlernal Affairs, 16 May 1948.
l'IThtSuruJayllerald, 23 May 1948,p.1.
"'lbld.,p.3.
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While confeder:ales and the EUP fought each other, the RGL was not entirely
artless. At the 29 April meeting of the executive, it was announced that the EUP would
co-operate with the RGL in providing polling day transportation for vOlcrs.:It
Furthennote, Railway union boss and League member James Ryall immediately began
a trip across the island to hold meetings at railway stations..o The league's public
meetings continued in and around the St. John's area, and on 6 May it ffio';.( in Holy
Trinity Roman Catholic Parish Hall in Torbay.·1 Like Smallwood's confederate party,
it stuck to the areas in which it had support, but because of the sectarian connotations
which were bCing drawn by all parties, this may have been a mistake. At its 13 May
meeting, the League decided to "effect a liaison" wilh the BUP. Each group would divide
up the campaign to avoid duplication of effort.'l But given the demonstrated difficulties
the EUP had in holding meelings in hostile lemlOry, Ihis may not have been agOOC idea.
With the sectarian nalure of settlements in mind, the league tried to assign appropriate
speakers to visit its various districts. Thus at the 13 May meeting, Hunt and cashin were
assi~ 10 go to Grand Falls; R. Cramm and P. Oliver were to work the north side of
Conception Bay; Bay Roberts and Port de Grave were the domliltn of W.R. Daw~ and
Ted Sparkes; Cashin and Hanington were to visit BeU Island; R.J. Fahey and Major
Marshall were to cover Gander; Fogwill. Marshall, and Higgins were to canvass Comer
Brook and SlephenviUe; and Butt, Hollett, and A. George were to canvass Trinity South,
with Currie to be sent 10 Bay Roberts if possible.U On the whole it sent many speakers
out, but unlike the confederates, whose grassroots speakers and organizers came from
,. RGLP3.01.00J, MiDllte!ll orOeneNl Meetings. 29 April 1948.
-Ibid.
.. RGLP3.01.023, Com.lIpondence O·t.ear:t!Collins May 1948, Collins to Rev. Dr. GreeDe, 14 May
1948. eDclo!inc $10 payment or renl.l1 for tbe hall.
oQ RGLP3.01.00I, Elteeulive MinulelI, 13 May 1948.
"Ibid.
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tbe communities in which they campaigned, with few eXceplioos the League exported its
campaign from St. John's.
The League was aware lhal damage 10 the EUP's claims would mean a smaller
vote for responsible government. In the 13 May !rultptntle",. an attempt was made 10
refute the Hudson memorandum, and the full front page bore the headline -Trnde
Agreemenls With United Slales Definitely Possible stales Judge Hudson Americ111
lawyer, Other Concessions Assured-," In the same issue TIlt J"dtpendem lold -The
Truth- about a failed meeting lhe confederates had held in Spaniard's Bay around 24
April, and recorded that the assembled crowd had delivered a weak "3 Cheers for
Gordon Bradley·,~' But in reality, the confederates' meetings in the oUtpOns were milch
more successful· almost suspiciously so - in comparison to those of the League and the
EUP. So while trying 10 diminish the confederate campaign, the RGL prepared a multi·
media presentation to appeal to the electorate.
At the end of April, Marshall Studios prepared and donated advertising slides to
the League, co-ordinalcd to match the League's first IWO campaign posters. It was
intended that these would be shown in au movte theatres and meeting-halls which would
display them,<l6 During late April and early May the League approached various
organizations across the island, bul the slides were given a mixed reception, They were
.. Thtfrtdtptfld~flt, IJ May 1948, p. I.
'lfbid.,p.IJ .
.. RGLP 3.01.003, Minutes of GCllel'll Meetings. Minutes of Joint Planning Committee Medinl' 21
ApriI1948; and 3.01.022, Correspoodeneo O'lurylCollillJ, JlIluary-Aprill948, Collins 10 Fr. MeaM)',
24 April 1948.
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shown in Comer Brook,'l but at the Prince's Theatre on Belllsiaod. it was a different
story. On 17 May theatre .....anager Eric Luffman wrQle to Collins:
Your letter of April 24th. regarding advertisement through tbe medium of the
screen. I have taken the matter before the Board of Trustees of the Loyal Orange
Association, who own and control the Prince's Theatre. After much discussion
they decided that they could not advertise for any party. as the Orange
constitution forbids anything of a political nature to be brought in its lodge room.
There are a great many members of our lodge on Bell Island who favour
Responsible Government but still there are a few who lean otherwise and we are
afraid it may cause some split amongst our members.4I
Luffman's letter was significant. Apart from the Lodge's refusal 10 show the slides, it
indicated the fractured nature of political opinion in the Bell Island Orange Lodge. It is
unknown whether the Ikll Island Lodge's policy of keeping politics out oftl~~ Lodge was
a standard policy followed in aU Newfoundland Lodges. But the Bell Island Lodge's
affinity for political non-alignment was not shared by all members of tbe Loyal Orange
Association.
While John G. Higgins confidently dismissed McEvoy's -incident- of the Hudson
memorandum as a -boomerang-, a -piece of impertinence-, and observed that -10 use
the ....vrds of Bradley, it stinks- ,.' the League was eager to defeat the McEvoy-Hudson
propaganda. On 11 May, the Daily Ne~ commented on the extensive political
affiliations of the senators, with Perlin as -The Wayfarer" observing that tbe list included
many Republicans, and that -it is wen to have in mind that the Republicans were always,
in the past, the high-tariffparty-.50 Paul Bridlf" reported the press comments to Ottawa
OJ RGLP3.01.02J,CorrelpOlldellce O'leaJy/ColJins, May 1948, I.W. Buba toCollills, IS May 1948.
• RGLPJ.OI.023,Correspondencc O'leaJy/CoJlins, May 1948, E, Luffman toCollins, 17 May 1948.
.. J.G. Higgins PapeR, J.01.027, Correspondence 1.0. Hiilins, Much-December t948, Higgins to
O. Hicks, Grud Fall., 13 May 1948.
" PRO DO :3$/J45S, Bridle to Secrelal)' of Sate for External AtTain, 17 May 1948.
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and London, but when he noted that there was local speculation (presumably among the
confederates) . ver who addressed the question of supporting economic union to the
senators, and o'/er how long Crosbie had kepi the senators' statements before releasing
them,sl he betrayed the confusion which Crosbie's announcemenllllomemarily brought
upon the confederate camp. Likewise, the RGL marshalled all ils efforts lowards
discrediting the McEvoy bombshell. On 17 May Charlr.s Hunt and Cashin spoke in
Grand Falls on their way back to St. JOhO'5,51 and five days later the Grand Fall.f
Advertiser reported their speeches and noted that Hunt favoured a ftcloscr union" with
the United Slates.')
Meanwhile, Smallwood and Bradley launched a virulent reply to Crosbie. Bradley
took to the ailWaves, and dismissed Crosbie's announcement of senatorial suppol1 as "a
development without any real significance".'w Smallwood also attacked the EUP. In a
speech dated 20 May,5' Smallwood first denied a mmour that he had been physically
attacked by Cashin, but accused the anti·ccnfederates of being "great !lands at cooking
up rumours and spreading them about" .'6 He then elucidated for his audience:
...1bat's what['s] known as a whispering campaign. The whispering campaign is,
of course, the cheapest, meanest, dirtiest 'olm of political campaigning. What you
II/bid.
II Bridle, DOCllm£nlJ, p. 883, Bridle 10 Secretary of State for Exlemal Affairl, 27 May 1948.
1'/bid.,p.883.
j.O Brid;e, DO<.'Um£nll, p. 875, Bridle 10 Secretary of Stale for Elllenul Affail'3, 20 May 1948.
3J J.R. Smallwood Papers, 4.01.007, Smallwood Speechel 1948·1949,20 May 194G. Smallwood'l
IpCCO III by giving reason. why he WI! 'on the air tonight', hut it unclear whether this lpeeeh wu
ever broadcast, or if !Ill, on which .tatioo. Given the accusal ions it made, it would nol likely have been
broadcut on VONF, which CClltOred libellous contenl. On BeN een!lOJ'lhip poliey KC W.F. Galgay
Papen, file 1129, Politle.J Broadeasll, GllIgly 10 RGL, undated, rc: conllulting Richard Cramm, Ihl! BCN'a
lawyer regarding JibellollJ maleria!.
so J.R. Smallwood Plpen, 4.0UI07, Smallwood SpceehCll 1948·1949,20 May 1lJ.48, p. I.
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say in a public meeting, or on the air, is heard by your opponents. 1bey can
check you and contradict you and show you up. But a whispering campaign is a
pretty hard thing to check and to deal with. You can never say exaCl:ly who
cooked up the rumor, and it's almost impossible to track it (If wn 10 its original
source.n
No doubt speaking from the knowledge of how a whispering campaign was used,
Smallwood then shared his views on how the campaign had begun:
Our opponents have around two hundred men hired at Ihis present minute to
travel about the counlry spreading poison against us....Most of those heelers are
supposed to be travelling on business selling insurance, buying vegclables, or
anything else thai covers up their real business -- their real business being to
spread anli-Confederate lies amongsilhe people,"
Then, after telling his audicoCt'· of how the anti-confederates were in "deadly fear- of the
family allowance, the cornerstone of the confederate appeal • "They fear and hate it" •
he asked his audience whether
...those two hundred Newfoundland fisbennen along the south coast fishing in
Canada right now would be 50 strong for Confederation if Confederation would
hurt our fisheries? Or maybe they're about to be numbered amongst the Quislings
and Traiton that Mr. Cashin is always talking aboot. ...And by the way, taUdng
of traiton, our linie friend Mr. Wicldord Collins, the secretary of the
Responsible Government league, has been throwing his weight about quite a bit
lately. According to him, everybody in Newfoundland is a traitor except the
handful who ate for Responsible Government.)f
Next came an attack on 17K Western Slar for its pending publication of a report on union
which Lewin commissioned.60 Voters were tben encouraged to use the advance polls to
vote, and the time, date, and location of these was then broadcast. Finally with a sweep
around the island and Labrador, Smallwood named all the strong confederate
communities he had visited, and noted that at Pound Cove he had the pleasure, "lI"'t to
II Ibid.,p. I.
lIlbid., p. 2.
It Ibid.,pp. 31U1d6.
ot/bid•• pp.l!i_9.
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say embarrassment. of walking under the first arch ever buill for me"_He concluded by
citing the good example of the high school students of Wesleyville. who had contacted
him thai afternoon 10 say that"Sunday Heralds dropped by Ches were immediately burnt
by school pupils· ,61
On 2i May, Lewin had The WeJftm Star publish the "Report on the Proposed
Anangements for the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation". prepared by
McDonald, Currie and Company of Montreal,'1 The report observed that under
confederation, Canada would spend more on Newfoundland than it received: taxes would
increase, the new province would have a deficit of 54,468,000 from the outset, and the
per capita debt would rise from $160 to 51,340.63 The document concluded by asking
a number of questions ·of an intangible nature". such as whether confederation would
provide Newfoundland with a more stable economy. or if there would be adequate
provincial ~enue -to maintain and improve natural resources, roads, educational
facilities, health and other services-. tot Bridle noIed that the report contained information
which both opponents and advocates of confederation could use, but that in St. John's,
only The Daily News and the League latched onto the report and highlighted the projected
provincial deflcit6J Instead of disputing specinc points in the report. Smallwood opted
for the more profitable activity of attempting to discredit Lewin for having a personal
interest in seeing the return of responsible government (so that Bowaters could continue
·'fbld.,p.lI.
II Bridle, DOCllftWlIS, p. 811, Bridle to Secretary of Silte fQr EKleml1 Afflin, 26 MIY 1948.
OJ/bid., p. S7S.
"Ibid., p. 87S.
l4/bid., p. 879.
183
operating with lax concessions), and the confederates avoided speaking on the repon.66
As a campaign tactic, instead of addressing issues which many people wished 10 hear
addressed, Small.....ood often chose to make personal denunciations and use class hatred
(even if, in some cases, his observations were true) to incite a dislike of responsible
government.
After J .5. Macdonald left Newfoundland, the confederates enjoyed the assistance
of Paul Bridle. and t~e to British predictions, the Canadians became more involved than
ever in the confederate campaign. Bridle became the conduit through which MacKay sent
hundreds of copies of Canadian Hansard, reports of the meetings between the Canadians
and the Newfoundland Convention Delegation, the "Black" and "Grey Books", and
"further copies of really basic uncoloured matf'.rial on Confederation", with fun intentions
to supply more if there were a second referendum campaign.67 The printing presses
churned out copies in Ottawa, and the confederates distributed the material and waved
the books h· public meetings. Concerned that it not be known that the materials came
through the High Commissioner's office, Bridle encounged MacKay to "refnin from
writing the words "St. John's" on the copies".61
In the last of its special series of iour issues before the vote, the May Monitor
published a huge editorial entitled "God Guard Thee Newfoundland", in which it stated
the belief that
Mlbid., p, 879·80,
"' PAC MG 30 E 1S9. Vol. 6, file: 1944-19SO. Bridle to MI~Kay, 14,20, and C3peeially 11 May
1948.
M Ibid., Bridle to MacKay. 20 May 1948.
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the merits or demerits of Confeder.uion with the Dominion of Canada arc
completely foreign 10 the problem 10 be decided :lIthe present llloment. ... the
question should not have been admiued to the ballot paper as a third choice.6'l
Confederation had bet:n placed 011 the ballot by "outside influences", and ullfonunntcly
this was irrevocable.10 II roundly condemned the British government. and noted lhat "to
ask our people 10 decide the question of a union on the basis of the prescnt me..gre ilnd
indefinite information available, is 10 commit a poli:ical crime against this countl)'". JI
Then, giving a historical background to its claim against confooeration, it noted tim!
The faith and courage of the Newfoundlander no one has ever doubted.... It was
that faith and courage which, over a hundred years ago, inspired a small group
of patriols to fight for and win that political freedom which we have long
treasured as our proud heritage and which today is in jeopardy. 71
In another article nJe Monitor reviewed each of the choices. The period of Coml1lis.~ion
of Government was a ·wild era of limitless spending·, and ·could no longer be accepted
as a possible fonn of government".73 And since ·no enquiry whatsoever has been put
on foot to ftnd out what the social and religious implications· of confederation were, The
Monitor concluded that there was "not sufficient information at present available to the
people to enable them wisely to detennine whether or not Newfoundland should become
a province of Canada".7. In contrast, the "positive advantage of Responsible
Government" would ensure "the maximum efficiency in the business of government",
based on "a complete and thorough knowledge of local affairs and local conditions; of
"17rtMonitor, May 1948,p.I.
lIIlbiJ"p.1.
11 Ibid., p. I. The confedeates' infonnalion on Canadl WL'l not Jbared with their oppo~nt.
lllbiJ.,p.1.
1lIbiJ"p,3.
7'1b1d" p,6.
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the business of government being operated to the full by Newfoundlanders wilhin
Newfoundland" .7~
In another twist, nle Monilor compared (he Newfoundland referendum wilh Ihe
April election in the Republic of Italy, in which ninety-four percent of the people voted
for Christian Democrat Alcide de Gaspieri "with lhe avowed delennination lilal the evil
and anti-religious inOuences ofCommuni.<;m would be halted.... ,,1. Newfoundland could
thus be like Italy, a place where the people could "virtually and thoroughly defeal all the
evil efforts of noisy and subversive minorities to undennine the moral slructure of a
nation"Y With a final plea for the women of Newfoundland to exercise their
obligations, and make sure thai everyone in the household voted, 71,e MOl/iror cnded with
the prayer "May God defend the right".7. The confederates were thus a "noisy and
subversive minority" I and confederation was equated wilh Communism, b01h of which
were to be despised and defeated.
While 11,e Monilor had condemned confederation, other Roman Catholics outside
the city disagreed. On 12 May Bridle noted that the "Irish Catholic e1emen!" on the we.~1
coast spearheaded the confederate movement there. Bishop O'Reilly was "certainly not
opposed to it", William J. Keough had brought the co-operative movement on-side, and
two of Smallwood's 'fice presidents, Kevin Barry and Loyola Whelan, were leading
Roman Catholic lawyers and spoke at meetings.79 Bany was also responsible for the
'17 Ibid., p. 3.
l'lbid., p.7.
71 Ibid., p. 7.
"lbld.,p.7.
19 Bridle, Documents, p. 866, Bridle 10 Secretary of sate for Extem.1 Mfllin, 12 May 1948.
O'Reilly's independence was also nnled in Smallwood, 1 Chose CoIlDl1tJ, p. 310.
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confederate pamphlet Oulpon Opinion, which -became the Comer Brook equivalent of
71/(" Con.J~d~rale·." M well, Fatncr Ronald Jones of Lourdes Parish openly campaigned
for confederalion," and Fr. S. SI.Croix of St. Benedict's Parish, Cape 51. George, also
seems 10 have been a supporter.c But when Bridle mistakenly assumed that west coast
Roman Catholics were Irish, he may have identifle'J one of the reasons for the Church's
support. Bishop O'Reilly was a native Irishman, not of Newfoundland-Irish extraction,
and had lillIe sense of the history of the Irish on the east coast. Newfoundlanders living
on what was the old French Shore were from varied backgrounds: some were French-
Acadian, especially on the Port-au-Port Peninsula. as well as Highland Scots and some
Scots and Irish from Cape Breton, with some older settlers from 51. Pierre and nonhern
France." Together they had more affinity with their families in eastern Canada and in
their communities than they did with either an unkoown Newfoundland Irish stock in St,
John's, or their panicular brand of nationalism. Like many Ihousands of other
Newfoundlanders, those on the west coast were very poor and lived in scattered
communities. Isolationism and nationalism would nOi foed their families, but
confederatioo would.
• George P. Hobbs. "We Hid 10 Hive I Driver", QlII Mt Joey, p. 7].
II I.R. Smallwood Papen, 1.37.001, St. Georp'S-Port'IU-Port, f're.Coofcd., list of key IIlpporters.
and Smallwood 10 Fr. 10Dell, 3 lune t948: IlDd PAC MG 26 L, Vol. 61, file N-I9-2, Fr. lODes to St.
t.aurent.9Mlltl:hI949.
IlI.R. Smallwood Pllpen, 1.37.002, St. George's·Port·au·Port 1949, Fr. S. 51. Croix 10 Smallwood,
4Iunel949.
" On the population of the west cout see Rosemary Ommcr, "Highll.lld Scotll Migration to
Southwestern NewfllUlldland: A Study of Kinship", The Pmplin, of lUwfoundland, Ed. lohn Mlllllion
(Toronto: Univcrsif)' of TOl'Ollto PresI, 1986), pp. 212-2]]: aad lohn I. Mwtlon. "Settlers and TT1IOer1
in WeSlem NcwfOWldland', ibid., pp. 234-275.
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Even off the west coasl, there were independently-minded Roman Catholic ch,:rgy.
Fr. Philip McCanhy of Gander was a confederate," and so were Fr. Francis
Mullowney,ts Fr. William Collins of Fox Harbour,1I> and Fr. Gregory Battcock of SI.
Vincent'sY Smallwood's greatest clerical supporter was Monsignor Michael F. Dinn,
the parish priest of North River, Conception Bay, and Vicar-General of lhe Diocese of
Harbour Grace." The activities of Dinn and Collins greatly displeaSt."d Archbishop
Roche, who wished to have Dinn removed, and who called Fr. Collins in for :I
leclure.19 On the olher hand, the anti-confederates enjoyed the support of mosl R.C.
clergy. Fr. Hinchey, in Fortune Harbour. Green Bay, was a League supporter,'IO while
newly-ordained Fr. James O'Dwyer made a modest contribution to the EUP.Ol The
League also received the support of Monsignor Bartlett of Bell Island, Fr. Randall J.
Greene of St. John's,?l Rev. Dr. Greene in Tornay, and Fr. Meaney in Grand Falls.OJ
.. Smallwood, 'The Stol)'". BNF, p. 8; J.R. Smallwood Papen, 1.14.004, Grand Falb I-N 1949. Pr.
McCarthy to Smallwood, 2 Apri[ 1949. and Smallwood to Fr. M~Carthy. 4 April [949.
ti Fr. Thol\'laS Moalc[er to tbe author. 2 April 1989; Smallwood. 'The Stol)'". BNF. p. 8.
.. Fr. Thomas Moaker to lite author. 2 April 1989; Gregory J. Power to the aUlhor. 21 January 1992:
8J\d Smallwood, I Chose OJnada, p. 309.
S7 Gregory I. Power to the autltor, 21 lanuary 1992.
.. Ibid.; J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.32.002, Port de Grave 1949, Msgr. Dinn 10 Smallwood, 31 May
1949.
.. Grcgory Power to the author, 21 JanUlI)' 1992, and Fr. Mouler to the aUlhor. 2 Apri[ 1989.
9Il ROLP 3.01.024, Ccrrespondcnce O·I..ary/Ccllins May-June 1948, Ca.shin to Fr. Hinchey, S June
1948.
" Su RGLP 3.01.0IS, Donors and Donation!.
.., Ibid.
91 Fr. Meaney 11''' approach«! by the I...eague to show slidCll (RGLP3.01.022), so preJUmably he Itad
been identified to them as a supporter: the same most likely applied 10 the rcntal of Ihe Church haU to the
RGL by Rev. Dr. J.I. Greene of Torbay (RGLP3.01.023).
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In reply to the league's request for names in lale 1947, Fr. L. FitzGerald of Buchans
had sent a list of supporters, identifying two "key men who can if they will swing it
here", and promising 10 do all he could behind the scenes for responsible government.""
In 51. John's, people in 51. Teresa's Parish in Mundy Pond who displayed confederate
signs were told by the pastor, Monsignor Harold Summers, to remove Ihem. 9l Gregory
Power maintains Ihal while he was in church in Placentia, Monsignor Edward P. Maher
mounted Ihe pulpit and denounced him as a "Communist among us, pouring out his
poison".'16
On Ihe other hand, the confederates did not lack support among Protestant clergy
orolher influential persons. Rev. F. W. Peacock, Superintendent of the Moravian Mission
at Nain, Labrador, eagerly solicited infonnation from Bradley on "confederation tenns
re eskimo and mission ft with which to spread the gospel of confederation among his
congregation, and sent grateful regards to the campaign." Harold Horwood noled that
in the oUlpOltS, Salvation Amy bands often provided musical suppon at campaign
meetings,!1 and SmaUwood later received official congratulations from Brigadier C.D.
Wiseman," who during the campaign was suggested to Smallwood as ,forceful and
.. RGLP 3.01.020, COlTCSpondenee O'lafy/Collins, September-December 1947, Fr. L FitzGerald
toRGL, n.d.
~ The luthor's malema! glTllldmotller wu one of tile few proud eonfederatelll of the Ropewll1k Range
who defiantly displlyed Ibe confederate sign. She wu 11IM! one of the plriab rectory's houaekecpen,
'" Gregol)' J. Power to lhe IUlhor, 27 January 1992; also see Horwood, Joey, p. 120.
., J,R, SDIIl1wood Papers. 1.23.(XlI, Lsbndor, Rev, F'.W. Pucock to Bradley, 30 April 1948.
• Horwood, Joq, p, 114.
.. J.R, Smstlwood Papers, 1.43.003, SI, John's Wellt H·Z 1949, Brigsdier C.D. Wiseman, SaivatiOQ
Army, to Smallwood, 4 April 1949.
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innuenlial speaker for confederation,IOO and whom Smallwood noted was a "good
Confederate" . 101 Rev. W.B. Perry, Minister of Memorial United Church. in Grand Falls
later supported Smallwood, and suggested acceptable political candidates. '1ll and Rev.
Lester Burry, the Convention delegate from Labrador. also openly supported
confederation in his pastoral charge in L:lbrador. 103 Even though it was deemed
improper for magistrates and justices of the peace 10 take part in political activitics,'(Il
the confederates also enjoyed the support of a number of them, including Magistt':llc
George Trickett of Glovertown,IOS Henry Genge, J.P. of Flower's COVC.l~ Cecil
Hann, J.P. of Cape Freels, and Solomon Gosse, J.P. of Spaniard's Bay.I01 In 1947,
when he went to Ottawa, Smallwood himself was a justice of the peace,IOl and his
liD J,R. Smallwood Papers, 1.32.001, Port de Grave Pre-Confed" J. Dswe, Coley's Point. to
Smnllwood,4May 1948.
10' Ibid., Snlllllwood to J. Dawe, .5 May 1948.
,m J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.14.OOS, Grand Falls O-R 1949, Rev. Peny to SmRlIwood. r June 1949.
Perry wu at the Orand Falls paston! charge in 1948, and wu most likely a supporter. In 1949 he WIS
familiar with and strongly disapproved of Cashin.
101 Hector Swain, usrer Ledand 81lny • LabrQdor Pastor lind Furher of elm/NertJ/ion, (St. John's:
Hany Cuff Publications, 1983), pp. 41-3,
100 Robert S. Furlong to lbe author, 20 JanWll)' 1992,
IOj J.R, Smaltwoodpapers, 1.03.001, Bonavista North Pre-Confed., Smallwood loG. Trickcll, 26 May
1948;
I~ J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.33.001, St. Barbe Prc·Confed., H. Genge to Smallwood, 18 March 1948:
Smallwood to H. Oenge, 2 April 1948. In contrast, S.T. Genge of Flower', Cove wrote the RGL.. wishing
'wholeheutedly' to 'regain our heritage our forefathers roughl.so hard for.... • See RGlJ> 3.01.019,
CorrespOlldence O'leary/Collins January·September 1947. S.T. Genge to RGL, 23 August 1941.
"" J.R. Smallwood Papers, 4.01.001, Newfoundland Confederate Association. Vice Presidents in
Referenda.
111I See Bridle, Doa.tfllVl/S, p. 468. W.J. Carew to J.S. Maedonald, 10 May 1941, regarding Mr, J.R,
Smailwood,J.P.
190
previous connections with the profession provided the confederates with a competent and
jnfonned political network when it was required.
In a last-ditch atlempt 10 enlist American support for economic union, Stirling
went to Washington in late May with a little more than a week left in the campaign. lOll
On 24 May he met Andrew Fosler of the Slate Department, but Stirling received no
encouragement. Foster had notified other officials that Stirling did not officially represent
the Newfoundland government, so no prompting or statements were to be given to
Stirling because they would be used in the campaign, ItO For his part, Stirling "referred
10 an alleged association of 25 years ago between Smallwood and Trotsky". and
allempted 10 foment American fear of a "Red Party" in Newfoundland, III but
apparently to no effect. Stirling was not even told that the Americans were interested in
maintaining and augmenting a quiet defensive presence in Newfoundland, In April they
had approached Commissioner of Ju~tice AJbert Walsh with a request to conduct
hydrographic and topographic surveys of the coastal area of Labrador,1I2 and hoped to
conduct amphibious landing exercises, The Commonwealth Relations Office was
contacted, but the Commission deferred permission pending confmnation by an elected
government of Newfoundland, fearing that to bind any succe!sive government in the
offing to a deal made by the Commission would give cannon-fodder to the RGL, I1J
1(>1 MIlCKenzle, 'Economic Union', NQ, Vol. LXXXIII, No.4 (Winler 1988): 29,
..t/bid"p,29,
'11 MlcKentie, In.<ide the Atlalllk TriaJlr/e. p, 201.
III PRO DO 3513488, W, Garland Richardson, United Sl.lItCli Consul, to Commiuioner Albert J,
Wllsh,13ApriI1948,
III fbid.. Commission of Govemmentlo Commonwealth Relations Office. 7 May 1948; Illd Foreign
Office to M,N, Tait, 26 May 1948.
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The status of the American presence in Newfoundland had the potential to
influence the political campaigns. On 27 May, Lester B. Pearson held a press conference
in onawa, at which he was asked about the fate of the American bases in Newfoundland
under Confederation. He responded that the present treaty would remain in existence and
that the RGL were wrong 10 suggest that it would be changed if confcdCnllion
occurred,ll4 The EYening Telegram published Pearson's response on the cover of ils 30
May issue, and Smallwood was so relieved that he read it over the rodio, and had copies
printed and sent 10 civilians working on the American bases al Argenlia and
Stephenville. 1IS But rumours of closure persisted on the bases, and were even "lIribu!cd
to the commander. So Smallwood contacled Major General C.V. Haynes of Fort
Pepperrell in S1. John's, and received a denial that he had made any sllch statemcnt. 1l6
When it came to the potential for the RGL to capitalize on Newfoundlanders' fears of
losing jobs on the bases, the confederates took no chances.
In the last few days of May, the battle raged. The RGL had n,e lndepeudem
delivered around St. John's by the boys of Holy Cross School,I17 and in an aUempt fO
reach the voters of the soulh·west coast, on 27 May the RGL broadcast its message on
radio stations in Sydney, Nova Scotia. III Suvporters were approached by the League
to act as official agents in the polling booths, and these often telegraphed back both their
Il. Bridle, Docummts. p. 882. Pearton to Bridle, 27 May 1948.
I1J PAC RG 2-18, Vol. 129, N-IS, 1948, file: June-July, Bridle to MacKay, 22 June 1948.
nt/bid.
," ROLP 3.01.023, COlTe!ipondence O'Lul)'fCollilU, May 1948, Brother D.F. Nuh to Collinl, 20
May 1948.
III Stacey. "'000 DIYS", BNF, p. 136.
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willingness to do so, and an occasional report on the state of opinion around the
island. 119 But not all was within the control of the League, and confederate tactics were
many and various. On the 27th from Gander, Ted Henley telegraphed Collins outlining
difficulties encountered at a meeting held the previous evening. While Major Fred
Marshall, Frank Fogwill, and Ron Fahey spoke, a small group ofconfederates attempted
to disrupt the meeting, bUI were unsuccessful. no Collins countered this by telling one
supporter of the nature of the confederate campaign:
The Confederate propaganda has begun to disgust the people for they are
descending to the use of communistic measures such as using ;.;, their broadcasts
Qui and oul lies and by trying 10 break up Responsible Government league
meetings in various settlements. I ff'~:1 their day is done and they will get the
licking they deserve on Referendum J..:ay.m
While the League still had life and could Iig~t, it did, but in a light which was largely
personal and used the mass media, it lacked the personnel and the expertise of the
confederates.
Indicative of the general bitterness which prevailed, all parties received
threatening telephone calls_ At one point, Smallwood was telephoned at home by a caller
who said: "Smallwood, you son of a bitch, I'm going to shoot you"; but before
Smallwood hung up he answered, "That's line. Thanks for letting me know~.m Donald
Jamieson later related that he also had received a phone call when he was home with a
cold. After he told the inquiring caller that he was ill, she exclaimed "TIlen I hope you
"' For an example oflhi! proccS! see RGLP 3.01.024, CorrespoDde~ O'I..eary/Collins, May-JIln!>
1948, E.P. Reddy, Maryslown. 10 O'Leary. 27 May 1948.
'''' RGLP 3.01.024. Com:sponden~eO'I..eary/Collhu, May-Jum: 1948, Henley to Collins27 May 1948;
and 3.01.018, Higginllo Henley, 9 Augusl 1948.
III RGLP 3.01.024, Correspondence O·Leary/Coliin., May-June 1948, Collins to A.P. Moulton,
Burgeo,27Mly 1948.
,:2 John R. Courage, •A Cause to Champion", Call M~ Joey, p. 117.
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die, you baslard!MI1l A general climate of uncertainty and acrimony had settled uver
the political community, and the potential for civic disorder was feared by many.
At every occasion, the confederafes hammered home the mcssagl.l that
confederation would bring the Canadian family allowance (Ihe ~b..tby bonus·), the -old
age pension- and a chicken (a savoured morsel at this time in NewfoundlamJ) in every
pot. In response, one ofPeler Cashin's plalfonns was the very immorality of aU this. bill
he was captured in a Confederate cartoon, and vilified as a penitent schoolboy filling a
chalk-board with lin~ of "It was I who said family allowances are immoral".m These
financial enticements waved in (Will of the electorate did not escape A.B. Perlin's eye,
who COil Jemned them in The Observer's Weekly because the confederate~ gave 110
indication of how these services were to be funded. m In his 27 May "Wayfarer"
column, Perlin also railed against this, and cited the recent McDonald, Currie Report
commissioned by lewin, which vindicated the RGL's view that confederation would
mean new taxes, and an increased per capita debt. "Can this province provide at least
$10,000,000 a year in new taxes", Perlin asked, "apan from customs and income taxes?
Certainly not without burdensome taxation" .1'16 But the confederates had the last laugh
when The Confederate published Greg Power's "Stable of the Sacred Cow N , which
featured vicious but hilarious attacks on the escapades of Crosbie, Cashin ("Pete, the
Hero of Sinking Fund Gulch"), Perlin (Mr. Wayfarer with a "thick, synthetic Oxford
accent"), Jamieson ("Donald Duck"), and Malcolm Hollett, who "refused to lOin his
I:> Jamie!OD,"' Saw lhe Fight", BNF, p. Ill.
IU For this eartoon see Ihe froot eover of The POl'll' of the Ptn.
I~ Obserwr's Weekly, 18 May 1948, p. l.
110 The Daily News, 27 May 1948, IU reprinted in Perlin, A Cleor HeDd, p. 120.
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stomach pump 10 anyone, least of all Pete~.1l1 The tiresome minutiae oFRGL and EUP
arguments were ignored. and instead the personalities (and thus theil' arguments) WeTI'"
dealt with much more eITectively using humour.
The confederates' greatest asset was the oratorical ability of Smallwood. He never
tired of telling voters how the merchant classes kept the poor down, and Grace Sparkes,
a campaigner for the ROL, claimed that Smallwood browbeat the people into believing
him. Sparkes claimed that while merchant exploitation had sometimes occurred, it
... was not true in many, many cases, It was not true. It was exaggerated by
Smallwood to the point of making people believe it. But Mr. Smallwood believed
it - if he said something (j",e limes, and people didn't believe ii, then he said it
len times, and still they didn't believe it; if he said it nineteen times everybo<iy'd
believe it, 'cause nobody'd say it that often unless t'were true,128
Smallwood was a master at what anthropologist Robert Paine has called "interlocutory
rheloric", whereby oratory took the fonn of a "conversation" with the audience,l19
Familiar examples were taken from rural domestic and family life, and the audience was
personally involved in the proposition under discussion b} means of rhetorical
questions. 130 Speeches were also illustrated with tall stories ("cuffers") which seized
the imagination of the audience, III Paine observed that Smallwood "brought
Newfoundlanders to a new kind of awareness regarding their political identity: the
III Power, 1J1~ Powtr ofthe P~I1, pp, 37-8,
1:lI GT1lCoSparkcs to the author, IS January 1992.
I~ See Robell Paine, "Smallwood: Polilical Strategy, and a "Career" of Rhetoric·, NFS, Vol. 3, No.
2(FallI987):2l7,
1.10 For an example of Smallwood's metoric in the "Ballot Box Peroration" from the 1948 campaign!
see Ibid.• p. 218.
III Roben Pl.ine, "The PenUlllliveneu of Smallwood: Rhetoric of Cuff~r and Scoff, of Metonym and
Metaphor", NFS, Vol. 1. No. I (Sprins1985): 60.
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awareness of self as an object unto il.s.:lf" .IJ: and that lacking -a -typical- llliddlc+cL'\S.~
51. John's voice, ... hiscountrywide audience coukl recognize he was -an ootpon speaker
[by birth] from a non·Irish area-. m
The confederates employed many slogans and e:tmpaign tricks, to considcmhlc
effect. Campaign worker Herb Wells had the job of worlcing on the St. John's finger
piers, where II'll schooners came in with visiting crews. When the advance polls were
held at the Colonial Building two weeks before referendulll day, Wells would nrr.lll11e
transportation for the crews to the polls, and noted that -I used to chalk Ui) on Illy lisl
so many more votes lost for Responsible Government" .1". Wells also noted tlmt one
evening, having been sent up to the VOCM studios on Parnde Street to pick up the
confederates'tape recorder, he mistakenly took the EUP's recorder, on which there was
a tape of speech by Jamieson which was about to be broadcast. The confederates listened
to the speech, took notes, and then returned the tape n:corder. When Jamieson's speech
was broadcast, and when the confederates spoke just after Jamieson, they rebutted every
argument. I»
During the last days of the campaign both sKies made an all-oot effon to secure
every last ounce of support. The RGL divided itself into various groups and St. John's
committees to ensure that its supporters turned out on polling day. 1)6 But according to
nIt COnftdtralt, the EUP was a little less restrained. Several nights before the
,)llbld., p. 222.
I» Paine, "Pemla.!Jiveness ofSll1IIlIwood", NFS, Vol. I, NO.1 (Spring 1985): 63.
1)0 Herb Well" "Some Memories ofllle COlIfedenlion CampaiJII', CAlli MtJut:y. p. 67.
IlJ Ibid., p. 69.
I» RGLP 3.01.001, ElI:CICullve Minutes, 27 May 1948.
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referendum a truck with EUP and RGL supponers plastered pictures of Cr:>sbie on
Smallwood's Devon Row house, and painted the sidewalk in front of his house with the
slogan ·Vote Respunsible Govemment". A crowd of "nearly 500 people" had gathered
outside, attracted by the campaigners, who terrorized Smallwood's wife and family who
were at home. IJ7 That night, Smallwood wa~ out of the house at radio station VOCM,
and when "hoodlums" in a "Crosbie truck" arrived allhe station threatening Smallwood,
they were "driven away by the police".IJ' Finally, another "Crosbie" loud-speaker
truck stopped oUlsjd~ Smallwood's mother's house, and "for half an hour blared out
insultingremarks".U9
The 20 May Confederate prinled a list of more than 500 expatriate
Newfoundlanders who supported confederation, along with their home communities in
Newfoundland. uo Telling readers that Canada was wa great Britbh nation with a great
future", it deliberately played to the pro-British sentiments of many Newfoundlanders,
especially OUlpOrt Protestants, and attempted to soft-pedal the French Catholic element
whose desire for Labrador Cashin loved to emphasize. "British Union" become the new
moUo, and eventually the masthead of The Confederate was outfitted with two Union
Jacks as emblems. The 28 May Independem also took a patriotic stand, and like The
Monifor prayed the words of the Ode, wGod Guard Thee Newfoundland", while
supporting economic union by publishing a photo of Stirling and Senator Brooks. 1(1
1>1 ThtCIJfl/tdtralt, 9 JlInc 1943, p. I.
''"Ibid.. p. \,
,", Ibid.. p. I.
,«I Tht'Con/tdt'ratt, 20 May 1948,pp.4-6.
,.. Tht'fruJtpf'ndtnt,23May 1948,pp.1 Uld6.
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On 31 May T1le Confederate projl"Cl~d the districts which would supplln ;md
oppose confederation, and Ihat night, in a show of defiance 10 anti-confederate 51.
John's, the confederates held a rally at the CLB Armoury on Harvey RLJ"lll.l~~ When
Smallwood emerged following the meeting, he was mobbed by a hostile crowd. His
glasses were damaged, and only wilh the assi!lance of bodyguards did he escape on the
roof of his car. l~J During the last two days before the vOle Smallwood made a sweep
around Trinity and Conception Bays in a truck equipped with loudspo:lakers. booming the
message from hilltops and across harbours. and as Smallwood put it, sculerncn!s were
blanketed wilh his voice. I," Fifly-odd speeches were given, with the appeal 10 the
emotions being uppermost. I~j Finally succumbing to hoarseness, even SmallwtXl(1
te,mporarily gave up the ghost.
All residents of Newfoundland who were 21 years of age or over, registered on
the voters list, or who were sworn in at the last minute were eligible to vole, The lhird
of June. polling day, came and went. Both sides contented themselves with making spot
announcements encouraging the electorate to vote. l46 Fearing that American military
personnel might interfere in the referendum, U.S. troops were confined (0 their bases on
polling day, and requests from the Nt..wfoundland government to open polling bonths in
special areas on the bases were refused,l41 That evening, the returns were broadcast
,e Smallwood, I ChOlie Canoda. p. 300.
1~ Gregory J. Power to the author, 27111luary 1992: abo see Horwood. JlJfry, p. 121.
,.. Smallwood, "The Story", BNF, p. 31.
l"l Ibid., p. 32.
1" The ConfNerate, 71uly 1948. p, I. This paper daimed thaI 00 3 June, a truck. bearinS Ihe Pinlc,
While. and Green flas llIade Ihe rouniU of St. John'., lellillS voleI'! '0011'1 vote ..,ai031 yoor flag!', bUI
thi.maynolhaveocc\I!Ted.
1"7 PAC RG 2-18. Vol. 129. N-18. 1948. Iile: J\lne-J\lly, Bridle 10 MacKay, 2: J\lne 1948.
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island-wide on VONF, and responsible government won, although with a plurality.
22,]11 vott:rs (14.32%) chose Commission of Government, 64,066 chose confederation
with Canada (41.13%), and 69,400 chose responsible government (44.55%)Y'
There were many reasons why Newfoundlanders voted as they did. In Fogo,
many 'IDled for confederation because the Commission did not build the hospital it
promised there.I~9 just as many civil servants and their families elsewhere '101(>.<1 for
Commission of Government because they feared the loss of government jobs. In the
neighbourhood of the Ropewalk Range on Mundy Pond Road in St. John's, not a few
residents voted for confederation because they thought it would improve the poor t "lusing
standards, and because they eagerly anticipated the family allowance scheme. ISO In
Nutak, in nonhern Labrador, the people voted for the first time. One speaker at a
referendum-eve political meeting there advised voters to choose confederation because
during the previous Easter week at the Moravian Mission at Hebron, he had been told
Ihat "God and Mr. Smallwood expected him to vote for Union with Canada".Ut But
lrue to Smallwood's projections, the Avalon Peninsula with its predominantly Roman
Catholic districts had solidly voted for responsible government. In St. John's East and
West responsible government was given 65.87% and 65.63% support, Harbour Main-Bell
,,, Refertnda slatisties are taken from Most Rev. R.I. labey, Comparative Tables. Appendix. 1.
'''I.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.10.002, Fogo A-F 1949, J. ,~ Earle to SlJ'lallwood, 12 April 1949.
':10 I.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.43.003. St. IOM'5 West H-Z 1949. R. Maher to Smallwood. 21une
1949. The aUll1or's malemal grandmolher, Katherine Nugent. was Maher's next door neighbour. She later
recounted that she.1tld a numbcr of her neighbours voted for confederalion bocause of the "baby bonus"
and the 'old Ige pension".
," Northel'l'. LabBdor Trading OpeBtions Diary. Nutak. LabBdor; 3 June 1948. autbor unknown. The
lIIuthor thanks Or. James K. Hiller for this document in his pol5ellsion. The same entry also noled that one
man and his concubine "are now very perturbed ('ver a misundel'$lalldinB whicb occurred. loe has a radio
and 11111 Winter they hive lislcned 10 Mr. Smallwood and bave grown 10 love him. Unfortunately Ihey
thought he represented Responsible Govemmcnt and because of the love they bave [for] him tbey both
voted for Responsible Government. Tola! votes Cl!it Forty-Four: Commission of Government one,
Confederation with Canada forty.two, Responsible Govemment two [sic]."
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Island saw 82.565 support, Fenyland gave Ihe highe~ with 90.48% support, and
Placentia 51. Mary's gave 78.685 support. Ofrthe Avalon. 205 voted for Commission,
54% voted for confederation, and 26% voted for responsible government. while on the
Avalon Commission support dropped 108%, confederation claimed 25'1. and responsibil:
government paUed 67".
Significantly, of all the districts which gave a strong majority 10 confeder-uion,
Labrador was the highest with 81.38%. If the events which occurred in Hebron and
Nutak were repeated in olher places in Labrndor, the vOle there could be easily accoulllt.'t!
for. But despite the support confederation received outside St. John's, it was nol strong
enough to win. Of great importance was the support shown for Commission of
Government in districts offlhe Avalon peninsula. It was strongest in Twillingatc, where
42.44% voted for it, Fogo (25.65%), Grand Falls (24.05 'I), Bonavista South (22.93%),
and in St. Barbe (21.09'1). ConSidering that there had been no campaign for
Commission, it did extremely well. 'The considerable number of votes it received had
resulted in an inconclusive verdict in the first referendum, and these votes would become
crucial in a run-off vote.
Table 6.1
VOle Percentages by Djstrict 3 June 1948
Com. Government Confederation R. Government
Districts (with over 15% vote) in Central and Western Newfoundland
White Bay 16.12 63.71 20.17
Green Bay 18.87 60.62 20.78
Or. Falls 24.05 40.37 35.59
Twillingate 42.44 43.13
Fogo 25.65 46.81 27.54
Bona.... N. 63.57 24.80
Bonav. S. 22.93 33.90 43.16
Trinity N. 19.67 47.93 32.39
Plac't. W. 48.78 39.70
Burin 78.56
Folt.D.-Henn. 17.47 63.54 18.99
Burg.-La.Paile 15.88 74.74
St. Gee's Pl.P. 15.93 47.22 36.84
Humber 20.43 53.72 25.85
St. Barbe 21.09 64.32
Labrador 81.38
Districts on the Avalon Peninsula
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Trinity S.
Carbo B.d.V.
Hr, Grace
Pt. de Grave
Hr.M.-B.IsI.
S1. John's W.
St. John's E,
Ferryland
Plac.·5t.M's
47.86
43.36
30.55
40.62
24.94
23.51
15.21
41.40
50.39
64.16
52.40
82.56
65.6"
65.87
90.48
78.68
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Immediate reactions 10 the results were mixed. AI confedel'3.tc he.'1dqU3rtl:rs.
Horwood recounted thai some cried, until Smallwood appearet~ among them from the
upstairs room and i>id them take heart. III Conf..n:ration was within their group. because
without a clear majority for responsibk government, Commission would be dropped, :11K!
a runoff referendum would be held. More Newfoundlanders vOied against responsible
government than for it, as the EUP quickly realized. Many Catholic settlements went
solidly for responsible government, which as Jamieson remarked, was a fact which later
·could bring fUl1her ,Protestant defections·. IS) The EUP saw that "Our movement had
reached the high watennark. We had no where to go bUI down·.l~ Jamieson noted
particularly that bOlh lhe League and the EUP "had shot our bolt", and thai "In the
aftermath of the first contest we were listless, uncertain, indecisive~. us Perhaps it was
his own wayward Celtic logic. but strangely enough, after hearing that responsible
government was leading in the 3 June referendum. the mercurial Mackenzie King
admined to his diary that ·Personally I would prefer to sec responsible government carry
&net then an agreement made between a government that was responsible with lhe
Canadian Government". ljf, It was a sentiment shared by many Newfoundlanden.
In the rust referendum campaign, the dominant struggle had been over economic
union, and it provkied the impetus for both the EUP and the RGL campaigns. With a
pyrThic victory for responsible government in the first round, the EUP went into decline
and quickly feU apart. and the RGL was left to banle the confederates without the aid of
III J.:orwood, J~, pp. 122·3.
lSI Jamleaon, "I Saw the Fipt', BNF, p. 99.
U4IbUJ., p. 99.
'" Ibid.,p. 99.
I" Bridle, Donunmu, p. 885, Extraet from 1M Madtnzie KiIll R.u:onl.
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the EUP's slickness, vigour, or enticements, or the confederates' Canadian financial and
infonnational assistance. The appealing wording of the Commission of Government
option on the ballot had been the governor's artifice, and had worked well. An otherwise
straight vote between two choices had been divided, and all that now remained was to
convince the Commission vote to switch to confederation, and to solidify the existing
voles for confederation and augment them using every conceivable means.
At midnight on the morning of Junc S, J.B. McEvoy was visited at his home on
Patrick Street by ~a Deputation" from the confederate party who asked him to assume
the party's leadership,1J7 and take over from Bradley. McEvoy wrote MacKay telling
him this, and while McEvoy did nol identify his visitors, MacKay later observed that
McEvoy had been approached, MI gather, by Mr. Smallwood and others who have been
disappointed by Mr. Bradley's lack of aggressiveness~, and that McEvoy had confided
that Commissioners Walsh and Quinton were prepared to publicly support him along with
Monroe. U1 McEvoy appealed to MacKay ~NOT as an Official of the Canadian
Government-, but as his old professor of political science, Mfor help at a very difficult
time" ,159 for infonnation on whether the teoos as negotiated were final, whether the
Canadian attitude towards unity was -Iukewann or indifferent-, whether the
Newfoundland system ofcontrolling fish exports would be wrecked by confederation, and
whether a bare majority would be sufficient grounds to proceed on confederation. l60
Because MacKay was now being asked to embark on activities which were ~somewhat
'l' Bridle, Documents, Vol II, Part II, p. 1969, McEvoy 10 MICKay, $ June 1948; and Bridle,
DOCllmtnts, p. 891, MlcKJy 10 Bridle. 8 June 1948.
". Bridle, DOCllmmts, p. 892, MlcKly 10 E. Reid, 9 JUlie 1948.
1J< For McEvoy's teltcllI of$ and 7 June see Bridle. DOCllmm/s, Vol. D, Part n, pp. 1969·1971. Dr
PAC MCi 30 E 159. Vol. 6, file: J.B. McEvoy, 1948-49.
I" Bridle, DOf:UInmts, p. 892, quesliolU ILl inlerpreled by MlcKay 10 E. Reid, 9 Juoe 1948.
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beyond the letter" of the instructions given 10 J.5. Macdonald, he had a discussion with
SI. Laurent before entering imo a voluminous correspondence with McEvoy. III For tbe
duration of the campaign McEvoy was supplied with a number of very useful memoranda
on recent Canadian policy changes, the advantages 10 Newfoundland of being .. p:an of
Canada in the event of a recession, and on Newfoundland public finance should
responsible government return, \'1 While McEvoy busied himself over the weekend in
preparation for his new exalted office, the long knives were drawn QuI by lhe
confederates.
,.. ibM., p. 893, (oot1Klles48fJld SO.
m For these sec Bridl,. Docvmmu, Vol. U, Part II, pp. 1972-1914.
Chapter 7
Town, Bay, and Garden Party:
The Second Referendum Campaign, June-July 1948
The second campaign began as soon as the results of the first were known. The
confederates immediately picked up where they had len off. With their superior support
network and propaganda machine, they gained control of political events, and more
importantly, political perceptions. ~ a result of the strength shown by confederation in
lhe fint referendum. a number of Water Street merchants and influential personalities re·
assessed their options in case confederation won in the second round, and came oul in
public support of the confederate cause. Unprepared for the inconclusive verdict of the
first referendum, the RGL was in a stale of disarray, and when the EUP began to
disintegrate, it did not fill the void. lale in 1948, an irate Joh:'l M. O'Neill, the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Harbour Grace, looked back on the events of the previous summer.
He wrote to Prime Minister Louis 51. laurent, informing him thaI
It has been your misfortune to have been cast in the stellar role in a
historical perfonnance in company with two unmitigated scoondrels - Smallwood
who unblushingly boasted 10 a canadian audience recently that he used
"Skulduggery" (his own word) to gain his point, and Bradley who served notice
011 one of my priesu after the first referendum to the effect that: "This time it is
going to be a straight sectai':''J'\ campaign." 11Je facts eloquently bear them both
out!'
O'Neill was opinionated, perceptive, and fairly accurate, but his account of events was
by no means complete. In the second round the confeder.ates engaged in a concerted
sectarian campaign in an anempt to captUre the Commission of Government vote and
sweep the country for confederation. McEvoy was "catered to" and used by the
confederates, who brilliantly exploited every situation to their advantage.
I PAC MG26 L. Vol.6l, file: N-I9-:Z-o, MestRe... J.M. O'Neill co SC. LaUrclll, 28 December 194tl.
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On Sunday 6 June, Stirling's SliT/day Hernfd published Ihe lIluch·loutl,.'<I MWords
of SenalorBrooks",l but also reported that for the first time in their history. the Romnn
Catholic lay orders of Irish Christian Brothers, Sisters of Mercy, and Presentation Sisters
had voted in the polls,J Harold Horwood later noted lhat the lay religiulls hnd been
"released from their vows" by lhe archbishop,~ which one nun laler confimlcd.' While
Richard Gwyn believed that the report was made by acddent,6 and Horwood thought it
was Mthe most serious mistake of the campaign" " other contemporaries had st:Cond
thoughts. James Halley later recounted that there had been a lull in Ihe EUP'~
propaganda, and then came Vie Herald's announcement about the brothers and nuns. He
was astounded at its inflammatory nature. It was written in the style of nle COIIJederatl!,
and Halley immediately wondered if something was wrong. He wondered whclhr;:r Ihe
EUP had laken leave of its senses or if party members had accepted Smallwood's
blandishments and become confederates, because the EUP would not have jeopardized
its own campaign and played into confederate hands unless there had been some
backroom politicking. I But Geoff Stirling later described the incident as one of the
biggest blunders of the EUP campaign.'
1 The Sunday Herald, 6 June 1948, p. 3.
1 IbUl., p.I.
• Horwood,Joq, p. 124. The vows volunlanlytaken by nuns anti broJllers prt!\lented them from taking
part in politieaJaetivity.
1 John Edward fitzGerald, "Sectarianism, The Roma."l Catholic Church, and the Fight for
Confederation" unpublished IDS. in Centre ror Newfoundlllllu Studies. Queen Elizabeth II Ubrary,
Memorial Univen-ily of Newfoundl.. I 1989, p. 39.
• Gwyn, Smallwood, p. t09.
'Horwood,Joey, p,l24,
'JIJlle' Halley 10 theautltor, 20 May 1992,
" Geoff Stirling 10 the aulbor, 6 July 1992.
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Harold Horwood later admitted that the division of vOles by religion in the first
referendum was Ma split we could use to great profit". 10 At confederate headquaners.
he asked Smallwoud if he had ~n The Herald. Smallwood's response is not known. But
the confederates shot around lown to buy up all the Sunday Heralds they could find,lI
Horwood circled the artick about the brothers and nuns, and wlm Smallwood worked up
a list of Newfoundland Orange Lodges,12 of which there were around 190. II They then
clipped the article oul of the paper and sent it to every Lodge in the country ,14 Copies
of The Monitor's e(ii~orials were also scnt to the Lodges, IS According to Power, during
the second campaign Smallwood called a number of his supporters into his office, notably
the Keans and Barbours, who were captains of vessels which called at ports around the
island. He threw a copy of The Monitor on the desk in front of them, told them about
the MBorgil! from Branch" and "the Popish Plot" and, playing on the ROL's "Home
RuleM, said "What do you want? Rome Rule? Now go and tell your people" .16
During the first campaign, Governor Macdonald had alluded to the connections
between religious duty and politics. For Ihe 75th anniversary of George Street United
Church, he mounted its pulpit and revealed his dream of the union of church and state
when he admonished the congregation to voce in the fonhcoming referendum
10 Harold Horwood, "How We Got Coofederatioo", The Ewning Tele&,am, 28 Mm:h 1969, p. 37.
n Horwood. Joey. pp. 124-5.
"Horwood. "How We Got Confederation', Ew:nlng Telegram, 28 Mmb 1969, p. 37.
1) Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smyth, The Sash Canada Wore: A Hisforical Chography oj Ihe
Orange O,der in CaJr(Jdo (Toronto: Univenily of Toronto Preu, 1980). p. 83.
"Horwood. Joey, p. 124.
II Gr~gory Power to the luthor. 27 JlIluary 1992; 1.150 sec J.G. Hinins Plpen, 3.01.028,
CorrespondeflCe J.G. Higgins. 1949-1951. Free Protestant, Grand Bank, to HiggiM, 29 Mm:b 1950.
"Gregory Power 10 Ihc author, 27 JanlW)' 1992.
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... for the sole purpose of making Newfoundland a grander country. not so lllllCh
to serve selfish and personal interests, but to serve the interests of every
Newfoundlander... To vote to serve sectional interests regardless of lhe
consequences to others is patently unchristian. It is only when the CI:rislian spirit,
the Christian way of life prevails at Ihe polls... that we shall be able 10 remove the
misery and anxiety that torture the human race today. Putting Newfoundland righl
is also an individual responsibility. 11
On 23 May the governor delivered another sennon at St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church
in St. lohn's. Noting the Italian election and that
Many factors affected this election, but few would claim Ihal any of those factors
operated more decisively than the action taken hy the leaders of the Roman
Catholic Church....They intervened and intervened effectiv!'!y. II
Noting Bishop Abraham's article in The Diocesan Magatine reminding every voter of
thc "personal responsibility" to "record his vote; thcn to make it a personal vote" ,IQ
Macdonald then quoted 771e Monitor's admonition to voters, and pronounced lhal "The
Christian Church is nol prepared to stand aside and to maintain an altitude of silence,
whilst fundamental issues in which man's welfare is involved are being decided" .10 By
thc governor's lighls, it was only rig!:l and proper thallhc church playa part in the stale,
and in the first campaign he had contenfed himself with encouraging VOlcrs 10 fulfil their
Chrislian duty. But his earlier sennons were only the beginning of his public political
activities.
On Thursday 3 June, the day of the referendum, the Newfoundland Conference
of the United Church of Canada went into regular annual se~'iion for six days at Wesley
11 Sir Gordon Macdonald, NewfollJlll/aru} at the Crossroads, (Toronto; Th~ Ryerson Pr«~, 1949), pp.
66'7,speechof 17 May.
11 Ibid., p. 69.
l'lbid.,p.69.
'lOtbld.,p,70,
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United Church in 51. John's.'! On Saturday 5 June, the delegates were guests of
Governor Macdonald at an afternoon tea at Government House,nand al that lime the
governor was invited to address the Conference banquet on 7 Junc,D "A Great Bible
Man" ,1'0 Macdonald had irritated many St. lohn's inhabitants (or his condemnation of
"the decadence orSt. lohn's·, where lhepeople were the "beer guzzlers ofille West end
and the cocktail drinkers of the East end",ll Macdonald spoke on Monday evening and
remarked thai "There is one denomination here which played a big part in the Jast
Referendum. It is time that the Protestant bodies should unite".l6 The United Stales
Consul General observed that the event "sparked protest and bitter feeling", and lalcr
reported thai the governor was accused of inspiring a circular letter to the Loyal Oran~
Associalion.J1 Where in Ihe first campaign Macdonald had been pro·active in his
support of confederation, in the second, he joined the confederates in becoming openly
sectarian in the bid for votes.
" MitwrtSand RtporfsoJlhe Nc-(oundl(JndConftrm~ oJt~ Unllffi Church ofCaNJikI held in WBIt)'
Church, 51. John '5 Nc-(oundlond. JUIlt 1·9, 1948, (St. 101m'S: Robinson and ComJllllY, 1948), in the
Archives of the Newroundlllld Conference, Unitcd Church ofCanadll, Elizabeth Aveoue, St.John's.
~ ibid.. p. II.
:I Ibid., p. 12.
;. See Willltd De Lue, file: Dc lM in NewfO\1lldland, Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives,
Queen Elb..belh II UfJraty, Memori.al Univenil)' of Newfouodlaod, MF-233, 'lAbor Peer Governor 'A
Gre-I Bible MiIll', no pub. or dale; and Brilll Cahill, 'Newfoundland's Labor Govemor', Allantic
Guardian, VoI./V,No.4(JiIllUU)' 1948):12.
~ J.G. HiggiM Papers, 3.01.028, Cormpondel'lee 1.G. Higgim, 1949·1951, Higgim 10 Sir Waldron
Smithers,Keol,Engl.and,22Mud> 1949.
:0 1.0. Higgins Papers. :lOI.027, I.G. HiggiM 10 Dr. LeoI.ICkman, 26 Augus11948: J.R. Smallwood
Papets. 7.01.003, Cuhinto Burchell, IS January 1949; Uld Neary, North Atlantic World, p, 323.
ZlNeary, NonJrAtlant/cWorld,p. 323,andp. 420, footnotesSS·7.
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On 8 June, R.A. MacKay wrote Bridle infonning him of the request the
confederates made of McEvoy, and that McEvoy M appears to have definitely made up his
mind". n MacKay also noted that in a telephone conversation, McEvoy mentioned thaI
"two commissioners and W.B. Munro [sic] might come out publicly in support ifhc look
the lead",l'I Bridle indicated that "unless there is a substantial alteration of existing
views the disposilion of the 22,000 Commission of Govemment voles will likely he the
decisive factor at Ihe second poll" ,JC He was sure Ihal Ihe atlilude of the ROlll;lI\
Catholic Church was an important faclor in the support given to the RGL, but also thaI
thr confederates "may shortly receive the support of some more influential and prominent
... Politics have entered inlo the very texture of society here.... MJI
McEvoy's overnight involvement in the Newfoundland Confcdemle Association
illustrated two battles raging: one puJ..lic, and one private. The first was for Commission
of Government voles; the second was fOT final control of the confederate pany, and tllU.~
for the premiership. For years, Smallwood and Bradley had planned for confederntion
and prepared to lead a confederate party, and it would be most unlikely that they would
suddenly step down after so much work, with the taste of victory on Iheir lips.l1
McEvoy also envisioned himself as the premier, and given the warning Brndley had
received in ApriJ about McEvoy's vanity, ~rnal1wood fillst have known this. The bencfit.~
'" Bridle, DOCIIlMnls, p. 891, MacKay to Bridle, 8 June 1948.
:If Ibid., p. 891. Waller S. Monroe was a Water Street businessman and had been prime minister from
1924-1928.
"'Bridle,Docummll,p.889,BridletoMacKay,8Jun3l948.
ll/bid.,pp.890-1.
"On I June f.G. M.tthews of Corner Brook wired the Confederate Associ.tion inquiring as to the
INth of. rumour lh.t Bradley had fCSj·'3ed. The reply came back over the Iyped n.me1 of Smallwood and
Bradley, simply giving 'our kindest .egards' and predicting a "glorious viclory.· Su J.K. S/IlIllwood
Papera, 1.20.001, Humber Pre-Oltlfed., f.G. M.tthews to Confederate Associ.lion, I June 1948;
Smallwood/Bradley to f.G. Mallb"ws, I June 1948.
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ofoffering McEvoy the party leadenhip wert obvious. The latter could be removed once
and for all as Smallwood's rival; through McEvoy's connection with R.A. MacKay,
Ollawa could be milked for even more infonnation and assistance; McEvoy was a
confidante of the governor, and above all, McEvoy's connections could bring
Commissioners and prominent Water Street merchants into the party to help switch the
Commission v()(e from the first referendum, and pullhe decisive stamp of respectability
on confederation. In a brilliant ..troke, Smallwood astutely dangled the party lcadenhip
before McEvoy's eyes in the hope thai his vanity would make him take it, but in the
knowledge that with a sectarian campaign in the orting, McEvoy as a Catholic would
nt:ver be accepted by the Protestant outports, even if he brought in some Catholic
support. Smailwood may have mercilessly denounced the merchants, blll their support
and the. support of the Commission h:l.d 10 be obtained in order to switch the Commission
vote. He would later ditch McEvoy and disavow him for his February 1948 statement
to the E'ltning Tt/tgram,» bUI for the time being, he used him 10 deliver two things the
confederates needed: Canadian infonnation, and Commission of Government support.
With McEvtlY enthralled with the idea thai he was to lead the party, events had
to become sectarian to prevent him from actually doing so. On June 8, members of the
Star of Bethlehem Lodge LORA of Little Catalina, Trinity Bay met with their
counterparts of the Benbow Loyal Or.mge Association.)I The next day the following
letter was s.igned by James Johnson, Worshipful Master, and C. Edgecombe, Acting
Secretary, and sent to Captain Leonard T. Stick, one of Smallwood's vice presidents and
Provincial Grand Master of the LOA;
II FOI Smallwood', desertion of McEvoy see PAC MG 27 III B 20, Vol, 59, file: 26 British
Government, files 6 &. 7: 5ellator A.N. McLean to Hon C·,D. Howe, 28 MllI"Cb 1949.
)< tn the 1930., sevcrailitempll wcre madc to rename Unle C.ta1inl IS "Orangevillc", 10 recognition
of the "sllllllJly Protcstsnt cbarscter of the communily," See Robert H. Cuff, 'Unle CaIaIiD'", ENL m,
pp.339-40.
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At an emergenc), meeting held on June 8th, the members of the Slar of
Bethlehem Lodge L.a.B.A. and Benbow L.a.A. passed the following resolution
to be forwarded to the Grand Lodge for Ihe considerntioll of its TIll,ll11hers.
We, as members of the Association have come to the conclusion that the
Roman Catholic Church is endeavouring to dominate Newfoundland. We have
reached this conclusion after careful consideration orlhe results of tlte voles frolll
the various R.C. Settlements during the National Referendum. TIu,lrcfore be it
resolved:·
THATTIIE GRAND LODGE CALL AN EMERGENCY MEETING AT
mEI~ EARllEST CONVENlENCE AND SOME WEEKS PRIOR TO
TIlE COMING REFERENDUM IN ORDER TO DISCUSS AND
CONSIDER TIlE QUESTION SUBMITtED BY OUR COMBINED
LODGFS."
Whether Johnson and Edgecombe actually wrote the letter, or whether Stick was told by
Smallwood to suggest that they write it is unknown. Once the letter arrived in Slick'~
hands, Bradley and Smallwood would probably have been given a copy.J/i BUI tht.l
confederates already had the referendum results, and they first went to work using thcst.l.
The Hl'St referendum had left the 22,311 Commission of Government voles in
limbo. By Smallwood's own account, it was JUSI after this lhat he latched upon the idt,\,1
of appealing to Newfoundlanders' sense of being British, and the ties with Britain which
Canada also shared, as a means of defeating the EUP platform, which would require "us
to strike the flag ... and swear a new oath of allegiance to a foreign land and flag".)1 Ht.I
went to long Brothers, the confederates' printers, and ordered fifty thousand small
posters with the words "British Union" and "Confederation", between which was a
ij PAC MO 26 L. Vol. 61, file: N-19-2, copy of leller of Johmoll and Edgecombe to L.T. Stick. 9
JUliO 1948.
W A carbon copy or Ibis leller exist!l in Smallwood's pipers. See J.R. Smaltwood Pipers, 7.01.002,
l.R. Smallwood Correspondence, 1948, Johnwn and Ed,ecombe 10 L.T. Slick, 9 June 1948.
l'l Smallwood. "The Story", BNF, p. 31.
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multicoloured Union Jack. "The sudden appearance of thousands of these in house
windows and elsewhere", Smallwood claimed, "was a violent reminder of the fact that
we were British, nol American, and that Confederation would allow us to continue 10
be Rritish subjects" .JI The confederates' new platfonn was born.
June 9 was the busiest day of the campaign. The latest edition of 71,e Confederate
appeared, having been prepared over the weekend, and to use Power's phrase, it "poured
forth its stream of poison" . It announced that a second referendum would be held "about
the middle of July" /9 and with "British Union" as its new motto, its headline shouted.
"Tail Tries 10 Wag Dog". In an attempt to rout the remaining EUP/RGL support in the
outports, it cui to the quick when it claimed that
There is an element in Newfoundland who is anti-British; an element
amongst our Newfoundland people who hate everything British.
These people would like to pull down the Union Jack and run up some
other flag.
Behind the Economic Urnon movement is this anti-British hate, this pro-
American sentiment.·o
Cashin, Jamieson, Crosbie, and their panies were all accused of -rotten", "cheap",
"cold-blooded, deliberate" lies, and the RGL was accused of bribery for passing out S20
bills in ell:change for the placement of "cenain pictures" in windows. The Daily News
was decried as a "bitter and vindictive enemy of Confederation and of every move ever
made for th~ uplift[ing] of Newfoundland's people", and Stirling's Sunday Herald was
a "filthy and obscene rag". Furthermore, the newspaper claimed that in districts "such
as Hr. Main-Bell Island, Ferryland, and Placentia-SI. Mary's· (predominantly Roman
Catholic districts), "the lie spread and whispered about to kill Confed.;ration" was that
,. Ibid•• p. 31.
)0 11It Conftdtt'Ott. 9 June 19411. p. L
., Ibid.. p. I.
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·Confederation equals Communism. If Confederation wins, religion will not be allowed
to be [aught in the schools". ~l
Smallwood and Bradley were quite aSlUte 10 appeal 10 oulpO" Newfoundlanders'
affinity to Britain, and to their suspicions of pro-Americanism. Crosbie and Stirling had
a considerable following among Newfoundlanders with personal connections to Amencl',
It was well known thai Newfoundland Roman Catholics had been one of the island's
foremost groups of migrnnts 10 the United Stales at the tum of the century and lalcr.~~
They were also the working class civilian employees of the American bases, especially
Forts Pepperrell, McAndrew, and Argentia,4J and with families. cousins. and friends
in the United States, many were not surprisingly pro-American in their views. Certainly
for some members of the ROL, Smallwood's "British Union- with Canada had overtones
of the Irish Act of Union, and further polarized political opinion. In comrnst, outport
residents on the north-east coast were primarily Protestant. Newfoundl3nd Orange Lodges
were among the largest in the world, and the Loyal Orange Association was a significant
social, cultural, and political force in community life." A powerful allegiance 10 Britain
was a hallmark of the Order, and as folklorist Philip Hiscock has demonstrated, in
Newfoundland with this went a strong anti-republicanism and a dislike of the American
flag, the symbol of a nation which had been bom of a rejection of Britain.4J Because
"fbid.,p.1.
.:: On chis see William G. ReeVe!. "Newfoundlanders in the "Boston Slates": A Study in ElIrly
Twentielb Century Community and Counterpoint", NFS, Vol. 6, No. I (Spring 1990).
•, McAnd~w was It Argent;l. wbich was. dominlUltJy Ro/lll./l Catholic community. Por the human
history of the lll'CIlround this time see Eileen Houlihan, "Eileen (Hunt) Houlihan'l Fmtily Memoir!" (Ed.
Peter Neary). NFS. Vol. 7, No.1 (Spring 1991): 48-64. .
"h'Just(lnandSmylb.TheSashCanadD Wore,pp. 79 and 83.
d Philip Hiscock, "Orangeism lUld O~gcmen'l Diy in Newfollndlll\d". unpublilhed 1IllI., Dept. of
Folklore, Memorill University of Newfoundllll1d, 1984, pp. 5-6.
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of ils pro-American platfonn, by itself the EUP may have frightened off many outport
Newfoundlanders, who may have suspected them of treason. But Smallwood's
Conjederme embarked on a calculated campaign of enlisling support for confederation
by playing Ihis anti-republicanism for all it was worth.# In Canada, Orangeism already
had a history of supporting "the maintenance of the British Connection and the support
of any movement which tends to make closer and more binding the relation between
Canada, Newfoundland and the Mother Country" .41 and from their own experiences as
Orangemen it was likely that Smallwood and Bradley had some sense of Ihis.
In much of the confederates' correspondence after the appearance of the 9 June
Confederate, Smallwood began 10 use the slogan "British Union" and appealed to his
correspondents' senses of "what happened" in the first referendum:
I can see from your letter that you understand clearly what happened on
June 3rd, and that you understand how and why it happened. "The tail tried to
wag the dog", but this time "the dog will wag the tail. " In other words, the boot
will be on the other foot.~'
and to Carbonear:
This time it is going 10 be a different story. "The tail tried to wag the
dog" but on the 22nd of July "The dog will wag the tail."
From all pans of the country we are getting word that shows that the
people know clearly what happened on June 3rd. They are going to tum the
tables.'"
... tn the fall of 1948, one RGL supporter nnled lut the LOA was not in f.vour of the Uniled Stales
Illd that this hid been. faclor in the CUlpalp. See RGLP 3.01.026, Correspondenee Collins, September
1948, T. Hickey, Toslow, Placenti. West, 10 Collins. 8 September 1948.
"HouslonandSmYlh, ThtSashClnadD WOrt. p.ISI.
.. J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.14.001, Grand Falls Pre·ennred., Smallwood tn. correspondent,
Buehanl.18JuneI948.
•• Ibtd.. 1.08.001, Carboncar.Bay de Verde Pre-Confed., Smallwood to. eorrespondent in Carboncu,
18 Jll:.le, 1948. Also see 1.15.001, Smallwood 10 R. Crowell, Lillie B.y Islands. 18 June t948.
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The confederates carefully co-ordinated their use of slogans, suggestions. and insinuation,
and throughout the entire campaign, Smallwood's dictum of the need for a unity of
approach permeated.
On 9 June, the Responsible Government League met at 8 p.m. in its offices ntthe
Angel Building. A small committee from the League and the EUP had met, and while
"both groups would continue as at present", they would be financed from a comlllon
fund, and a joint comminee would co-ordinate their efforts.}O As ill the previous
campaign, the responsibility for campaigns in the districts would be divided between the
League and tht'; EUP, but O'leary announced that for the second campaign, the EUP
"had decided not to put forward names of men to form [a] pal1Y," though the League was
free to do SO.51 This was significant, for it reflected a disintegration of the BUP to
which the League was blind, and a lack of commitment by the EUP, a danger sign which
the League ignored. For all intents and purposes, with union to the RGL the BUP had
ceased to exist, and thus there would be a battle for the allegiances of its members and
adherents. Finally recognizing that confederate strength had come from the use of local
supponers and workers, it was suggested that the League prepare campaign pamphlets
"to suit different districts," instead of having just one pamphlet. But this should have
been done a ye;lt earlier, and if it was done, it was ineffcctual. 'f11ere was also
considerable discussion of the results of the referendum. Then a bombshell struck. The
entry in the minutes records that "A suggestion that the chairman vacate the chair in
favour of Hon. J.S. Currie due to anticipated sectarian issue was ---" ,J2 There were
obviously serious doubts about O'Leary's ability to lead the RGL in the coming fight
because of his Catholicism, and the support that would be drawn away from the RGL by
.. RGLP 3.01.001, Execulive Minules, 9 June 194&.
Jl/bid.
" Ibid. It wu 1101 recorded who made the 3uUe3lion,
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the confederates, who were running a sectarian campaign. Cunie was nOl a Catholic, and
would have been therefore more acceptable as a leader 10 outpon Protestants. But for the
matter to have bee:l allowed to come up for discussion would seem to indicate, if not a
certain self-doubt on O'leary's part, then certainly serious doubts and dissension in the
ranks c..fthe RGL executive membership. O'leary and the RGL stayed the course for the
time being, but within a week there was a plea to send "influent: _. men" to campaign in
a district. "to whom the country can look up [toJ with confidence. Make a public
announcement that they would be willing to assume the responsibility of managing this
country's affairs" .'3 After the first referendum, the league never fully regained its
momentum, and was out-manoeuvred by the confederates. A definite governmental
alternative to leading lhe count!)' into confederation should have been presented to the
electorate by the combined League and Economic Union Party, but it never was.
Following the merger of the two parties, the EUP fell into decline. Jamieson later
maintained thaI once Crosbie was converted to a power-sharing arrangement, "The most
our faction could salvage was an agreement to keep our worker organizations more or
less separate although subject to the board's overall control".~ In his earlier account,
Jamieson noted that once sectarianism became an issue, strenuous efforts were made to
convince Crosbie to "bid for Protestant support", but Crosbie ·was temperamenlally
incapable of waging a religious battle", and "insisted that if we could not win without
appealing to prejudice he would rather 10se".H More likely, Crosbie had seen that as
a United Churchman, he could not hope publicly to fight the Loyal Orange Association
and Smallwood without being labelled a traitor. But above all, the fact remained that
J) RGLP 3.01.024, Correspondence O'l..eatyfCollins, May-June 1948, S.W. Cook, Comer Brook, to
O·Leary. 16 June 1948.
.. Jamieson, NQ Pface For Fools, p. 118.
JJJamiC50n.") Saw the Fight", IfNF.pp. 91.103.
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more people had VOted in the firM refcn:ndum against responsible government than for
ii, and in light of the excellent known prospects for confederation, whether achieved in
the second vOle, or under a future responsible government, it was obviolls lhal
confederation would not disappear as an issue. As astute businessmen. like a number of
Water Street merchams, the EUP leadership began to reconsider Ihe possibilities of
lending tacit support to confederation, just in case il did win and they found thJ;,,!';Clves
out in the cold.
While the old EUP was re-examining its political options, the new RGL·EUP had
other problems. Cashin and Hollen were not present althe 9 June meeting. It is known
that at one poine in the second campaign, Cashin went on a drinking spree..I/I Two
weeks later, a resident of Dildo, Trinity Bay, wrote O'Leary advising thal
It would ... be wise to send suitable men to districts if you have to send any. Not
just men out on a drunken spree like Ihe ones Ihat visit this district a few weeks
ago. This is a small village, and news get around quickly. Has for your
newspaper, The II/dependent, its belief to send my copy to one of the 69,000 has
I am one of the 65:000 who was never interested in it. It only gOI has far has the
kilchen stove.57
In more than one case, the damage was done not by what the League organization did,
but by the human flaws of its membership.
On 9 June, Noel-Baker reported the results of the first referendum to Clement
Attlee. While Gordon Macdonald had Knot yet fixed a date for the second ballot-, but
because "party feeling has become so strong" (or, more likely, because the governor
knew that the all-out campaign that a confederate win would require could not last
,. Tboll'W Cahill 10 the .ulbor, II M.y 1m.
)1 RGLP 3.01.025, COlTe$JlOndence O'u.uy/ColUns, July-September 1948, Mrs. Brown, Dildo, 10
O'u.uy.24Ju.nel948.
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indefinitely), Macdonald had announced that "if the necessary arrangements can be mad~
in time, it will be held in the second half of July" ,n Noel-Baker also commented that
It is intcf"Jiting 10 observe that at the recent ballot Responsible Government
gained a majority in only eight of the Iwentyfive [sic] electoral districts. Thus,
even if there were a majority of voles for this form of government il is possible
that the "confederate" party would have a majority in the elected chamber,s,
Not surprisingly, Noel-Baker clearly expected that regardless of the outcome of the
referenda, the confederates would eventually dominate a Newfoundland House, and in
any event confederation would be a distinct possibility.
As a result of the play (0 McEvoy's vanity, Smallwood received high-powered
support when it was required. On 10 June Bridle informed MacKay that
... following have agreed to enter a sort of inner Cabinet of Confederate
Association: J,B. McEvoy, Will Roberts, Lowther Monroe, Honourable W.S.
Giffard, Sir Leonard Outerbridge, HonourableH.W. Quinton, Honourable H.L.
Pottle, Honourable A.J. Walsh. C(alvert] C. Pratt is said to be on the outer
fringes. All except Pratt are said to be prepared to support Confederation
publicly.6D
Bridle then noted that he was "inclined to wait rut the tum of events before concluding
that the above will eventuate entirely as planned". and that
My infonnation differs from yours in one respect. I understood that [the]
present leadership of the Confederate Association is to remain intact. On the other
hand, I have heard it rumoured that Bradley is going to resign as President. While
it may be that McEvoy is to succeed him, the rumour regarding his resignation
is entirely unconfirmed so far as I am concerned.61
Bradley was far too involved with the Confederate Association to withdraw just before
victory, and he still had a vital part to play in the campaign. Meanwhile, that ~ame day
51 PRO PREM 811043, Noel-Baker to Altice, 9 June 1948.
51 Ibid.
'" Bridle. Documents, p. 894, Bridle to MacKay, 10 June 1948.
"lbid.,p.894.
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MacKay delightedly replied to McEvoy, saying MMay I say how pkascd I am Ihal you
have been asked 10 assume the leadership of the Confederate Party·.~: BUI in lhe words
of Peter Neary, American Consul Genernl Wainwright Abbott obSl;lrved thm "some of
the 'best people' who had now lined up on the Confederation side hoped 10 dump
Smallwood once Confederation was carried....." Smallwood was not about to rei that
happen.
On 12 June, McEvoy again wrote MacKay, noting that his final decision whether
to lead the confederate party would be made "at a Meeting to be held on Monday night
[14 June] al our country home at Manuels, and upon which I shall give you an immediate
report".64 Six days later McEvoy reported that
... we are slowly but surely getting a worthwhile Organization buill up although
it will probably take another week before we will be ready to go into action ...
Meanwhile, we had a full dress meeting two night's ago in which Policy
was decided upon, and I think that Y0l! ..dn expect that the matter will be
conducted on a much higher plane than heretofore.6.l
With Commissioners and Water Street merchants in tow, McEvoy was preparing an
attempt to switch the votes from Commission to confederation, and Mto conductN a more
"respectable" campaign on a "higher plane" than could be mustered by Joe Smallwood.
But Smallwood and Bradley never gave him the opportunity (0 lead the Confederate
Assodation. Instead they attempted to secure more broadcasting time from the Broadcast
~ PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, tile: J.B. McEvoy, 1948-49, MacKay to McEvoy, 10 June 1948.
tJ Neary, Nonh Atlantic World, p. 322.
600 PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 6, file: J.B. McEvoy. 1948-49. McEvoy 10 MlcKay, 12 June 1948.
U Ibid., M.:Evoy to MacKay, 18 June 1948.
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Corpomtion of Newfoundland for the influential speakers McEvoy was expected to bring
lU the cOl\federalecause,66
On II June SiT Eric Machtig wrote Governor Macdonald and asked:
Could you arrange to fly over for a few days in the week after next so that
we could discuss with you the steps to be taken when the result of the second
referendum in July is available? We feel that whichever of the two new forms of
government is successful at the referendum we ought to ~ ready with our plans
as soon as the result is known and that we should not then have to embark on
correspondence before we can announce them.61
The next day Macdonald wired back that he was in full agreement, and informed Machtig
that .. Arrangements being made to leave Gander on Tuesday night 22nd June
accompanied by Walsh, Vice-Chairman, and Private Secretary".61 Macdonald then
wrote Attlee "just a liUle line" to let him know about his travel plans, and to suggest that
"Maybe you could find time in your Very busy life for a brief conversation.69 Gordon
Macdonald and the Dominions Office were detennined to have a ruponse prepared for
whatever the decision was. In preparation for the visit. Macdonald had Commissioner
of Finance R.L.M. James prepare a memorandum on the Canadian tenns of union
already offered. and on questions which Canadian and Newfoundland representatives
would discuss in the event of a majority for confederation in the referendum.1O For
answers James went to Bridle, who in tum infonned MacKay of James' questions.
... W.F. Gillgay Papen, file #3, Monlh1y Meeting, June 1948, Gillgay to Govemon, wherein Galgay
presented the Con(edente Association's request lUld com.mented that hr thought there was too much
political broade.uting in tbe first re(erendum campaign.
"PRO 0035/3458, N 2005/63, Machtia: lovordon Macdonald, 11 June 1948.
N Ibid.. Gon!on Macdol1l.ld to Machlig, 12 June 1948.
.. Altice Papen, Deposit 71. (olio 114, Gordon Macdonilld to Attlce, 12 June 1948.
,. Bridle. DOfUlMfIIS, p. 90S, Bridle to MacK-y, 21 June 1948.
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On 14 June, the governor announced that the dale of the S«QI\d referendulll
would be 22 JUly,JI but Smallwood was aln:ady out of the blocks on the 12th,
predicting the dat.,: of the referendum to the editors of Toronto newspapers. and asking
Newfoundlanders in canada to send money to the cause.n "The Dominions Office lah:r
noted that Macdonald fixed the date without consulting (hem in advance, but observed
that he was -naturally anxious to get the voting done in time 10 allow for a possible
General Election in the autumn in the event of Responsible Government bdng
restored- :13 More li~elY. the governor made the decision in order to give the advantage
to the confederates, who by this time were running an all-out campaign, and because he
feared a small majority for conrederation.7~ Compared with the first referendum, the
second was to be held al the height of the summer fishing season, so the Commission
took care to make special polling arrangements for the fishennen through a revised
Referendum Advance Prlll Act. The number of districts in which advance polls were held
for the second referendum increased from nine to seventeen, and depending on the
district, the advanced poll extended from 25 June or 2 July to 21 July. JJ Along the
Labrador coast, a motor vessel had deposited ballot boxes for the first referendum and
afterwards retrieved them; the same procedure would be followed in the second. For the
noating fishery, the vessel would come alongside schooners and the advance poll would
be held on board." As in the first referendum, Nehemiah 5hoft would be the Chief
Returning Olficer, and members of the Newfoundland Constabulary and the
" See Bridle, DoauMlltr, p. 894, Bridle to Secn:ury or Stale rl\r Elttcr1Ul1 Mf,ir!. 14 June 19411.
12 J.R. Smallwood Pipers, 4.01.006, Confederslion Miscellaneous CORellpondenec:, Smallwood to
Editor,1htDllilyStllr, 12 June 1948.
12 PRO DO 35/3459, Dominion. Office inlern.al cil'l:ular memo, 16 July 1948.
To For Ihi. litter observllion see PRO DO 3513459, lOOf1, luthor unidenlified.
TJ Bridle, Doculllttllr, p, 920, Bridle to Scc:retIly of Slate ror EAlernai Affairs, 2 July 1948.
.. Ibid., p. 920.
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Newfoundland Ranger Force would assist in supervising the referendum, where
nccessary.71 BUI Macdonald's timing of the event was critical. It gave the confederates
a da:isive opportunity to run a tight second carnpai6" using all the m~ns at their
disposal.
The confederates and the opposition used every opportllnity they could to
convince the electorate of the merits or the perils of confederation. When one Bonavista
correspondent asked Smallwood on 17 June if he could arrange (or a polling booth on
Gooseberry Island for 28 voters, Smallwood replied that he had, and sent "regards to all
frieoos",1' Even though this would have been done by the Chief Electoral Officer, not
by Smallwood, the confederates still claimed the credit. On the other side, the 19 June
MOlli/or expressed its gratification that Newfoundlanders "responded so magnificently~
to the refer'"ndum, but observed that the failure to restore responsible government gave
"rise 10 a great deal of misunderstanding and arouses a great deal of suspicion~.19 It re-
slated the position that it was "wholly and indefensibly wrong" 10 ask people to make a
choice based on so little infonnation, and proposed that ~the resloration of the
Newfoundland Parliament should be the aim of every Newfoundlander·.to While TlIe
Moni/or was delivered on the ground, the EUP obtained the seIVices of a Piper Cub
airplane, which bore Jamieson and his amplified voice aloft like Smallwood, preceding
the party's caravan over outpoTt communities.sl But the second campaign belonged to
the confederates, and their two goals were the destruction of the overwhelming
11 Ibid., p. 92Q.
"J.R. Smallwood Papen. 1.03.001, Bonavi,la North P~-Confed., H. Perry 10 Smallwood, 17 June
1948:SItUIJlwoodloH. Perry, 17 June t5l48.
'N The Monitor, 151 June 1948,p. I.
"lbid.• p.1.
'1 Jamieson. No Pll1ct! For Fools. p. 104.
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responsible government vote in 51. John's, and the conversion of the COlllmission of
Govemment vole.
Early on the morning of Sunday, 20 June, a truck filled with campaign workers
drove around the downtown of S1. John's. Their mission was to paste up posters re.1ding
"Confederation means British Union with French Canada" at various locations. The
Confederare later related that these poslers were "offensive" and had been placed on
Smallwood's house, on telephone poles, and on Protestant churches, notably on Gower
Street United Church. poles near the Anglican Cathedral, Victoria Hall (the Loyal
Orange Association hall), Sc. Michael's Anglican Church, the Elim Tabernacle, and
George Street United Church,l'l Later that day an Orange parade was scheduled 10 pass
several of these buildings. lJ The Confederale used the rhetoric of the poster's headlines
to great effect, since the headlines were not dissimilar 10 a typical RGL slogan, and n,e
Confederate even published the name of the truck owner, CliffonJ Coady, and its license
plate number, and blamed the League for the scandal.M All parties denied any
involvement, IJ but Horwood later maintained that Phil Forsey had arranged the incident
to confederate advantage with the Mlunatic fringeM of the League, and that the
confederates had the posters printed and posted them up. 'll
.., TheCollftderole, 23 June 1948. p. I.
Q Ibid.• p. I. Thll next edition of The Con/alrrore claimed lhal the parade did nol take place that day
beeauseofhuvyrain.
.. The COllftdemle, 30 Juno t948. p. I.
OJ Sec The Ewnilll Telegram, 21 June 1948. p. 3, and 23 JUlie 1948, p. 6: 11fe Independent, 26 June
1948. p. 1; and ROLP 3.01.024, Correspondence O'laI)'/Collins, May-June 1948, eupy of CoJliMlo
Edilor. Evenlllg Telegram, 22 June 1948.
"Harold HOlWood, "Newfoundll.lldand Confederation, 1948-1949,· Reglo/llJll$m /867-1967. p. 254;
and HOlWood,Joey, p. 126.
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Two days after the posters appeared, the pro-confedenlte El'tning T~l~gram called
the act "reprehensible... and condemned lhis attempt "'0 introduce into the campaign the
sinister spirit or racialism and sectarianism".11 The Independent called the poster
incident ·silly·. but part of a ·skilfully thought cut plot" because of the sectarian
interpretation given the event by ntc Confederate," and one observer later noc:ed that
from the conient of Ihe posters, it w..~ perfectly clear thai their inlent)on was not
sectarian, but rathertodenateSmallwood's "British Union" slogan with a dose of reality.
In addition to what The Corifedtrare and the Evtning Telegram reported th,. posters said,
in smaller print they primarily gave statistics on the populations of Canada, Onlario,
Quebec, lhe numbers of judges, and how in tlte future, given the birthrate in Quebec,
Canada would be a mostly French nation. lit Clifford Coady later observed !hat the
posters were put up with no intention of promoting sectarianism, and that they were just
-an expression- of his -personal conviction that by no stretch of the imagination can we
call Canada [a) pure British rlatton-!~ But regardless of what the posters actually said,
the event had already been seized upon by the confeder.l.Ies. 'I
By claiming that its opposition's supposed tactics were sectarian, the confederates
turned a poster which innocently rebutted -British Union- into a most useful half-truth,
and bruited it around the coontty to great effect. Much later, Harold Horwood claimed
that Philip Forsey had suggested the idea of plastering the churches with the posters to
., 7h~ Evtnin6 TtI~trom, 22 June 1948, p. 6.
" The Ind~JHndCllI, 261Ulle 1948, p. I.
.. James Halley 10 the author, IOluQC 1992.
.. The DaUy Ntws, 261uly 19<4&. p. 6•
.. lamieson. No Pla« Fdr Fools, pp. 121-2 also SUUClIlec! that the poslers were innammalOfy, but
made no mention of the .maller prin!.
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an inebriated nightclub owner, one of whose assistants was the truck driver.': 1bc sense
that things British and Proteslanl were being: persecuted was further fomented on 23 June
when 711~ E\'~lljng Ttlegram lold readers that an arsonist had levellt'd the Britannia Lo)'31
Orange Lodge Hall al Petries on the west coast. Neatly juxtaposed nex110 the article was
a photograph of Archbishop Roche, with a cap(ton lhal congratulated him on his tiny·
first anniversary as a priest and pregnantly wished -that His Grace may be spared lllany
more years of fruitful service". 'J
On 21 June, Smallwood and Brndley wrote a significant leiter 10 C.D. Howe, lh~
Canadian Minister of Reconstruction and Supply. who had suggested contributors 10 the
cause. They informed him that "a new group for confederation" had !>reo fonned,
consisting ,.,(McEvoy, Arthur S. Monroe, his father W.S. Monroe, Leslie Curtis, Eric
Bowring (of the St. John's finn Bowring Brothers), Sir Leonard Outerbridgc, antl
Commissioners Hennan Quinton and Hernen PoUle. among others." Bradley and
Smallwood noted that -All of these. except Hon. W.S. Monroe, will broadcast for
Confederation, and will contribute something- to the cause. Then, betraying their delight
at the alliance forged with the previously-eondemned upper classes who could deliver the
stamp of British respecta.bility on the -British Union- campaign, Br.ulley and Smallwood
noted that -t!lis will bring to the cause what it hitherto lacked - namely, the respc:ct.a.ble
element of the country-. 'They then prophesied that
The prospects now look excellent. What happened last time was that the
Roman Catholic Church (except on the West Coast) went solidly responsible. This
has provoked an underground reaction. The population is two-thirds Protcstanl,
The consequence may be that the Catholic Church will throw its influence our
P.lHorwood,Jory, pp.126·7.
" 1M Ewninl Td~lram, 23lune 1948, p. 3.
to PAC MG 27 III B 20, Vol. 58. file: 26 British sovemment, I, Bradley and 51MIlwood to C,D.
Howe. 21 JIlllC 1948.
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way, or al lease drop its pressure the other way. In any case, even without
Catholic suppeR, it looks like a comfortable majority for confedenuion'"
Bradley and Smallwood then confinned the source of their funding, and told Howe ·We
need money desperately. Taking into account what we will raise locally, we must have
at least another 520,000. We need it~•. Smallwood then added the postscript that
M A great many people were surprised by the big showing Confederation made. They had
not been laking it seriously· ...
In response 10 the "British Union" slogan, on 26 June The independent made an
appeal to fair-minded British sentiments among its readers, asking, ·Who Says We're
Anti-British?" It also conveyed a warning by Walter Jones, the Premier of Prince Edward
Island 10 Newfoundlanders not to join the federation, lest they be treated as Prince
Edward Island had been." The last thing Smallwood wanted were public indications
from Canadian politicians that union with Canada might not be as beneficial as the
confederates had claimed. He immedia.ely shot off a telegram to Jones, observing that
·This statement published today in large type in anticonfederate paper and will do serious
hann if allowed to stand ... Is statement correct? ... can you remedy'?·"
But the Jones affair was minor stuff for the confederates. who saw much more
profit in spreading news of the Clifford Coady poster scandal. and playing up the
sectarian possibilities. When Coady apologized for the posters in the press on Saturday
"llbid.
"Ibid.
." 11lt lrulqwndml. 26 JUIlt 1948, p. 4.
.. l.R. Smallwood P.lpen. 4.01.C06. Confedcratioa MiscclllDCOllS CorrespoodCllCC, 1948-1949,
SlTIIllwoodIII W. JOlla. 26JIlIl<lI94&.
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26 June.~ his timing could not have been more perfect. The next lI10ming saw one of
the largest Orange parades in the hi~IOry of 51. John's. Hosted by the 51. John's Royal
Oak Lodge, it included representatives of outpon Lodges. Accompanied hy a Salvation
Anny band. it proceeded 10 Sl. Thomas' Anglican Churcl1 for a scrviCt:. lOO Many
Orangemen who had spent the preceding night in 81. John's would have seen the Coady
leller in the papers, and if told to, would have interpreted it as evidence of a conspiracy.
But Smallwood further exploited Ihe sectarian possibilities of the event and reinforced
them. In the 29 June Evening Telegram he demanded a f"nher inve~tigationof Coady's
~diabolicalmove", l~1 and the 30 June Conjederare also pressed for an inquiry into "the
whole dastardly affair". 100 The Confederate of that day also trumpeted "Whispering Is
On Again", and accused the RGL and the EUP of running a "Diny Campaign", and of
whispering that there was a secret Communist party in St. John's; that the confederate
campaign was run by Russian money; that people in Catholic districts were told Ihal
confederation would mean bdng over-run by Communist Protestant Canadians, and that
people in Protestant districts were told that confederation would mean being over-run by
Catholic French Canadians. II))
On 26 June, BCN Chainnan George Williams wrote to VONF manager William
Galgay, informing him that the corporation had decided that political broadcasts would
re-commence on 5 July and terminate on 17 July, and that the RGL and confederates
would be given equal ainime. Because Galgay had been in Comer Brook, this
.. Tht Daily Ntws, 26 JUDe 1948, p. 6.
I'll Tht Ewning Teltgram, 28 June 1948, p. 3, and 30 June 1948. p. 6.
101 ThtEvening Telegram, 29 June 1948, p. 6.
Ill:! The ConfNerote. 30 June 1948, p. I.
11I3/bid.,p.l.
228
information had already been sent 10 the concerned parties. 101 Pencilled in the ll1alXin
of Williams' leiter. Galgay noted: -two periods 20 mins. total for all .&Lmim.-.1QS
Galgay may have desired 10 impose the limit of forty minutes broadcasting time per
political party on the campaign, bill as events lumed OUI, more broadcasting was done
during the second campaign than during the first.
While the confedernle campaign went funher down the road of sectarianism, the
Commission of Government continued to plan the political future. On 19 June, Bridle
reported that the governor was alarmed "at the prospect of Newfoundland being restored
to [the) unfettered ministralions of local politicians", and that he was doing "'Jhat he could
10 further the cause of confederalion. 106 On 21 June, Macdonald and Justice
Commissioner Albert Walsh left for London to discuss the steps 10 be taken following
the referendum. 107 The next day the talks began, with High Commissioner Norman
Robertson and M.H. Wershof of Canada House sitting in.
On I July, the vigilant Sir Eric Machtig reported to the British High
Commissioner in Canada that the London talks had been concerned with the steps 10 be
taken after the results of the referendum were known.·· In the draft of his despatch,
Machtig revealed that during the discussions, Gordon Macdonald was
... very anx..ious to reach agreement beforehand as to the announcement which he
should make if. Newfoundland when the result of the referendum is known and
'" W.F. Galgay P.pera. liIe 13, Monthly Meeting, June 1948, Willilllnll to Galgay, 26 Juoe 1948.
IM/bW.
,... PAC RG 2-18, Vol. 129, N-18, 1948, file: June-July, Bridle 10 Secretary of SIaCe for Extern.1
....«.il'll,19JuneI948.
•m Bridle. DOOlfMfllS, p. 89S, Bridle to Secretary of Slale for Exlemal Atfaira, 11 June 1948;and The
EWflifl! Te/,,&ram, n JUM 1948, p. 3.
.. PRO DO 3SrnS8, MaehtillD Hlgb CollUllissiooer in CaDIda, 9.·45. p.m., I July 1948.
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that in view oflhe political conditions in Newfoundland there should be no undue
delay in establishing a new govemmem.\0'1
If Newfoundland voted for responsible government, the action would bt: strnigillfotwurd.
The 1934 letters patent would be revoked. and a general election would be held in lime
for a new government to lake over on I January 1949. 110 Macdonald had suggested that
...3 decision to proceed with Confederation, in [Ihe] face of a very narrow
majority, might ind-:ro lead 10 disturbances in Newfoundland and particularly in
St, John's, where a large majority of the population strongly f.wour Responsible
Government. 1I1
The Canadians wanted the British and Newfoundland governments to say whether the
majority achieved would be adequate to justify confederation, bUI the British could /lot
accept this view, and this was explained to the Government of Canada through Nonnan
Robertson. Machtig also proposed to tell the High Commissioner in Canada that the
British should, ~if pressed, argue thaI Confederation had carried the L~~y even if (he
majority in the referendum were a majority of one repeal one only" .lll In the actual
despatch, Machtig stated that, if left 10 Britain, confederation would be proceeded with
if only "a bare majority" for confederation were received. III BUI the mailer was not
one for Britain, and officially, the Government of Canada would decide whether or not
a majority for confederation was adequate, and whether they would accept Ihe
decision. 114 If it were not, responsible government would be restored. lIS
IOII/bid.,dral\ofdocument, enclosed In file with despatch.
IIO/bid.
Ill/bid.
l12/bid.
II) PRO DO 3513458, Machtig to High Commiuioner in Canada, 1 July 1948.
nO/bid.
11' PRO DO JS/J459. 1008, author unidentified, 1 July 1948.
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Macdonald and Walsh were more cautious than Machlig, but still felt that Hthere
was no chance of a big majority for confederation", and "very probably much less" than
3000,"6 and Walsh thought that it would not be wise to base an irrevocable change on
a very small majority. III But they worked on the rlraft documents to be used depending
on the result of the referendum, and then TelUmoo home in time for Macdonald to unveil
a war memorial and speak at Grand Falls on 4 JUly.1II By 7 July all documents and
possible Slatements were in place, ready to cover any constitutional eventuality.1l9 But
there remained the niggling problem of civic troubles should the populace not accept the
verdict.
While he was h England, Macdonald had approached Viscount Hall, the First
Lord of the Admiralty, and Noel-Baker, about the possibility of obtaining naval
assistance in the event of civil unrest. Infonning Hall that Altlee had approved of the
idea, Noel-Baker requested a naval presence in Newfoundland waters, ~jf only because
the safety of the Governor and Commissioners may come into question.... ~110 On his
return to Newfoundland, Macdonald remained haunted by ,he spectre of civil disorder,
and discussed the matter with Walsh. They decided that the -the future is uncertainM , and
in a leiter to Machtig agreed
... that it would be advisable to have say within a day'S sailing of St. John's a
Cruiser or a Destroyer on Friday night July 23rd. We should need to know how
," Ibid.
III See Macdonald, N~oundllJndat the Crossroads, p, 76,
," This is evident in PRO DO 3513461. For. dmft oflbe glJvemor's stalemenl which would have been
made hid re:lponlibillgovernmenl been relurned lee '?AC KG 2-18, Vol. 129, N-18, 1943, file: June-July,
enclosed in M.H. We..,bofloSecrelary ofSUle for £:O:lernal Affain, 1 July 1943.
'XI PRO PREM 8/1043, Noel·Balcer 10 Lord Hait, 3 July 1948.
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to contact the ship to inform the Commander, as soon as possible. as to whether
it was necessary for him (0 sail into 51. John's Harbour.
I am sorry Ihat one is unable 10 be more definite, bUI you know the
difficulty, ~specially as the whole matter has to be kepI a lOp secret. m
But Machtig informed them that a naval visit was impossible because the closest naval
vessel would be in San Juan, Puerto Rico, a five and a half-day sail from 51. John's.m
Privately, Macdonald's wife lived in Government House in mortal terror that civil
disobedience would bring hann to her family.1ll When Macdonald wired back his
appreciation that there would be no naval visit that year,IU his dClcmlination must have
been steeled to see' confederation achieve a large enough majority so Ihal eXlernal
intervention would not be required.
Soon after Macdonald left England, the British government decided Ihal after the
voting, Macdonald should submit an objective repmt which cO:lld be used to help decide
on what to do next, and to give the Canadians assistance in reaching a decision.
Instructions to Macdonald were drafted, with the objective being, as one Whitehall civil
servant observed,
to phrase the despatch that the Governor is able to prevent members of the
Commission from imerpret!ng it as either a request or pennisslon for
recommendatjons from them as to the line to be takcn as a result of the
referendum. 11.!
The mles of the game were made and tightly controlled by the Dominions Office and
Gordon Macdonald, and not the Commission. On 13 July, Philip Noel-Baker sclltthe
III fbid.,GordollMacdooaldtoMachtill,13JulyI9411.
I~ fbid., Mlehtig to Gordon Mledonlld, 17 July 1948.
1:1) aerore hi! death, the late Frank W. Grahlffi told tbi! to tbe author IU'Id Wallace Furlon,. n.d.
I,. PRO PREM 811()4), MlCdoGllld to Macbtig, 17 JUly 1948.
1:Ii PRO DO )513460, C.G.L. Syers to Machl!g. 6 July 1948.
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despatch 10 Macdonald, requesting from him that 6 as soon as possible after the full
results of the referendum are known, I should receive from you a full summary of the
results and an appreciation by the Commission of Government of the position in the
Island" .116 Noel-Baker then requested a report on the lotal number of voles polled for
responsible government and confederation, Hwilh percentage indications in relation to (a)
the lotal voters' roll, and (b) the total number of votes cast", as well as an analysis of
the voting in the districts, and "an objective appreciation of the position in the Island as
revealed both at the referendum and during the following days". Macdonald was also to
send this to the British High Commissioner in Canada for communication to the Canadian
authorities. IV In a draft of this despatch, however, Noel-Baker had been much more
urgent and personal. and he wrote that the London meetings were "designed to ensure
so far as possible that you and I were in agreement as 10 the action which will have to
be taken-. 11I
John G. Higgins of the RGL later observed lhat after the governor arrived back,
"immediately things Slarted going" in the confederate campaign. l19 The confederates'
broadcasting campaign was re-opened for the second referendum. and on 5 July Bradley
spoke on the radio. That evening the confederates held a large rally in St. John's at the
eLB Annoury. Sixteen hundred people listened to music by the CLB band, and speeches
by Bradley, Smallwood, Leslie R. Curtis (who had previously signed the Newfoundland
Bar's protest to Britain), Dr, William Robens, Henry Genge, J.P.• Solomon Drodge, and
I'll PRO DO 34/3460, Noel-Bak.er 10 Gordon M-.:donatd, 13 July 1948.
Il'l/bid.
III PRO DO 3513460, draft despatch of Noel-Baker to Gordon 1o.'lacdonald, 121uly 1948.
,~ J.G. Higgins Papen, 3.01.027, Cormipondence I.G. Higgins, Man:b-December 1948, Higgins to
A.G. Al1C11. London, II AUgwJl 1948.
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Frank Brenton,l)!) The confederates had begun a concentrated campaign in SI. John's.
But as Smallwood left the rally I he was mobbed by anti·confederntes, and the mood
turned sour. The Confederate later claimed Ihal Smallwood was simek on the neck, and
that Bradley had to be escorted out of the meeting. III But ci.~spite the rabble-rousing
efforts of the mob which included MO'Keefe and Murphy", two Irish pro-RGL types,lJ:
Smallwood escaped on the roof of a car, which Paul Bridle reported had almost been
overturned, III Putting a triumphant spin on the event, nil! Confederate claimed Ihal 51.
John's was confederate, and that confederation would get a majority in 51. John's on
polling day. The truth may have been different, but impressions were everything.
In addition to purveying news of the rally, The COlifederole became openly
inflammaLOry. In an article entitled "Who Started This Sectarianism?" , the papt:T rc-stated
that "the campaign leading up to June 3rd was a sectarian campaign", and asked and
answered rhetorical questions:
Who whispered around in the Roman Catholic districts the foul lie that
Confederation means Communism?
Not the Confederates.
Who whhpered in those districts that Newfoundland would be nooded
with divorce cases?
Not the Confederates,
Who whispered around that bingo, housie-housie and otheT games of
chance would not be allowed under Confederation?
Not the Confederates.
Who went on the radio and in an anti-Confederate speech read out
statements made by the Lord Bishop of Newfoundland and the Archbishop of 51.
John's?
Not the Confederates.
'~The C()flftderate. 7 July 1948,p. I.
UJ /bld., p. J.
In/bld.,p.l.
III Bridle,Dot:lUllmt:r, p. 92.5, Bridle 10 Secrclary ofSl.lte for External Affairs, 12 July 1948.
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Who compared the recent June 3rd referendum 10 the feC\JnI election in
Italy?
Not the Confederates.
Who plastered offensive anti·Confederate posters on Protestant Churches
and the Orange Hall in 51. John's two Sundays ago?
Not the Confederates.
Who went around 51. John's around Polling Day in a loudspeaker truck
flying the Pink, White, and Green flag, shouting "Don't vote against your flag"?
Not the Confederates.lJ.l
Then readers were rhetorically asked if their Orange Lodges, unions. and churches were
already united with Canadian Lodges, unions, and churches, bow confederation could
mean selling their country,m In another anicle, entitled ~Just Picture It", n,t
Confederate warned outpolt readers that if responsible govemment won, the Irish would
be in power and the country in an uproar:
Cashin would want to be the boss in the Government. He would have Hr. Main,
Ferryland, Placentia·St. Mary's at his back, and he would demand to boss the
Government. He would be backed by O'leary, Doyle and HoUett. l :l6
The RGL-EUP campaign was called Madisgusting game· a filthy, diabolical game", but
with sixty thousand copies of The Confederate being delivered to every comer of the
island, it was a game the Confederates played better than their opponents.
Bradley's speech began the confedernte broadcast series. On 7 1uly the speaker
was Leslie Curtis, and Smallwood spoke the next night. On 10 July, Commissioner
Herman Quinton spoke for confederation "as a private citizen", and was introduced by
Sir Leonard Outerbridge, a former supporter of responsible government, U1 astutely
,,. Tht Conjtdtnm, 7 July 1948, p. l.
tll IbUl., p.I.
,JII lbUl"p. 2.
171 Outerbrldge'••ympathie. were rel.ted in RGLP 3.01.027, J,G. Higgin! Correspondence, March-
December 1948. Hlggin! to A.G, Allen, London, 11 August 1948.
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advertised as Colonel Sir Leonard, D.S.O., LL.B. 1lI Outtlrbridge was Britain
personified, a pillar of the Anglican Cathedral, and the brightest and best of the SOliS of
the Empire. Bridle reported that OUlerbridge spoke on the Christian and British traditions
of Canada, and that his introduction hailed the objectivity which Quinton's Spt:cch would
bring to the campaign, and highlighted Quinton's service in the first World WlIr. IJO
While Bridle thought Quinlon's speech was ·simple in the ex.treme", it signalkd the
Commission's approval ofconfederation, and Outerbridge's introduction lent considerable
legitimacy. Commission!::r Herbert L. Pottle spoke on behalf of confederation the nex.t
evening. 140 Bolh Commissioners' speeches would have been made with the tacit
approval of the govemor, and they were done in an attempt to persuadt:: Commission
voters of the respectability of voting for confederation.
The Commissioners' speeches caused considerable outrage in RGL circles, and
around the island. The conservative Grand Fa{fs Adveniser "demanded that the two be
either removed from office or silencedM , while Currie's Daily News regretted that such
a public scandal had taken place,"l and demanded that Quinton resign. 142 But Tile
Evening Telegram thought that it was for the Commission to detennine whether Quinton
was no longer "capable of exercising his functions" as a Commissioner. 14) Bridle told
". Bridle, DOCl4ntt'IlU, p. 921-5, Bridle 10 Sec:rela'Y of Slale for Exlern.l Mf.i",. 111uly 194R.
Smallwood, "The Sto'Y', BNF, p. 29, noted tll.t lie insisted on seeing Ille speeclles ofOuterbrid&e and tile
conuniuionersbeforelheywerebroadeut.
ll'lbid"p.923.
,«I Bridle, Docurm!nts, p. 925, Bridle to ~relary of State f.lr Exlern.1 Aff.ir!, jJ July 1948; Stacey.
"1000 D.ys", BNF, p. 136.
". For neWSpllper reaction see Geoff C. Knight, "Newfoundland Newspaper Reaclion 10 the
Confederation Issue: 1946-1948" B.A.(Hons.) OilS., Memori.1 University of NewfoundlUld, 1984, p. 71.
"2 Bridle, DoCl4/Mnts, p. 923, Bridle to Sel:retaJY ofSlale for Extern.1 Affairs, 12 July 1948.
IOl Ibid., p. 923.
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Ottawa thai in his broadcast, "Quinton himself said thai. since the Commission of
Government was no longer a possible future (ann of Government for Newfoundland, he
is under no obligalion to remain silent (In political matters".l""
In early July the RGL was much more aggressive in sending speakers outside St.
John's,lU but it was nOI able to counteract the confederate propaganda, and was
disorganized. Mrs. Fanny Ryan Fiander, a welJ·known journalist, writer, and popular
speaker from Harbo~r Grace. 146 campaigned at outdoor meetings, and her appeal was
powerful and strident. But when she claimed that "we'll look after our own babies", il
was, as Judge Billy Browne later observed, fatal.l~1 In a cirtumspection typical of the
RGL's supporters in the legal community, Browne contented himself with being a silent
supporter of the League and seemingly an advisor, even though Smallwood's magisterial
supporters took active parts in the campaign. Browne noted that Cashin and Malcolm
Hollen had already condemned the "baby bonus" as immoral. He thought that this was
a lactical mistake, and encouraged Cashin to state that the scheme would also be possible
under responsible government, but Cashin said "I won't say anyth.ing about it",l.' But
the damage had already been done in other ways. One writer to the League from Change
Islands noted rumours that Smallwood was chartering a boat to canvass the area,1'9 and
'''Ibld.p.m.
'01 For alist of speiken and tbe town, and diSlrict, in which they 'poke, sec RGLP 3.01.003. Minutes
of General Meetingl, Dislrict Speaken.
,.. On Ihis often-forgotten but ~marIc.ble woman, see BertJ'l.lll G. Rigg,. "Fanny Ryan Fiandcr', ENL
l,pp.60-1.
101 Browne. Elghry-follr YMr.J a Nfi'Il{oundlond~r, p. 301.
'''Ibid" p. 301.
,.. Several vessels bid been chartered IIld equipped with loucl~er syslems. See Bridle, Docummls,
p. 924. Bridle '0 Sc:c~tary of Slile for Extental Atfain, 12: luly, 71l~ Sllnday H~rold, 11 July 1948, p.
,.
237
observed that he was "using every diny-lrick conceivable" 10 capture the votes of the
"illiterate and poorest classes":
One woman belonging to here went to the polling booth. She cou:d not read or
write and when asked what (onn she was voting for she said. "Oh, the one who
gives out the money" .150
Another supporter from Clarenville was pleased to see the League advocate "Home Rule"
for Newfoundland, but reported that the sectarian cry had been raised, and Ihat he had
been told by one voter that
...he was going to VOle Confederation. "They says" he said, "if we don '1- we'll
have a Catholec [sic] Government." I said "What odds if we do?" Now they did
circulating in remote places Ihal Crosbie is a Catholic. I had 10 tell a 101 of people
when Alderdyce [sic] led his party Ihat Alderdyce was an Anglican,lll
In Deer Lake, another complained that ~These miserable Confederates try to explain the
vole as a religious one. They deliberalely insult the adherents of one panicular
religion~.U1 The confederates had not only gained support: they had also polarized the
electorate.
Week by week the campaign grew more bitter and murky. Political newspapers
continued to go missing, and were sometimes burnt by those of differing views.m On
I I July, the front cover of Stirling's Sunday Herald blared "POISON PEN LE1TERS~
in huge headlines. The paper noted that "terrible" letters ·of a religious and political
nature~ had been sent to "three clergymen, four Water Street businessmen, the Mayor,
'''' RGLP3.01.02S, COrTC!lpondence O'Leary/ColJill5July.Septembcr 1948, G.T. Far.cy to O'leary,
4 July 1948.
'I' Ibid., M. Pelly, Clarenville, 10 O'L.elry, 8 July 1948. Frederick C. Alderdice wu Prime Miniller
of Newfouodlandin 1928, and from 1932·1934.
'II 'bid., K.R.J. Pro\lllOloO'Leary, 14 Jill)' 1948.
'"ThtSundayHerold, II July 1948, p. I.
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and six other prominent citizens of SI. John's· by an unknown writer on naval
stationery, uc commenting on their political k3nings. The next week, the Huald
claimed thai Mayor Andrew Camell, Mr. E. Collingwood. Mr. C. B~ltt and six «her
citizCJls had rteeivCll the Ietters. IJJ Confederates were also threatened. Smallwood was
taunted by Mayor Carnell. who himself was then acxosted by Gregory Po....er with his
own walking stick and given a good scare. I,. UJce Smallwood and Jamieson, Power
himself received telephone calls during the middle of the night, with gruff voices
threatening 'We're gonna get you, you baslardl"lJ1 AI the end of the first campaign
Smallwood had been given bodyguards in St. John's, and he began wearing a gun,
although Horwood claimed it was never loaded. UI As if in confinnation of The
Herald's nebulous allitude towards the confedcrntes • during the first campaign it had
provided mililani opposition - the II July Herald gave uncritical top billing \0 the
confedelates' scheme of using ·Political Loudspeakers· in its campaign, and printed an
article on this.·" The EUP party line was also mainu.i.ned. but from the changed
content of The Huald it seemed as if the bets were now hedged with Smallwood.
Gordon Bladley later noted tbat in the rlCSl referendum, ·Protestants and
Or.ilngemem had been offended by the way that RomaJI Catholics had ganged up· .110
During the wcdc of 8-14 July, tbe women of tk Loyal Orange Benevolent Associ.ation
''''ibid.• ~'P. I and 5.
IJl11ltSwuJayHeraid,11July 19~,p. 2.
U' Gresor)' J. Power to lhe IUlbor, 27 Januuy 1992.
ill/bid.
IlfHorwood,Joey. pp. 121-2,
Ilt11lrSunda]Hrrald, IIJulyI943,p. 5.I. Hiller. "Bradley· Po!iticaiBiollapby",P. 49.
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held their annual convention al Grand Falls. at which Gordon Bradley was prescot and
proposed a toast.l~l After the convention, Bradley remained in Grand Falls for the
convention of the Grand Lodge,16l which was presided over by Gr,md MaSlllr Cllplllin
Leonard T. Stick, Smallwood's vice-president in Bay Robt:ns. l6J Stick had just rclunlcd
from Hamilton, Ontario, where he had been raised to the rank of Past Grand Maslt~r of
Sovereign Grand Lodge of British America. a signal honour of Canadian favour and
encouragement which would not have been lost on Newfoundland Orangemen,ll>! On
17 July, Bridle indicated his own close knowledge of the evenb of the convention when
he reponed that ~(he officer who was next in line for the po311ion of Grand Master, lllld
who is said to be a Confederate, has been elected to Ihal office- .165 The previous day,
Chesley Fillier, a small merchanl from Clarkes Beach, had been elected 10 replace
Slick. 166 In Bradley's handwriting, Ihere exists a resolution dated 12 July, Orangemcn's
Day, specifically citing that
...the campaign waged by 11lt Monitor the official organ of the R.e. Church. the
attitude (If its clergyman, the nature of the argumenls used by its adherents, and
above all the records of the polls in the various settlements and districls indicate
clearly an attempt to influence the results of the said referendum upon grounds
~~~:,. ~~16:elation to the various fonns of government submitted 10 the
IfI 1h~ Evming T~I~gram, 3 AugUlit 1948, p. 7.
If>: Horwood, J«y, p. 129, Gwyn, SmDllwood, p, 110 c1.intll that Blldley "rarely acted excepl on
Smallwood's inslructiollll," This WILS not true, but Smallwood WILS probably consulled on Bradley',
activitiesattbeGrand Lodge.
,6) Th~ Ewning T~/~gram, 29 June 1948, p. I.
I" Ibid.. p. I. The article noted 1hal the previous Newfoundlander ftcorded this honour was Prime
Minister Sir Richard Squires, It may have been that through a highly plfted 50uree in the Canadian
government, Smallwood and Bradley arranged Ihis honour for Slick,
,U PAC RG 2.18, Vol. t29, N·18, 1948, file: June-July, Bridle to Scerelary of Slate, 17 July 1945.
I ... Th~ evening T~/~gram, 24 July 1948, p. 3.
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This letter retained the signatures of the movers of the original resolution, Johnson and
Edgecombe, and indicated that the resolution was made ~on behalf of Little Catalina
LodgcM,lfll
Even though the Prince's Theatre on Bell Island had indicated to the RGL thai
politics was prohibited in the Orange Lodge, this dictum seems not to have been followed
at the Grand Falls convention, which saw considerable disagreemenl over the propriety
of the resolution. 169 But on 16 July, Fillier issued a new "Ornnge Letter", which quoted
Bradley's draft and addressed all the Orangemen of Newfoundland,l10 Fillier later
claimed thai he never wrote the letter,171 and Gregory Power said thaI Smallwood
wrote il. III It is likely that Bradley and Slick arranged Fillier's election to the post of
Grand Master in e",.. i1angc for the latter's agreemenl to issue the pre-prepared circular
leiter calling on Olangemen nto use every effort" to bring the Church's activities "to
nought-. m According to Don Jamieson, the lettJr quickly became public, and got into
the hands of Cashin, who ensured it wide distribution in Catholic districts "as evidence
of Orange tacticS".174
While the confederates were busy prompting Olangemen to give confedelation :l
majority, the civil servants were quietlyclafiing more policy. In mid-July, the Dominions
I"/bid.
,.. Diane P. Janes, 'Cbesley Fillier', ENLII, p. 66; Jamieson, No PloctforFools, p, 122.
110 The eopy of Fillier', leuer in lbe Bradley Papcrs beats tllc rollowingbandwriltM note by Bradley:
'scveraleopiesofthisonb.llld.'
171 GnceSparkelitolheautbor, IS January 1992.
m GregoryJ. Power lotbeauthor. 27 January [992.
m For Fillier's [etter see Appendhlll.
". J:'II:licson, "' Saw the Fight', BNF, p. 102.
241
Office sent H.N. Tail to Ollawa to discuss how to deal with a small majority. and 10
solicit Canadian views as to the statements Macdonald would have 10 make depending
on the outcome of the referendum. 17! On 15 July Lesler B. Pearson suggested that if
the majority for confederation were small,
... il might assist in reaching a decision here for a Canadian Ministt:r (e.g. Mr.
Paul Martin) to go 10 SI. John's as soon as possible after lhe reFerendum in order
10 judge for himself the local atmosphere. since so much will depend 011 how the
opponents of confederation, and panicularly the Roman Catholic Church.
reacl. l76
After hearing from Machtig on this, and after discussing this suggestion wilh Alben
Walsh, Macdonald feared that it might not serve any useful purpose. 171 Macdonald had
already been instructed to provide an official report. But the Canadian suggestion was
later to be a most useful tool for convincing a hesitant Mackenzie King to accept union,
and there were other considerations. On 16 July, Pearson told Robertson that the plan
was to avoid making a public statement about a decision to accept a small confedemtc
majority until after the election in Quebec on 28 JulyY' Meanwhile, whomever the
Canadians sent would sound out the willingness of opponents of confederation to enter
the union, and if some of the "leaders of the Responsible Govemment group were to
indicate that, the people having spoken, they were prepared 10 accept the decision, this
might well be an important factor in the decision of the Canadian GovemmLnt".17'I
,1:1 On Tail ill Ottawa see PRO 00 3513460, Commonwealth ReI_tio!IS Office 10 Gordon Macdonald,
11 July 1948.
116 PRO DO 3513459, United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada to Machtil' 15 July 1948.
J7l PRO DO 3513460. Gordon Macdonald to MlChtis, 19 July 1948.
,:II PAC RG 2-18, Vol. 129, N-]8, 1948, file: June-July, Pearson 10 Robenson, 16 July 1948.
"'Jbid.
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While ofnciaJ amngemenls for the aftcnnath of the vote quietly proceeded. the
campaign raged on. The remnants of the EUP used a variety of tactics 10 counler the
conftrlerates. One was particularly intercsr:ing. Crosbie's son John worked for the EUP
at Geoff Stirling's house. listening ·on the radio to all phone calls between
Newfoundland and Canada" in order to "get any information on what the Confederates
were doing... or locate who they were getting their money from",11O The younger
Crosbie later explained that Stirling "had some kind of a gadget fixed up to listen in on
all radio phone calls·, which would have been all long distance calls made to outside the
country.1Il In a real sense, the battle was as much for information which could deliver
political power, as it was for the allegiance of the electorate.
In ils own campaign the RGL avoided the technologically advanced methods of
the EUP. and instead used some of the confederates' campaign tactics, but with varying
success. On 14 July, R.J. Fahey reported from Humbennouth on the west coast that an
RGL meeting had been held in the Orange Hall there, and while the attendance was not
large, the meeting went well and responsible government was favourably received. IU
But the same day, J.T. Cheeseman reported that a League meeting at Twillingate had
been broken up by a small band of confederates. 1o Peter Cashin also used the
emotional appeal ,,'jlh a sectarian twist, but misguidedly. At a Twillingate meeting he
absent·mindedly held up a set of Rosary beads in one hand and an orange in the other.
and asked the crowd to choose between the two. When the audience chose the orange,
'Ill John C. Crosbie, 'A Completely Dominant Persollllity," Coli MtJoey, p, 145.
," Ibid" p, 145. This lIIIIy have been how the Sunday Htrald found out during the first campaign that
the confcdel1llel had made $100 i,· telephone ulls to Ottawa.
,r. ROLP 3.01.025, ColTeSpO(lllence O'LulyfColllnsJuly-5eptembcr 1948, R.J. Fahey 10 CoUinl, 14
July 1948.
II) Ibid., J.T. Cboeteman to CoUim 14 July 1948.
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Cashin recoiled in horror, and then realizing his predicament. aucmptlld an escape. bill
barely left the community unscathed.lIo! On this occasion, Cashin's only error was in
not gauging the sentiment of the community before he spoke. Smallwood WilS also
familiar with the tactic,l" but the confederates always made sure of their audience
before il was used.
During the second campaign. League campaigners Gmce Sparkes, Frances
Holmes. and Major Fred Marshall went 10 hold meetings in the Bonavista-Trinity area.
Sparkes later recalled that Mthe people had been primed with two years wonh of
propaganda of old age pensions and baby bonuses". 111& Every evening before their RGL
meelings, Smallwood's plane would "buzz" the communities overhead. booming oul his
message. At Champney's Easl, the League decided to "let the people beentel1aincd", and
incongruously prefaced their meeting with a movie of the Queen's visit to Africa,
facilitated by an electric generator outside the building. If! When the movie concluded,
Sparkes recalled,
We couldn't make ourselves heard. There was such a noise ofballging, and oh!
A terribly loud noise! We found out it was a crowd of men outside the building,
pounding on the building with slaves... and we found out afterwards that Ibey
were going to cut tbe wire to the movie, but tbey were warned and didn't do it.
We had to close the meeting. lll
Not knowing that Sparkes was at the meeting, a number of years later, one man who was
there told her that be had been paid $5,000 by the confederates to hire men 10 disrupt the
IS< Augustus Hutcbmgs to Ihe author, 8 June 1992. This may have been the Cheeseman muting.
115 Smallwood, I Chose Ca1lDlUJ, p. 312.
'... Grace SpsrlcC! 10 llle author, 15 1l1J!U81)' 1992, and The GaZrIlt, Vol. 24, No. 18 (4 June 1992),
p.12.
Irl Orace Sparkes 10 lht author, IS1anUll)' 199'2.
I"lbld.
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meeting. l19 Harassment of League meetings occurred a number of times on their
speaking tour.
Promises and the distribUlion of confederate largesse had an effect during the
second campaign. Confederate party workers expected to be re-appointed as paid official
agents in exchange for supporting confederation,l90 although the payment of agents was
prohibited by the Referendum Act. 191 One correspondent wrote to Collins that
The Confederates worked every scheme to outwit! [sic] us as the
Confederates "ad payed [sic] agents working in evel)' place. There were two here
and when there were two here how many was there in other places? The way I
see it - it was disgraceful as it looks to me as if these people were payed and
bribed to vOle for Confederation.... Itl
The confederates were not the only group which used patronage. At one point the Chief
Returning Officer told W. Bussey in Port de Grave that widows ~were the right ones to
have the polling booth", because a stipend was awarded for perfonning the function. 19J
But the District Returning Oflicer gave the booth there to one of his relatives. Bussey
told Smallwood that confederate votes would be lost unless the situation was
rectified. 1M but Smallwood explained that he could not interfere. 19.l These episodes
'''Ibid.
''0 Fora request for a pol1ing bootb seeJ.R. Smallwood Papel'3. 1.32.001, Port deGrave, E. Bradbury
/oSmlIllwood, 28 June 1948.
,., 1948 The Referendum Act No.9, Acts oflh~ Honourable Commission OfGo~111l7l<!'nt 1948 (51.
John'.: The King'. Printer. 1948), p. S4.
10: RCiLP 3.01.026, COfTC5pondence Collin5 Sqlt. 1948, W. Hollahan, Soutbem Bay. Bon.vista Bay
toCollin5,undated.
'01 J.R. Smallwood P.pers, 1.32.001. Port de Grave, Pte-Confed., W. Bussey to Smallwood, 3 May
1948.
tOilbld.
'tllbid.. Smallwood to W. B~y. S May 1948.
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illustrate the widespread expectation of political patronage, 31 : it is questionable whether
the "vacation from politics·, which was part of the raison d'ell'e of the Commission, Imd
any effect. The confederation campaigns of 1948 were no different Fro.ll allY olher
campaigns in Newloondland history, and Newfoundlanders' expectations of their
politicians in 1948 had nol changed substantially from the 1920s or 1930s.
Despite confederate dominance in some campaign practices. the Le.1gue continued
on the warpath, When the 15 July Independem appeared, it claimed that"Al Last We
Know" that Smallwood had vehemently attacked "merchants, lawyers, millionaires, and
old time politicians", but that he had now attracted Water Street merchant Arthur S.
Monroe, millionaire merchant Sir Leonard Outerbridge, Leslie R. Curtis, and especially
"old-time politician Herman Quinton".I96 On 17 July, Bridle reponed that during the
previous evening the "painfully aniculate" Jamieson spoke on the radio for economic
union. He castigated Quinton as Commissioner of Public Health and Welfare for
"squandering money- on useless projects, and savaged Commissioner Pottle for his claim
to have voted in the first referendum for confederation, even though he had made a pro-
Commission speech. Jamieson insinuated that Pottle had been bought off, and concluded
that Potlle -must have had a strong reason for espousing confederation-. Bridle also
noted that Crosbie also broadcast an address, but that he "murdered" his delivcry.t97
On the night of 16 July, Gordon Higgins, PresiderJI of the Benevolent Irish
Society in St. John's, addressed members on the confederation issue, and told them that
because they were Catholics it was incumbent upon them to vote for responsible
," Tht/ndqnndtnt, IS/uly 1948, p. 3.
1<rI PAC RG 2-18, Vol. 129, N-IS, 1948, file: June-July, Bridle 10 Secretary of Slate for futcmal
Affairs, 11 July 1948.
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government. 191 But the most impressive event was yet to come. Later that night, the
speech of Mrs. Fanny Ryan Fiander at the League's rally at the ern Annoury was
broadcast. Bridle reponed the press opinion that she delivered an "eloquent expression
of faith and cuurage~ and "aroused the audience (0 a high pitch of enthusiasm" ,1\19 "As
one of those who listened" 10 the broadcast, an impressed Bridle continued.
I can testify that this description of her oratory is in no sense exaggerated. Her
ability to play on sheer emotion is superior 10 thai of the inimitable Major Cashin.
It is perhaps a good thing for Confederation that they are the only ones of their
kind in active politics. 1lXI
At the same meeting, the League attracted other speakers, including the popular Mayor
Andrew Carnell, I.S. Currie, P.E. Outerbridge (Sir Leonard's brother),lOI and the
ardent Grace Sparkes,1m but none were as slirring as Fiander. By the end of the
meeting League supporters were so agilaled that they left and marched on Government
House. Sparkes nOled thai only the plaintive cries of Major Fred Marshall, standing on
top of his car at the gate of the estate prevented the house from being stonned and the
governor lynched. 203
The last week of the campaign saw a variety of activities by all parties. On the
west coast, McEvoy made speeches in Stephenville and St. George's, and gave a public
address for confederation on the radio, introduced by St. John's businessman Don
,. Edward FilzGerald to the allthor, IS May 1992.
,00 PAC RG 2-18. Vol. t29, N-18 1943. file: June·July, Bridle 10 Secretary of Slate for External
Affairs, 17 July 1948.
:.>llbld.
)II Ibid.
XllGl1IceSparkcslothcauthor, 15 July 1992.
:.>llbld.
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C1OUSlon.1OI The last issue of 77lt COllftduare on 16 July cried MBRlnSH UNION ON
TOP· and claimed that -Grand Reports Pour From All Directions". Touting the support
received by Commissioners and various notables, the paper also went around the island.
printing reports on the state of confederation ()(I the nonh-easl, south. aod west coaSlS
by confederate campaign workers Samuel F. Vincent. Philip Fomy, and Charles Ballam.
On the evening of 17 July, fish exporter H.B. Clyde Lake was introduced by Dr. Will
Roberts and gave a radio address on the future of the fishery under conrOOeralion.~
That same evening, Calvert C. Pratt spoke on national radio for responsible
government, stating that he was ·unalterably opposed to voting in favour of
Confederation" because so little was known about how it would work in NewfoundlAnd.
But Pratt, who had been rumoured to be one of McEvoy's confederate supporters,
carefully avoided "burning his bridges·, and simply staled that with the results of lhe
recent referendum, confederation would remain an issue in the future.2Ol> TIle ncltt
morning, The Sunday Herald appeared with tbe headlines ·DIRTY POliTICS·, anti
nebulously claimed that
A politician flees for his life in St. John's....Another is stoned in tbeBurin
Peninsula....A clergyman receives a slanderous letter....A prominent cilizcn
receives a phone call threatening his family....Another is warned to kc:ep his nose
out of politics....and yet another is publicly abused because of his religM>n.)U7
The Herald then observed that father had been set against son, family against neighbour,
and that the whispering campaign was spreading across the country. But unlike its iSSlles
:lIN Bridle, DoctuMnu, p. 942, P.A. Bridle 10 Secrel.lty of Slale for Elttemal Affairs. 21 July 1948;
SW:ey, 'IOOODaYI", BNF, p. 136. Slaeey datea MeE'/oy'uddR!1I uhavin, been ,iven on IS July, whilo
Bridle, Otx'ulMnIS, p. 931, Bridle 10 Scerel.lty of Slate for Elttern.l Aff.il'l, 11 July 1948, nOle<! that
MeEvOY$JlOke 'Jilt nlJht'.
lI» Bridle, DowlMnts. p. 932, Bridle 10 SceR!1a1)' of State for Extem.1 Mf.;I'I, 19 July 1948.
XI' Ibid., p. 934.
101 "I'M Sunday H~ld, 18 July 1948, p. L
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b~fore the first referendum, The Herald carefully avoided slamming the confederates, or
even identifying who was using which campaign methods. It instead satisfied itself by
-demanding" (to use a favourite word of Smallwood's) "that the next 12 days of the
campaign be conducted on a dignified scale, and let us on th~ 23rd of July join
hands.... "l01
On Monday 19 July, Smallwood spoke on the radio,2Cl9 and after dismissing the
issues of taxation and the possible effects of confederation on codfish markets and
exports, proceeded to tell his audience how he had been threatened with hanging, knifing,
and shooting, and had ~n assaulted twice - once by Cashin and once outside the CLB
Annoury - and how the police had to place a guard outside his house at nighr.1lO
Bradley broadcast on Wednesday evening, in what was probably a recording, but he had
been clearly eclipsed by Fanny Ryan Fiander, whom Bridle observed had made a
"strange pilgrimage from obscurity to political fame ft ,211 She had done morning and
evening radio publicity spots for the RGL before returning to Harbour Grace on the
Sunday prior to the vote, at which time she took her leave of politics with a -remarkable
valedictory letter" in the 20 July Daily News, entitled "Over the Top With FaMy",m
Just before the referendum, Smallwood sent out a final letter to the electorate, claiming
that
As soon as we get Confederation in Newfoundland, the Old Age Pension
will be Thirty Dollars ($30) a Month per person, starting at age 70.
lDJ Ibid" pp.l and 22.
»I Thi' must have been a recording, for on the same evening Smallwood atteJ\dcd a confederate rally
a"heClB Armoury.
:10 Bridle, Dorumenls, p. 937, Bridle to SecretaI)' of Stale for EJl,tcmal Affai1'9, 20 lilly 1948.
"'/blJ.. p.9J9.
to: IblJ"pp.9J8-9.
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This will be $30 a month for the husband, and 530 a month for the wife.
A couple will get 560 a month.
Besides the Pension, an old-age pensioner will be allowed to C<1m another
5240 a yt:ar and still get the full Old Age Pension.
We hope you will be sure 10 vOle for Confederatioll on the 22m!. Do 1m!
let anything stop you from voting.
Confederation will put money in your pocket. And prices of what you buy
will be lower.
Be sure to vote for Confederation,11J
This infuriated one RGL supponer on Ihe West Coast, who fulminated: "What do yOll
call this? I call it bribery They have cheated us out of our Responsible Gov'l ... no doubt
all old age pensioners got one- ,2'.
On 20 July the League finally reacted to the speeches of Commissioners Quinton
and Pottle, and sent telegrams to Philip Noel-Baker, the British press, severnl British
MPs, and members of the House of Lords. The League claimed that
The Comm: ;sion of Government has pennitted tWO of ils members to broadcast
strongly partisan speeches in favour of confederation with Canada....We protest
the action of these two Commissioners and the apparent acquiescence of the
Commission of Government and we request your support in obtaining fair play
and assuring that undue or improper pressures will not be allowed unchallenged
to prejudice issue,m
The Commissioners' open advocacy of confederation violated many Newfoundlanders'
sense of fair play, A reply to the telegram was requested, but it did nOI arrive until after
the vote. Noel-Baker confinned the "complete freedom of any citizen to broadcast under
'" RGtP 3.0I.oJ8, Correspondence F.M. O'Leary 1944·1948, enclosed in C. Renouf, St. Dayid's,
loO'Leary, 1 August 1948.
11'1bld.
111 RGLP3.01.018, Correspondence F.M. O'Leary 1944·1948, O'Leary to Nocl·Bakerttul., 20 July
1948.
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the auspices of any of the organizations engag-xl in the Referendum campaign-. and
explained that he saw no grounds for intervention.lit
At the end of the referendum campaign, radio broadcasts for both sides were
extensive. and an all-out campaign was waged. On 20 and 21 July, RGL radio speakers
included Cashin, Crosbie, Charles Hunt, and Raymond Gushue, who at last had gone
public. The confederate speeches of Pottle, Monroe, Quinlon and Outerbridge were re-
broadcast.1I7 Hunt was introduced by R. Gordon Winter I president of the well-
connected impor1ing finn of T. and M. Winter LJd. lIJ While the League concentrated
on 51 John's and its areas of strength, the confederates repealed the pattern of the first
campaign and held another concluding rally althe CLB Armoury on the night of Monday
19 July, and in the following two days Smallwood made the rounds of Conception and
Trinity Bays with a vchicle and the loudspeaker trock, Slaning at Brigus. m
Occasionally he met with some resistance, as in the responsible government stronghold
or Harbour Grace, where he broadcast to the community from across the harbour, while
responsible government supponers leaned on their car homs, trying to drown him
ouLno On the eve of polling day, Bracher Smallwood also visited the Orange Lodges
in Conception Bay -to marshal the pr'O-a)nfcderation voIe-. 221 By Smallwood's own
11. RGLP 3.01.018, ColTeSpOlIlknce, F.M. O'Leary, 194+1948, W. Manllall, Aecing Secretary of
tile Comminion of Govemmeot, to O'I..eaIy, 31 July 1948.
111 Bridle, [)gCllJMlllS, p. 943, Bridle to Secretary of State (or Extemal .... (fain, 22 July 1948; (or 1M
VONF political broaclcut .:lIedule lee W.F. Galpy Papcn, file' 26, Schedule of Political Broadcasts.
". Bridle, [)QnunnllS, Vol II. Part II, p, 1011, Bridle to Secretary of State for External ....ff.irs, 26
Augus11948.
:'·Smallwood. "TheSto",", BNF, p. 31.
::l'lbid.. p.31.
:::. HOUSloollDd Smyth. 7heS4sh Ovroda Worl, p. J.54. Fori Il\Ip of Ihe leoll'lphie locatioaso(thesu
lodges_p.81.
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admission, the second campaign "was a cruel ordeal". and he knew full well that "tile
slightest wrong word might lose us thousands of v()(es~.m His words were words to
live by, and they were a dictum Smallwood enforced. With his "iron dictalOrship" over
the confederate campaigns from sian to finish. it worked.
In tone and content, the second campaign had been quite different from the first.
It was dominated by the confederates' public campaign of sectarianism. which had bt.'Cll
aimed at the conversion of the Commission of Govemment vote, and the decimation uf
the EUP. Towards these ends, the Commission of Government also put forth concerted
efforts, and the sanction of the governor and Commissioners greatly helped the
confederate cause, Smallwood brilliantly used his rival McEvoy to deliver last-minute
"respectable" and influential support for confederation, and then just as brilliantly
prevented him from claiming the credit by pressing the sectarian issue. The Leaguc had
been weak, and was further weakened by the disintegration of the EUP, a part of the rc·
examination of political options in light of the results of the first referendum. But thc
confederates again succeeded in delivering a tight campaign to the outports, one
unmatched by their opponents. With the decisive help of the Canadians aud the
Commission of Government, the results were not surprising.
1%2 Smallwood, I Chos~ CanadtJ, p. 305.
Chapter 8
"The Country's Gone n' We're All Canadians!"l:
Referendum and Result
Even though it rained in Newfoundland on polling day, Thursday 22 July 1948,
in many ways the rambunctiousness of the campaign was reflected in the events and
activities of the day and its aftermath. The confederates had named poll clerks for all
divisions and districts, but in what was perhaps to prove to be their downfall, the RGL
and EUP split the responsibilities for scrutineering juS! as they had divided their
campaign responsibilities, and in many polls they had no representatives. Deputy
returning officers supervised the voting, which proceeded from 8 a.m. until 9 p.m.2
Early that evening the first returns were telephoned aod telegraphed 10 the Chief
Returning Officer, Nehemiah Shon, whose headquarters was the Colonial Building in 51.
John's.J At 4.15 that afternoon, Sir Eric Machtig had sent a telegram to Gordon
Macdonald instructing him that apart from sending an objective analysis of the returns,
he was also to ~keep me and Canadian Government informed at regular intervals by
telegram of voting figures as and when they become available~. 4 The governor spent the
evening busily dashing off telegrams to Downing Street and Ottawa.
For all the riotous political activity which preceded polling day, ti'e day itself
was more quiet than expected. On the whole, Newfoundlanders' reasons for voting the
way they did were multitudinous, and all of them will never be known. But Harold
I Jlmeil A. Mc(Jrathtotheluthor,27Augustl991.
l Sec Acts oflll~ HonourrJbI~ Commission of GovtmJMnl of N~OIlruJIQnd J948 (St. John's: King"
Printer,1948),p.54.
I James A. McGrath to llleauthor, 27 AugUit1991. Only these two metllods ortnumniuing returns
would account ror tile ability or tile government to release tile resuJI.'I over VONF that eveniog.
• PRO DO 35/J46O, Machdg \0 Gordon Macdonald, 4.15 p.rn.. 22 July 1948.
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Horwood later generalized on what happened 10 the ROL and the Catholic Church in Ihl,l
outports in the second JefcJeooum:
Every right thinking Protestant in the country went out and votc..'d again.~t thl,lm.
In the laSilen days we fired off tons of gunpowder and distributed thousands uf
dollars of Union Jacks. The baymen walked and crawled, and went in whl.'CIcI1.1irs
to the polling booths, and gave us a 7.000 majority (78.000 to 71,0(0). The
Queen [sic] had been saved and the Pope sent back to his lair. J
Other evidence survives to indicate more clearly Ihe events or the mood in wille
communities, and why the results were as they were. In Bonne Bay, on the wcst CO;lst
of the island, one woman was struck as she went to vote because she was a confedenlle,~
while in North River, Monsignor Dino's house was pelted with stones.J South-west of
St. John's in Ihe Goulds, anmher confederate was "barred from a job inlhc booth" and
was later "deliberately assaulted on entering the booth" to vOle.' Voting had alway~ been
a tutnultuCM!.s business in Newfoundland, and 1948 was no exception.
There were also a host of electoral irregularities, offlcial and otherwise, evidence
of which the League collected in an anempt to have the Jeferendum declared null and
void, and which were also later reported by confederate correspondents to Smallwood.
In one case, a returning officer took a ballot box from a polling booth and brought it to
an old lady so she could vote.' In Harbour Breton, an RGL supporter reported lhatthc
-highroad booth- reported 80 vote< for confederation when only 8 had been polled, and
put his finger on the problem when he claimed
'Harold Horwood, "t'd Do II AI[ Apin", CQII MtJ~, pp.62·3.
"J.R. Smallwood Papert, [,33.0(11, S.D. Pike, Bonne Bay 10 Smallwood, 2 Febnwy [949.
'Gregol)' J. Power to th author, 27 Janual)' [992.
"J.R. Smallwood Papert, 1.43.002, SI. John's West A-G [949, R. Bowe, Gouldf,to Smallwood, 2'
April 1949.
• J.G. Higgiml Papenl, 3.01.027, Higgins to E.J. Pbelan, 14 Seplembet 1948. The community in which
lhisoccumdwunolidcotified.
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Honestly, I believe Ihis referendum crooked in strong Confederate centres where
illiteracy is great. I may be wrong, but have feeling votes were illegally marked
in stations where poll officials were both Confederates and where no Responsible
GOl/cmmer., agent was present.. .. Cannot understand why Magistrate was not
allowed to open Ballots in my presence as thaI I could check count and compare
with lhal reported by message(s] from various stations. This most undemocratic,
and J vehemently prOiesl conduct and procedure this referendum.... there was
nothing to prevent an ardent Confederate deputy to mark illiterate ballots for
Confederation where we had no agent. III
Illiteracy in the OUlports was a major problem for the League, which had not mounted
as effective a campaign as the confederates, who had more personnel, and who were
r:onsistently vigilant and shepherded the elector.tte. ll As one confederate reported on 7
June, MOn Polling Day [in the first referendum) I acted as Agent for Confederation in
Marystown South Booth I went there to watch the illiterate vOle so I know who to work
on this timeM•ll In then following up on who voted for which options, confederate
campaign workers made their campaign a personal one, and tailored their appeals to
individual electors. From the first referendum, the confederates' campaign workers knew
exactly how the vote stood in smaller communities, and because the RGL lacked polling
workers in the outports, it was powerless to counter this kind of campaigning.
In another instance, RGL agent BiU Cossin in Corner Brook supplied J.G.
Higgins with evidence on electoral fmud in the -...::st coast community of Mclvers in the
Bay of Islands. IJ Higgins observed in reply that
Your information... confinns what many of us think, that there was a good 101
of fraud in connection with the voting, ... You say only six voted for Responsible
'"RGLP3.01.018, Correspondence F.M. O'I..eaty, 1944-1948.G.W. POr1erto O·l...eaiy, 29 July 1948.
" On the correlation between illiteracy levels and voting for responsible government see Appendix III.
lIIitera~y is defined bl"Oadly as the inability to read or write.
"J.R. Smallwood Papen. t.30.00I, Placentia West, J. Brenton to Smallwood, 7 June 1948.
U For evidern:e of thi. information-gatherlnS see ROLP 3.01.027, Correspondence J.G. Higgins,
March·December 1948, Higgins to Co~itl. Comer Brook, 9 September 1948, Illd 13 September 1948.
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Government. If we find out Ihere were fjfl~n or twenty who said thc:y VOh..'d for
Responsible Government then it would look as if the ballot paper was not marked
as direcled. 14
In response to the events in Mcivers, Higgins waxed poetical:
Who is this noble gentleman,
This dapper gay achiever,
This doughty warrior of words,
One Warren J. MacIver?
So Newfoundlanders take your posts
And man your every sration:
MacIvers are abroad today
To force Confederation, 15
Because many voters were illiterate, they had to indicate to a returning officer or a poll
clerk which option they wished to be marked on the ballot. Polls in which there was only
a confederate agent or in which the returning officer was confederate most likely played
the decisive part in delivering the confederale vote, Th~ damag:e which could be done by
an un-scrutinized confederate team running the polling stations and counting the ballots
later became apparent to League campaigner Grace Sparkes. She later observed that a
number of responsible government voters around the island wrote in to the League saying
"we voted for responsinle government, but there were none of our votes counted from
this community",16 As Sparkes recalled, Champney's East was one settlement in which
Ihis occurred, I? But after confederation when this evidence was presented 10
Smallwood's Minister of Justice, Leslie Curtis, it disappeared,l' and was too little, too
late .
.. Ibid.. Higgins to CoSllin, COr:1er Brook, 9 September 1948.
" Ibid., "Rhymes of a Newroundlander", Also see Ibid" Higgin! to COSlliu, 9 September 1948.
16 Grace Sparkes to tile author, ISIanUll)' 199:Z.
If Ibid.
'" Ibid.
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Other discrepancies occurred. In TwiIJingatc and NoIre Dame districts, a
correspondent maintained that at Cottle's Island the confederates told voters that "if they
voted for Responsible Government they were voting for the Roman Catholic Church" t
and that the magistrate there moved several ballot boxes to the residences of confederates
to ensure votes for confederation, because "he didn't want a Catholic to run his
country". t, Funhennore, the magistrate changed officials in another polling booth in
the district, presumably 10 ensure that voters could come under confederate influence. 2o
In St. John's, two ladies visited a number of polling booths around the city and voted a
number of times, and the League obtained a number of sworn affidavits attesting to
this,ll
The confederates had knowledge of a number of instances where influencing and
~instructing the vote K occurred. In the community of Creston, on the Burin Peninsula,
one confederate later wrote,
I myself fought hard for Confederation in fact all the people of this little place
Creston fought hard. I was in the Pool [sic] Room door keeper on July 22nd on
the South Sid.: of Creston & Every Person went through the Secret Room door
I reminded them well to mark there X For confederation. We had 132 voters &
114 [ofthemj marked [their] X for Confederation. So I trunk we done well on the
South Side of Creston.n
Another in Burin acted as polling agent and loaned his truck to the cause. He later
admiut".d ~I done all in my power to force this thing and I am still doing it because I
think it is the best thing for Newfound[and~. n In other small communities like Hopeall,
I' RGLP 3.01.018, Correspondence F.M. O'Leary, 1944-1948, G. Pike to W.S. Pulin, 13 August
1948.
:0 Ihid,
II/Md.....rioU!enclosures.
~ J.R. Smallwood P.pe", 1.30.003, P1f1Cenli. We$l, correspondent to Smallwood, 6 April 1949.
:) J.R. Smallwood Pape", 1.06.001. Burin 1949, S. Moulton to Smallwood, I February 1949.
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Southport, Caplin Cove and Hodge's Cove (Trinity Bay), North Harbour, Odenn, and
St. Joseph's (Placentia Bay), and Campbellton (Notre Dame Bay), voters lalcr reported
to Smallwood their intimate knowledge of who voted for confederation, and who voted
against it. 24 In Harbour Mille, one supponer later noted that game wardcns and fishery
inspe<:lOrs (Commission of Govemment supporters) voted for responsible governmcnt,
while 166 others voted for confederntion.1$ Considerable psychological pressure was
likely placed on outpon voters by outpon confederates either to vote for confederalion
or run the risk of the community being denied patronage. Respected community leaders.
especially teachers, were often openly confedernte, and admitted to influcncing the vole.
One in Hopeall wrote, "I won many Confederate votes both at my home, Grnles Cove,
and where I was last year, Musgravetown. I have been teaching for the past five yelll'S
and have used my influence and ability for the cause of confederation" .16 Evidence of
influence being brought to bear reached its apotheosis in the claim of Fr, J. Ronald lones
of Lourdes, on the Port au Port Peninsula, to Prime Minister Louis SI. Laurent:
I have no hesitation in claiming that it was due principally due to my efforts that
about founeen hundred voters in this area voted for Confederation while less than
four hundred voted for Responsible Gov'\.
Besides this, my W07.:l~ were carried to all pans of the island. ( asked
them to be carried when I spoke Sunday after Sunday to my people.21
l< For in,tances of this see J.R. SmaJlwood Papers, IAS,,»4 (Trinity Nonh M·Z 1949). A. Peddle 10
Smallwood, 5 April 1949; 1.30.(Xl2 (Placentia West A-F 1949), R. Eddy 10 Smallwood, 28 April 1949;
1.30.003 (P1acenlia Wcst G-O 1949). T. Lake to Smallwood. 30 April 1949; 1.30JX14 (Placcntia West P·Z
1949). E. Pierce to SmaJlwood. 2 May 1949, 1.45.()02 (Trinity North A·F 1949), S, Ayery 10 Smallwood,
2 May 1949, llIId J. Drodge to Smallwood, 16 April 1949; 1.46.003 (Trinity South H,P 1949), H. Piercey
to Smallwood, 2S April 1949.
lj l.R. SmaJlwood Papers, 1.12.001, Fortune Bay-Hermitage, R. Baren' 10 Smallwood, 5 February
1949.
:0 tR. Smallwood Papcr1. 1.46.004. Trinity South Q-Z 1949, G. SlaJlsford to S.,....aUwood, 25 April
1949; llso Ibid., 1.45.002, Trinity Nonh A-F 1949, E.R. Fishcr 10 Snv.llwood, 4 April 1949.
2'1 PAC MG 27 L. Vol. 61, N-19-2. Fr. IooelilO 51. Laurent, 9 March 1948.
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In many cases, the motivation to vote for confederation was provided by the close
relationships of the campaign workers with the electorate, and the vote was delivered by
a tight party organization.
When the first resulls became available just after 9 p. m. 21 thai night they were
broadcast nationally on VONF at intervals,19 interspersed with muskal selections. The
whole country held its breath while the caun! proceeded, and the atmosphere was
electric. Responsible government led confederation in the first tel' reported counts. Paul
Bridle laler reported that by 1.10 a.m. the next moming, c.umplclc returns had been
received from 7 of 25 districts, with Labrador returns incomplete, and confederation
stood at 64,160 votes with responsible government at 64,890 votes.w But when the
eleventh count was announced, confederation had overtaken responsible government, and
the latter never recovered its lead.Jl After the eleventh return was broadcast, the disk
jockey played a record, entitled "The Beginning of the End", and the BCN telephone
lines began buzzing with virulent responsible government callers. Jl late that night,
when the results indicated an irreversible trend, young James McGrath made his way
home past the Colonial Building, from the polling station in the General Hospital at
which he had worked. He noticed that like II. national shrine, the Colonial Building was
brilliantly floodlit for some unknown reason, and he later recalled that it gave him a eerie
1II The Daily News, 23 July 1948. p. 3. indicaled lliat the first return Wll!l from the Grace Hospital at
9.03 p.m., with returns of49 for responsible govemmenl and 60 for confederation,but presumably this WlI5
an error. 'ince il would hardly have been possible to OpeD and empty the ballol boxes, count the ballots,
and lelephone lhis to the Colonial Buildingwilhinlhree minutes,rler theJcgal hour for polls 10 close.
:0 See ROLP 3.01.044, Polling, ·Totlll~·Re,ponsiblc-Confcdcration.·
)0 Bridle,D.Jcuflll'nts, p. 944, Bridle lo$ccretlllJ' of Stale, 23 July 1948.
/I IbiJ.. p. 944.
Jl RGLP3.01.02S, CotTe5pondcnce O'Lcary/Collins Ju1y·Septcmber 1948, clippiDgofCanadilll Press
News Service article, 23 July 1948.
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sense that 'something terrible was happening" to his country,JJ Ncar his house, he
slopped to visit a ueighbour, and was met with thcp[aintive cry. "My Jaysus, Jamie, the
Country's gone 11' we're all Canadiansl",l.l
With some polls not yet received from Labrador, the referendulIl results look 11
number of days to be finalized. The final count showed thaI 84.89% of eligible voters
had voted, a drop of 3.47% over the first referendum. Confederation received 78.323
votes, Machlig's "bare majority" of 6,989 votes over the 71,334 votes for responsible
govemment. JJ BUI as'John G. Higgins observed, though confederation received aboul
52 % of the actual vote, Ihis represented less than 43 % of Ihe "total of registered
voters" ,16 The predominantly Roman Catholic districts of 51. lohn's East and West,
Harbour Main-Bell Island, Ferry/and, and Placentia-St. Mary's - [he historic strongholds
against confederation - voted for responsible government, along with the predominantly
Chun:h of England districts of Harbour Grace and Port de Grave, while the remaining
districts. including the Roman Catholic districts of 51. George's-Port au Port and
Placentia West, voted for confederation. Twillingate, which in the first referendum had
voted 42% for Commission of Government and 43% for confederation. voted 75% for
confederation in the second referendum, seemingly confinning the efficacy of the ~British
Union N and the Commissioners' campaign. Responsible government lost support in scycn
districts, and Bonavista South switched from responsible government to confederation.
The Avalon Peninsula had rejected confederation, but the outports and the rest of
Newfoundland had chosen it.
llJlITIesA. McGrath 10 thcaulhor, 27 Augusl 1991.
"/bld.
II See AppeDdixI, Table III.
»RGU'3.01.02S, Correspondence F.M. O'LearyfCollin9Jury.Seplcmber 1948, HiggintlO 1M Edilor,
(jlo~ and Mail, Toronto, 30 July 1948.
Table 8.1
pisposal of Commission of Government Vote 22 July 1948
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Districts where
majority of
Commission Ville
wenllO Confed.
Districts where
majority of
Commission vote
went to R.O.
Districts where
Majority of
Commission vote
was split between
Canfed. and R.O.
While Bay Labrador
Grand Falls
Twillingate
Fogo
Bonavisla North
Bonavista South'"
Trinity North
Burin
Fortune-Hcnnitage
Burgeo·La Poile
Humber
St. Barbe
Trinity Soulh
Carbonear Bay de V
Harbour Grace (R.O.)
Port de Grave (R.O.)
Hr.Main-B.lsl. (R.O.)
51. John's W. (R.O.)
St. lohn's E. (R.O.)
Ferryland (R.O.)
Green Bay
P]acenliaWest
St. George's Pt.Pt.
Plac.-St.M's (R.O.)
'" Bonavista South voted for responsible government on 3 June.
Unless noted by (R.G.), districts vQ(ed predominantly for confederation.
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Responsible government lost support in the south coast Anglican districts of
Fortune-Hennitage and Burgeo-LaPoile, wlli1e con(cdcmtion g<liooo, very likely dlle to
the confederates' "British Union" campaign. Responsible government also loS! support
in the Protestant Conception Bay - Trinity Bay districts (Trinity South, Carbollcar-Bay
de Verde, Harbour Grace, and Pan de Grave), where Smallwood's Orange Lodge rallies
seem 10 have had an effect, and also because a number "r residents were engaged in the
migralury fishery on the labrador. Support for confederation dropped ill Labmdor, while
responsible government gained, which was possibly due to the summertime fishery,
accounling for lhe 119.44% vole turnout. Ferryland $I' N a drop in Ihe responsihle
government vote, and an increase for the confederate vole, and had 104.59% turnout,
possibly because of the summertime fishery in that area, In later years, Jamieson
pondered: -The tantalizing question remains, however, to which there is no answer; was
the {Orange] letter enough to give the Confederate force the splinter thin margin of about
one per cent by which it finally triumphed?-]1 But Smallwood's carefully orchestrated
second campaign employed far more than just one Orange letter, and its sectarian appeal
was ..eliberately aimed at the conversion of the Commission voters. Confedcmtion
claimed the pro-British Commission vote, and with other factors being equal, that was
probably enough to put confederation over the top.
While the district results indicate trends in voting, a number of mysteries remain
about the polling. On 26 July Governor Macdonald reported that 12,927 votes had been
cast for responsible government in St. John's West. JI Two days later he revised Ihis
figure downward by 414 to 12,513 because one ballot box had been counted twiCC. l9
)f Jamieson, '[ S.W the Fight', BNF, p. 103.
)I PRO DO 35/3460. Gordon Macdonald to Noel-Baker, 7 p.m.. 26 July 1948.
" Ibid., Gordon Macdonald to Noel-Baker, I p.m., 281uly 1948.
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But if one ballot box was used for each poll,~ and if there were only about three
hundred voters per pOIl,·1 the governor's explanation would not seem to account for the
revision of the figures. Significantly, supervision of the compilation of the polling results
at the Colonial Building remained the sole prerogative of the governor, Shan, and his
designates, and no evidence exists to indicate that the political panics scnllinized the
gathering and compilation of the resultS. 42 Minor "skulduggery" could have been carried
out with ease, and probably was, but definitive proofof this is lacking. Other events also
remain clouded. Years later, in 1966, the then chief returning officer, G.B. Trickett,
certified that from 191310 1954, all the ballot boxes for ani :iven district were sent to
the returning officer, who opened them and mixed them all together, and ~Thus only the
total vote ... for the district could be obtained".<O But the Referendum Act required
depUly returning officers to submit official statements on poll returns to Short.44 As
well, the Johnson-Edgecombe and Bradley Orange letters implied a knowledge of the
poll-by-poll returns for the first referendum, and the confederates obviously had and used
this information and knew precisely which neighbourhoods in which communities voted
for and against confederation. But this information is missing from the Smallwood and
<Ollwouldbelikelythatal[lhevotenlnonepolJvotcdioooeblll[otbox. For pollingd:visions in St.
John's West see RGLP 3.01.044, Polling. Each poll was comprised of one or two neighbourhoodl, and
certainly had less thllo 414 voters each. Additionally, large divilionlwould most likelyhllve used split
pol1l. with two bal101boll.eS per poll.
'1 SlaCcy, '1000 Days', BNF, p. [36. The Referendum Actlefl the creation of polling divisions to th~
chief retuming officer.
" There WAll no provision in the Referendum Act for scrutinizing the compilation of the results.
" "Prefatory Note' in a.E. Trickell, "Report of the Provincial Elections of the Province of
Newfoundland Covcring the Yean 1949 to 1966 Indusive, Together With Ibe Names of the Personl
E!Cl;ted 10 the National Convention in 1946 and the Resulta of tbe Referendums of 1948", typescript,
Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Queen Elizabeth U Ubl'al)', Memorial UD.ivenity of Newfoundlllld .
.. SeeThe Referendum Acl 1948, and The National Convention Act 1946, parM. 70 and 84, on which
it relies for the provision of the mecbanica ofcooducling the polling.
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Bradley papers.'" :lnd (he official poll-by-poll Slatements are missing from Ill(
Newfoundland provincial archives.... In 1981 IWO acadelllic~ at Memorial University
discovered the returns for Bonavista South Oil the Newfoundl:md provincial archivcs.u
and in 1985 the poll-by-polJ results for Labrador were publishcd.~1 Ir complete poll·by·
polls are found and correlated with documentary and oral sources, there will emerge a
clearer picture of why Newfoundlanders voted as ",hey did.
For better or worse, confederation had narrowly won over responsible government
in the referendum. But this did nol mean that it w-,u a fall accompli. The union of
Newfoundland and Canada would require definitive enunciations of policy and the laking
of action by the Canadians, the Commission, and Ihe British, and it would have to be
accepted by the population, and especially by those who opposed it and voted against it.
The weeks which followed the vote were as crucial as the campaign and the vole ilsclf.
and saw an unprecedented quantity of behind-too-scenes manoeuvring take place in the
final push to put Newfoundland into confederation.
., The Smallwood and B~ley papen conlain no poll-by-poll resulu.
.. On the work of. preview researcher .t findinll this information soe W.bh. Murt! Tho" u Poor
Majorlly. pp. 300-1. Not $lIlprbinJly. then. do Nmoun penist to Ihe pretenl day .bout the rer~rendum
"beinlltigged".
" Sec Mark W. Oraeuer and Mieh.~1 Wallack. 'PartiJalllhip, 5o<:ial StnlclUrc, and Politieal CUIlUfll
in N~wfoundland", unpublished mil., Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Que.en Eli:u.beth II Ubrary,
M~motial Univenity of Newfoundland, 1981, pp. 29 and 40. Th~ author hu been unable to lind _hi.
informatioo'lt the provincial archives.
• Doril Saunokn, "Coofederalioa • Labrador GelS tI,,; Vole". 11ltnl Days Martlt1tle, Vol. 10, No. ]
(Man:h 1985):]8-42.
Chapter 9
"Amid the Fog and Oft the Stonn"l;
The Confederate Ascendancy
and the Dec:line of the League. 1948-1949
With victory althe polls for confederation, the confederates, the British, and the
Canadians lost no lime in giving legal effect to the results. A survey of Newfoundland
political opinion was done immediately following the vote, during which the Roman
Catholic Church virtually abandoned its opposition to confederation, and the Canadian
decision to proceed with confederation was encouraged. The RGL began 10 dissipate in
the wake of its defeat, but remnants ::If the group continued to fight back with a variety
of legal appeals, receiving some assistance from British MPs. But the RGL eventually
abandoned the cause after confederation was realized. During the days and months
following the campaigns, Smallwood eagerly pressed the Canadians for control of the
provincial government of Newfoundland. He received this, and the important right to
dispense patronage, ensuring allegiance to the cause, and forging the acceptance and
initial success of the new political arrangement.
The morning after the referendum, the timing of events and the making of
decisions once again became the prerogative of governments, with help from tbe
confederates, and the process of crafting a constitutional settlement was once again
removed from the realm of public politics and the input of average Newfoundlanders.
Gordon Macdonald wrote Sir Eric Machtig a personal letter, infonning him that
The result of the Referendum wiU give Confederation at least [a} five
thousand majority. Having in mind the campaign that preceded the second
referendum, I consider it a fine achievement.. .
.. .in Iny personal opinion there is only one course for the Canadian
authorities, namely, to accept the decision and to ask for a delegation of
authorised representatives to be appointed, and to state that such a delegation
I RGLP 3.01.027, Correspondence, 1.G. Higgins, MlIl"th-December 1948, in Higgins to A.P. Herbert,
lODecemberl948.
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would be received at an early dale. So rar as you can il\nu~nce the lkcisiol1 I
tillS! you will do so. Quick decision along wilh quick action is hy rar Ihe wisest
course.
...There must be no hesitation on the pan orlhe Canadian 3ulilOritieS. Any
sign whatever of hesilation will be fatal.
You need not refer 10 Ihis communication in any official cOllltllunicatiun
to me,l
Machlig copied Macdonald's leiter to the High Commissioner in Ottawa,.l On 23 July,
Gordon Macdonald wrote to Clemcnt Aulee, and suggested with a certain urgency HUll
.. if you can find an opportunity in your busy life, ... you might have a word
with Noel·Baker 10 urge him to urge the Canadian authorities to cease [sic}lhc
opportunity of bringing about Confederation to do so without delay.
The slightest sign of hesitation on their part can do irreparable hanll.
Quick decision and quick action is the one hope.·
The confederates, the governor, the Commissioners, and Canadian monc}' had dclivered
the vote, and now the initiative was with the Canadians.
In a press release on the afternoon of the 23rd, Mackenzie King simply
acknowledged Ihe events in Newfoundland, and refrained from further comment unlil the
final results were known.' But that morning, King's secretary Jack Pickersgill had been
prepared, and reminded King Ihat Ihe majority for confederation was larger Ihan any the
Liberal party had received in any election since 1921. 6 That night, King's diary recorded
his own preference for Ihe union of Newfoundlaod with Canada "as the logical end to
l PRO DO 35/3460, Gordon Macdonald to Machtig, 23 July 1948.
l PRO DO 3SIJ460, Machlig 10 U.K. High Commissioner in Canadt., 26 July 1948.
• AUlee Papers. Deposil72, folio 217, Gordon Macdonald to AltIce, 2J July 1948.
l Bridle,Dtx:uJMn/$, p. 947, Statement 10 the Prc5S by the Prime Minister, 23 July 1948.
IBridlc,Do~flIS,p.948,foolnole76.
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it",7 and at midnight R.A. MacKay quietly arrived in Newfoundland as the Canadian
obscrvcr. 1
Even before the final results were in orcould be appreciated by Newfoundlanders.
the final push was begun to pilot Newfoundland into the Canadian federation. The day
after the vote, Smallwood, McEvoy, Governor Macdonald, and the Attlee government
turned their energies towards pressuring Ottawa to accept the small majority for
confederation. TIle EUP, which had declined in the second campaign, collapsed, and the
RGL pressed on in ils efforts to halt confederation. When newspaper reports appeared
speculating that Canada would not accept the majority, Smallwood contacted Bridle to
impress upon him the urgency of a Canadian announcement, but Smallwood was told thai
a Canadian decision would be unlikely before the official retums were known.9 The
same day, McEvoy telephoned MacKay to say that Newfoundland ftwould be "very badly
out on a limbft should the Can•. ~ian government tum down the verdict of the people. 1o
According to plan, RA. MacKay would visit the politicians and especially the Church
hierarchy in order to omain their analyses, and detennine if the opposition could accept
confederation.
When the results became known, reactions were mixed. The confederates were
elated, and within days held a victory celebration in the confedernte stronghold of
Victoria, Conception Bay, with Smallwood under the 'watchful eyes of his personal
1 Bridle. DocumtnfY, pp. 947-8, Exlracl from Th~ MOcU/lzie King Record•
• Bridle, D()CII~I1/S. p. 947, MlcKay 10 Bridle. 23 July 1948. l'Iu] Mlrtin did oot come to
Newfoundland, u he was a leadership hopeful for the imminent Liberal Party leadership convention.
• Bridle. Documtnfs, p. 946, Pearson 10 $1. lAu~nl. 23 July 1948.
'0 Ibid" p. 946.
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bodyguards. II But in 51. John's, the mood was "lIgly".11 Th~ RGL was devastated "nd
angry. bUI did nol yet consider itself defeated. Jamieson recalls that as Ihe night wore on
and the trend became known, he was "beyond consolation" ,1.1 and "the older and more
stoic amongst OUT supponers, though bitterly disappointed, were resigned 10 the
outcome. "Z. The next morning at dawn, Crosbie "roared" 10 his workers. "What the
hell's wrong with you? It's nol the end of the world, Let's gel sOllie brc.lkfasl",lS and
Jamieson reportedly headed off on a "three day drunk" ,16
On 24 July Paul Bridle despatched a cursory analysis of the referendum results
to Ottawa, identifying Smallwood as the" Apostle of Confederation", and crediting the
decision for confederation to the promises of the Canadian social welfare 5tatt:. 11 He
deliberntely downplayed religious and class divisions· since these could possibly dampen
Canadian eagerness to proceed with confederation· and claimed that he could Msce no
evidence that anything like a religious cleavage has occurred or is likely to occur". II
Noting that the Roman Catholic Church supported confederation on the west coast, he
thought that "this is one indication of a definite movement away from a division of
political opinion along strictly religious lines·, and that ·reluctant to press further along
the road of sectarianism". in the second campaign the Church did not exert "the effort
II Smallwood, I Chose Co1lQda, p. 314·5.
I: Ibid., p. 315.
IJ JamiC!lon, "' Saw the Fight', BNF, p. 104.
I' Ibid.,p. 104,
"Ibid., p. 104.
II Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 112.
17 Bridle,DoCllmtnts, p. 953, Bridle 10 Socrclary of State for External Arral,.,. 24 July 1948.
II Ibid" p. 953.
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they put forth before June 3rd" ,19 Bridle nOle<! that the EUP "were unable to produce
further evidence to support theiT claims", and that "their campaign was rather drab this
time in comparison with the highly theatrical perfonnance which they put on last
May". n But the RGL was expected to continue the fight, and Bridle claimed that "I
would not be surprised (0 see some of the die-hard advocates of Responsible Government
continuing \(' agitate for its return on constitutional grounds·,ll Two days later, Gordon
Macdonald made his official report to London, and ohserved that
... fishennen and lumbennen supported Confederation and... professional and
commercial classes and miners supported Responsible Government. ... the chief
support for Responsible Government was in St. John's and on the Avalon
Peninsula...
If the poll is examined from the point of view of religious division of the
country it can, we think, be said that the Roman Catholic vote was mainly
Responsible Government and the remaining denominations were divided but
chiefly C'.Jnfederate. l1
Macdonald also added that "Early decision on pari of Canadian authorities is essential.
Any. hint of hesitation on pari of Canada will have an adverse effect on conditions
here",13
In St. John's, R.A. MacKay collected personal evaluations of events from the
confederates, the governor, the Commissioners, and the hierarchy of the Ro;nan Catholic
Church.1• The governor thought that the RGL had "suffered a shattering defeat\ and
'·Ibld" p. 952.
"'Ibld" pp. 951-2.
"Ibid" p. 953.
:: PRO DO 3513460, Gordon Macdonald 10 Noel-Baker, 7.00 p.m., 26 July 1948.
:Jlbld.
:. There are cOllceled in PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 3, Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-
Newfoundland Relalions, General Cornspondcnce. Forthcir partial pUblication see Bridle, Doc:unumts, pp.
981·992.
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advised that a date be chosen for lhe union, suggesling 31 March 1949.~ Macdon.,ld
lold MacKay thaI he would choose two negotialOn from responsible govemnltml t'ilnk$
who would serve ;,m a delegation to Ottawa, although he was not quite sure if the two
he had in mind would accept his offer,H MacKay reponed that
The Governor emphasized that nol to proceed with Confeder-Hion al the preSllnt
time is not only 10 decline 10 accept the decision of the majority of the
Newfoundland people but also broadly speaking to support the Responsible
Government people on the Avalon Peninsula against those favouring
Confederation outside of it. 21
The next day,' MacR:ay further discussed the establishr.aent of political parties, and
confederation with the governor, who reiterated that ~ir Confederation is turned down
now by the Canadian Government, it may never happen in our lime" ,11
MacKay received a similar analysis from McEvoy, Smallwood, Bradley, and
Monroe, whom he met on the evening of 26 July at McEvoy's house. But the topic of
discussion turned to sectarianism, and McEvoy attributed lhe responsible government
vote on the Avalon peninsula 10 1h~Manila,'s stand, and ~a few chance remarks which
the Archbishop was alleged to have !nade", while the confedernte vole on the west coast
was largely attributed 10 the Church.2't Another person present then noted lhat 70. of
lhe vote outside the Avalon Peninsula had gone for confedernlion, and that a number of
people had written the confederates asking whelher the AV'ollon could be polilically
::l PAC MG 30 E 159, Vol. 3, I.C.C.N.R., General Correspon6ene<:, Fint Convel'SlltiOll With
Ci<Jvemorand Commiuionen Willsh and Pottle, 26 July 1948, p. I.
lollbid.,p. I.
:J Ibld.. p. 2.
::I Ibid., Second ConverSl.tiOll With Govemor and Commissionen Pottle, Quinton and Wal~h, 27 luly
1948,p.2.
2t ibid., Discussion at lie Ruid~_ of Mr. J.B. McEvoy, 26luly 1948, pp. 2·3.
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separated from the rest of the island,JO Bradley observed that the Orange Order "had
turned out 10 a man in favour" of confederation, and thought that it had swung the vOle
in Bonavisla.J1 MacKay noloo that there had been no discussion of divorce and
education at the McEvoy meeting,)1 But when he passed on the opinion that "for
Canada to decline te. accept Newfoundland ...would be to establish minority rule", and
that such a response would precipitate civil disturbances in the outpons.JJ he betrayed
a certain confederate panic that their win would not be confirmed. Perhaps unable to
wait, the next day he telephoned Pearson to press the point that "not to proceed with
Confederation.. would cause great resentment and would be considered by the
Confederation party as disastrous".~
On 27 July, RGL members Cheeseman, Collins, and Hollett were courteous to
MacKay, but emphasized their determination to fight any decision to put Newfoundland
into confederation, and remarked that ~in spite of the best will in the world on the part
of the League it might be difficult to prevent trouble" ." Two days previous, the League
had contacted Mackenzie King. Claiming to represent the 48% who voted for responsible
government, the League observed that the
... confederate majority was unquestionably obtained through use by confederate
asftOCiation of tactics deliberately designed to divide people on class regional and
'llbid.• p. 4. MaeKay did nOI identify the person who said this.
li/bid., Discussion at McEvoy's house, p. 4, and .lso Ibid., MacKay's "Memorandum for the Under·
~retary of Slate for External Aff.irs, 29 July 1948,' p. 2.
nlbid.• p. 4.
"Ibid.• p. 4. It is not known who said this.
)0 PAC RG 2-18. Vol. 129, N-18, 1948. file: June-Jul)', Memorandum for the Prim~ Minister from
Peanon, 27 July 1948.
J. PAC MG 30 E 159. Vol. 3. I.C.C.N.R.. GencBl Cams. Jlld~net:, Talk With Rt'.5ponsible
Gov~mmenl People, 27 Jul)' 1948.
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sectarian grounds with result thai divisions and connicts created thai would
gravely prejudice success of confederation from very beginning. J&
MacKay saw the telegram and challenged its a.s.senions. On 27 July, he lold 51. Laurent
that -In my opinion the views set fonh in the telegram canllQ( be said 10 represent the
present attitude of moSl of the 70,000 people who voted (or Responsible Government-.Jl
He confnued that -there is an element in the Responsible Government movement which
is detennined 10 use every means at its disposal to oppose Confederation-, and observed
that the telegram's assertion that the charges of sectarianism against the confederates
...not only ignores the fact that it was the Responsible Government side which
were Chiefly responsible for Ihis sort of thing but also inexcusably exaggerates the
seriousness of such divisions as exist at present, The only division lhal is of
significance is that between the Avalon Peninsula and the rest of the country.JI
MacKay's assenion that there was a division between the Avalon and the rest of the
island was true, but his other observations about sectarianism were inaccurate, and his
interviews had been primarily with the confederates and thus tempered by their opinions.
Much more evidence existed of confederate ~tarianism than evidence 00 the exploits
of Peter Cashin, or on the anti-confederate sectarian activities of the east coast Churth.
Chief Justice Sir Edward Emerson, a Roman Catholic, told Bridle and MacKay
that the religious vote had been signiftcant, with The Monitor and the archbi!oOOp
influencing the -average unenlightened voter- ,yt but that religion had not. been as
" Bridle, Documents, p. 955. Collillllio MacKmzie Kina, 25 Jllly 19-48.
J1 Bridle, Documents, p. 966, MicKa)' to Secretary of Slate for Elttemll !lfflirs, 21 July 19-48.
IIlbid.,p.961.
It PAC MG 30 E 159. Vol. 3, I.C.C.N.R., Gl:lIcnJ CorTC.llpondm(~, Firat ConvelKtion With Sir
Edward Emcnoo (With Mr. Bridle Alone). 26 July 1948.
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important as the "floating votc-, which was unrelated to religious opimon.40 Emerson
advised them 10 see Archbishop Flynn, to obtain the Church's opinions on what had
transpired. Bm Emerson was preaching 10 the convened, for the Canadian and British
governments had been consistently mindful of the Church's position on confederation.
If its opposition could be placated, reduced, or contained, then confederation could be
proceeded with without fear or recriminations. All that was required was the opportunity.
On 27 July, MacKay mel Flynn and Bishops O'Neill and O'Reilly, who had been
gathered in a retreat. They told MacKay of the Church's fears that wucational funding
would be inadequate, and that to proceed with confederation would funher split the
country. The bishops stressed that confederation was a national and not a religious issue,
because two Catholic districts had voted for confederation.41 MacKay's report presented
other reasons for opposition: Archbishop Roche was old, tired and averse to change; next
to the Crown the Church was the biggest landholder in Newfoundllmd, and feared the
imposition of taxes; the hierarchy disliked the prospect of losing autonomy to the Quebec
hierarchy; and historically, the Irish had ~put over- responsible govemment.41 But
MacKay was also careful to create the impression that the opposition of the Church could
be overcome. He reported that O'Neill and O'Reilly were personally in favour of
confederation, and noted that in the meeting they had to present a common front.
MacKay then concluded that the bishops "appreciated a mistake had been made by open
opposition to confederation", and he claimed that "they would like a face-saving
., Ibid.• Seconl! Conversation with Sir Edward Emerson, p. I. Neither Emerson nor M~cKay defined
what Wall meant by the "n<».ting voto'; presulDlIbly, these we~ the voters who were undecided until the
Illlitminute.
" Ibid.• Talk With Coadjutor Arehbishop Flynn and Bishop O'Reilly and Bishop O'Neill, pp. 1-2.
c Ibid.,pp. 2-3.
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amngement·.~) Significantly, in meeting wilh MacKay. the Church freely showed its
hand and allowed MacKay to put his own interpretation on the event. Apart from a
Monitor editorial which re--statcd the Church's view that confedelOl.lton should have betn
decided between the elected parliaments of Newfoundland and Canada. and a few
rumblings by O'Neill that fall, the ChutC'h essentially abandoned its opposition to
confederation. MacKay's meeting with the bimops gave the Canadians the opportunity
to describe the encounter as a success, which they quickly did.
Wainwright AObott, Ihe American consul general in St. John's, sent a S;'lIllllary
of events to Washington. He thought that "Had it not been for the success of the
Governor in obtaining the aid of the United Church, Ihe Orangemen, 191'0 of the
Commissioners and a few other prominent citizens at Ihe last moment the result would
probably have been different".oW But Abbott was more candia about Smallwood's
prospects for the future:
TIle new men who came out at the last moment reassured the more conservative
voters and cast an aunt. of respectability about the Confederate party which had
been lacking before. Having made use of Smallwood's undoubted organizing and
demagogic talents, these new accessions to Confederation are now faced with tile
problem of how to get rid of him, which they privately stale they wish and intend
to do."
In MacKay's fmal summary to Lester B. Pearson (which the latter referred to Mackenzie
King on 30 July), he concluded that "the Catholic vote in the 51. John's, Belllsiand and
Harix>ur Grace areas was instructed",* and that this had the effect of "stirring up the
Orangemen who conducted a whispering campaign and appear 10 have turned out to a
4) fbitJ.,p. 3•
.. Abbott to Secretary of Stale, Washinglon, 2 Augus11948. cited in Neary, Nurrh Allomlc World, p.
324.
OJlbld., p. 324.
.. Brid.le, OoCllm.mtS, p. 980, MacKay 10 Pearson, 29 July 194!.
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man to support Confederation, especially in the second referendum". 47 While skirting
the issue of who created and ensured the Orange vele, MacKay noted that there had been
a considerable Cat:lOlic confederate vote at Placentia, and thai on the West Coast, three
Catholic priests were confederate workers, and one "presided at Confederation meetings
and Mheckled" at Responsible Government meetings".·' In MacKay'S opinion, religion
had been a dominant factor in the campaigns, and the post-referendum aUi(llde of the
Archdiocese of St. John's would playa major role in delcnnining the settlement which
would be possible. Despite the bitter campaign, MacKay advised that if responsible
government were lo'be restored, confederation would be postponed "indefinitely and
perhaps for everft • Even worse, MacKay pregnantly remarked, "the Confederate leaders
would feel they had been double-crossed and supporters generally that they had been
rebuffed" .•9 The implication was not only that the day must be seized, but that the deal
had been done and could only be completed with the continued sc,-,port of Smallwood and
his band of confederates, who had been intimately involved thus far in Canadian plans
and who would fear betrayal if an answer were not given in the affinnative.
On 27 July the Canadian cabinet mo,,~'d quickly and apnroved the referendum
majority as substantial enough to proceed with confederalion.'o While MacKay's report
on sentiment was being written, the United Kingdom and Canadian govemments
exchanged last-minute views over legal procedures, and the fmal WOrding of the
announcement of the Canadian decision. Gordon Macdonald pressed for both acceptance
"{bid.,p.980,
411 Ibid., p. 9BO•
.. Bridle, Docum~nts, p. 980, MlleKlly 10 Pearson, 29 July 1948.
lO See Bridle, DOOlmtnlS, pp. 964-S, "Memorandum by Department o(Extema! Affail'3," and Exlmet
(rom 11l~ Marh:nzit Kin, Rtrord.
mand simultaneous announcements in Ollawa, Lcndon, and 51. John's." On 29 July thLl
League made a last-ditch appeal 10 Mackenzie King 10 receive a delegation -10 L1.Y befon:
you the considered views of the League in what is regarded to be the be..;t interests of
both Newfoundland and Canada- prior 10 making an announcement.n King replied.
claiming that -the Canadian government has at no time intervened in any way in the
detennination of the procedure to be followed in Newfoundland-, and slaled thai Can.,tIa
would only receive a delegation ·authorized by the duly constituted authorities of
Newfoundland-, n Thai same day the announcement that union wou:1j be proc~~.;d~d with
was agreed upon between Gordon Macdonald and Otlaw~, U and on 31 July the
Canadian, Commission, and United Kingdom governments made their announCell1t:I\IS,
though not without a transgression of the news release embargo by Reuters News
Agency.55 The Canadians welcomed, ·warmly and sincerely, the c:l·:.cision of the people
of Newfoundland", and the British nOied that "the next Slep will be for appointed
Newfoundland representatives to go to Ottawa in order to am.nge for negolialion wilh
representatives of the Canadian Government the final lerms of union".$6 Governor
MacdonaJd announced thai Commissioner Alben Walsh would lead the Ottawa dclegatlon
to negotiate the lenns. In addition 10 Walsh, the group eventually came to consist of
Smallwood, Bradley, McEvoy, Philip Gruchy, Gordon A. Winler (R. Gordon's
confederate son), and Ches Crosbie,n the last of whom accepted appointment afier
J1 Bridle, DDtumtnu, p. 970, Pw10n to Bridle. 28 July 1948.
~ Bridle, Docum.·lIu, p. 972·3, Collinl to M.ckemi~ King, 29 July 1948.
Jl Bridle, Docu_m$, p. 978, M.ckenzie King to Collins, 30 July 1948.
~SeelbiJ.,pp.974-978.
» See PRO DO 3S134S9 for thi•.
,. For the new. releuoa _ Bridle, Dfml_tlls. pp. 993.9911•
.. Bridle, ,''kx.!uMnll, Vol. II, Part II, p. 1007, Minutes of a meeting of the Delegation of
NewfOUlldland. 2S AUfllSI19o'.1. Stllmquenl citation. of Bridle will be 10 this volume uRlen noted.
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consultJtion with the commiltecs of the EUP.loI Charles Hunt and R. Gordon Winler had
been invited to join thedelegalioo, but they declined." 5igniftcantly, the delegalioil was
appointed and not democr.uica.lly eledcd, llld in this respect it was in keeping with
recent BliUsh pl3.Clice in Newfoundland: like the Commission. it was neither
representative of nor answc170ble 10 Newfoundlaooers. While each membtr of the
delegation may hive had every intention to secure the best tenns pos.sibIe for
Newfoundland. in retrospect, the delegation's appointed status placed it in an unequal,
and ultimately poor, bargaining position for securing tenns from Canadian civil servants
and cabinet ministers.
While the Canadians had came to Newfoulldland and measured reaction and
OPPOSilMln 10 the decision, another process of mollifying, assimilating, and muuling
opposition to confederation was begun in the Newfoundland political community. This
was begun and aided by pleas 10 forgive and forget, and the appearance of a surprisingly
conciliatory attitude from some quarters. Three days after the referendum, 1hL Sunday
HtfQld editorialized that -tile YOM:e of the majority is generally l'XtpIed by the minority,
and both majority and minority groups co-operate and wolk together for the comroon
good".'" Then quoting Addison's rejoinder to Cashin, The Huald added: "The old
saying that -God helps those woo help themselves- is still true even under
Confederation-"! AlfTlOSl in oonfinnatioo of the sucteSS of SmaUwood's earlier baiting
of Crosbie, tbe day after The Htrold appeared, Bridle "received a tin from one of the
It Bridle. Docwntms, p. 10111. lelegram of CroJbie to EUP, dtod in Bridle to Secrel&ry of Slale for
EXltmal Arfaitt. 26 AugUJt 194'6.
)I Bridle. DllfllllltntS. p. 1006. Gordon t.bcdonald to Noel-Baker, 14 A~g~51 1948.
to Thr Sunday HtrIlld, editorial of I August 1948, p. 6. quoled ill Bridle. Do~/lll. Vol. II, Part I.
p. 963, MICKay to Sei:~lary of State for Exltmal Affain, 26 July 1948.11 il evidentlhat the 2S July
edirionwiKiuutdbtfORll1lesecood~rtrtDdum,uiICOlll&inedpolilic.alldvertilinl·
.. Bridle, DocwrInlu, Vol. n, Part I, p. 963, TeJegl'&lll 143, MICKay 10 Peanoa., 26 July 194&.
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confederates that Crosbie was disposed to accept [Ihel verdict and might come out
publicly and would like 10 be on [the] delegation to Oltawa".62 Crosbie's conv..:rsion
was important 10 the confederates, the Canadians, and the governor, whose success with
the confederation process would be greatly aided by public support from a lonna
member of the EUP~RGL group. On 28 July, Bridle infonnt.'d MacKay that he had
spoken with Crosbie, who was "obviously bitlerly disappointed by [Ihe) failure of an
effort into which he has pul so much~.6J Yel Crosbie had emphasized that "fur1hcr
postponement of an announcement by the Canadian Government to proceed wilh
Confederation is fraught with danger" ,001 How did Crosbie know Ihat a Canadian
announcement was imminent, and after all the lime and money he· spent on the EliP
campaigns, why was he now encouraging confederation? Compared with the glamour anll
glitz of the first campaign, his relative silence during the second was quite apparent, and
Jamieson recounted how easily he accepted the verdict of the electorale on MUle rnonling
after-. It may have been that recognizing a sinking ship, he accepted Smallwood's
blandishments in exchange for tacit support. His defection to the confederate side further
splintered the already shattered opposition to confederation, and removed the only
popularly-acceptable anti-confederate leader from the responsible government campaign.
The Canadians downplayed the divisions and rancour created by the confederalion
campaigns, and despite the loss and defections of the EUP, the RGL was less than
entirely defeated and bravely pressed on. On 2 August the League executive mel 10
discuss sending its own delegation 10 Ottawa and a meeting with the governor, bUI with
a characteristic legalistic bent, spent the evening making and amending motions to effect
i2 Bridle, DO€U~nlJ', Vol. II, Part I, p. 962, Telegr'llm 142. MacKay 10 Pearson, 26 July 1948.
63 PAC RO 2-18, Vol. 129, N-(S, 1948, file: June-July, Bridle to MacKay. 28luly 1948,
"!bid.
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these ends..s A wee.k latcr, the meeting was devoted 10 reading colTCspondcnce and
moving thai the Drafting Committee draft replies." The same day, Higgins wrote Ted
Henley in Gander, renecling on the Slate of public tension and the Commission's
intolerance of protest:
Between ourselves, we are still fighting although we are doing it very quietly.
GeslaPPO (sic) methods are being employed here. V.D.N.F. has shut off all
political discussions and V.Q.C.M. is being muzzled. Strong pressure h,as been
brought 10 bear on the lancr."
The next day, VONP received an applicatiiJo from Peter Cashin, appealing for broadcast
lime as a fonner minister of the Crown. The stalion manager, William Galgay,
diplomatically replied:
Your application for broadcast lime for the purpose of expressing your
views in connection with the result of the recent national referendum. has been
considered by the governors of the BCN.
I am now instructed 10 infonn you Ihat all pllilical broadcasts and
broadcasts on political matters have been suspended for the present and it is not
possible to place time al your disJXlsal.61
While the League was temporarily rebuffed, Galgay was planning Ihe merger of the
corporation wilh lhe Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. He forecasted -little hope of
success- for the League's efforts, and observed that "nle fact lhat Confederation will be
consummated sometime in March or April of next year is generally acknowledged.......
Disheartened, on 13 August O'leary resigned the League's presiJency, observing
thai while he thought that responsible government should be TCStored, canada and the
"ROLP 3.01.001, &eculjve Minute,. 2 August 1941.
"/biJ., 9 Augu,t 1941.
Of ROLP 3.01.18, COlTe'ponc!ence F.M. O'leary, 1944-1948, Higlin.! 10 Henley, 9 August 1941.
.. W.F. Oalgay P.pel'J, file 121. Oalg.y 10 Cubin, 11 Auglltt 1948.
.. W.F. OalJay l'apcn, file , 16, Oalpy to D. Mansoo. ~jstanl Oenen.l Manager. Canadian
B~u.g Corponlioll, 7 September 1941.
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United Kingdom were determined 10 proceed wilh confederation, and "funhcr action at
this time would not be in the best interesl of the League or lhe country" .70 Wickford
Collins later noteJ Ihat League members felt deeply hurt ovt:r the kind of campaign
waged by the confederates, and observed that the League "had neither the inlention or
the talent to engage in a war of deceit, vilification or ridicule".71 O'leary may have
been correct to resign. There were few avenues of action left open to the League: Ihe
Church had virtually accepted the verdict, radio discussion was muzzled, the COlllmission
of Government was, intent on proceeding with confederation, and the Canadians hild
refused to receive a League delegation and were pushing forthe union. The only avenues
left to the League were to collect evidence of wrongdoing, to make various appeals to
Britain, and 10 attempt to stop confederation in the courts.
Political activities eventually came full circle. RGL lawyer John G, Higgins
recruited Sir Alan P. Herbert, the originator of the idea of the Convention, for British
parliamentary assislance to save Newfoundland from confederation. Higgins passionately
told Herbert that
The story of the manner by which Newfoundland has been railroaded into
Confederation is a sordid one, a contemptible piece of political chicanery,
perpetrated on a simple, honest people by men holding high positions who
apparently forget the primary tenets of public morality...
If Confederation eventually goes through, there will be a blot on English
politics which will never be erased. Everything was done to force ii through. At
the last moment the Commission of Government took an active part for
Confederation and two Commissioners broadcast in favour of it. The Governor
ever since his arrival has been stirring up class haired. His sinister figure has
moved through many situations.n
10 RGLP 3.0t.ol8, Com:.lpoodenee, F.M. O'Leary 1944·1948, O'leary to Collins, 13 AugU5t 1948.
11 Collins, 'League oUlcJJOS!ed', 1h~ E~ning T~ltg'Clm, 28 March 1969, p. 36.
n RGLP 3.01.027, Correspon<knce, J.G. HiUillll, March·December 1948, Higgins 10 A.P. Herbert,
6 AUgUS11948.
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The League estimated that the Orange vote "tumed over at least 5,000 voles which would
lOean in the long run 10,000 that is to say vOles that had gone in favour of Responsible
Govemmerll in the previous referendum" ,7) and Higgins lold Gerald Waring of the
Montreal Sfandard that
The Roman Catholic Monitor suuested that the tenns of Confederation
should be negotiated between two governments. There is no hann in saying that
and it outlines the proper procedure. The Loyal Orange Association held its
Convention a week before the last elections and a disgrnceful Resolution was
passed and this was embodied in a letter from the Grand Master to all Orangemen
in Newfoundland. This is the first time thaI Sectarianism has been shown in this
country for many years. The effect of this letter was noticeable on the votes in
some of the districlS. II tumed a sufficient number of voters to bring about
Confedenltion.ll
Higgins later wrole 10 the Daily News under tile nom-de-plume "Realist" and accused the
confederates of introducing "the red rag of class distinction" 10 win votes, and of
commiuing "the heinous crime of using the highest, the most sacred and Il\Qst personal
of all human ideals and beliefs,- REUGION, 10 attain their goal",15
Like O'Leary, some Ihought it betler to accept the verdict, but forgiveness came
laic to others. On 2 Scplember the League started a petilion demanding the retUrn of
resJXlnsib1e government, which eventually received 50,000 signatures.76 Public reaction
nooded in. In SI. John's, Peter E. Outerbridge, Sir Leonard's brother, wisherl the
petition every succes~butwrote
Illl>id., Higgins to A.G. Allen, London, 11 August 1948. Allenllld Overy were solicilOl'contaeted
by tile laguetolCCurecOUIlSeI forChe laJUe in Englllld. SeeW.1. BfOWDe, Eishry.FourYeal'3,pp.304
llIld:m.
10 RGLP3.01.027.Correspondenec, J.G. HiUins, Mareh-Dccembet 1948, HiUinltoG. Waring, 12
Augusll948.
"J"ki., 'Realill'loEditor. The Doily NnIIS. undated.
'"Nwy,NortItAtIClllricWorld,p.337.
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If you gave a bum on the meet a dollar and went 10 him the next day to try IlJ
get it back, what would be your chances? In this instance lhe bum is the Province
of Quebec and the British Government as represented locally by His Excellency
Sonavabitch Sir Gordon Macdonald. The dollar is Newfoundland which ignor:lllt
and avaricious outporters handed over 10 Canada as a free gift on july 22nd. 77
Others were etlually as vicious, but ofiered analysis and suggestions. "It is apparent yOll
are refraining from holding public meetings because of possible disturbance Ihal lIlay \)1)
created", said another perceptive St. John's resident. "May I offer you a suggestion'!
Order 75,000~ flags and 11.OO.Q h!..a&k .t:liw: 24 X 24 (nice size)
immediately. let the Responsible voters make their own price. send them 10 your outside
agents a1so".71 Even Newfoundlanders abroad were shocked and dismayed. "The
Confederates fought anything but a clean campaign, when men stoop so low as (0 allempl
to divide class against class, and creed against creed in order to gain their ends .... " wrote
one man in New York. "This lasL campaign was so rotten that 1was expecting to hear
of i. being declared null and void-.19 Like some confederales, a number of RGL
supporters also suggested the partition of tlte Avalon Peninsula from Ihe rest or the
Island,ao creating a North American Free State of Avalon on the Irish model.
Still others vented their rage at the confederates' sectarian tactics, and sugg~tcd
various solutions. "Of course it is understood that "Loyal Orangeism" might oppose any
movement for closer business association with the United States", wwte one pro_Er '"'
observer in Tos!ow, Placentia West, "But what has "Loyal Orangeism" ever done for the
11 RGLP:3.01.026, Com:spondence rollins, September 1948, Outerbridgelo RGL,:3 September 19411.
"'[bU., V.I. NUBeniln Collins, 12 Augus11948.
... Ibid., C. Goff, New York, to Collins, 17 Augll5t 19411.
.. See RGLP 3.01.025, Correspondern:c O'Leary/Collins, lu1y-Septe ".. .948, un.igned luppol1m,
Kingwell, Placentia Bay, to Collins, 2 August 1948; 3.01.026 COIn.pomlence Collins Septembc:r 1948.
T Hickey, Toslow, to Collin!, 8 September 1948.
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advancement of the world'!~·' An()(her voter in Musgrave Harbour complained. "both
Com.[mission] and Responsible [government] refused to vole as the Confcdcrn![cl
Leaders had used so much sectarianism bol:h in the Omnge Societ:y & Church & Slate the
few with a bil of intelligence refused to vote with the ignorant and illilcrnlc" .': One
resident of MXk1le Brook, Gambo. wrote Collins thai
If the fight was a square fight we would accepc it in a better sliirit. But it
was only won on Bluff and Deceit. T~lting the people there would be no taxes.
and turning class against class and Smallwood by his Diabolical Schemel' Gol
every Orangeman in the Country to Fight, which disgusts every 5.100 and
intelligent person in the country.... Even in re.ligiolls circles. we see that by a
settlement here about Ten miles away The first referendum it was 85 %
responsible last Time only 35%. That was after Joey started Seclananism. lJ
Enraged with the British treatmenl of the island, one resident of Long Pond, Manuds,
concluded "We have been treated worse than the Indians and now we all know what is
causein& [sic] troubl\: in other Count{r)ys [sicr. 14 But somc analyses were slightly
different_ One resident from East Curling wrote that
The Responsible Government League faikd miserably in their duty to give
the people the facts about Confederation ...
Jn May of this year I wrote Mr. F.M. O'Leary and asked him if he cook!
make arrangements to have meetings where a speaker could address the people
out the Bay of Islands and speak to them in a language they could understand. At
that time the good people out the bay were afraid of Confederation and were
fmding it hard to make up their minds between Responsible and Commission.
Nothing was done about it so the entire Bay of Islands went Confederate.
It RGLP 3.01.026, CorTapondence O'Leary/Collins, September 1948, T. Hickey to Collins, B
September 1948.
II RGLP 3.01.025. Correspondence r.M. O'leary/Collin,. July-Seplember 1948. E.G. Abb!lttto ROL,
26 July 1948.
n Ibid., A.L Pritchett 10 Collin•• 3 AU8UJt 1948.
"Ibid., Mrs. R. Jdfotd 10 RGL, "July·.
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The Responsible Government League were so sure of the second victory
that they just sat back and lost the election."
Because it sent campaign workers out from the city, the League's campaign outside SI.
John's lacked the strength of the confederate campaign, which used residents of
communities to campaign in their own communities. The confederate advantage was
clear; the gospel was spread by familiar faces with intimate knowledge of the views and
aspirations of the people.
On 12 November Higgins, Cashin, and Major Marshall went 10 England to
present the League's petition. They lOCI Herbert, and once Noel-Baker discovered that
they inlel1ded to press Parliament to stop the Newfoundland constitutional process, there
was consternation in Whitehall. On 13 November in Newfoundland, six fonner members
of the House of Assembly issued a writ against the governor and the Commission of
Government, claiming that union could only be legislated by the Parliament of
Newfoundland, not the British parliamem.'II On 18 November, an obviously flustered
Noel-Baker hastily asked for the governor and Commission's views on the petition and
the League's arguments.11 Four days later, he requested views on the advisability of
meeting the delegation, and he told Macdonald to include "an indication of the
approximate political strength in Newfoundland of [the] party represented by [the] present
DelegationM•II Macdonald replied that the Commission found it "difficult to disagree
with the disposition of the SecretaI)' of State to receive the delegation, even though it
ou RGLP3.01.026. Correspondence Collins. September 1948. M.S. Leggo to Collins. I Seplembcr
1948.
... These plainliffswere Hon. J.S. Currie. Han. Frank McNamara. Han. J.V. O'Dea, Caplain w.e.
Winsor, Harold Mitchell. and Judge W.J. Browne. For Ihil period and hi. involllementt in il see Browne.
Eil1hty·Four Years. p. 317. .
~ PANL GN 38/5'3-5-4, file If 14. Responsible GOllemmenl Petition, Noel-Baker to Gordon
Macdonald, 18 NOllember 1948.
.. fbUJ•• Noel-Baker 10 Gordon Macdonald, 22 NOllember 1948.
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means official recognition to an unofficial delegation*." Then. in an attempt 10 discredit
the RGL and the delegation. Macdonald observed thai the Commission was ·unable 10
comment on the r..cthods adopted 10 5(:Cure signatures- on the pt".tition.... Furthennorc.
the Commi.ssion was unable to give
...any reliable escimale of [Ihe} approximate political Slrength in Newfoundland
of [the] party represented by the delegation. It is thought that though now
numericaJly smaller than the Referendum indicated, feeling seems 10 have
intensified since then in some quarters. Cashin is not popular with the modcrnlcs
of the RG group but has a large and vociferous following among the uneducated
classes in St.,John's and the Avalon Peninsula. Crosbie, the leader of the most
potent faction in the campaign for Responsible Government, publicly acceplt:d the
decision of the people in the Referendum and is a member of th~ N~wfoundlnnu
Delegation now at Ottawa.9l
Finally, for good measure and to halt any allegations of collusion that the delegation
might make, Macdonald instructed Noel-Baker that
Members of the Commission wish you to know that they have not hitherto been
consulted on the matters raised in paragraph 6 of the petition and thai they have
throughout assumed that the decision to give the people the choke of
Confedel3tion with Canada was reached, and the method of enabling them to
exercise it was devised, by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.'!
Noel*Baker was thus equipped to deal effectively with Cashin and company. Sir A,P,
Herbert presented the League's petition to the Commons on 23 November, and moved
that the government introduce a bill to restore self-government to Newfoundland.9) Even
.. fbld., GordOlI M.cdolUlld to Noel-Baker, telegmn 26.1, 23 November 1948.
to Ibid., Gordon M.cdonllld to Noel·Baker. unnumbered telegram, 23 November 1948.
91 Ibid., GOrdOlI Maedon.ld to Noel-Baker, telegram 267, 23 November 1949.
O'llbld.,p.l.
9l Bridle, Dtxwmmrs, p. 1342. Roberuonlo Peanoa, 24 November 1948.
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though Herbert had help from len British MPs of all political stripes," the motion died
on the order paper."
When Herbert and the Newfoundlanders mel Noel-Baker in early December, the
latter stated that he had made the decision to add Confederation with Canada to the other
recommendations of the Convemion, and that Ihis had been done ·with [the] full approval
of Cabinet".- He noted that his decision had also been influenced
by the considerable minority in the Convention which had expressed itself in
favour of the people being given a opportunity to vote on the fonn of
Government. To have refused them Ihis opportunity would have been virtually to
disenfranchise Ihem.17
Noel-Baker "strongly" rebuked the delegates for making allegations of misconduct against
Gordon Macdonald, and told them that he would require "detailed wril;!' n evidence" of
wrongdoing, and that he would ~not listen to more rumour~." With no apparent
recourse in England, the delegation arrived back in Newfoundland on 9 December, and
the next night held a mass meeting in 51. John's, which resolved that the Ottawa
delegation be told by the Commission not to sign the teons." After the meeting
concluded around II p.m., many of those present marched to Government House in
protest. Higgins, Marshall, and cashin got the governor out of bed, and presented the
"lbitl.. p.I342.
OJ Neary. Nonh Allantic World. p. 338.
.. PANL ON 38153-5-4, file If 14. Responsible Govemment Petition, Noel-Baker to Gordon
Macdonald. 3 December 1948.
01 Ibid.
"'Ibid.
.. Neary. Mmh AI/antic World. p. 338.
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resolution to himYlil Macdonald, who had feared civil disobedience in St. John'~. met
the Commission the next day, and together they drafted a request for British naval
support. lUI The Commission later decided not to send the telegram. hUI a SL'Crningly
paranoid Gordon Macdonald privately senl it 10 London,lOl
Through the fall the Ottawa delegation negotiated the terms of union, which wcn~
signed OIl 11 December 1948 in the plush Canadian Senate chamher. Clu:s Crosbie
dissented and did not sign, fearful that the terms offererl were not adequate,lQI Only
on 13 December, when confederation was virtually assured, did Justice BriM Dunfield
dismiss the League's court action. After an unsuccessful10cal appeal, the Lc.lgue tinally
appealed its case to the Privy Council. lll4 At the end of 1948, when poetic verse
seemed to be the only useful weapon left in Newfoundland, Higgins sent Herbert an
offering on Noel-Baker's "twisted mentality":
I'll give to you exactly what's your due
(Of every decent cause the mean forsaker):
The curse ~f every honest man on you,
Noel-Baker,
I've Ii'led amid the fog and oft the stann,
~ fear not at any time the calm or blizzard;
But oh! I hate your talk, your face, your fonn,
Ul> Ib.d., p. 338, anll Bridle, Docummrs. p. 1346, Acting High Commiuioner in Newfoundland to
SecretaI}' of Slate fOt ElItemal Mfllin, 10 December 1948.
'01 See Bridle, DocumlnlS, p. 1350, Robertson to Pearson, 30 OecembeT 1948.
'a;I/bid.,p.lJSO.
103 On Crosbie's decision not to sign see JamJC!OIl, ND Piau/or Fools, pp. 140-2.
'00 NealY,NorlhAI/llrllicWorld,p. 311,
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You linrd!'os
Although a zealot, Higgins was not alone in feeling offended. In January, Herbert had
help in London from Lord Sempill, who attempted to press a Newfoundland Liber-uion
Bill through the House of lords, bUI 10 no avail. lot Cashin wrote abusive letters to the
governor, Burchell, and St. Laurent, decrying varioos ·plots- to put Newfoundland into
confederation, and circulated the Johnson/Edgecombe and Fillier Orange Letters as
evidence of wrongdoing, but Ihis was also fruitless. UI'I That spring, the British bill
effecting union was debated and received third reading,JIlI and was given royal assent
on 23 March. In May the League's appeal was finally wilhdrawn. I09
In contrast with the fortunes of the Responsible Government League, the
confederates began enjoying unbridled success from their labours during the referendum
campaigns. From 5 to 7 August, Smallwood and Bradley attended the Canadian Liberal
leadership convention and addressed the delegates. lIo Because Lester B. Pearson
desired a ·well-known and popular Canadian· to fLillhe post of High Commissioner to
.., RGLP:.".OI.o:n,Conupoadence, J.G. Higginll, March-~.r 1~8, Higgins eo AP. Herbert,
JO Oecc.mber 1941. llOIlicllly, at the end of his life ill the Ille 1970s, NoeI·Baker wu Jivm a Papal
Knilhthood for his work lOWatdJ nue;lear disarmameal.
- See Bridle. Docvmma, p. 1366, Robertson eo Pcatsoa, 29 JanUll)' 1949, and p. 1524, Robertson
10 Pearson, 18 Febnwy 19451.
IW See Bridle. Do<vmcIu, p. 1359. footnote 124. U1d PAC MG 26 L. Vol. 61. liIe: N-19·2. variow
lellersby Cuhin.
101 On the progrea of Ihil!lucup Parliamenl, includiDJlbe opposilionsiven 10 tbe bill by Herbert and
Sempill, Re Bridle. DoamttnU, pp. 1544-1559. Higll Commiuioner in GIUI Bri~in 10 Stcrt~ry of Slate
(or:lltlemllAffain,24 Mlrcb 1949.
11>0 On this see w.e. Gilmore. "uw, Constitutional Coover,lion, llld Ihe Uoiooo(New(oundlllld and
Canada," Amditnsis, Vol. 18, No.2 (1989): 111-126. On tbe decline of the wgue see Webb,
"Retponlible Govemment Lu.1'IIl." NFS, Vol. 5, No.2 (Fail 1989): 214-16.
no See Bridle,l>oauncIlS, p, 100). Exlracl From 17lt M4chnzlt Kill, Rtcord, Illld foolnote3. At the
ronvenlioo. Louis St. uurenl WU chosea to replace Mac:kenzie KiDS U party lelder.
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Newfoundland - Bridle lacked the seniority and preslige1ll • Charl~s Burchell was re-
commissioned from Australia. His appointment was effective from 7 September. and hll
arrived triumphant, as he later noted, "to smooth over the details of Confcdernlion".1\~
Whik he had been in Ottawa, Smallwood attempted to consolidate his political holdings
and alienate his enemies. He questioned R.A. MacKay for information on the interim
government in Newfoundland arterconfederalion, threatening that "ifhe and Bradley did
not get control" befcre an election could be called, "Ihe Government here would lose
every seat in Newfoundland".11l He also intimated that he was afraid that McEvoy
would be asked to form a government, anrlthat McEvoy and Crosbie were "teaming
up" ,114 To prevent this, and to ensure that a favourable lieutenant ~ Jvernor would
appoint him as the interim premier, Smallwood and Bradley met wilh SI. Laurent,
Pickersgill, and Brooke Claxton one night in December, and discussed the maller. IU
Smallwood pressed a reluctant Louis S1. laurent to establish a lieutenant governor of
Newfoundland, who would then call on the confederate leader to fonn an administration,
instead of calling an election firSl. I16 Pickersgill later ootoo that "one of the things that
had to be done was to indicate to the new lieutenant governor... that Mr. Smallwood was
the man who in the opinion of the Canadian Government was the appropriate person to
be chosen as Premier", 111 Smallwood seems to have brought the Canadians around to
his way of thinking. By early February his fears had evaporated, and he OOastoo to the
III Bridle, Doc:umm/s, p. 1002. PCllTSOll 10 Secreu.!)' of Su.le for EllIemal Affaira, 3 August 1948.
1Il Kalhryn E. Hayman, 'The OrigiJU and FunClion of the Canadian High Commi$5ioner in
Newfoundland, 194I-t949" (M.A. thesi5, Univeraity llf Western Ontario, 1979), p. 39.
'" Bridle, DoCU/'MnlS, p. 1574, MaeKay 10 Burchell, 18 November 1948.
"'Jbld.• p.1574.
III Sec Bridle, D()("IUMnIS, p. 1580, foolnole 192, and Sl\UllJwood, J Chose Qmada, pp. 381-2.
"6 Sec Smallwood, f Chose Canada, pp. 581-2.
111 Jack W. Pickeragill, "My Part in Newfoundland'5 ConfClkralion", BNF. p. 69.
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media that he would become the first premier of Newfoundland after union, that he
would lead an interim administration, and thaI Sir Leonard Oulerbridge would be named
lieutenant govcrTl(,r. ll •
Respecting the wishes of Governor Macdonald, on 31 March at midnight the
union was consummated. and the next day official ceremonies were accompanied by the
Peace Tower carillon on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, and the crackling of logs in
fireplaces and the ch.iming of the hour of eleven on the stateroom clock in Government
House in 51. John's.lIt less fonnally, 87 year old Mrs. Annie Simms in Roddickton
was joined in spirit by handreds of Newfoundlanders in the ourports in the traditional
greeting of approval of ·dischargin~ a powder gun" to welcome confederation,UO and
nags new on Cape St. George. lll Telegrams and letters of congratulation flooded in
10 Smallwood, including advice from Monsignor Dinn on the future fonunes of the
federal Liberal p3ny in Newfoundland. In But in 51. John's, citizens wore black
annbands. R. Gordon Winler, whose son had signed the Tenns of Umon, lowered the
nag to haIr-staff on the family's beloved Winterholme on Rennie's MiU Road. l1l John
G. Higgins' house on Cochrane 5tteet was bedecked with black flags, and at a number
of places the Pink, White, and Green flew at half mast. Higgins even received a telegram
from a sympathetic Lord Sempill who submitted -that his ExceUency the Archbishop
II. Bridle. lJocrmsnIu, pp. 1514-5. Bu~bellio Secrelary of Stale for Exlernal Affairs. 3 Fcbnwy
1949.
II. For Kl;OunIJ oflheeeremonies _Smallwood, I Chose Canada, pp. 326-9.
I:» For thil see I.R. Smallwood Pipers, 1.48.002, While BIY PostoCOllfcdcnlion A·L
111 I.R, Snallwood Plpen, 1.31.002, SI, Geor8e'l-Port IU Port 1949, I, ComecllO Smallwood, II
April 1949,
II:: I,R. Smallwood Papers, 1.32,002, Port de Gnve 1949, Mflr, M.F. Dinn 10 Smallwood, 1 April
190.
I~GordollWinlcrlOtbc,ulhor,1111Q1l&t)'1992.
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should decree Aprillhe first a holiday of obligation- .l:~ This was not done, but instc:ld.
the De Projlmdls was sung in the packed Roman Catholic Cathedral on I April. which
coindded with the monthly R:ligious feast of -First Friday·. commemorating !he
crucifixion. l1J
Even before 31 March, the date of union. favour and patronage nowoo, although
not without considerable hone trading. From London, counesy of Gordon Macdonald,
the 1949 King's Honours US! for New Year's Day made Alber1 Walsh a Knight
Bachelor, while Dr. Will Roberts wa~ named a Commander of the Order of the British
Empire, and Chief Reluming Officer Nehemiah Shon wa~ named an officer of that
ordrr,l76 During the wint".., Smallwood first expectcdm and Bradley first suggested
(('I Onawa that Sir Leonard Oulcrbridge be named as the new province's lieutenant
govemor. 12I Bradley mcl OUlerbridge and discussed (he matter in early March,nG bUI
St. Laurent instructed Bradley [0 wait until Ihe British parliament had passed all lhe
Newfoundland legislation before -making a dcfinile approach to him-.n° But
Oulerbridge had no intention of calling on Smallwood to fonn an interim provincial
no J.G. Hig&illSPapen, 3.01.023, ConapoadcneeJ.G. HiUins 1949·1951, Lord Sempililo Hiaint,
31 Mardi 1949. A "holy dIIy of obliplion" is • dIIy in the church year on which ROfMI Calholia,~
obliplOlttcndcbll1th ltIdbeu Mus.
nl 'The lH Profundis ("Out of the Depths I Cry") js • funenu')' hymn.
I. The EI't1I;"r Telelram, 3 JanlW)' 1949, p. 6. Short's honour wu J;VUI "in recognition of hi.
outstandwiworkaJlma,isllale, and for his ,blc 5Crviccs to Ihe counlry in othcr fields."
In See Bridle, Documents, p. 1580, footnole 192, and p. 1581, Burcllellto Pearson, 5 March 1949.
I. Bridle,Documents, p. 1582, Burchtlllo Petrson, 7 M,rch 1949. Smallwood and Bradley were boIh
"llronilypro·OulerbridJe"(See ibfd., p. 1589, PickengilitoSI. Laurent, n.d.).
Il'I Bridle, l>ocumtnts, pp, 1579-80, Bradley 10 St. Laurent, 4 Mmh 1949.
,. Bridle,~ts, p. 1582,51. Laurent to Bradley, 8 March 1949.
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cabinet, UI and he was reluctant to "make political decisions without direct instructions
from the Govemment",U1 Thus, ostensibly to have someone willing to assume the
responsibility for calling on Smallwood to (ann a government, and to settle and reassure
the archbishop and Bishop O'Neill, and privately to keep Smallwood satisfied and quiet
about the >back-room maneuvering which had and continued to go on, I3J 51. Laurent
arranged that Sir Alben. Walsh would become Newfoundland's first lieutenant governor,
because he was willing to swear in Smallwood as interim prernier. 1l4 With Smallwood
taken care of, several months later, Sir Leonard OuterbridBc was appointed as the second
lieutenant govemor. 1JJ
Smallwood's first bterim cabinet, unlil he won a 27 May 1949 provincial
election, included Commissioners Herman Quinlon and Herbert Pottle, businessman
Gordon A. Winter, Confederate Association supporters W.J. Keough, Phil Forsey,
Charles Ballam, and Sam Hefferton; M.J. Sinnott, and finally Smallwood's lawyer,
Leslie R. Curtis, U6 who seems 10 have finally redeemed the promise of "olher good
'll Bridle.DfIt-'llrn~nlS,p.1582,BurchelltoPearson, 1 March 1949 noted thatOuterbridgetllougllttllat
lie !hould go to Ottawa to diseun 'upon wllom he should call upon to form an Executive Council'. because
of the 'unusual !ituation' in Newfoundland. A1so:ICC Horwood, Jo~, pp. 128-9. Horwood noted Lady
Outerbrid.e·1 dialike for 'that df'elldfulllttle man' Smallwood, and that it was rumoured at the time Illat
Outerbridge would not choose Smallwood u prcmier, and tllUi he wu not offered the Ileutel\llllt·
governorsllip until Smallwood wu in place.
ll> Bridle, Docu/'fU!Tlts, p. 1595, St. Laurent to Burchell, 25 March 1949.
III Pickersglll reported to 51. Laurent that he fe.rcd Ihat 'Sma1lwoodwould leave if we did not go
lIang wilh him." (See Bridle, Docum~nls, p. 1589, Pickersgil1 to St. Laurent, n.d.).
U< See Bridle, DOCWf'U!nls, p. 1583, 51. Laurent to Walsh, 8 March 1949. Brtldley could not accept
Walsh as lieutenant governor and remained biller about Roman Catholic opposition 10 Confederation (See
Bridle, Dorn/'fU!lIfS, pp. 1581-8. J. PickersgililoSI. Laurenl, n.d.). ODSt. Laurent"s affinity to Walsh. and
Walsh's teceptance of Smallwood for premier lee Pickersgill, "My Part", ONF, p. 68 QlId 69.
III Horwood. JMf, pp. 128-9.
11OIbid.,p.141.
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and valuable consideration" extracted from the Kenmount Road pig fanner in October
1945. After Smallwood pressured St. Laurent, Bradley was named Secretary of State in
the federal cabinet,1Jl while Ray Pellen, Alexander Baird, Goorge J. Penney, and Dr.
Vincent Burke became Newfoundland's first senators, III posts which in 1951 were
awarded 10 Calvert C. Pratt, Hennan Quinton, and Comer Brook native Michael
Basha.1)9 Leonard Stick and Thomas Ashboume were laler elected to the House of
Commons. According to Webb, McEvoy was given a $3000 honornriulIl for goorJ and
faithful.;ervice 10 the Convention,l~but this was all the recognition he gal. Smallwood
natly rejected him, and in punishment excluded the "vain" McEvoy from favour because
Jfhis predominantly non-commitlal attitude to lhe confederate cause, and his "damaging"
statement to the Telegram in February 1948.1'1 When Bradley was appointed to Ihe
Senate in 1953, Smallwood campaigned in Bonavista·TwilJingate for Jack Pickcrsgill,
who was elected and re-elected five times until 1967, when he resigned to become
chairman of the Canadian Transport Commission. 141
With the advent of confederation, political and sectarian divisions were maintained
and the anti-confederates became the Progressive Conservative party, Hollett, 1,0,
III Ibid., pp, 142-3. Illld SmllUwood, I Chose Conada, p. 584,
,,. Penney died in December 1949 and Wll5 replaced by Burke,
'" 'Newfoundland Senators since 1949', BNF, pp, 198-199. Sffil\Uwood and Bradley inlimated to
Pickerasill that Ihey thoughllhat Prall wu a 'pirate' and Ihal they wanted nothing to do with him (See
Bridle, DoCUIllOlf$, p, 1.587, PickerssilltoSt, 1.Iurent, n,d,),
1«1 Webb, "Convention', p, 14~'
"1 Jack Pickengi1l reported to St. 1.Iurenl that McEvoy had always been "anti-SlMlIwood" but a
confederate (Sec Bridle, DOCWMnts, p, 1589, Pickel'lgill to St, Laurenl, n.d.), While Senator A,N.
McLean liCcepted the confedcrata' condemnation of McEvoy, C,D, Howe wished to "keep him in the
Liberal camp ifat aU possible." See Bridle, DoctlIMflls, pp. 1560-2, McLean to Howe, 28 March 1948,
and Howe lO Mclean, 29MllfCh 1949.
loQ. Smallwood, I Chost Canada, pp, 501-9.
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Higgins. Frank Fogwill, Leonard Miller, and Ray Fahey were elected to the first
Newfoundland provincial House of Assembly as PCs, and Cashin as an independent,
while sometime anti-confederates Gordon Higgins and William J. Browne were elected
as PC members for SI. John's 10 the House of Commons. While Brad~ey had abandoned
the hope of getting federal Liberals elected in Catholic 51. John's,141 Smallwood made
attempts 10 secure the favour of his previous enemies, but securing Roman Catholic
representation in his provincial cabinets remained a perennial problem. Despite
encouragements thai Myou have the Protestants at your back; now keep the Romans in
their place! M, Smallwood re-established the traditional system ofsectarian representation,
fearing "dire possibilities" if Catholics were not represented in his first cabinet. I~
During the winter of 1949 he approached R.S. Furlong, Allan Fraser, Leo Murphy, and
Dr. J.A. McGrath to join, but all declined. I • J He also approached his old employer
P.M. O'leary, whc on 3 January 1949 wrote Archbishop Roche for advice. Indicating
his misgivings, Roche replied that
... the Catholic people of the country wish only to live and let live - to live in
peace and ... hannony with their fellow countrymen. The monstrous slanders
circulated recently [have put] a great part of the country against them.
notwithstanding, they have not, and never had any desire to dominate the country
and be a menace to their fellow countrymen... .It would be far better for Catholics
to have no representation in the Councils of their country than to do anything that
miglll ap!JC3.r 10 condone bigolry and intolerance, and the creation of religious
animosities against our people, 1016
'41 Sec Bridle, Documellls, p. 1590, Pickcrsgill to 51. LauTl:nt, n.d.
,.. Smallwood, / Chos~ Canada. p. JJ I. This system, u in the days of the Commission ofGovemment
and before, s&w one·third of the poslS in the eivlt service and eabinet filled by Anglicans, one·third by
Methodists, and one-third by Roman Catholics.
,.. R.5. Furlong 10 the lluthor, 20 Janusty 1992; Bridle, Documetlts, p. 1$91, PiekersgilJ 1051.
Laurent, n.d.; snd Smallwood, / Chos~ CtlIrad,'. lIP. 331-2.
,.. Archives oflhe Archdiocese of 51. Jobn'" ArchbishopE.P. RochePapen, Rnche10 0'1...eaiy, D.d.
The lluthor thanks Or. Hsns Rollmann for a copy of Ihis Ittte.r in hh pG'leSsion.
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Needless to say, O'leary also declined Smallwood's offer. W.1. Keough was the only
Roman Catholic in Smallwood's first cabinet. W
On the principle that Catholic districts had to have Catholic members of the
House, and Protestant districts had to have Protestants, Smallwood wooed and did secure
Catholics in his later cabinets, and attempted 10 circumvent hiernrchical opposition. III
He also attempted to secure the support and influence of a number of Roman Cathulic
clergy. Fr. Hinchey in Fortune Harbour, Green Bay, was mlli'~ chaim!an of the rTh1ds
board there,149 and Monsignor Dinn ill North River was also given a say over where
pavement was laid. For the first provincial election, Smallwood campaigned in Ferryl'll\d
by going to church with Greg Power, and greeting priest and people on the church steps
after Mass. In 1951 he commissioned a census of Newfoundland by community and
religious denomination, which was useful for securing district majorities when
constituency boundaries were re-drawnYo In 1953, Smallwood even succeeded in
getting fonner RGL activist Allan Fraser elected to the House of Commons as a Libeml
in the Catholic stronghold of SI. John's East. ISI
For the outport people, confederation meant t'.;e placing of more capital in their
hands than at any other time in their history. Smallwood's appointment and subsequent
election as premier in May 1949 also gave him a stranglehold on political patronage.
Confederate supporters received roads, social welfare, and swamped the er..:twhiie
I" Smallwood, I ChO.ft Canada, p. JJ2.
I. On thil_ Horwood, Joey, pp. 145, and 149.
I" J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.1.5.003, Green Bay I-Z, 1949, 8. Morgan to Smallwood. 7 May 1949.
1)11 See J.R. Smallwood Papers, 4.02.023, Census by Religious Denomination.
III "Election RuuJL!J Since Confederation', BNF, p. 179.
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prophet of confederation with clamouring !Uluests for palronagc and considcrctlion.
Essentially, confederation had been a pact made between Smallwood and his supporters.
He would provide ,he money; they the V()(es. II was a process the outport electorate
underscood p"".:fcetly well. As the postmaster on Brunette Island in Fortune Bay reminded
the new shephl:rd in early May 1949,
We are all glad that Newfoundland is now under Confederation and lhal
you are its Premier, and we sincerely trust that you will see :'lat this Island is
looked after, better than it was when under The Commission of Government. We
have been treated as an Island of people belonging 10 nowhere, every VOlcrvoted
for Confederenuion (sic]. and now they are ready 10 votc for a Liberal
Government. The reason for voting for Confederation and the Liberal Party, as
we are looking forward to be looked after,lSl
Still olhers expected jobs: -I am the man who telegraphed you to act a~ agent in the
Second Referendum", said another,
I considered things were unfair at the fif$l referendum. I received your telegram
authorizing me to act, but the telegram was delayed due to light trouble.
.. .1 have been looking after Bnmene light since 1945, for the same
salary.... t consider that I am entitled to some payment and I know you will agree
with me. IJJ
Another in Trinity Bay expected the promised pay"lent for the referendum agents, and
expected to receive the payment so he coold pay others and perpetuate another
hegemony. I'" And others wanted contracts. After noting that out of eight shopkeepers
in Whitboume, he was the ·Sole Liberal and Sole Confedente~ during the referenda,
II: I.R. Smallwood Papcrl. 1.12.002. Fortune.Hlmnilase. A-e 194\1. E. Ball 10 Smallwood, 8 May
1\149.
OJ' I.R. Smallwood Papcrl, 1.12.005, fortune S.y-HenniQge R-Z 1949. A. While 10 Smallwood, 16
April ;94\1.
". ForbulOllC!lnstUICe oflhiJsee J.1l Smallwood Papcrl, 1.46.003, TrinitySollth H·P 194\1, W.A.
Pollell 10 Smallwoocl, S April 1949.
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another supporter wanted the contract '0 supply the Whitbourne Boys' Home with food
and provisions. '"
The corollary 10 the desire for patronage was the desire to deny the dis~nsalion
of patronage to the enemy. Some voters were vindictive, and repoT1ed all anti-confcdcnlle
activity in their districts to Smallwood. "The customs man here - he sal in his caf and
drove them all 10 the Booth in the two days·, wrote one resident of Aquafonc. "he is all
With Cashin and to hell wilh me now i [sic] Want you to give me sollie Recognition
don't let me down .... • U6 From central Newfoundland came the observation
Those chaps that's on the fire warden job and the relieving officer. Now sirlhey
should have kepi their mouths shul. .. Now sir when you come in power don',
forge! those people. Someone got to bring them to their senses". UJ
From Spaniard's Bay, Smallwood was infonned that the chainnan of the Roads
Committee there spent money "against you in both Referendums". Smallwood was then
advised to change chainnen, and was told that the MBreakwaler at Upper Island Cove WitS
really a stimulant to (the] people of that place" . III Patronage even carried threats of
appeals to higher authorities if not awarded. "Mr. F.G. Bradley is my first Cousin and
J [am] proud I belong to the same family now sir I hope to get this job of relieving
officer here". said Wilfred Bradley, Master of the Lodge and Worshipful Preceptor for
the Royal Black Preceptory in Musgrave Harbour. "I fought for Confederation from start
to finish and use all my influence for your panyM I he continued, MI carried a good
influence for Confederation and I am expecting to get a job for it if I don't it Will be Just
Ul 1.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.46.00). Trinity South H·P 1949, E.G. Peckford to Sm&Jtwood, 6 June
1949.
'" J.R. Small'wood P~;lCrs, 7.01.002, J.R. SmallwoodCorrespondencc 1948, R. Maher to Smallwood,
16 December 1948.
'07 1.R. Smallwood Papers, 7.01.003, 1.R. Smallwood Personal COrmlponden«. J·M 1949, E.
Goodyear to Smallwood, 20 March 1949.
'10 J.R. Smallwood Papm, 1.16.002, H.rbour OIllCC 1949, ·Sol" to Smallwood, 22 ....pril 1949.
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to bad".lJ9 Even for the confederates, confederation came with a price lag. With the
largesse began the complaints, like one from Fox Cove, Placentia West, complaining of
higher prices in the wake of the choice of confederation, but even Ihis was tempered by
news that the returning officer was ~doing his utmost to tum votes- against Smallwood
in the upcoming provincial election,l60 Some, like one writer from Catalina after
confederation, just wanted their own venion of British justice:
What do some people wish 10 lum Ihis country iIlln a "Map of Ireland" 2/3 of
this country are Protestant why not give lI.S a chance.,., Never mind Joey old
man, you carry on keep XQY..I chin up. If some people are trying to work in
n:.J..i.&iQn the I fear there will be trouble,'61
A more temperate Rev, W.B. Perry, United Church minister at Grand Falls, cautioned
Smallwood that if rumours were true that Cashin were being contemplated for the post
of finance minister in the provincial cabinet, il could ~seriously effect the forthcoming
Federal Election in this riding~. 162 In confederate Newfoundland, there was a tacit
understanding that since "the Battle is fought and the Victory won", 16J there was 10 be
no surrender.
With the advent of confederation, opposition died and was removed by the efforts
of the new Smallwood administration, and the Government of Canada. The "Ieaders ft of
Newfoundland had become the confederates, and they replaced the members of the RGL,
who would have led a Newfoundland government if confederation had not come about.
,,. J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.10.002, Fogo A·F 1949. W. Bmllcy to Smallwood, 31 May 1949.
,oo I.R. Smallwood Papen, 1.30.002. Placentia Wcst. P. Anile to Sroallwood, II April 1949.
1'1 J.R. Smallwood Papcl1. 1.45.002, Trinity Nortb A-F . 949, A. Brazill to Smallwood, 14 Junc 1949.
Emphasil included in original document.
III' I.R. Smallwood PapeR, 1.14.005. Grand Fa.ll! a_R. 1949, Rev. W.B. Peny to Smallwood, I lune
1949.
lfJ AI observed in I.R. Sroallwood papcl1. 1.14.005. Grand Falls 1949 a_R. J. Rice, Indian Point, to
Smallwood, 4 April 1949.
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Ironically, the RGL and many of its more prominent supporters had become a
dispossessed colonial leadership, or Kelile K , abandoned in favour ofa new elite which had
been more than willing 10 collaborate with British policy. When the Newfoundland
electorate placed its approving stamp on confederation, it also approved the political
ascendancy of the new elite. Presiding over the new order was the undisputed champion,
Joseph R. Smallwood, who proceeded to role Newfoundland with an iron fist for almost
twenty-three years, and haunt her for even longer. Peter Neary thought that "of all the
players in a complex game" of constitutional positioning and amngemenl in the mid
194Os, the British "remained the best informed and the most c1ever".I64 In light of
Smallwood's engineering of the campaigns, and the settlement he forged out of them,
Neary's observation may be applied equally as well to Smallwood.IO'
'61 Neary, North Atlanlk World, p. 240.
'f) For the ~1l1emellt which emerged (rom the confedcration battlel, lee Peter Neary, "Party Politici
in NewfouDdlaJId, 1949-1911: A Survey and Analysis,· in cdJ. Hiller and Neary, Nn<foundland /II tM
N/IIttemth aIId 1'wmtltth Cmturiu: Essays in InrtrprtUlllon.
Chapter 10
Condusion
The confederation campaigns of 1948 were the most divisive in the history of
Newfoundland. They were the culmination of a long process of policy making by
officials of the British, Canadian and Commission governments, and of political
manoeuvring by Smallwood and Bradley in Ottawa and Newfoundland. Canadian High
Commissioner Charles Burchell, and his successors J.S. Macdonald and Paal Bridle were
intimately involved with Bradley and Smallwood, whose campaigns largely followed their
1946 plans. The confederates ran a tight campaign, with vital infusions of Canadian
funding and infonnation, with dense networks of Sl. John's and Ottawa-based
government officials, with island-wide contacts and supponers, and with the tactical
intervention of Governor Macdonald and the Commissioners.
In contrast to the confederates, the RGL was disorganized and bureaucr:ltic. Its
greatest failures were its inability to forge an alliance with the pro-responsible
government Convention delegates, its ineffectuality during 1947. when it had the golden
opportunity to agitate while the confederates were away in Ottawa, and the surprising
failure of its lawyers to anticipate and take action to counter British policy manoeuvres,
which should have been apparent from the first indications in 1945 that a policy
announcement would be made. By the time of the 1948 campaigns, the confederates had
long since finished planning and were prepared to act once the referendum dates were
known. But the League lost precious time planning, debating policy, and rescuing
wayward members from various stupors when it should have been on the hustings. Its
campaigns were lacklustre, and this was as much a function of the legal bent of the
executive and its perhaps naive reliance on "British justice", as it was of their
conservative-St. John's orientation. While the League's campaign was educated, rational,
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and constitutionally and morally correct, it was -dusty and academic" ,\ and probably too
highbrow for many outport voters. In contrast, the Economic Union Party was fast-
moving and well-organized, and provided much of the impetus and many of the issues
for the responsible government movement. While both parties were tinder-funded
compared with the confederates, responsible government received almost half of the
popular vole in the first referendum. But it was still inadequate 10 halt confederation, and
more voted against responsible government than for it. Aware of political realities if
confederation were 10, succeed, some Water Street merchants convened 10 confederation
during the second campaign. Once the ".sectarian card" was played by the confederates
in the second campaign, both the League and the BUP were unwilling to fight fire with
fire. The EUP fell into decline and was emasculated by the confederates' MBritish Union-
campaign. After :he referendum, the RGL was denied recourse to the Commission and
the Canadians. and had to satisfy itself with making legal claims in Newfoundland and
Britain. In many ways, its last public hurrah came vicariollsly in the pages of the
confederate Evening Telegram of 8 March 1948. two days after Governor Gordon
Macdonald left for England and a baronetcy. "Ennobled- as he was Mwith duty well
perfonned". Macdonald was venerated in an acrostic by the anonymous ftE.A.". Read
vertically, the first letter of each line made up the words "The Bastard".2 Many thought
it an appropriate tribute.
Jeff Webb argued that the case for sectarianism had been over~stated in explaining
why Newfoundlanders voted for or against confederation.3 This may be so. and it may
never be known exactly why everyone voted as they did. But when Commission of
Government was taken off the ballot for the second referendum, the confederates ran "a
I Gwyn, Smallwood, p. 109.
1 J.R. Smallwood, •ACT05tic, Celebrllted', ENL I, p. 3.
J Jeff Webb, 'RespomibleGovemment wgue", NFS, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 1989): 217.
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straight sectarian campaign- from stan 10 finish in an attempt to convert the Commission
vote. and destroy the EUP'.s appeal. The pro-British Commission vOle was captured, and
Protestant districts wert: swept for confederation Aided by Roman Catholic pro-
confederate sectarianism on the West Coast of thl:: island, and some electoral
irregularities, oonfedernlion narrowly succeeded. 11le battles which were fooghl and the
seulemcnl which was forged by the confederates provided the basis • the political
machinery and mythology· to launch Smallwood forth upon the Newfoundland political
scene, and ensure his grasp of power, which lasted for a generation.
Throughout the entire process of policy-making, National Convention and
referenda, and more policy-making, the official attitude and activities of the Roman
Catholic Church were cNcial. J.O. Higgins correctly observed that the Church ..:enainly
had the right to stale its views, but the question remains: when Ihe Church became
openly political, did il play into the hands of the confedet:ltes, who created and openly
exploiled the soclarian issue? The post-eonfederation establishment myth of the
monolithic Roman Catholic Church contributed to the perception thai the Church was
largely responsible for sectarianism, and largely circumvented further analyses of the
nature and role of this faclor in the campaigns. Sectarianism was important, but in later
explanations of what happened it was vaguely defined and was substituled for an analysis
ofconfeder.!.te·Canadian·Cv;.;~issionpoliticalcoUabomtion. The Roman catholic Church
was internally divided. and ironically, the prophecies of Archbishop Roche in 1916 about
the consequences of a divided priesthood seem to have come true. When O'Neill,
O'Reilly. and Flynn met with MacKay just after the referendum, the Roman Catholic
Church essentially abandoned its opposition to confedemtion, with the result that the
remaining responsible government movement was further crippled. Coupled with the
British and Canadian governments' effective stonewalling of the RGL's efforts to halt the
march of evell'~. followoo by the Smallwood government's healing balm of partisan
patronage and equal sec;:lar1an division of all cabinet and civil service posts, the path was
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cleared of major opposition 10 Smallwood and union. With the de:llh of Archbishop
Roche in 1950,lhe mantle of leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in Newfoundland
fell on Patrick J. Skinner, a Newfoundland-born Canadian-trained cleric. In many ways,
confederation saw fOe Irish heritage of Newfoundland independence traded for CUlltlrOiI.
educational, spiritual and iconographic assimilation by North American ways.~ It is
hoped that future studies will funher illuminate the roles of the Roman Clllholic Church
in twentieth-century Newfoundland history.
Viewed almost half a century later, the actual events of the confcdenuion
campaigns have dulled in the memories of Newfoundlanders. Legend has replaced thu
knowledge of and desire for fact, though the Newfoundland consciousness is nOl without
occasional pangs uf postpartum nationalism. In 1948, the Responsible Government
League had its own nationalist mentality, and was a world apart from many of the
oUlports of Newfoundland. Webb Ihoughtthat lhe RGL may have lost when il combined
an inchoate campaign with an appeal to a nationalism which was nun-exi.~tent in and
foreign to the outpurts.' But the League's nationalism was real and did exist outside St.
John's. Furthennore, this alone does not explain why confederation won. The
confederates won in a bitter campaign facilitated with Canadian money, when they
created and played on fears of a relUrn to government dominated by St. John's
merchants, and latterly, the Roman Catholic Church, and appealed to outport
Newfoundlanders' desire fur lX:onomic SlX:urity provided by a "British" nation to the
west. For the British, the transfer of Newfoundland 10 Canadian jurisdiction wanned the
hearts of Whitehall mandarins and ministers, who delighted in the thought of pacifying
the "somewhat squawking baby" with a Canadian social welfare state. In Canada, the
• On the Canadianization of the Newfoundland Church sec Bridle, DOC14lUnls, pp. 1309·10, Robertson
to Pearsoll. 10 August 1948; and 71le Centerwry of the Basillm CAlthedrtlf ofSI. Juhn Ihe Baptlsl, Ed. Rev.
P.l. Kel1lledy (51. John's: Robil))Oll and Company, 1955).
, Webb, "Responsible Govemment League", NFS, Vol. S, No.2 (Pall 1989): 216-7.
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union of Newfoundland with the federation was seen as a triumph of Canadian policy
making, a goo-political "rounding out of the union", and was acclaimed in ministerial
circles as the completion of the nation's manifest destiny. In Newfoundland, Smallwood's
post-eonfederate triump!ialism momentarily prevailed, along with attempts 10 build a
~new Jerusalem". But when the young province bitterly experienced labour unrest,
resettlement, ou(-m'gration, massive unemployment, fumer economic decline, and the
collapse of the fishery, many Newfoundlanders had cause to think again of what had been
lost. and to reassess the "benefits" which accrued to Newfoundland when an appointed
delegation negotiated "Tenns of Union" which substituted Canadian nalionalism and
monthly cheques for Newfoundland's sovereignty and control over its own resources. As
one writer put it most succinctly: ~The Quebeckers say "Je me souviens,· but they do
not remember being a nation. We remember. 06
• Patrick O'Flaherty, Co~ NMr Af Your Peril, (51. lohn't: Brukwaler Preu, 1991), p. 20.
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Appendix I
Comparative Tables of Religious Demography and Referenda Results.
These tables were compiled using the Reports of the Chief Returning Officer
for both referenda (12 and 26 August 1948), and data obtained from the referenda
results (which are also in Bridle, Documents, Vol. II, Part n, pp. 1990·)) 'll'.d the
1945 Newfoundland census. The author thanks Most Rev. R.J. Lahey hI' II:"
compilation, reproduced here.
TABLE I
315
Religious Demography ilnd Votin. Peuentages
oistrici De%.4:~'i";'1 Totst C.E. S.A. ,~ :l:ofvote_.G. l:ofvotepopl'n
'M' el" ".
I/lIltehy 10,745 3221
'"
2163 ... 3741 oro 16.12 63.11 20.17 75.8124.19
Greenhy l,I.e. ....
'" ""
'00 2530
"" "
18.70 60.62 20.78 71.3628.64
GrandFlIlh U.C. 19,454 ]401 ,or, ".. 5521
'"
24.05 40.37 35.59 56.46'1.45
Twlllingete u.c. ..., 1212
." '"
me S003 .42.4' 43.11 14.43 75.Z524.75
,~, U.C. la,On 3500
'"
1138
'50' 3925 50' 25.65 46.81 27.54 61.9338.07
BOI\IvlsUN. C.E. 12,918 4920
"
\310 ZM'
""
.. 11.63 63.S1 24.80 74.4925.51
BOIIIvltuS. C.E- 11,584 4630
·""
", 4194
"
22.93 33.90 '1.16 51.9ll48.10
TrtnltyN. !J.e. 12,80'8 534'
'" '" '" '''' "
19.67 47.93 32.39 65.0'134.91
Trinity $. 10,983 5021 ". ." 1401 '''' "
10.74 47.86 41.40 60.2739.73
C.ebanesr·Boru.C. 12,825 1221
'"
3139
". "" "
6.25 43.36 50.39 52.1147.29
m.
"'" "
1624
" '"
65 5." 30.55 64.16 37.6862.32
8278 3119 ". 1635 50. "" " .... 40.62 52.40 49.0450.9617,549 6015
"
.." 505
'" '"
5.32 12.12 OZ.50 17.4282.58
36,435 9178 27916,815
'"
8107
'"
9.43 24.94 65.63 33.1166.89
st.John'sE.R.C. 28,821 7204 1514,737
'"
5478
'"
10.61 23.5\ 65.87 31.2268.78
Ferryland R.C. 6346
'" ·
.", . , . ,.~ ,.n 90.48 15.4484.56
PIK't·St.Il'sR.C. 9448
'"
,
.m
" '" "
6.10 \5.21
"."
18.4081.61
Pl..:mllsll• ••C. 9653 ,,,. ", 50"
'"
1~89
"
11.51 U.78 39.70 54.8145.19
Burin 10,940 m.
·
3274 ,,~ "'.
"
'.95 78.56 13.51 84.9615.04
11,445 50"
·""
". OZ. , 17.47 63.54 16.99 81.4016.60Burgeo·lsPollC.E. 9,357
"" · " "" "
15.88 74.74 11.38 88.9111.09
SI.Geo's·Pt·PU:. 13,074 2327 2810,122
" '" "
15.93 47.22 ".M 56.73'3.27
'",,", 20,~
"" '" ""
m,
"" '"
20.'3 53.72 25.85 68.7331.27
C.E. ~.. 5220
'" ""
, 21.09 64.32 14.59 78.8021.20
lsbrador C.E. 5525 2391
"
12511162 7.10 81.38 11.52 77.7822.22
K.... : C.E •• ClI....chof EOil.ncr Pent.·Pmlecostsl ..C.oRoman Cstkolic
S.A•• S.I ..stlonAI'eY U.C.·UnltedCkurck Otk.·Olher
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TABLE II
Denominational Pen;entages of Total Population
TOlalPopl'n e.E. R.C. s.~.
lIIiUBay U.C. 10,745 29.9 20.\ ..,
Green Bay U. ~.
.."
.., ,.. 29.4
Grandfalls 19,458 17.5 23.1
Tw\llln!ilate U.C. oe.. 12.7 ,., 23.3 52.3
fogo U.C. 10,071 ".. ,., 11.3 11.6 39.0
BONlvlsUNorth 12,978 31.9 ,., 10.1 15.6 35.8 ..,
t.E. 11,51l4 40.0 , 15.4 ,., M.' ..,
TrinilyNorlh U.C. 12.803 41.7 ,., ,., ... ...
Trlnity$outll t.E. 10,983 45.7 ,., U 12.8 30.9 ..,
CltboMar-Bay de verde U.C. 12,825 '.S ,., S.' H.7 ..,
e.E. 7249 "., ,., 22.4 .., 11.3 ..,
.m 37.1 S.' 19.8 ,., 32.5 ...
Hr.llaln-eell IllandR,C. 17,549 34.3 ,., 56.5 ,., 5.' ..,
36,435 "., ,.. 46.3 ,., 22.3 ,.,
R.C. 28,821 25.0 ,., 51.1 ,.. 19.0 ,..
Ferryland R.C.
""
.., , 97.5 . .., ..,
Pla<entla-SI.Mary'sR.C. ,,,. ,., 92.1 .., ,., ..,
Plleentl.llesl R.C. 'OS, 22.4 '.1 56.0 ,.. 17.5 '.1
U.C. 10,940 "..
, 29.9 14.4 35.0 '.1
Fortune 8. - MlMrllu!ileC.E. 11,445 65.3 , 26.0 ,.. S.S ,
Burll"o-laPolle 9357 ...., , I.' ,., 13.a ..,
St.GeOrlle's·P,auP. 13,074 17.8 .., n.4 '.1 ,., ..,
""."
20,560 35.6 ,.. 30.0 .., 21.1 ..,
~.. 69.5 14.3 ,., 12.1 .
5525 43.3 1.5 10.8 ... 22.6 21.0
321,819 33.16X 2.73X 21.55X 25.15X
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TABLE III
Numbers of voters and Votiog Pernntages in the Referenda
Voting
ResponslbltGOV'1 %ofPopl'n
Dis tric ~ Rtf.' 2
IIhltehy
." 3327
4111 1053 1331 92.2\ 97.\6
GntnBey
'"
",.
'''' '" ".
18.45 72.09
3025 5078
""
4802 109.78 96.U
Twllll"llue 1544 'SO, 2524 m
." 65.99
.~.
""
,m 2438
""
,,,. 74.77 69.66
59' '''' "" 1269 1187 75.78 69.001315 ,~, m.
''''
2530 eo.34 ".~
Trfnltyllorth 2554 1726 1691 76.30 69.37
TrlnltySoulh
'"
"W ~" 1816 ".. 74.15 72.73
Ctrbonur-alYde V.
'" ""
,,~ 2115 18.14
Hubourl>rtce 50' ,~,
'''' "" ""
81.89 11.71
'"
1409
''''
\818 1626 ~." 69.32
Hr.ll.ln-Beltls.
'"
... 1431 ,,,. 6784 ..... 89.61
1874 4958 6193 13,048 12,513 101.50 95.51
'm 3838
""
10,1'52 10,784 100.0S
ferryl.-.d m ,~
'" ""
3353 94.17 104.59
Ptlcentl.-$t.H.ry's313 ,.. 92. 4034 4081 89.96 87.75
PIU01llhWKt
'"
\987
""
1617 ,,~ 74.22 63.71
'"
50" ,,~ "" no "." 04.48
fartunea.HeMllttlge815
'''' ""
...
."
8urlll'O-LIPOUI
"" "" ""
us
'"
19.39 n.oo
SC.Gur,O'I·PIUP1030 30S3 3811
""
Z911 9S.5\ 99.39
._. Z361 6225 1133 ,." 3245 107.84 96.58
SC.Bfrbe
'"
1949 2353
'"
'J> 80.69 79.52
'"
1858
"" '"
,.. 19.11 119.44
22,311 64,066 78,323 69,400 71,334 _VIUG£S:86.36X
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Appendix II
"The Orange Letter"
Clarke's Be.lch
July 16. 1948
Dear Sir and Brother,
As your Grand Master I direct your earnest and loyal atlenlion to the following
important resolution adopted at the recent Session of our Provincial Grand Lodge at
Grand Falls. It requires your Immediate consideration:
"Whereas a referendum on ronns of government (or Newfoundland was held
on the 3rd of June, 1948;
And Whereas the nature of the campaign waged by "The Monitor", the
official organ of the Roman Catholic Church, the attitude of its clergymen, the nature
of the arguments used by its adherents, and above all, the records of the polls in the
various settlemen:s and districts, indicate clearly an attempt to inOuence the resull of
the said Referendum upon grounds having no relation to the merits of the various
ronns of government submitted to the people;
And Whereas this, in the opinion of this Grand Lodge, constitutes an
unwarranted invasion of and an effort to dominate the free right of choice of the
individual elector;
TIlEREFORB BE IT RESOLVED:
~~ nat this Grand Lodge in regular session assembled condemns such efforts at
sectional domination, and warns the Orangemen of Newfoundland of the danger
inherent In all such attempts to Innuenct! the reiult, and calls upon them to use
every effort to bring such attempts to naught."
I cannot too strongly impress upon each member of our Order the
Importanct! of this decision of your Grand Lodge land the necessity for his loyal
co-operation.
Yours fraternally,
Chesley Fillier,
GrandMaster.
Appendix III
Voting Percentages Favouring Responsible Government
by District, 22 July 1948. with Illiteracy Rates.
% Vole for Responsible % of Illiterate Voters
Government in District
Central/Western Newfoundland Districts
WbiteBa)' 24.19 18.7
Grecn BIY 28.64 20.8
Grmd Fan, 43.45 14.2
Twillingalc 24.75 16.9
Fogo 38.07 16.5
Bona'l;slaNorth 25.51 17.7
DonavislaSoulh 48.10 21.1
"i:inilyNorlh 34.91 13.0
Plil<:cnli.West 45.19 23.7
Burin 1S.04 13.9
Fortune-Hennilage 18.60 28.4
Burgeo·uPoilc 11.09 ".7
St,Georgc'sPt.Pt. 43.27 21.9
Humber 31.27 12.8
Sl.Barbe 21.20 26.0
Labrador 22.22 NfA
Av.JonPellinsul.Dislricts
Trinity South 39.73 14.1
Carbonear Bay de V 41.29 9.7
H.rbotJrGrace 62.32 14.5
Port de Grave 50.96 9.'
Hr.Main-B.Isl. 82.58 Il.i:
St. Jolm'.W. 66.89 ...
St.John'IE. 68.18 5.2
Fenyland 84.56 5.8
Placentia·SI.M 81.61 9.8
Source: William Wamtt, •A Methodologic:al Conliden-tion of Some Geogn-phic Alpccts of the
Newfoundlllld Referendum on Confeden-lion With Canada, 1948", CGrJQJum Chographer, Vol. 6
(1955):43.
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